Anaximander wrote a book which was catalogued by the librarians of Alexandria under the title Πέρι Φύσεως--the first of many books so called. It is the first known philosophical work, in fact the first known prose work, in Greek. Of this book only one sentence is extant: "Into that from which beings have their origin they also have their passing away, by necessity; for they render to each other retribution and atonement for their injustice in the order of time." But (...) numerous references from reliable ancient sources enable us to recon- struct, with reasonable certainty, some of the principles of his doctrine. (shrink)

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, a Bengali Brahmin, was born in 1875 at Serampore near Calcutta, one of eight children of an impoverished clerk Educated at Presidency College in Calcutta, he studied under B. N. Seal, who had revived the study of Indian philosophy. He was a brilliant student clearly destined for an academic career, but his unwillingness to appease British administrators prevented his obtaining an appointment commensurate with his ability, and he held a variety of teaching and administrative positions in government (...) colleges. When he reached the retirement age of 55, he was principal of small Hoogly College. After retirement, however, he became professor in the Calcutta post-graduate department, spent two years at the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, and finally became George V Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calcutta. After final retirement in 1938 he lived at Serampore, reading little because of failing sight, but writing a great deal and discussing philosophy with his sons and his many visitors until his death in 1949. (shrink)

"Religions", Mahatma Gandhi once said, "are different roads converging to the same point". But in this stimulating assessment of Christianity, Buddhism, and Vedanta, Professor Burch develops the revolutionary theory that religions, starting from the same point, take divergent roads to different goals incompatible one with the other. Whereas Gandhi asks, "What does it matter that we take different roads so long as we reach the same goal?" Dr. Burch asks, "What does it matter that in taking different roads (...) we reach different goals?" Religions, he maintains, do not have to fight each other because of their differences, or abolish their differences to avoid fighting. He is a firm believer in coexistence for religions. Ecumenicity is good "in so far as it means, on the one hand, cooperation with other faiths in their common concerns of social activities and resistance to irreligion, and on the other hand mutual respect for the other faiths themselves". Dr. Burch argues for the coexistence of three alternative Absolutes: Truth which corresponds to the religion of Hindu Advaita Vedanta, Absolute Freedom which corresponds to Buddhism, and love which corresponds to Christianity. The religious quest requires absolute commitment to one or other of these irreducible alternatives; not to truth and freedom and love, but to truth or freedom or love. In his Foreword, Professor W. Norris Clarke, S.J., of Fordham University, subjects Dr. Burch's theory to the most rigorous critical analysis, but in the end invites each reader to make the effort himself of coming to grips with the author's profound and original challenge. (shrink)

Ghanshamdas Rattanmal Malkani, a Sindhi Kshatriya, was born in 1892 at Hyderabad Sind, and educated at Karachi, where his principal philosophy teacher was T. L. Vaswami. When the Indian Institute of Philosophy was founded in 1916, he was one of the six original fellows chosen to attend it. He soon became its permanent director and, except for two years at Cambridge University, has been there ever since. Since 1926 he has also been editor of the Philosophical Quarterly, which under him (...) has become India's leading philosophical journal. (shrink)

T. R. V. Murti is a Tamil Brahmin. He was born at Madras in 1902, and educated at Trichinopoly Christian College, which he left before graduating to commence five years of Congress Party work. He was in jail five months. In 1925 he came to Benares, where he studied the Sanskrit classics with pandits and gurus. He then completed his undergraduate course at Benares Hindu University, receiving his A.B. and M.A. together in 1929. From 1929 to 1936 he was a (...) fellow at the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner. Here he came under the influence of Professor K. C. Bhattacharya, and was considered to be, among the philosophers at Amalner, the one who best understood the Professor's teaching. In 1936 he returned to Benares Hindu University for advanced study, and later was appointed Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Professor of Indian Civilization and Culture. He has been there since, except for three years on leave as professor of philosophy at Colombo and one year as Spalding Professor of Oriental Religions at Oxford. (shrink)

Analyzes the doctrines of five philosophers of the early Middle Ages: John Scotus Erigena, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Isaac of Stella.

