Resumen:Es innegable que desde la publicación de A Theory of Justice en 1971 la filosofía política ha dado un giro en las temáticas que históricamente ha abordado. Pues como afirma Robert Nozick, es imposible realizar cualquier tipo de filosofía práctica, sin considerar el marco teórico ofrecido por la obra de Rawls, dado que lo inédito de su trabajo es ofrecer una teoría sustantiva de justicia que deja atrás la tradición lógica-analítica, así como el mero análisis histórico-sistemático. Las múltiples repercusiones han (...) dado inicio a una vasta cantidad de encuentros y desencuentros en la forma concebir la justicia social. En este debate se enmarca el último libro del profesor Pablo Aguayo Westwood: Justicia social: conceptos, teorías y problemas, donde propone una breve revisión de los principales hitos que han marcado la discusión en torno a la justicia social, así como algunos problemas prácticos que conciernen a esta. (shrink)

El presente artículo indaga si ¿es el sujeto un ser autónomo en la deliberación política o sonlos pensamientos, las posturas y las formas de la organización política mediadas por las distintas herramientas comunicacionales a las que se ve expuesto quienes lo determinan? Así, analiza larelación que existe entre mass media y política, con la capacidad deliberativa del individuo altomar decisiones en el contexto político, a partir de Chomsky y Han. La metodología es cualitativa con diseño documental, el instrumento son fichas (...) bibliográficas aplicadas a fuentes primarias y secundarias. Se usan bases de datos con el algoritmo: “Neoliberalismo, psicopolítica, big data, medios de comunicación de masas y democracia”. Se analizan 13 libros y 20 artículos. Se identifican las nuevas formas y herramientas de organización política y la relación entre política y medios de comunicación. Se concluye que: 1) el neoliberalismo direcciona la idea de libre mercado hacia el individuo mismo, 2) es necesaria una ciudadanía crítica que tenga un rol más activo en lademocracia, 3) se identifica a la psicopolítica como una nueva forma de organización política, 4) lanueva herramienta de la política es el big data, 5) se evidencia que la relación entre política y massmedia está vinculada con los grupos de poder y 6) la emocionalización de la comunicación políticadisminuye la autonomía individual. (shrink)

Es innegable que desde la publicación de A Theory of Justice en 1971 la filosofía política ha dado un giro en las temáticas que históricamente ha abordado. Pues como afirma Robert Nozick, es imposible realizar cualquier tipo de filosofía práctica, sin considerar el marco teórico ofrecido por la obra de Rawls, dado que lo inédito de su trabajo es ofrecer una teoría sustantiva de justicia que deja atrás la tradición lógica-analítica, así como el mero análisis histórico-sistemático. Las múltiples repercusiones han (...) dado inicio a una vasta cantidad de encuentros y desencuentros en la forma concebir la justicia social. En este debate se enmarca el último libro del profesor Pablo Aguayo Westwood: Justicia social: conceptos, teorías y problemas, donde propone una breve revisión de los principales hitos que han marcado la discusión en torno a la justicia social, así como algunos problemas prácticos que conciernen a esta. (shrink)

The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former. These (...) clarifications allow the argument to explain in detail how we can make two claims. The first one is that being a recipient of value should be the only criterion for full moral considerability. This follows if we accept that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance. The second claim is that, given what the main theories of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability. The paper argues that this conclusion stands even if we hold views that consider other values different from sentience. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um quadro conceitual para examinar a questão do especismo. Começa definindo-o como a consideração ou tratamento desfavorável injustificado daqueles que não pertencem a uma determinada espécie. A seguir, esclarece alguns dos mal-entendidos comuns acerca do que é e do que não é o especismo. Depois disso, argumenta contra a confusão entre (1) os diferentes modos em que se pode defender o especismo; e (2) as diferentes posições que assumem o especismo como uma de suas premissas. Dependendo se (...) essas últimas aceitam ou não outros critérios para a consideração moral à parte do especismo, podem ser posições especistas simples ou combinadas. Mas o especismo segue sendo em todos os casos a mesma ideia. Finalmente, este artigo examina o conceito de antropocentrismo, que define como o tratamento ou consideração desfavorável daqueles que não são membros da espécie humana. O conceito de antropocentrismo difere do de especismo e do de misoteria (animadversão para com os animais não humanos). Não obstante, pode-se concluir que o antropocentrismo é uma forma de especismo, à luz do que indicam, entre outros, o argumento da sobreposição de espécies e o argumento da relevância. (shrink)

