Le Musée d’Anatomie humaine de l’Université de Turin , créé en 1739, fut transféré en 1898 dans le bâtiment où il se trouve actuellement, dans des locaux caractérisés par une architecture monumentale. Il a été récemment restauré dans le but de retrouver l’atmosphère de l’époque, et en même temps, le projet à fait l’objet d’une réflexion attentive sur les possibilités de le transformer de musée savant en musée communiquant. Le Musée d’Anatomie humaine fait partie d’un pôle muséal turinois en développement (...) qui comprend actuellement, en outre, le Musée des Fruits et le Musée d’Anthropologie criminelle « Cesare Lombroso ». Ces trois musées, qui accueillent presque 200 visiteurs par jour, offrent un bel aperçu du positivisme scientifique, qui fut particulièrement important à Turin.The University of Turin’s Museum of Human Anatomy, founded in 1739, was transferred in 1898 to the building it still occupies, which is notable for its monumental style of architecture. It was recently restored to the atmosphere of its day, but during the project, careful consideration was given to possibilities for transforming this scholarly establishment into a communicational museum. It is one of those included in Turin’s new museums project, alongside the Museum of Fruit and the Cesare Lombroso Museum of Criminal Anthropology. All three museums, which have about 200 visitors a day, offer valuable insights into scientific positivism, which was particularly influential in Turin. (shrink)

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...) with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking (...) prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your future selves. (shrink)

The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the objective self. I am taking (...) a different approach. In addition to objective reality, which is usually understood and explored from an impersonal, quasi-observational and metaphysically realist perspective, we can also explore the nature and structure of subjective reality. The nature and structure of subjective reality is defined by the nature and structure of first-personal, conscious experience. Subjective reality is as real as objective reality, and a metaphysical realist such as myself can endorse the existence of both kinds of ontology. The mental states that, as experienced from the first-personal or subjective perspective, capture the nature and structure of subjective reality, are included in objective reality. The questions to explore in a subjective ontology of the self concern the nature and structure of the self from the first-personal or subjective perspective, that is, the nature and structure of the self from within. This is the subjective self. (shrink)

The debate over the temporal arrow is a debate over what fundamental ontology is needed for the temporal asymmetry of the universe, which determines the fact that time seems to be oriented or directed from earlier to later. This temporal asymmetry underlies (or, as some might argue, is the same as) the asymmetrical fact that the past is fixed while the future is open, as well as the global asymmetries of counterfactual, causal and agential direction. I explore the metaphysics of (...) the temporal direction within the context of empirical work in psychology and cognitive science. I argue that, in our debate over the metaphysics of the temporal arrow, we need to explore some of the deep connections between our cognitive response to the world and our metaphysical theory of the temporal direction. (shrink)

Recently Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux have attacked the core of the phenomenological hermeneutic tradition: its commitment to the finitude of human understanding. If accurate, this critique threatens to render the whole tradition a topic of merely historical interest. Given the depth of the criticism, this essay aims to establish a provisional defense of hermeneutics. After briefly reviewing each critique, it is argued that Badiou and Meillassoux themselves face rather intractable difficulties. These difficulties, then, open the space for a hermeneutic (...) response, which is accomplished largely by drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur. We close with a suggested program for hermeneutic thought. (shrink)

Chris Tucker's paper on the hiddenness argument seeks to turn aside a way of defending the latter which he calls the value argument. But the value argument can withstand Tucker's criticisms. In any case, an alternative argument capable of doing the same job is suggested by his own emphasis on free will.

this paper offers a critical discussion of Martial Gueroult's philosophical conception of the history of philosophy as a discipline. Gueroult was among the most influential French historians of philosophy in the twentieth century and the author of a long list of monographs on a host of modern philosophers. Gueroult's first book, on Maimon, was published in 1929, quickly followed in 1930 by a monograph on Fichte. In the English-speaking world, he is probably best known for his two-volume Descartes selon l'ordre (...) des raisons and the volumes on parts I and II of Spinoza's... (shrink)

In the preface to his book God the Problem , Gordon Kaufman writes ‘Although the notion of God as agent seems presupposed by most contemporary theologians … Austin Farrer has been almost alone in trying to specify carefully and consistently just what this might be understood to mean.’.

Pucelle tries to show how the idea of personal liberty is central to Green's ethics. Green's criticisms of other philosophers and the historical context of his philosophy are especially well handled. --W. L. M.

