In Society as a Department Store Ryszard Legutko wrestles with the emancipatory ideology promulgated by postmodernists, libertarians, and liberal thinkers. Legutko argues that modern Western liberals have embraced a revolutionary ethic; they have turned their backs on their own cultural heritage, and used its political and ideological apparatus to destroy classical metaphysics and epistemology. The book considers the paradoxical implications of this state of affairs for Eastern European intellectuals arguing that, with the triumph of liberalism over communism, (...) these intellectuals feel compelled to digest an ideology that shares many elements with the oppressive system from which they just liberated themselves. Based on hubris rather than genuine humane concerns, Legutko mourns not simply the loss of faith in classical Western culture, but the way in which that loss is becoming a central point of identity. (shrink)

In a departure from traditional Western political theory that is reminiscent of left?wing anarchism, contemporary libertarianism rejects the necessity of making political choices based on a value hierarchy, instead claiming that it is possible for all individuals to pursue their divergent values simultaneously?as long as each respects the equal rights of others to do the same. The caveat, however, hides a conflict of loyalties that would plague a libertarian society: on the one hand are the particular loyalties of one's preferred (...) Utopian community; on the other hand, loyalty to the larger ?framework for utopias?; within which one's utopia exists. The second loyalty implies a value relativism incompatible with the first one, meaning either that loyalty to the libertarian framework will undermine the utopias within it, or that the particular values of the utopias will destabilize the libertarian framework. The durability of a libertarian society, then, requires a mentality best characterized as nihilistic. In this, libertarianism differs from liberalism but is surprisingly similar to the cultural diversity movement. The thesis is illustrated by examining John Gray's attempt to eschew both a hierarchy of values and moral relativism. (shrink)

In his most recent works, John Gray attempts to achieve two things: to refute the universalist tendencies of modern liberalism and to propose an alternative in the form of postmodern liberal conservatism. While largely supportive of the first, this paper is critical of the second undertaking, which seems a dubious attempt to synthesize postmodern liberal anthropology with a conservative conception of the social order.

In Poland, the practical difficulties encountered in the struggle to create a capitalist society are leading many Hayekian liberals to the realization that social factors crucial to the creation and stability of such a society are invisible within the classical liberal intellectual horizon and are undermined by its ethic of egalitarian individualism. Therefore, paradoxically, a major step forward in the creation of a liberal society has been the abandonment of significant elements of liberal ideology in favor of civic republican and (...) neoconservative ideas. (shrink)

History -- Utopia -- Politics -- Ideology -- Religion.

The paper attempts to reconstruct Thales’ argument about water, which is rightly considered to be the core of his philosophy of nature. It consists of two separate arguments – one biological and the other physical – which ascribe to water two different functions: in the first case, it is a source of life on the earth or, in another version, a source of life of the earth in its entirety; in the second case, it is something that supports the earth (...) in its stationary position in the cosmos. These two arguments indicate that Thales’ notion of water was meant to answer more than just one question about nature. This, in turn, might justify the use of the concept of arche, which Aristotle attributed to the Ionian philosophers, even though Thales had obviously never used the term. The concept may somehow accurately render Thales’ more general view of water. It should be noted, however, that if the term arche can be applied to Thales’ views, then it is only in the sense related to the “coming-to-be”. Thales’ arguments did not apply – contrary to what some doxographers said and what certain scholars still maintain – to the question of the end, or perishing of physical things, the problem taken up only by later Ionians. To put it differently, Thales never claimed that the physical things which die or undergo destruction change into water. (shrink)

Like many libertarian thinkers, Simpson assumes that the minimal state is culturally neutral. This is false. Libertarianism is a theory opposed to hierarchy at the state level. As such, it also undermines the grounds for hierarchy at the community level. Since communities require some form of hierarchy not only to exist but to generate meaningful culture, libertarianism is inherently nonneutral towards culture. From this it follows that Simpson's idea of a minimal state overseeing various nonliberal communities cannot be realized within (...) the libertarian framework. In its place, I defend republicanism, which makes no pretensions toward cultural neutrality. (shrink)

W tomie zamieszczono teksty powstałe w ramach programu "Demokracja - idee, dylematy, praktyka", który obejmował cykl wykładów i dyskusji organizowanych przez Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej w roku 2001 na Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie.