El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar los procesos de acreditación de programas de licenciatura en la Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas (UAZ), para identificar áreas de oportunidad para la consolidación del proceso y de los programas. El enfoque es cualitativo, la metodología utilizada fue la revisión de documentos institucionales y la realización de entrevistas semiestructuradas a exfuncionarios, las cuales se transcribieron, codificaron y analizaron con el software ATLAS.ti. Se concluye que la consolidación de procesos de acreditación en la UAZ es (...) una utopía. Sin embargo, se identificaron áreas de oportunidad como insumo para el Proceso de Reforma Universitaria en curso. (shrink)

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper (...) argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether. (shrink)

This article tries to define what discrimination is and to understand in particular detail its most important instances: those in which the satisfaction of interests is at stake. These cases of discrimination will be characterized in terms of deprivations of benefits. In order to describe and classify them we need to consider three different factors: the benefits of which discriminatees are deprived, the criteria according to which such benefits are denied or granted, and the justification that such deprivation of benefits (...) may have (or lack). This definition intends to present discrimination as a concept that may be useful not only to examine certain social phenomena, but also, more widely, to ethical theory in general. (shrink)

The concept of “moral equivocation” may be defined in the context of an ethical framework for moral judgment. This framework comprises two universal principles of right: the Dependency Principle, found in Plato's Republic, and the Democracy Principle. Moral equivocation is evident in a violation of either of these two principles. At the cultural level, coping with moral equivocation often requires moral compromise, as is evident in applying the Dependency-Democracy Principles Ethical Framework to the issue of HIV testing for pregnant women.

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...) it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view. (shrink)

The author of Look Back in Anger, Inadmissible Evidence, and The Entertainer has created a brilliant dramatization of this classic about a man who retains his youth while the decay of advancing years and moral corruption appears on a portrait painted by one of his lovers.

Conforme al antropocentrismo moral, está justificado tratar de forma desfavorable a los animales no humanos frente a los seres humanos. Esta idea se mantiene a menudo indicando que hay ciertas capacidades o relaciones, defendidas como moralmente relevantes, que solo tendrían estos últimos. El argumento de la superposición de especies apunta, sin embargo, que esta asunción se encuentra equivocada. Toda una serie de seres humanos incumplen también tal criterio. De este modo, si continuamos defendiendo su relevancia, estaremos aceptando que se dé (...) a estos seres humanos un trato coincidente con el que se proporciona hoy en día a los animales no humanos. Si, en cambio, se quiere dar una plena consideración y un consiguiente trato ecuánime a todos los seres humanos, ello implicará el rechazo de tal criterio, y la extensión de tal consideración y trato a los demás animales sintientes. Se ha intentado responder a este argumento asumiendo que sus premisas son equivocadas, o sosteniendo que hay otras razones por las cuales todos los seres humanos deben ser moralmente considerables. En este artículo se examinan estas respuestas y se concluye que ninguna de ellas tiene éxito. (shrink)

