La notion de passage n’a pas été conceptualisée en linguistique ; cependant, elle se révèle utile dans des domaines d’application aussi divers que la thématique, la recherche d’information ou la représentation des connaissances.En s’appuyant sur l’expérience de la sémantique de corpus, cette étude précise la notion de passage par l’examen des rapports de sémiosis entre contenu et expression du passage, comme par l’étude des rapports contextuels au sein du passage et entre passages. Tenant compte des rapports entre fonds et formes (...) sémantiques, puis des transformations entre passages, l’investigation conduit à préciser des phénomènes qui intéressent tant la textualité que l’intertextualité, de la citation à la traduction. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

La notion de passage n’a pas été conceptualisée en linguistique ; cependant, elle se révèle utile dans des domaines d’application aussi divers que la thématique, la recherche d’information ou la représentation des connaissances.En s’appuyant sur l’expérience de la sémantique de corpus, cette étude précise la notion de passage par l’examen des rapports de sémiosis entre contenu et expression du passage, comme par l’étude des rapports contextuels au sein du passage et entre passages. Tenant compte des rapports entre fonds et formes (...) sémantiques, puis des transformations entre passages, l’investigation conduit à préciser des phénomènes qui intéressent tant la textualité que l’intertextualité, de la citation à la traduction. (shrink)

Après avoir interrogé la philosophie sur le peu de cas qu’elle fait de son propre langage, on cherche à définir si elle possède un domaine sémantique propre. Une analyse de la constitution de la terminologie propre à l’ontologie met en relief le rôle éminent de la substantivation des particules grammaticales, qui, indépendantes de tout domaine sémantique déterminé, assurent à cette terminologie son ubiquité. On interroge enfin la textualité philosophique et les récits abstraits qu’elle met en œuvre, pour reposer la question (...) des rapports entre mythe et philosophie. (shrink)

This study deals with money, especially coins, and intends to circumscribe the place of coinage among cultural objects. Money cannot be described without a semiotics of culture. We shall consider the definitions of value in order to define the evaluative foundations of meaning, and discuss the recurring parallel between signs and coins. Using a theory of anthropic zones, we will then attempt to determine the conditions necessary for the creation of objects of value, which should lead to a typology of (...) the different orders of fascination. (shrink)

Independently of the generative and enunciative theories, the dynamic structuralism of the Saussurian tradition has made it possible to pose the problem of semiosis, understood as the individuation of the sign from a structural germ. At a higher level of complexity, the processes that preside over this individuation seem to also govern the composition of texts. Literary and pictorial examples make it possible to detect them; they confirm that reflection on the arts is a major area of general and comparative (...) semiotics. (shrink)

Décisif ouvrage que ce dernier opus de François Rastier. Après Sémantique interprétative (1987), et dans le fil conducteur de Arts et sciences du texte (2001), qui furent des références pour une génération de chercheurs, l’auteur nous propose une réflexion réinventée sur un objet renouvelé. L’ambition du propos, telle qu’elle s’énonce dans le sous-titre de l’ouvrage, est de théoriser tout autant que pratiquer, une sémantique de corpus encore aujourd’hui dans les limbes. Ce projet, que Rastier..

Décisif ouvrage que ce dernier opus de François Rastier. Après Sémantique interprétative (1987), et dans le fil conducteur de Arts et sciences du texte (2001), qui furent des références pour une génération de chercheurs, l’auteur nous propose une réflexion réinventée sur un objet renouvelé. L’ambition du propos, telle qu’elle s’énonce dans le sous-titre de l’ouvrage, est de théoriser tout autant que pratiquer, une sémantique de corpus encore aujourd’hui dans les limbes. Ce projet, que Rastier...

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 214 Seiten: 193-198.

L’affaire Faye: Johannes Fritsche’s bizarre Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time mistranslates every key term in Sein und Zeit §74 and distorts the entire book. Gaëtan Pégny’s justification of Emmanuel Faye’s mistranslations of Heidegger is beyond irresponsible. François Rastier’s “Open Letter to Philosophy Today” lends uncritical support to Faye’s dubious “scholarship.”.

L’affaire Faye: Johannes Fritsche’s bizarre Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1999) mistranslates every key term in Sein und Zeit §74 and distorts the entire book. Gaëtan Pégny’s justification of Emmanuel Faye’s mistranslations of Heidegger is beyond irresponsible. François Rastier’s “Open Letter to Philosophy Today” lends uncritical support to Faye’s dubious “scholarship.”.

