'Regardless of certain shortcomings and mistaken judgements, these studies remain among the best on the subject' (Schmitt 1983, 47 n. 119).

The article refers to a long-standing dispute over the relations between the two orders of study of Plato’s dialogues in the Prologue of Albinus (Ch. V and Ch. VI, respectively). The dominant solu- tions are identified: 1) the acceptance of the first curriculum as «for amateurs» and the second curriculum as «for professional platonists» (J. Freudenthal, O. Nüsser, J. Mansfeld); 2) the treat- ment of the first course as a short introduction to the second (B. Reis). On the grounds (...) of the obvious weaknesses of both positions and the lack of textual evidence, a change of perspective is suggested. The author argues that there was no need to coordinate these curricula, since the second curriculum was the only one that Albinus promoted, and the first, which focused on a non-exist- ent «ideal student», served as a «model». In addition, the author proves that Albinus did not offer for study the entire Plato’s dialogues, but only seven of these dialogues in the 5 stages of the second curriculum. (shrink)

Im Zentrum des Buches steht ein kurzer Traktat des Albinos, der sogenannte Prologos. Albinos ist geistesgeschichtlich dem Mittelplatonismus zuzuordnen, der Phase des antiken Platonismus, die dem um 250 n.Chr. einsetzenden Neuplatonismus Plotins vorausging. Der antike Autor fuhrt den Leser seines Prologos mit folgenden Fragen an die Dialoge Platons heran: Was ist ein Dialog? In welche Typen lassen sich die Platonischen Dialoge einteilen? Mit welchem Dialog soll das Studium der Platonischen Dialoge beginnen? Welche Anordnung der Dialoge ist Platons Philosophie angemessen? Der (...) Prologos wurde in der alteren Forschung aus verschiedenen Grunden vernachlassigt: Zum einen glaubte man, die philosophische Position des Albinos besser aus dem umfangreicheren Didaskalikos, der ihm zunachst zugewiesen wurde, rekonstruieren zu konnen; zum anderen sahen die meisten Forscher in dem Prologos nur eine schlecht gearbeitete Zusammenfassung (Epitome). Diese Vorurteile grundeten auf der Monographie "Der Platoniker Albinos und der falsche Alkinoos", die J. Freudenthal 1879 publizierte. Seit einigen Jahren wird der Didaskalikos jedoch wieder Alkinoos, einem nur in den Handschriften auftauchenden und ansonsten unbekannten Autor, zugewiesen. Somit wurde der Weg fur eine unvoreingenommene Neubewertung des Prologos frei.Das Buch beginnt mit einem Uberblick uber die Forschungsgeschichte zum Prologos. Ein Durchgang durch Leben, Werk und Lehren des Albinos mundet in eine Einordnung des Traktats unter die Testimonien zu Albinos und dessen Lehrer Gaios. In einem dritten Abschnitt wird in dem Buch die zentrale Frage diskutiert, worum es sich bei dem Prologos handelt, um ein Exzerpt oder eine Epitome. Aus einer philologischen und philosophiehistorischen Untersuchung der Textstellen, die von Freudenthal in seiner oben erwahnten Monographie als verderbt beanstandet wurden, geht hervor, dass es sich bei dem Prologos um ein Exzerpt und nicht um eine Epitome handelt. In einem vierten Kapitel wird mittels eines formalen und funktionalen Vergleichs des Prologos mit spateren Einfuhrungsschriften dessen spezifischer Charakter herausgearbeitet: Der Prologos gibt sich als unkorrigierte Mitschrift einer Vorlesung zu erkennen und gewahrt als solche Einblick in den Horsaal eines Platonikers der Kaiserzeit. In einem langeren funften Abschnitt wird die handschriftliche Uberlieferung dargelegt und kritisch betrachtet. Reis beschreibt hier ausfuhrlich 21 griechische Handschriften und eine lateinische Ubersetzung unter kodikologischen, historischen und palaographischen Gesichtspunkten. Die Verflechtung der Textgeschichte mit derjenigen Platons und spaterer Platoniker macht diese Untersuchung wunschenswert. Die Abhangigkeit der Handschriften voneinander wird ermittelt, worauf eine kritische Edition des Prologos folgt. Die beigegebene Ubersetzung macht den Text auch interessierten Nicht-Grazisten zuganglich. (shrink)