Background:Dignity experience in the daily lives of people living with dementia is influenced by their relational interactions with others. However, literature reviews show that knowledge concerning crucial interactional qualities, preserving their sense of dignity, is limited.Aim:The aim of this study was to explore and describe crucial qualities of relational interactions preserving dignity experience among people with dementia, while interacting with family, social network, and healthcare professionals.Methodology:The study was founded upon Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, and an exploratory design employing qualitative research interviews (...) was conducted.Participants and research context:A total of 11 individuals diagnosed with mild to moderate dementia, living in their own homes, were recruited from two Hospital Memory Clinics in Norway.Ethical considerations:In recruiting persons with dementia as study participants, sensitivity toward their life history, autonomy, integrity, relationships, and dignity is essential. These standards, and the ethical principles of moral sensitivity to their vulnerability, doing no harm, showing justice, and respecting their personal utility, guided our research.Results:Three main interactional qualities preserving the participants’ dignity experience were found: Experiencing love and confirmation; experiencing social inclusion and fellowship; experiencing humane warmth and understanding within a caring culture, while being met as an equal human being. A total of 10 sub-qualities were identified within these 3 main qualities.Discussion and final considerations:Dignity experience among the participants was preserved when certain interactional qualities were present in their interactions with family, social network, and healthcare professionals. While supporting some of the findings of previous studies, this study adds new knowledge on the subject. Knowledge of relational interactions toward preserving dignity experience should be a fundamental part of future dementia care practice. Based on the results of this study, an empirical–theoretical model was developed for this purpose. (shrink)

The term “speciesism” has played a key role in debates about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals, yet little work has been dedicated to clarifying its meaning. Consequently, the concept remains poorly understood and is often employed in ways that might display a speciesist bias themselves. To address this problem, this article develops a definition of speciesism in terms of discrimination and argues in favor of its advantages over alternative accounts. After discussing the key desiderata for a definition of discrimination (...) in general and speciesism in particular, a wide and evaluative account of speciesism is presented. According to it, speciesism is unjustified consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. The article then discusses rival accounts, namely narrow and descriptive definitions of speciesism. The article argues that such accounts are problematic as they overly restrict the scope of phenomena that can be identified as speciesist and disrupt the continuity with other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. (shrink)

This book examines philosophical and scientific implications of Neodarwinism relative to recent empirical data. It develops explanations of social behavior and cognition through analysis of mental capabilities and consideration of ethical issues. It includes debate within cognitive science among explanations of social and moral phenomena from philosophy, evolutionary and cognitive psychology, neurobiology, linguistics, and computer science. Cognitive Science (CS) provides an original corpus of scholarly work that makes explicit the import of cognitive-science research for philosophical analysis. Topics include the nature, (...) structure, and justification of knowledge, cognitive architectures and development, brain-mind theories, and consciousness. (shrink)

Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if we (...) abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the way in which we should intervene in nature. Rather than intervening for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in order to reduce the harms that nonhuman animals suffer. This conflicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals whose defence is not compatible with the consideration of the interests of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post‐hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre‐establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre‐establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone (...) metaethical arguments. (shrink)

The philosophy of history of 1804 and 1805 enables Fichte to place his natural right, developed previously at Jena, against a diachronic background. This means that Fichte does not reason merely synchronically from a timeless conception of society and state. From a synchronic viewpoint, Fichte cannot solve the problem of the control of political power because he has to draw on the assumption of a virtuous ephorate. This assumption is not consistent with the Fichtean ideal of a philosophy of right (...) completely independent from moral considerations. Thus, the control of government is possible only if at least a group of citizens can go beyond the mere rational egoism. This new temporal conception of the state leads Fichte to think that the problems of consistency of his theory of Jena are unavoidable, given that a society integrated by egoist individuals cannot be sustained. However, his later philosophy of history enables Fichte to state the inexorable annihilation of this type of community and gives place to an ensuing epoch, when citizens are not self-interested anymore. (shrink)

The moral consideration of nonhuman animals and the critique of speciesism have been defended by appeal to a variety of ethical theories. One of the main approaches in moral and political philosophy today from which to launch such a defense is egalitarianism, which is the view that we should aim at favoring the worse off by reducing inequality. This paper explains what egalitarianism is and shows the important practical consequences it has for nonhuman animals, both those that are exploited by (...) humans and those in need of aid in the wild. Egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, and in practice it prescribes ceasing to exploit nonhuman animals as well as assisting them. Moreover, because they are worse off in comparison to humans, egalitarianism prescribes giving priority to the interests nonhuman animals. Due to this, egalitarianism gives us extra reasons to defend them beyond those entailed by other nonspeciesist approaches. (shrink)

