Znane z Traktatu wypowiedzi na temat „Ja" i „świata": „świat jest moim światem", „Sam jestem swoim światem", czy tez „Świat i życie to jedno", są istotne dla zrozumienia kwestii solipsyzmu, omawianych przez „wczesnego" Wittgensteina. Pod „solipsyzm" rozumie się zazwyczaj krańcową formę subiektywnego idealizmu głoszącego, że istnieje tylko Ja sam, a wszystko inne jest moim wyobrażeniem. Solipsysta uznaje, ze jego własna subiektywność jest czymś jedynie możliwym do poznania, co oznacza doprowadzenie idealizmu do subiektywnej skrajności: wszystko co nam się ukazuje, jest traktowane (...) jako coś wyobrażonego. Pytanie o solipsyzm pojawia się w dzisiejszych analizach subiektywności świadomości. Solipsysta neguje chociażby możliwość ustalenia, czy jakiś inny podmiot są siebie świadome. Rzeczywistość obcych stanów świadomości jest przez solipsysta ignorowana, gdyż wychodząc z istnienia własnej świadomości, może on jedynie przez analogię wnioskować o istnieniu obcych stanów świadomości. W argumentacjach przeciwko solipsyzmowi podkreśla się, ze stanowisko to wikła się w sprzeczność, gdyż w celu sformułowania swoich własnych też musi używać języka, co z kolei zakłada obecność intersubiektywnego świata, którego istnienie neguje. (shrink)

Znane z Traktatu wypowiedzi na temat „Ja" i „świata": „świat jest moim światem", „Sam jestem swoim światem", czy tez „Świat i życie to jedno", są istotne dla zrozumienia kwestii solipsyzmu, omawianych przez „wczesnego" Wittgensteina. Pod „solipsyzm" rozumie się zazwyczaj krańcową formę subiektywnego idealizmu głoszącego, że istnieje tylko Ja sam, a wszystko inne jest moim wyobrażeniem. Solipsysta uznaje, ze jego własna subiektywność jest czymś jedynie możliwym do poznania, co oznacza doprowadzenie idealizmu do subiektywnej skrajności: wszystko co nam się ukazuje, jest traktowane (...) jako coś wyobrażonego. Pytanie o solipsyzm pojawia się w dzisiejszych analizach subiektywności świadomości. Solipsysta neguje chociażby możliwość ustalenia, czy jakiś inny podmiot są siebie świadome. Rzeczywistość obcych stanów świadomości jest przez solipsysta ignorowana, gdyż wychodząc z istnienia własnej świadomości, może on jedynie przez analogię wnioskować o istnieniu obcych stanów świadomości. W argumentacjach przeciwko solipsyzmowi podkreśla się, ze stanowisko to wikła się w sprzeczność, gdyż w celu sformułowania swoich własnych też musi używać języka, co z kolei zakłada obecność intersubiektywnego świata, którego istnienie neguje. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud i Ludwig Wittgenstein byli Wiedeńczykami. Twórca psychoanalizy spędził w tym mieście całe swoje życie, zmarł jednak na wygnaniu w Londynie. Wittgenstein, jeden z największych filozofów minionego stulecia, większość twórczego życia spędził poza Wiedniem. Osobiście prawdopodobnie ze sobą się nie spotkali, chociaż żyjąc w Wiedniu Wittgenstein na pewno słyszał o freudowskiej metodzie terapii. Stosunek Wittgensteina do Freuda i jego psychoanalizy jest ambiwalentny. Od wielkiego i wielokrotnie wyrażanego podziwu dla twórcy psychoanalizy i rozwiniętej przez niego teorii świadomości, po ostrą krytykę (...) jej samo rozumienia i stosowanej w niej metody. Istotne pytanie, które Wittgenstein zadaje nie tylko Freudowi, ale i jego uczniom, brzmi, czy faktycznie psychoanaliza jest naukową hipotezą o nieświadomości? Zdaniem G. Locka, „Wittgenstein jest «uczniem» Freuda, który zdaje się nie czynić nic jak tylko stawiać zarzuty swojemu mistrzowi". Freud, zdaniem Wittgensteina, twierdzi, że postępuje w sposób naukowy, że jego badania potrafią wyjaśnić ludzkie zachowania. Lecz faktycznie Freud uczynił coś zupełnie innego - stworzył nowy mit. Psychoanaliza, według Wittgensteina, oferuje formę myślenia i mówienia, która jest raczej nową mitologią aniżeli nową nauką. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud i Ludwig Wittgenstein byli Wiedeńczykami. Twórca psychoanalizy spędził w tym mieście całe swoje życie, zmarł jednak na wygnaniu w Londynie. Wittgenstein, jeden z największych filozofów minionego stulecia, większość twórczego życia spędził poza Wiedniem. Osobiście prawdopodobnie ze sobą się nie spotkali, chociaż żyjąc w Wiedniu Wittgenstein na pewno słyszał o freudowskiej metodzie terapii. Stosunek Wittgensteina do Freuda i jego psychoanalizy jest ambiwalentny. Od wielkiego i wielokrotnie wyrażanego podziwu dla twórcy psychoanalizy i rozwiniętej przez niego teorii świadomości, po ostrą krytykę (...) jej samo rozumienia i stosowanej w niej metody. Istotne pytanie, które Wittgenstein zadaje nie tylko Freudowi, ale i jego uczniom, brzmi, czy faktycznie psychoanaliza jest naukową hipotezą o nieświadomości? Zdaniem G. Locka, „Wittgenstein jest «uczniem» Freuda, który zdaje się nie czynić nic jak tylko stawiać zarzuty swojemu mistrzowi". Freud, zdaniem Wittgensteina, twierdzi, że postępuje w sposób naukowy, że jego badania potrafią wyjaśnić ludzkie zachowania. Lecz faktycznie Freud uczynił coś zupełnie innego - stworzył nowy mit. Psychoanaliza, według Wittgensteina, oferuje formę myślenia i mówienia, która jest raczej nową mitologią aniżeli nową nauką. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi containing, (...) besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

