The paper attempts to schematize, in the form of abductive inferences, the major changes in the developing picture of the atom during the modem period of scientific investigation. The aim of this presentation is to enable students in logic or the philosophy of science to see how a sustained application of abduction might be seen as operative in the development of changing conceptions of the atom, a development which may well be seen as a scientific revolution. The sustained example also (...) illustrates, in pedagogic fashion, the role of images in abduction, the theory-observation distinction, and the analytic-synthetic distinction. (shrink)

The purpose of this substantive volume is to familiarize English readers with the Tübingen interpretation of Plato’s thought. Although there are a few other works in English on the German school of Platonism—Catan himself had earlier translated a work of Krämer, the founder of the school— this is by far the most detailed. Moreover, the work also tries to be a systematic defense of the position of the school and to amplify the explanatory power of the position by exploring further (...) implications of the basic ideas of the school. (shrink)

In the course of examining the notions of cause and explanation, Hankinson’s book draws the reader into a summary of much of Greek philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the end of the Antiquity. Of such a huge survey this review can only provide a brief summary.

Most students of Greek philosophy would probably find it difficult to recount significant features of Cynic philosophy from their undergraduate or graduate courses in philosophy; it would often be omitted from the treatment of Hellenistic or later philosophy. Such omission was due not simply to an oversight on the part of the instructor but also to the general lack of interest among the scholarly community. Of course, the scholarly community had little material to nourish its insights; Dudley’s work was about (...) the only book easily to be found on the topic. However, evidence of a new interest in the Cynics is evidenced not simply by this book but by other works that have been emerging over the last while—even beyond the narrow confines of philosophy. Navia had recently published a detailed bibliography on the Cynics. Canadians can be happy that already years ago Paquet published at Ottawa an important sourcebook on the Cynics, with fragments pertaining to them translated into French. Recently a scholarly conference of CNRS in France put its proceedings into print on this topic, while somewhat earlier, a German anthology on the subject also appeared. All these stirrings of interest notwithstanding, there are other and even more provocative reasons to take note of the Cynics. Some theologians have been courting the idea that Jesus might have been a Cynic. The most serious work along these lines has been done by Downing, who has published a book of fragments as well as a monograph on the topic. In the more popular sphere, Crossan has been advocating the thesis that Jesus was a “Jewish Cynic.” Finally, given the many so-called “cynical” attitudes that have developed on the part of the general populace toward politicians, authority figures, sports heroes, and even entertainers, it seems worthwhile to pause for a consideration of the roots of cynicism and look at what is thought to be its ancient namesake. (shrink)

LetCbe an axiom system formalized within the first order functional calculus, and letC′ be related toCas the Bernays-Gödel set theory is related to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Ilse Novak [5] and Mostowski [8] have shown that, ifCis consistent, thenC′ is consistent. Mostowski has also proved the stronger result that any theorem ofC′ which can be formalized inCis a theorem ofC.The proofs of Novak and Mostowski do not provide a direct method for obtaining a contradiction inCfrom a contradiction inC′. (...) We could, of course, obtain such a contradiction by proving the theorems ofCone by one; the above result assures us that we must eventually obtain a contradiction. A similar process is necessary to obtain the proof of a theorem inCfrom its proof inC′. The purpose of this paper is to give a new proof of these theorems which provides a direct method of obtaining the desired contradiction or proof.The advantage of the proof may be stated more specifically by arithmetizing the syntax ofCandC′. (shrink)

This work is a revised presentation of Kupczak’s dissertation, The Human Person as an Efficient Cause in the Christian Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla. It is introduced by Michael Novak’s article, “The Christian Philosophy of John Paul II”, which serves as an excellent entrée to Kupczak’s analysis of Wojtyla’s system.

Reductionism and holism, that is, antireductionism, are two of the prevailing paradigms within the philosophy of biology. Reductionists strive to understand biological phenomena by reducing them to a series of levels of complexity with each lower level forming the foundation for the subsequent level, by mapping such biological phenomena inasmuch as possible to the principal phenomena within the fundamental sciences of chemistry and physics. In this way, complex phenomena can be reduced to assemblages of more elementary explananda. Holism, in counterpart, (...) claims that there independently exist phenomena arising from ordered levels of complexity that have intrinsic causal power and cannot be reduced in this way. When dealing with the nature of biology and its unique foundations of essentialism, determinism and ethics, the pedagogical lens through which these foundations are conveyed to learners could provide a limited perspective if only the reductive approach is followed as it would not sensitise learners to the true complexity of the phenomenon of life and the study thereof, and it is the purpose of this article to frame the reductionist–antireductionist debate in order to illustrate this.Contribution: This article contributes new knowledge to the field of the philosophy of science; more specifically, the philosophy of biology by critically evaluating the pervasive dialectic between the theoretical frameworks of reductionism and antireductionism and alluding to the pedagogical consequences thereof. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that medical professionals should protect a future child's rights by prohibiting disabled parents from using technology to deliberately have a disabled child because disability is taken as an inevitable, severe threat to a child's otherwise “open” future. I will first argue that the open future that allegedly protects a child's future autonomy is precluded by the very conditions needed to develop that future autonomy. Any child's future will be narrowed as they are socialized in a way (...) that gives them the capacity for autonomous choice. However, oppressive master narratives can diminish a future child's autonomy by distorting their narrative identity and constricting their agency. In fact, the open future argument does just this by advancing one of the most damaging master narratives about disability: that disability inevitably and severely restricts a person's autonomy and closes their future. (shrink)

This paper examines the need for static dispositions within the basic ontology of the powers view of properties. To lend some focus, Neil Williams’s well developed case for static dispositions is considered. While his arguments are not necessarily intended to address fundamental ontology, they still provide a useful starting point, a springboard for diving into the deeper metaphysical waters of the dispositionalist approach. Within that ontological context, this paper contends that Williams’s arguments fail to establish the need to posit static (...) dispositions, or at least any sort not already well appreciated by advocates of the powers view. The paper then proceeds to suggest an alternative motivation for positing static dispositions, the success of which depends greatly on which ontological approach to objects is paired with the powers view. (shrink)

It may seem obvious that causing disability in another person is morally problematic in a way that removing or preventing a disability is not. This suggests that there is a moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability. This chapter investigates whether there are any differences between these two types of actions that might explain the existence of a general moral asymmetry. After setting aside the possibility that having a disability is almost always bad or harmful for a person (a (...) view that we have critiqued at length elsewhere), seven putative differences are considered. Ultimately, it is concluded that none of these seven factors can ground a general moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability, though each factor can provide some moral reason to avoid causing disability in certain particular cases. (shrink)