The Stoics considered that in order to die well, one must previously have lived and not merely existed, an assertion which will not be contested in this paper. The question raised here is whether an individual whose life expectancy is jeopardized by serious illness or whose life has not been lived to the ‘full’ for whatever reason should have to abandon all hope or, alternately, whether that life could still somehow be saved. One clear obstacle to achieving this stems from (...) moral character, given that moral character is an element which conditions an individual’s moral behaviour, as pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress and particularly Pellegrino and Thomasma. The transformation of moral character requires time and effort but the testimonies of patients who have given their lives a radical new direction upon being diagnosed with a serious illness seem to show the existence of a peculiar phenomenon of moral catharsis. In this paper we attempt to illustrate that this alleged phenomenon is not the result of a kind of cataleptic impression but rather the result of a dialectic and narrative process, during which a first hope of healing is dashed, unveiling a new sense in the illness. Its fulfillment provides the patient with a final hope. (shrink)

Con el título de nuestro trabajo pretendemos investigar el problema de la libertad en la figura de G. W. F. Hegel desde una perspectiva propiamente ontológica. Con vistas a este propósito hemos querido deslindar el problema moral de la libertad de su dimensión propiamente ontológica, sobre todo en un texto como la Fenomenología del Espíritu, que en nuestros días cumple su aniversario doscientos. Por medio de este análisis del problema de la libertad en la Fenomenología del Espíritu, también hemos conseguido (...) sacar a la luz la profunda familiaridad del pensamiento hegeliano con otras corrientes del pensamiento radicalmente genealogistas e inmoralistas, como son las de Nietzsche y Spinoza. (shrink)

Según la psicología moral de Iris Murdoch no hay ninguna diferencia esencial entre el arte (el buen arte) y la moral. Ambas actividades exigen del individuo una disciplina que está encaminada a desembarazarse de las distorsiones que nuestra imaginación produce en la realidad. La imaginación, puesta al servicio del egoísmo y la autoconsolación, impide todo progreso hacia la objetividad y el bien tanto en el arte como en la moral. Un obstáculo en este progreso, además del egoísmo, es la opacidad (...) de los seres humanos. Según Murdoch, el arte y, sobre todo, la literatura tienen la función primordial de retratar la situaciones humanas de una manera que haga de la lectura una actividad no sólo estética, sino también cognoscitiva. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall argue that both cognitivism and liberal contractualism defend a pre-moral conception of human desire that has its origin in the Hobbesian and Humean tradition that both theories share. Moreover, the computational and syntactic themes in cognitive science support the notion, which Gauthier evidently shares, that the human mind ¿ or, in Gauthier¿s case, the mind of ¿economic man¿ ¿ is a purely formal mechanism, characterized by logical and mathematical operations. I shall conclude that a single (...) conception of human behaviour runs through the various dominant psychological, moral and political theories of analytic inspiration. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall argue that both cognitivism and liberal contractualism defend a pre-moral conception of human desire that has its origin in the Hobbesian and Humean tradition that both theories share. Moreover, the computational and syntactic themes in cognitive science support the notion, which Gauthier evidently shares, that the human mind – or, in Gauthier’s case, the mind of “economic man” – is a purely formal mechanism, characterized by logical and mathematical operations. I shall conclude that a single (...) conception of human behaviour runs through the various dominant psychological, moral and political theories of analytic inspiration. (shrink)