The Belgian conflict can be compared with a game theoretical model with two groups and a negative sum-game. Within each of the groups there is hierarchisation, role playing and formation ofcoalitions. On the Flemish side the main actor is the CVP, on the Walloon side it is the PS.The main objectives of the communities in the economie field are: temporary boarding employment in depressed industries and, simultaneously, the creation of high tech industries. Policy instruments to attain those goals are : (...) general economie measures ; selective-protective measures ; selective-innovative measures.Why is the sum-game negative or at least suboptimal?1. Mentioned policy instruments are spread over an incoherent set of institutions on the national and regional level, with rules that are partly centralist, partly federalist, partly confederalist. This leads to a complicated, unstable set of game rules in which the financial implications of decisions are shifted from the regional to the national level and vice versa.2. Selective-protective measures are of such large size that they offset and erode the beneficial effects of general policy measures regarding wages, taxes and exchange rate.Federalism or confederalism would and should establish a new set of rules between the two regions and between regional and federal state. Since a return to the ancien régime is politically unfeasible, this is the only logical way out of the present chaotic decision making process. Federalism would, inter alia, shift the financial responsibility of decisions in the field of industrial policy, education, health and public works towards the regions.This political reform requires a new constitution and therefore an agreement between the two communities. The chances for a new «talk» are presently not very high. Among the many reasons, one in particular strikes the eye : the major partner on the Flemish side, namely the Christian Democrats, have a multi-dimensional utility function, which not only is «concealed» for the others, but also undefined and unclear for the party itself. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...) decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature. (shrink)

I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct (...) authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

This book consists of the edited proceedings of a debate among Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Leszek Kolakowski that was held in Warsaw in May of 1995. It includes also commentary from those in attendance, including extensive remarks by Ernest Gellner. The debate marked the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and focussed primarily on topics related to historicism and cultural relativism.

deel 1. De zedelijkheid als menselijk fenomeen.

: This paper provides an analysis of the first decade of bioethics development in Slovakia (1990-1999), together with an overview of the most important bioethical issues entering the scene of public debate and scholarly ethical analysis.

The primary goal of this article is to get to the specifics of Zbigniew Herbert’s work. The poet had formal philosophical education and cannot be treated merely as a writer raising existential issues. The consequence of his studies in philosophy with the most eminent Polish philosophers of the time was that he took up important philosophical questions rather than used the answers that philosophers of the past had given. This is an important feature of his poetry and distinguishes Herbert from (...) those writers who subscribed to the worldview of their era. Failure to distinguish between these two stances has led to one-sided readings of his poem To Marcus Aurelius. The interpretations of the last sixty years quoted in the article lead to the conclusion that we are dealing with a kind of “contemporary”, or modified, “stoicism”. Later scholars interpreted the work as existential. A comparison of the poem with the work of Marcus Aurelius, and above all, an analysis of the differences between the ancient and modern understanding of such concepts as “nature”, “fate”, “self”, or “suffering”, allowed us to show the internal intellectualemotional tension in Herbert’s poem, and above all, the general idea of philosophizing poetry. The poet himself believed that it resembles primary reflection, such as that of the early Ionian thinkers. This is not about philosophizing on the basis of an elaborate conceptual apparatus, but about philosophical intuition and “philosophical experience”, an intellectual and emotional tension, in which – thanks to poetic talent – beauty is born. The dialog in To Marcus Aurelius is precisely a record of such poetic agitation. (shrink)

W 2021 roku przypada 700. rocznica śmierci Dantego, jednego z największych twórców literatury światowej. Polska tradycja klasyczna, romantyczna i katolicka przez wieki czerpała pełnymi garściami z jego dzieł, a szczególnie z _Boskiej Komedii. _Dante był bliski wielu pokoleniom naszych przodków, towarzysząc im na kolejnych szczeblach edukacji: gimnazjalnej, licealnej i uniwersyteckiej. Dla uczącej się młodzieży był mentorem i nauczycielem ukazującym naturę ludzką w pełnym jej wymiarze – od bestialstwa po heroizm i świętość. W czasach zamętu, którego obecnie doświadczamy, kiedy nie tylko (...) jednostki i wspólnoty, ale wręcz cała zachodnia cywilizacja znalazły się w „ciemnym lesie” i zostały wydane na łup trzech bestii : pychy, chciwości i pożądliwości, Dante Alighieri pozostaje drogowskazem i natchnieniem dla ludzi podzielających przekonanie, że istnieje prawda obiektywna oraz wartości uniwersalne, które wiążą wszystkich ludzi bez względu na rasę, narodowość i status społeczny. (shrink)