3. The third proposition seems to imply that outside metaphysical analogy there are only different degrees of "univocity." This would mean that things expressed according to the Aristotelian πρὸς ἕν relations, or in Scholastic terminology "analogy of attribution," should be classed as basically "univocal." This seems to be against the traditional usage [[sic-corrected duplicate line/portion of sentence missing]] organism are healthy in a way that is basically univocal, just because the reference in all cases is to one and the same (...) nature, would be to miss the import of this type of metaphysical procedure, as well as to cause confusion in the traditional terminology. Would not the interests of clarity be better served by retaining the basic opposition between the Aristotelian μοναχῶς and πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα? For the latter type I would suggest retaining "equivocal," which goes back to Boethius, who has given the fixed and definite meanings to so much of the traditional terminology. Basically opposed to the "univocal" will be the "equivocal," and under this latter class will come its three main divisions: equivocal by chance, equivocal by proportion, and equivocal by reference. Analogy, then, will be equivocity by proportion, and will be opposed immediately to the other types of equivocity, all of which as a class are opposed to the univocal. (shrink)

John Scotus Erigena.--Anselm of Canterbury.--Peter Abelard.--Bernard of Clairvaux.--Isaac of Stella.--Bibliography (p. [129]-136).

Gaudapada is usually supposed to have lived about 500 A.D. His Karika or Agamasastra, a short work of 215 verses, combines the conciseness of a sutra with the clarity of a commentary, thus avoiding both the unintelligibility characteristic of the Hindu sutras and the interminability characteristic of the commentaries. In the first of the four chapters, which is a commentary on, and usually considered part of, the Mandukya Upanishad, the appearance of the Self in the "three states" of waking and (...) dreaming and sleeping is contrasted with its true being in the "fourth state" beyond duality, various theories of creation are rejected, and the meaning of the mystic syllable Aum is explained. In the second chapter subjectivism is defended, with its consequence that the objects of waking experience, which constitute the world, are no more real than fairyland or the objects of dreams; really there is no creation and no destruction of things, no bondage and no liberation of the Self. In the third chapter the apparent plurality of selves is compared with the apparent plurality of spaces defined by various containers; just as there is only one real Space, so there is only one real Self; the "highest truth" is that "nothing is born." In the final chapter consciousness is compared to a firebrand, which seems to produce various figures when whirled around, though it does not really produce anything; so consciousness seems to produce various objects when agitated, but when calm it is just the Self. (shrink)

According to the Platonic philosophy of love, a thing is to be loved because it is beautiful and insofar as it is beautiful. Since Beauty is the radiance of the Good, a thing is to be loved, ultimately, because and insofar as it is good. The entity which is best and therefore most beautiful and therefore most lovable is the Good itself, or God. The Good alone deserves our final and unconditioned love. And since the only characteristic of things which (...) makes them good is their participation in the Good, when we love things it is really the Good in them which we are loving, and so we can say that the Good is the only object of love. But since all things do participate in the Good, all things are lovable. They participate in it, however, in varying degrees, and so they are to be loved more or less, depending on their goodness. This doctrine leads immediately to mysticism. Corresponding to the dialectic path of the intellect there is an anagogic path of love, leading from the least of things, which is least lovable, up to God, who is absolutely lovable, and in loving whom our love comes to rest. To the extent that Christianity is Platonism this Platonic philosophy of love permeates Christian thought and especially Christian mysticism. But to the extent that Christianity differs from and transcends Platonism this is not the Christian philosophy of love. (shrink)

The Hindu approach to philosophy tends to be epistemological rather than ontological. Metaphysics is rational analysis of experience rather than rational analysis of being. Being is grouped with consciousness and bliss, in the classic formula, as one of the characteristics of absolute experience. In ordinary experience the problem is to distinguish between those contents which both appear and exist and so are real and those which appear but do not exist and so are illusory. Existence is to be sought within (...) the realm of experience. (shrink)