RESUMENEl particularismo moral rechaza la pertinencia del recurso a los principios en ética. Una serie de autores de filiación postanalítica neowittgensteiniana han asumido esta posición conducidos por planteamientos antiteóricos, que rechazan el rol evaluativo de la filosofía moral. En este artículo se presenta y examina críticamente esta posición. No se afirma aquí que los antiteóricos incurran necesariamente en posiciones inconsistentes, pero se apunta que su crítica a la teoría moral puede estar descaminada, al descansar en una comprensión incorrecta del carácter (...) de la justificación en ética.PALABRAS CLAVEPARTICULARISMO, GENERALISMO, ANTITEORÍA, JUSTIFICACIÓN MORALABSTRACTMoral particularism claims that principles have no use in ethics. A number of authors working in the postanalitic neowittgensteinian tradition have held this position, driven by an antitheoretical viewpoint which rejects the evaluative role of moral philosophy. This paper presents and examines this position from a critical perspective. It does not claim that antitheorists necessarily hold inconsistent positions, but it points out that their critique of moral theory may be misinformed, since it rests on a wrong conception of what justification in ethics is about.KEYWORDSPARTICULARISM, GENERALISM, ANTITHEORY, MORAL JUSTIFICATION. (shrink)

El particularismo moral rechaza la pertinencia del recurso a los principios en ética. Una serie de autores de filiación postanalítica neowittgensteiniana han asumido esta posición conducidos por planteamientos antiteóricos, que rechazan el rol evaluativo de la filosofía moral. En este artículo se presenta y examina críticamente esta posición. No se afirma aquí que los antiteóricos incurran necesariamente en posiciones inconsistentes, pero se apunta que su crítica a la teoría moral puede estar descaminada, al descansar en una comprensión incorrecta del carácter (...) de la justificación en ética. -/- Moral particularism claims that principles have no use in ethics. A number of authors working in the postanalitic neowittgensteinian tradition have held this position, driven by an antitheoretical viewpoint which rejects the evaluative role of moral philosophy. This paper presents and examines this position from a critical perspective. It does not claim that antitheorists necessarily hold inconsistent positions, but it points out that their critique of moral theory may be misinformed, since it rests on a wrong conception of what justification in ethics is about. (shrink)