Hans Kelsen est, sans conteste, le juriste le plus important de ce siècle. Il n'y a pas une seule question de théorie juridique qu'on puisse traiter aujourd'hui sans examiner d'abord l'analyse qu'il en fait, mais son œuvre ne concerne pas seulement le droit et la philosophie du droit ; elle touche aussi la philosophie politique, l'épistémologie, l'éthique ou la logique. Sa théorie du droit représente, à côté du réalisme, l'une des deux branches du juspositivisme moderne, connue sous le nom de (...) normativisme et que lui-même appelait " Théorie pure du droit ". Elle se donne comme une théorie scientifique qui se borne à décrire son objet, le droit positif, et qui donc est " pure " de tout jugement de valeur. La pureté ne concerne toutefois que la méthodologie. Le droit, lui, n'est nullement pur, car il exprime des choix moraux et politiques. La doctrine kelsenienne pure apparaît ainsi doublement politique : d'une part, elle se donne pour tâche de mettre en évidence la fonction idéologique du droit ; d'autre part, dans la mesure où elle analyse les dispositifs juridiques comme des moyens au service de certaines fins, elle peut servir de fondement à une véritable technologie juridique. C'est cette technologie que Kelsen prétendait appliquer à la politique et qui fonde aussi bien son travail de constituant - il est le père de la Constitution autrichienne et de la première Cour constitutionnelle - que ses écrits sur la démocratie. La Théorie générale du droit et de l'Etat présente à cet égard un intérêt exceptionnel. Elle a été écrite aux Etats-Unis, où Kelsen s'était réfugié au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme le souligne Stanley L. Paulson dans son introduction, elle constitue une étape marquante dans l'évolution de sa pensée entre le néokantisme des origines et l'empirisme des derniers écrits. C'est aussi une présentation claire, systématique et concentrée de l'ensemble de sa doctrine et c'est le seul ouvrage de Kelsen qui porte à la fois sur les conditions de possibilité d'une science empirique du droit, sur la théorie générale du droit au sens strict - l'analyse structurale de tous les ordres juridiques possibles - et sur la théorie générale de l'Etat - l'analyse des concepts constitutifs de tout Etat possible. (shrink)

This article explores the philosophical concept of akrasia, also known as weakness of will, and demonstrates its relevance to clinical practice. In particular, it challenges an implicit notion of control over one’s actions that might impede recovery from substance misuse. Reflecting on three fictional case vignettes, we show how philosophical work on akrasia helps avoid this potentially harmful notion of control by supporting a holistic engagement with people for whom substance misuse is a problem. We argue that such engagement enhances (...) their prospects of recovery by focusing on agency over time, as opposed to individual lapses. (shrink)

Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.

L. Jonathan Cohen; XI*—Guessing, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 189–210, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/7.

Le présent article offre une nouvelle interprétation du concept aristotélicien d' « imagination » ou phantasia par les moyens d'une lecture attentive du Traité de l'âme, III, 3, tout particulièrement de son début. Aristote soutient que ses prédécesseurs ne peuvent expliquer comment l'erreur se produit. Mais c'est également une difficulté pour sa propre explication des formes de base de la perception et de la pensée, et Aristote introduit la phantasia précisément pour répondre à cette question. Il soutient qu'elle ne peut (...) être réduite aux autres états mentaux et offre donc une nouvelle explication causale du contenu, laquelle explique comment un état mental peut être aussi bien vrai que faux. The present article offers a new interpretation of Aristotle's concept of « imagination » or phantasia through a close reading of On the Soul, 3. 3, with special attention to the chapter's opening. Aristotle argues that his predecessors cannot explain how error can ever occur. But it is equally a difficulty for his own account of the most basic types of perception and thought, and Aristotle introduces phantasia precisely to answer this problem. He argues that it cannot be reduced to other mental states and then offers a new causal account of content which explains how a mental state can be either true or false. (shrink)

In "But Is It Art?", B. R. Tilghman argues in effect that art's necessary paracriticism on other areas of human activity and interest follows from the condition that artistic and aesthetic perceptions are matters of experiencing aspects. However, aspect-seeing is so common in many avenues of human endeavor that it fails to justify a special artistic paracriticism. The realm of art has a language which must be understood in its own right, as is the case for any social realm which (...) dominates a portion of language as a whole. (shrink)

It is argued that ideas and theories often evolve into preconceptions of our perceptions. Such evolution is implicit in Heidegger's notion of truths of alethia. The description of this process holds implications for the traditional givenness of humans for themselves in terms of the changabllity of absolute presuppositions. Among the implications are 1. the insufficiency of the historical mode for explaining changes in human self-perception; 2. the inadequacy of radical subjectivism and environmentalism; 3. a radical contingency and complexity to the (...) course of human conceptualization; and 4. the awareness that human efforts can influence alterations in preconceptions. The influence of modern brain theory is subject to these conditions. (shrink)