Even inanimate bodies, to be sure, have a certain amount of freedom. Insofar as they are definite things they maintain their integrity against the tendency to be reabsorbed into the Indefinite. Even a gas preserves its mass, a liquid preserves also its volume, and a solid preserves even its shape, in the face of a hostile environment. But the motion of an inanimate body is determined by the outer forces acting on it. This fact is formulated by the classical laws (...) of motion. The law of inertia states that a body left to its own devices will not change its motion. The law of force states that a body not left to its own devices will change its motion in a direction and to an extent determined by the imposed force. The law of reaction states that a body will not kick back any harder than it is kicked. (shrink)

Some Christian philosophers, notably Tertullian, have gloried in this absurdity, finding in its very irrationality a sign of the dogma's truth. But most Christian philosophers, following Augustine, have tried to find some reconciliation between reason and revelation. The history of medieval philosophy is the history of the attempt to make the revealed truths rationally intelligible. The attempt was a failure. As we proceed chronologically from Anselm of Canterbury to Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam, we find the (...) domain of intelligibility relentlessly contracting as standards of logical rigor were raised. Anselm could prove all the dogmas of the Church. Abelard could prove the Trinity but not the Incarnation. Aquinas could prove that God is our beatitude but not that he is a Trinity. Scotus could prove that God exists, but not that he is our beatitude. William of Occam could not prove even that God exists, for without revelation we know only the immediately obvious and what can be inferred from it, the empirical world. As the rational defense of Christian doctrine collapsed, the domain of rational philosophy grew smaller and smaller, leaving dogmatic theology the sole defender of metaphysical truth. The alternatives seem to be to refute William of Occam's positivistic analysis, to accept revelation blindly, or to get along without metaphysics. None of these is easy. (shrink)

The second volume of Father Copleston's History of Philosophy covers the period from Augustine through Duns Scotus. Of its 51 chapters Aquinas has eleven, Augustine and Duns Scotus six each, Bonaventura five, Erigena two, and Dionysius, Anselm, William of Auvergne, and Albertus one each, while other philosophers are treated more briefly. The author's point of view is strictly and explicitly Thomist, and the book is intended primarily as a textbook for use in Catholic seminaries. But it is written with such (...) scholarship, integrity, and clarity that it should interest a much wider circle of readers. Apparently the book is based on a thorough study of the original sources. The documentation, while not detailed, is as complete as one expects in a general work of this sort. Since the Thomist concept of philosophy is accepted, little is said about mysticism or dogmatic theology. But the various rationalistic philosophies are analyzed with a critical sympathy which endeavors to appreciate their various insights into the nature of reality. (shrink)

Tertium Organum, published in Russian in 1912, is the most interesting and important of these works. The title is explained as meaning that the book is about "the third canon of thought," namely the mystical, which has always existed, although for us moderns it appears as a third method after the deductive and inductive methods described by Aristotle and Bacon. The English translation by Nicholas Bessaraboff and Claude Bragdon was published by Manas Press in 1920, and again, revised, by Knopf (...) in 1922. The simplicity of the literary style, the short sentences and paragraphs, and the clarity with which subtle arguments are developed show the influence of the author's training as a journalist. In content Tertium Organum is a systematic treatise on epistemology. The first seven chapters are an objective survey of the physical world. The author considers that the most basic problem of physics is why space has just three dimensions, and he concludes that it is impossible to find any answer to this question in an objective study of the world of space and time. Consequently, taking as a clue Kant's thesis that space and time are forms of intuition, and inferring from this that "we bear within ourselves the conditions of our space," he approaches the problem subjectively. In the following chapters he endeavors to show how our mode of consciousness makes space three-dimensional, how other modes of consciousness would, and for other beings do, make it of fewer or more dimensions, and how these different spaces are related to each other. The next to last chapter is a collection of selections from mystical literature, with comments, and the concluding chapter considers the "cosmic consciousness" with has for its object a world of four dimensions. An appendix gives a table showing the space and time sense, psychology, logic, mathematics, forms of action, morals, forms of consciousness, forms of knowledge, and forms of science characteristic of, as well as the different beings characterized by, four "forms of the manifestation of consciousness.". (shrink)