Se sostiene de manera habitual que los animales no pueden ser considerados personas, razón por la cual no es posible efectuar una demanda en su nombre. Este artículo examina tal idea. En él se analizan en primer lugar los distintos sentidos que el término "persona" tiene en el ámbito coloquial, metafísico, moral y jurídico, y se muestra que no hay una conexión necesaria entre estos. Asimismo, se desgranan y evalúan los distintos argumentos a favor del antropocentrismo moral, concluyéndose que ninguno (...) de ellos tiene éxito. Finalmente, se argumenta que si se continúa manteniendo la centralidad en el plano jurídico de la categoría de la personalidad, pero se excluye del alcance de esta a los animales de especies distintas a la nuestra, se incurrirá en una posición que carecerá de justificación moral. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Allegory and the Spaces of LoveOscar Martín (bio)Writing about Spanish sentimental fiction from 1450 to 1550 is not an easy task, as we are discussing a genre with a difficult theoretical configuration. The investigation of sentimental fiction, however, has been sorting out the classifications that applied to a hodgepodge of works previously labeled as “sentimental novel” (“novela sentimental”). This label, once attached uncritically to a bunch of heterogeneous texts (...) that shared such intangibles as “loving focus” or “prevalence of psychological description over narratives,” has been applied more consistently nowaday, thanks in part to the scholarly efforts started in the 1980s like those of Martínez Jiménez and Muñoz Marquina (1982), and Martínez Latre (1989).1 Using some of these research efforts, Alan Deyermond has codified the genre accurately:Brevity; focus on psychological interest over external action; a tragic vision of love; autobiography (first-person narration or a narrator as a character) and the insertion of letters or poems (or, often, both) into the narration.[77]2Within this scholarly categorization, Regula Rohland de Langbehn has been pivotal in offering—first in 1986, and more recently in 1999—a threefold scheme in the development of the genre she labels as “sentimental novel”: a first group chronologically of the genre would be represented by Siervo libre de amor and Sátira de felice e infelice vida, both works marked by the influence of cancionero poetry—specially in the allegorical structuring and in the characterization of love, and by other subjects being limited to an abstract and general analysis of emotions. Both works also present a debate over the moral value of love. A second group would gravitate around Triste deleytacion and the works of Diego de San Pedro and Juan de Flores, works that show a wider range of topics and the impact of a broader generic textuality like cancionero poetry and such chivalric novels as Tirant. Finally, she distinguishes a third group whose main characteristic is the imprint of Celestina’s influence on both the narrative surface and its thematic approach. In the same vein, Vicenta Blay Manzanera has taken up this threefold scheme, dividing the genre into “the creation of the paradigm” (“la creación del paradigma”) the climactic stage, and the downfall and disarticulation of the narrative sentimental system” (“la fase climática” and “el tercero la fase de declive o desintegración del paradigma”) [“La conciencia genérica” 221]. [End Page 132]Just as Rohland de Langbehn’s works had at least settled down the arguments about the existence of a sentimental novelistic genre, however, medieval Hispanic scholarship has been shaken by an entrenched debate over not only the identification of this genre (novel or fiction) but whether the genre even existed at all. It was Antonio Cortijo Ocaña who, while editing a critical cluster in La Corónica on sentimental fiction, opened the door to some scholars such as Weissberger who voiced their skepticism over the generic nature of sentimental prose, a skepticism already present in an innovative volume published by Gwara and Gerli in 1997. This skeptical position was also supported by Cortijo Ocaña himself, who in 2001 published a monumental work in which, although using the generic term as a departure point, he ended up suggesting the difficulty of defining it, therefore jettisoning it. This position in turn was contested by Rohland de Langbehn, who in 2002 defended the validity of both the existence of a genre and its name novela sentimental, a position that has sparked a new round of replies in a La Corónica forum in 2003.In this debate, I would join today’s minority position on the existence of a sentimental genre, because, as I explained in my 2001 review of Rohland de Langbehn’s book and as I find convincingly argued in her 2002 contribution, there are internal traits within sentimental fictional texts that do not appear together in other sentimental generic texts [139]. In addition, once we take into account the obvious intertextuality of those sentimental texts, as Blay Manzanera has shown [“La conciencia genérica”], and the overutilization of central motifs in the configuration of love’s debate, we... (shrink)

RESUMENLa filosofía del derecho de Fichte supone una importante anomalía dentro del Idealismo Alemán, en especial por su problemático posicionamiento en relación con la filosofía del derecho de Kant y su reelaboración del derecho natural. Fichte publica el Fundamento del Derecho Natural según los principios de la Doctrina de la Ciencia en 1796, es decir, un año después de la publicación de Hacia la paz perpetua y un año antes de la publicación de los «Principios metafísicos de la doctrina del (...) derecho» de la Metafísica de las Costumbres. La formulación y fundamentación que lleva a cabo Fichte en esta obra del derecho natural es enteramente original y a la vez internamente problemática debido a la tensión que en ella se da entre la validez normativa de los principios del derecho y la realización positiva de los mismos. Ejemplo paradigmático de esta tensión lo ofrece la noción de «derecho originario» (Urrecht) que Fichte elabora a lo largo de su trabajo de 1796. Nuestra investigación se va a centrar en analizar esta noción de «derecho originario» en la doctrina del derecho de Fichte para desplegar una interpretación iusnaturalista de la misma con vistas a relativizar o por lo menos matizar las lecturas preeminentemente positivistasde la filosofía del derecho de Fichte.PALABRAS CLAVESIDEALISMO ALEMÁN, DERECHO NATURAL, PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHOY DERECHO ORIGINARIOABSTRACTFichte's philosophy of right constitutes an anomaly within German Idealism, particularly due to its problematic positioning in relation to Kant's philosophy of right and his reworking of natural right. Fichte published Foundations of Natural Right in Accordance with the Principles of the Doctrine of Science in 1796, that is, a year after the publication of Towards Perpetual Peace and a year before the publication of «Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Right», in Metaphysics of Morals. Fichte's formulation and substantiation in this work on natural right is entirely original and, at the same time, internally problematic due to the tension created between the regulatory validity of the principles of right and their positive realisation. A paradigmatic example of this tension can be seen in the notion of «primordial right» (Urrecht) developed by Fichte throughout his 1796 work. Our research will centre on analysing the notion of «primordial right» in Fichte's Doctrine of Right to present a natural law-based interpretation of this right with a view to qualifying or at least placing into perspective the pre-eminently positivist readings of Fichte's philosophy of right.KEYWORDSGERMAN IDEALISM, NATURAL RIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT,PRIMORDIAL RIGHT. (shrink)