Depuis maintenant plus d'un siècle, soit depuis la parution en 1863 de la monographie de J. Freudenthal, la tendance générale des interprèetes qui se sont intéressés à l'imagination chez Aristote aura été, sans conteste, de privilégier l'examen du De anima III 3 et de certains textes des Parva naturalia afin de rendre compte de son rôle à l'intérieur de la psychologie aristotélicienne. Ce faisant, on a laissé quelque peu dans l'ombre, consciemment ou non, peu importe, la fonction de l'imagination (...) dans l'explication du mouvement animal et de l'action humaine qu'Aristote nous a léguée essentiellement dans le De motu animalium et le De anima III 7, 9–11. Certes, étant donné l'importance de l'imagination en ces questions, certains exégètes n'ont pas manqué de s'y arrêter, mais la rareté des commentaires sur ces sujets, tout spéecialement le premier, et la possibilité d'apporter de nouveaux éclaircissements nous incitent àen reprendre l'examen. Nous traiterons d'abord du rôle de l'imagination dans l'explication du mouvement animal, puis dans celle, plus complexe, de l'action proprement humaine où l'imagination, de prime abord, pourrait sembler avoir une fonction préjudiciable à l'action réfléchie. Pour effacer ce soupçon à l'égard de la pensée du Stagirite, que bien des philosophes auront manifesté dans l'histoire, il nous faudra, notamment, discuter la question du bien apparent et du bien comme tel en regard de l'imagination délibérative. (shrink)

Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific theories, (...) by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)

We all ‘know’ that public opinion came to prominence in the political vocabulary of the late eighteenth century. It may be that this dates its rise a bit late, but it is not relevant to argue the matter here. My concern is rather that we be equally aware of the purposes for which people made use of the concept. Here I wish to consider various possible contexts for speaking or writing of public opinion, or ‘opinion’, as it was usually called (...) prior to the mid-eighteenth century. It may be possible to define, more fully than heretofore, the work that the expression did in eighteenth-century thought. As contemporary students of public opinion have been learning, an answer to this question may not even be wholly irrelevant to the task of specifying the nature of public opinion in our own time. (shrink)

The background and purpose of this paper require some explanation. It is not the product of a New Testament scholar, able to weigh and balance theories as to date, origin and doctrinal background of the text attributed to St John, nor to assess the identification of its author with the beloved Disciple elsewhere mentioned or with the author of the Apocalypse, nor to consider his relationship to Gnostics or Stoics or Essenes or other influences in the contemporary Jewish or Christian (...) ambience. It is only the effort of one who recognizes in St John's Gospel, if read with an appropriate hermeneutic, a supreme mystico-religious document which can provide guidance at every turn of the spiritual life, but which, if read in another manner, becomes only the expression of a hard-line particularism, which is not less unacceptable in that it acclaims a particular standing in a special relation to another particular on which we all depend for our existence and for all our properties. Conceive of God, or the supreme object of worship, as a particular among particulars, and as much other than ourselves as other things and persons are other, and religious reverence becomes a repugnant form of heteronomous idolatry, wrought up, moreover, with the blind acceptance of a large number of historic and cosmic myths. But conceive of God as being something beyond category-differences, and which as much transcends particularity as it transcends any form of abstract universality, and which incorporates in strict identity all those values of Truth, Love, Beauty, Justice, etc. which are all simply universality in action, and which, moreover, as much transcends personality and personal relationships as it also may have in them its supreme expression, and religion and worship at once acquire a perfect sense and reference. (shrink)

In an article in Philosophy R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument’ . This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ . The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding 1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification (...) is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim , that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years. (shrink)

I want to consider in this paper a question that is looming large in the theology of most world religions, not least in the Christian tradition. The following discussion will be confined to the Christian standpoint, though I hope mutatis mutandis the main points will be seen to apply to other religious perspectives as well. Specifically then, this question can be ex–pressed in two ways. We may ask, in the context of the contemporary dialogue situation, how is the committed Christian (...) to regard the adherents of non–Christian religions? and what status do these alien belief–systems have with respect to the Christian faith–response? Both forms of the issue are often discussed it seems to me without due attention being given to an important distinction between them. So, at the outset, it will be useful to make one or two observations about this. First of all, it is inevitable, I think, that an evaluational factor is implied by both formulations. We are pondering a basically Christian assessment of religious traditions that are non–Christian, and any solution suggested which eventually eliminates a one-sided overall perspective will apparently put us in a dilemma. For, on the one hand, a Christian theology of religions will be expected to produce a Christian result; on the other hand, a finally nonevaluational solution seems unable to be called a Christian view of things at all. In the event of such a ‘neutral theology’ as the latter resulting , is the dilemma that becomes apparent a genuine one, or can it be resolved by a more stringent analysis of the relevant issues? (shrink)