By viewing toleration—which is usually interpreted as a personal attitude—through the lens of peaceful coexistence, Michael Walzer links toleration to political arrangements. The consequence of this approach is to blur basic political categories such as the state, political power, culture, and political creed. Moreover, while Walzer clearly prefers an immigrant society as embodying the practice of toleration more fully than any other regime, he fails to identify either its cultural or its political preconditions.

The book has two currents. The first is an analysis of the three concepts of freedom, which are called, respectively, negative, positive, and inner. Negative freedom is defined as an absence of coercion, positive freedom as an ability to rule oneself and rule others, inner freedom as being oneself, that is, being an author of one's decisions. Each concept is analyzed both in terms of its development in the history of ideas and in terms of its internal logic. The major (...) problem of negative freedom is to find widely accepted rules according to which this freedom can be distributed. The major problem of positive freedom is to define what constitutes a free person. The major problem of inner freedom is how to correlate it with the proper interpretation of the human self. The book advances the thesis - and this constitutes the other current of its narrative - that we have been witnessing the advent of a new form of despotism, much of it being the effect of the dominant position of liberalism. Precisely because it took a reductionist position, liberalism has impoverished our view of freedom, and consequently, our notion of human nature with its political, moral, and metaphysical dimensions. (shrink)

In Hayek's Social and Political Thought, Roland Kley argues that Hayek's defense of capitalism is instrumentalist: that is, that Hayek sees market societies as efficient mechanisms that have no independent ethical justification. But in fact, Hayek does have such a standard, one that is expressed in the notion of a discipline of freedom. This standard derives from the moral anthropology of the liberal‐conservative tradition.

The general aim of this book is to provide an elementary exposition of some basic concepts in terms of which both classical and non-dassicallogirs may be studied and appraised. Although quantificational logic is dealt with briefly in the last chapter, the discussion is chiefly concemed with propo gjtional cakuli. Still, the subject, as it stands today, cannot br covered in one book of reasonable length. Rather than to try to include in the volume as much as possible, I have put (...) emphasis on some selected topics. Even these could not be roverrd completely, but for each topic I have attempted to present a detailed and precise t’Xposition of several basic results including some which are non-trivial. The roots of some of the central ideas in the volume go back to J. Luka siewicz’s seminar on mathematicallogi. (shrink)

Cooperation between doctors of various specialties and other medical specialists is the standard of care in the treatment of patients. Due to the variety of diseases and the dynamic development of medicine in general, it is difficult to be an expert in every field and know all the recommended treatments. An example of such cooperation is the joint treatment of patients with the problem of ingrown toenails. The article contains an analysis of patients who received treatment in a doctor’s office (...) in cooperation with podiatrists. A conservative approach towards the treatment of this condition sees the patient being initially diagnosed and treated by a podiatrist and then later, if necessary, being referred to a doctor for surgical treatment. The exchange of experiences and information on patients treated by interdisciplinary teams allows doctors and podiatrists to find the best possible treatment and improve the quality of life of patients. The follow-up of patients after surgery can be performed later in podiatry offices. Owing to modern electronic communication, it is possible for a doctor to constantly monitor the patient’s condition without the need for direct visits to the doctor’s office. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, by Daniel C. Dennett.

An Antique Prototype of the Modern Mathematisation of Psychology Ryszard Stachowski. (1) matter or that which is not in itself a particular thing, (2) form or essence, which is that precisely in accordance with which a thing is called a this, and ...

