The specific field of the history of science is the study and explanation of the origin and transformation of the structures of scientific knowledge. The historian of science should render understandable the reality of scientific research. The relationships between the history of science and the philosophy of science are examined stating that (1) the philosophical theories on the development of science have a scientific content only as much as they may be compared with the results of the history of science, (...) and (2) the philosophy of science does not refer to an immediate historical reality but to an intellectual reconstruction of the past. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough some of the most radical hypothesis related to the practical implementations of human enhancement have yet to become even close to reality, the use of cognitive enhancers is a very tangible phenomenon occurring with increasing popularity in university campuses as well as in other contexts. It is now well documented that the use of cognitive enhancers is not only increasingly common in Western countries, but also gradually accepted as a normal procedure by the media as well. In fact, its (...) implementation is not unusual in various professional contexts and it has its peak in colleges. Even when certain restrictions in the legislation of a country are indeed in place, they are without doubts easy to overcome. The legitimacy and appropriateness of such restrictions will not be the focus of our investigation.DiscussionOur concern is instead related to the moral and social reasons to publicly acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. These reasons are linked to a more neutral analysis of contemporary Western society: it is a fact that an increasing number of competitive-selective contexts have a substantial number of contenders using cognitive enhancers.SummaryThrough the use of five explicative examples, in this paper we want to analyse the problems related to its use. In particular, it will be our aim to show the tension between one of the main argument used by bio-liberals and the actual implementation of the drugs in competitive, or semi-competitive contexts. (shrink)

Recent developments in the study of our brain and neurochemical maps have sparked much enthusiasm in some scholars, making room for speculations over the possibility to shape our morality from within ourselves rather than through [failed] socio-political projects. This paper aims at criticising the prospected scenario put forward by some scholars supporting a specific version of Moral Enhancement as an overly optimistically described manipulative tools. To do so, I will focus on a specific version of Moral Enhancers, namely Emotional Enhancers. (...) By looking from close at this group of enhancers and the potential results of their implementation, I will underline the risks that those could pose to sexual minorities, and I will use this analysis to support a much more cautious assessment of these drugs and a broader assessment of what their social acceptance would mean. (shrink)

I feel the urge to express my solidarity with Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, the authors of the much‐discussed article “After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?” that appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics in February. Both their argument and, more sadly, they themselves suffered a violent attack by people who obviously do not consider freedom of expression an important value. Censorship does not fit well with the mission of scholarship—particularly when the scholarship depends on a method of speculation (...) and hypothetical argument, as in the case of philosophy and bioethics—and the level of hatred and extremism expressed about the article seem out of proportion. Having said this, though, I want to consider why publishing the article was nonetheless inappropriate. (shrink)

Controversies over the acceptability of male circumcision (MC) are not new to the international bioethical community. I do not expect to add much to the arguments or evidence presented elsewhere, but I want to acknowledge the often-overlooked political element in which the debate is entrenched. In fairness to those sympathetic to the circumcision ban, I will first introduce some supportive arguments to their position. Next, I will show the limits of those critiques, affirming that MC should not be outlawed in (...) any liberal country, but that its permissibility only be evaluated within its medico-ethical dimension without the political charge often associated with the issue. (shrink)

A reply by the author of “Scholarly Discussion of Infanticide?” to “The Arguments Matter,” by Don Marquis, “The Importance of Rationality,” by G. Owen Schaeffer, and “Reasons and Freedom,” by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva.

This paper will focus on two controversial cases relating to the [mis]use of the notion of autonomy in situations of life and death. While in one case the patient’s will to die was not respected, in the other there was no attempt to save the life of the individual. I have chosen to put these two specific cases in parallel for the fact that in both instances the presence of some kind of mental impairment is not given at all. Yet, (...) in both situations there is substantial reference to some type of temporary competence -as this is the key element that, allegedly, should function as decisive to assess the moral and legal justification behind the decision to enforce -or not- medical treatment upon the protagonists of these two very sad stories. Following on from the objective of this paper thus, the contraposition of these two cases will provide us with a vivid image of the practical implications of using the notion of autonomy in an inconsistent manner within the Western world. Raising many doubts over its appropriateness. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Covid-19 pandemic caused situations where, in some hospitals, there were more patients in need of urgent treatment in intensive care units (ICU) than were available. In particular, there were not sufficient ventilators or critical care resources for all patients in danger of dying from respiratory failure or other organ failures.DiscussionAs the “first come, first served” criterion was not considered adequate, more nuanced and fairer clinical criteria were proposed to assess whom to treat first. One type of patients that has (...) not been considered in the literature so far is that of “important patients”, individuals that many people might consider worthy of priority treatment for the contribution they made or might make to society as a whole.SummaryIn this article, we discuss the moral insights behind the possible treatment of “important patients” and suggest a supererogatory solution of voluntary renunciation/withdrawal. Details of the proposal are explained, and potential objections are addressed. (shrink)