Nonhuman animals are routinarily used as resources for us to use. An important argument in the literature on the issue claims that this is justified because we are not attached to them by the emotional ties that bind us to other human beings. This line of reasoning is examined here and found to be faulty as regards both its factual and its normative assumptions. This implies that the burden of proof rests on the side of those who want to defend (...) the use of nonhuman animals. The paper concludes with the claim that until a sound defense of anthropocentrism is provided, we should assume that such use is not morally justified. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza la tesis foucaultiana de la reducción de la filosofía a forma de conocimiento en Descartes y el consecuente abandono de la espiritualidad clásica, es decir, de la filosofía concebida como forma de vida basada en el cuidado de sí. A partir de aquí, además de observar que el propio Foucault matizará esta tesis, se demostrará que en Descartes la filosofía sigue esencialmente unida a la espiritualidad.

El punto de vista de Ferrater Mora en filosofía moral fue de una notable originalidad, anticipando en determinados aspectos posiciones desarrolladas por otros teóricos en décadas posteriores. En metaética Ferrater se opuso al realismo moral, así como a la idea de que existen imperativos categóricos, defendiendo un enfoque internista de las razones y relativista. En ética normativa propuso un sistema de fines últimos no identificable con ninguna de las teorías normativas aceptadas de forma extendida en la actualidad, e intentó conciliar (...) ciertas facetas de los enfoques contractualistas y consecuencialistas. Finalmente, dignificó la ética aplicada en el mundo de habla hispana, adoptando en este campo posiciones notablemente comprometidas en un contexto que en su momento resultaba muy poco propicio para ello. El punto más representativo en el que esto fue así lo constituyó su defensa de la consideración moral de los animales, rechazando los planteamientos especistas antropocéntricos. -/- Ferrater Mora’s viewpoint in moral philosophy was significantly original. In certain aspects, he anticipated positions which were further developed by other theorists decades later. In metaethics, Ferrater opposed moral realism, as well as the view that there is such thing as cathegorical imperatives. He defended a relativist viewpoint and an internalist stance about reasons. In normative ethics, he proposed a system of ends dissimilar to any of the normative theories that are more widely accepted today, and tried to put together certain traits of contractarian and consequentialist views. Finally, he dignified applied ethics in the Spanish speaking world. Moreover, he adopted rather commited positions in this field, in a context which was not favorable at that time. Most significantly, he did this in his defense of the moral consideration of animals, and his rejection of speciesist views. (shrink)

In standard cases of discrimination the interests of the discriminatees are considered comparatively worse than those of others. Accordingly, discrimination is often defined as some form of differential consideration or treatment which, among other features, entails a disadvantage for discriminatees. There are some apparent forms of nonstandard discrimination, however, in which it seems that this need not occur. This paper examines three of them: epistemic discrimination, discrimination against entities unable to be harmed by it and nonhierarchical segregation. If, as it (...) seems, these really are forms of discrimination that means standard definitions may fail or must be reinterpreted. There is a way to account for the mentioned nonstandard forms of discrimination by claiming that all forms of worse consideration or treatment can be considered discriminatory. This, however, entails interpreting the term “worse” in a very broad manner, and some may not find this solution intuitive. Despite this, the paper will argue that alternative accounts entail more serious problems. (shrink)