To push the edges of the known, to look at the accepted in novel ways, is indeed to stand at the frontiers of a field. In Frontiers in American Philosophy thirty-five contemporary scholars explore classical American thought in bold new ways. An extraordinary range of issues and thinkers is represented in these pages--from such core themes as metaphysics and social philosophy, which receive primary attention, to some consideration of American philosophers' technical accomplishments in mathematical logic and philosophical analysis. The authors (...) also offer new perspectives on the work of the leading American philosophers, including George Herbert Mead, William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Emma Goldman. Not surprisingly perhaps, a great deal of the discussion revolves, either directly or indirectly, around that great axis of intellectual issues commonly known as the "realism/idealism" controversy. It seems fitting that so much attention is devoted to the possibility of some sort of middle position between "external realism" and its antipode in some form of relativistic subjectivism. For, in the last analysis, such a middle position is for the American philosophers the core meaning of "pragmatism.”. (shrink)

"Its publication should be a major event for cognitive linguistics and should pose a major challenge for cognitive science. In addition, it should have repercussions in a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology and psychology to epistemology and the philosophy of science.... Lakoff asks: What do categories of language and thought reveal about the human mind? Offering both general theory and minute details, Lakoff shows that categories reveal a great deal."—David E. Leary, American Scientist.

I argue, In opposition to george f burch, That anaximander was not a metaphysician but a natural scientist, And a very great one.

Self-taught mathematician and father of Boolean algebra, George Boole (1815-1864) published An Investigation of the Laws of Thought in 1854. In this highly original investigation of the fundamental laws of human reasoning, a sequel to ideas he had explored in earlier writings, Boole uses the symbolic language of mathematics to establish a method to examine the nature of the human mind using logic and the theory of probabilities. Boole considers language not just as a mode of expression, but as (...) a system one can use to understand the human mind. In the first 12 chapters, he sets down the rules necessary to represent logic in this unique way. Then he analyses a variety of arguments and propositions of various writers from Aristotle to Spinoza. One of history's most insightful mathematicians, Boole is compelling reading for today's student of intellectual history and the science of the mind. (shrink)

This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary philosophers of mathematics, is a fully rewritten and updated successor to the author's earlier The Unprovability of Consistency. Its subject is the relation between provability and modal logic, a branch of logic invented by Aristotle but much disparaged by philosophers and virtually ignored by mathematicians. Here it receives its first scientific application since its invention. Modal logic is concerned with the notions of necessity and possibility. What George Boolos (...) does is to show how the concepts, techniques, and methods of modal logic shed brilliant light on the most important logical discovery of the twentieth century: the incompleteness theorems of Kurt Godel and the 'self-referential' sentences constructed in their proof. The book explores the effects of reinterpreting the notions of necessity and possibility to mean provability and consistency. (shrink)

The Unprovability of Consistency is concerned with connections between two branches of logic: proof theory and modal logic. Modal logic is the study of the principles that govern the concepts of necessity and possibility; proof theory is, in part, the study of those that govern provability and consistency. In this book, George Boolos looks at the principles of provability from the standpoint of modal logic. In doing so, he provides two perspectives on a debate in modal logic that has (...) persisted for at least thirty years between the followers of C. I. Lewis and W. V. O. Quine. The author employs semantic methods developed by Saul Kripke in his analysis of modal logical systems. The book will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in logic, mathematics and philosophy, as well as to specialists in those fields. (shrink)

If a tree falls in the forest and no one is present to hear it, does it make a sound? It does not, according to George Berkeley. Originally published in 1710, this landmark of Western philosophy introduced a revolutionary concept: immaterialism, which asserts that to be is to perceive or be perceived. The treatise opens with an assault on Locke's theory of abstract ideas and proceeds with arguments that sensible qualities exist only when perceived as ideas. Physical objects, he (...) claims, are no more than collections of qualities, and these sensible objects, too, are merely ideas. Berkeley relates his position to the achievements of eighteenth-century science, and proclaims the compatibility of immaterialism with traditional religion. (shrink)