This article explains how people synchronize their thoughts through empathetic relationships and points out the elementary neuronal mechanisms orchestrating this process. The many dimensions of empathy are discussed, as is the manner by which empathy affects health and disorders. A case study of teaching children empathy, with positive results, is presented. Mirror neurons, the recently discovered mechanism underlying empathy, are characterized, followed by a theory of brain-to-brain coupling. This neuro-tuning, seen as a kind of synchronization between brains and between individuals, (...) takes various forms, including frequency aspects of language use and the understanding that develops regardless of the difference in spoken tongues. Going beyond individual-to-individual empathy and SYNC, the article explores the phenomenon of synchronization in groups and points out how synchronization increases group cooperation and performance. (shrink)

This paper aims to present the main contours of Burns’s literary output which, interestingly enough, grows into a personal understanding of the collective mindset of -Troubles Northern Ireland. It is legitimate, I argue, to construe her fiction as a body of work shedding light on certain underlying mechanisms of sectarian violence. Notwithstanding the lapse of time between 1998 and 2020, the Troubles’ toxic legacy has indeed woven an unbroken thread in the social fabric of the region. My reading of the (...) novelist’s selected works intends to show how the local public have been fed by an unjustified—maybe even false—sense of security. Burns, in that regard, has positioned herself amongst the aggregate of writers who feel anxious rather than placated, hence their persistence in returning to the roots of Northern Irish societal divisions. Burns’s writing, in the above context, though immersed in the world of the Troubles, paradoxically communicates “an idiosyncratic spatiotemporality”, namely an experience beyond the self-imposing, historical time limits. As such, it gains the ability to provide insightful commentaries on conflict-prone relations, the patterns of which can be repeatedly observed in Northern Ireland’s socio-political milieu. Overall, the main idea here is to discuss and present the narrative realm proposed by Burns as determinate, liminal in terms of time and space, positioning readers between “then” and “now” of the region. (shrink)

The title of this paper is a theorem, which I am going to state and prove. The theorem extends from prepositional to predicate languages the result I presented in [5].

This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski’s theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski’s theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science. In this paper I argue that Tarski’s chief concern was the following question. Suppose (...) a language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L +. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L + and, if it can, how can this be done? Many students of Tarski’s conception will find the above exposition inconsistent with their own views on the essence of Tarski’s conception. On the other hand, as it is argued in this paper, the proposed interpretation of Tarski’s ideas allows one to use Tarski’s theory as a fundamental tool for semantic analyses of various theories, factual theories in particular. More specifically, it is argued that Tarski’s theory of truth allows one to clearly oppose a theory meant to be certain deductive system (a set of accepted sentences, say axioms, and a logical machinery for deducing from them new ones) and a theory meant to be a certain semantic system, i.e a set of sentences that serve to communicate some states of affairs and to use that opposition to explicate and occasionally also define the notion of truth. The opposition in question is of the utmost significance for analyzing some developments in both mathematics and factual sciences. The approach which is concerned with the logical relations between the elements of science such an approach is throughout this paper called analytical is put into question. The growth of science is determined by how well scientific theories are able to account for factual states of affairs. The intuitive notion of truth applied by the scientists does not necessarily correspond in a straightforward way to its Tarskian counterpart. On the other hand, as is claimed in this paper, the Tarskian notion of truth offers as adequate explication of intuitive notion of truth as possible. (shrink)

This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski’s theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski’s theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science. In this paper I argue that Tarski’s chief concern was the following question. Suppose (...) a language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L +. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L + and, if it can, how can this be done? Many students of Tarski’s conception will find the above exposition inconsistent with their own views on the essence of Tarski’s conception. On the other hand, as it is argued in this paper, the proposed interpretation of Tarski’s ideas allows one to use Tarski’s theory as a fundamental tool for semantic analyses of various theories, factual theories in particular. More specifically, it is argued that Tarski’s theory of truth allows one to clearly oppose a theory meant to be certain deductive system (a set of accepted sentences, say axioms, and a logical machinery for deducing from them new ones) and a theory meant to be a certain semantic system, i.e a set of sentences that serve to communicate some states of affairs and to use that opposition to explicate and occasionally also define the notion of truth. The opposition in question is of the utmost significance for analyzing some developments in both mathematics and factual sciences. The approach which is concerned with the logical relations between the elements of science such an approach is throughout this paper called analytical is put into question. The growth of science is determined by how well scientific theories are able to account for factual states of affairs. The intuitive notion of truth applied by the scientists does not necessarily correspond in a straightforward way to its Tarskian counterpart. On the other hand, as is claimed in this paper, the Tarskian notion of truth offers as adequate explication of intuitive notion of truth as possible. (shrink)