Résumé Cet article se propose d’envisager le signe iconique à l’aune du modèle néosaussurien du signe et de la sémiosis qui se dégage des Écrits de linguistique générale. Après avoir exposé ce modèle à partir des propositions que François Rastier tire des textes autographes de Saussure, cette contribution transpose le cadre à la description du signe iconique, en réinterrogeant certains éléments de la conceptualisation que donne le Groupe µ de ce type d’énoncé visuel. Une brève analyse de la toile (...) Le retour à la nature de Magritte permet d’illustrer et de valider la transposition théorique du modèle néosaussurien du signe et de la sémiosis. Cette démarche ouvre la possibilité de procéder à l’interprétation des images selon la théorie morphosémiotique développée par la sémantique de Rastier. (shrink)

La collection « Lettres numériques » d’Honoré Champion est un des rares lieux éditoriaux aujourd’hui qui s’applique à promouvoir des ouvrages de philologie numérique. L’essai de Margareta Kastberg Sjöblom ne déroge pas à la ligne éditoriale fixée par les directeurs de collection, François Rastier et Jean-Marie Viprey, et propose une étude linguistique assistée par ordinateur de l’œuvre littéraire de Jean-Marie Le Clézio. La force de l’ouvrage tient d’abord dans le corpus étudié et la méthode ..

La collection « Lettres numériques » d’Honoré Champion est un des rares lieux éditoriaux aujourd’hui qui s’applique à promouvoir des ouvrages de philologie numérique. L’essai de Margareta Kastberg Sjöblom ne déroge pas à la ligne éditoriale fixée par les directeurs de collection, François Rastier et Jean-Marie Viprey, et propose une étude linguistique assistée par ordinateur de l’œuvre littéraire de Jean-Marie Le Clézio. La force de l’ouvrage tient d’abord dans le corpus étudié et la méthode...

Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...) the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethic without sentience.

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...) of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion. (shrink)

Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from (...) discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature. (shrink)

Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link between (...) phenomenality and value. If they accept that there is such a link, they might be committed to revisionary normative consequences (and some of them may prove to be uncomfortable). If they deny that there is such link, they might avoid revisionary normative consequences (without being guaranteed against them) but then they have to give reasons to deny that such link obtains, which is not a trivial task. The existence of the normative challenge does not show that illusionism is false, but it shows that illusionism might have important consequences in the normative domain, which have to be clarified. (shrink)

The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. This critique is most charitably construed as a dilemma. The principle of equal consideration can be interpreted in either of two ways. While it faces counterexamples on the first reading, it makes Singer’s argument question-begging on the (...) second. In response, Singer has grasped the first horn of this dilemma and tried to accommodate Kagan’s apparent counterexamples. In my opinion, this attempt is unpersuasive: the principle of equal consideration is inconsistent with common-sense intuitions on Kagan’s cases. Worse, Singer’s argument begs the question anyway. It therefore faces two serious objections. This is not to say that there is nothing wrong with speciesism, however. In the second half of the paper, I propose another, better argument against speciesism, which I argue is immune to both objections. According to this other argument, speciesism is wrong because it involves discriminating on the basis of a merely biological property. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The present (...) paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable. (shrink)

Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals, and this “speciesist belief” plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I develop a debunking argument against it. My contention is that this belief is unjustified because it is largely due to an off-track process: our attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance generated by the “meat paradox”. Most meat-eaters believe that it is wrong to (...) harm animals unnecessarily, yet they routinely and deliberately behave in ways that cause great unnecessary suffering to animals. As recent research suggests, this practical inconsistency puts them in an unpleasant state of dissonance, which they try to escape by resolving the paradox. And they do so in part by adopting the speciesist belief—if animal suffering matters much less than human suffering, then harming animals cannot be so wrong after all. Since this belief-forming process does not track moral truth, I conclude that we are not justified in believing that human interests matter more than the similar interests of non-humans. (shrink)

Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. They think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue (...) that this argument fails by showing that its defenders cannot maintain that its crucial premise has the kind of support needed for the argument to work, without begging the question against illusionism. (shrink)

In this strikingly original contribution to our understanding of Chinese philosophy,Françle;ois Julien, a French sinologist whose work has not yet appeared in English usesthe Chinese concept of shi - meaning disposition or circumstance, power or potential - as atouchstone to explore Chinese culture and to uncover the intricate and coherent structure underlyingChinese modes of thinking.A Hegelian prejudice still haunts studies of ancient Chinese civilization:Chinese thought, never able to evolve beyond a cosmological point of view, with an indifference toany notion of (...) telos, sought to interpret reality solely on the basis of itself. In thisgroundbreaking study, prejudices toward the simplicity and "naiveté" of Chinese thought, Hegelianand otherwise, are dismantled one by one to reveal the intricate and coherent structure underlyingChinese modes of thinking and representing reality.Jullien begins with a single Chinese term, shi,whose very ambivalence and disconcerting polysemy, on the one hand, and simple efficacy, on theother, defy the order of a concept. Yet shi insinuates itself into the ordering and conditioning ofreality in all its manifold and complex representations. Because shi neither gave rise to anycoherent, general analysis nor figured as one of the major concepts among Chinese thinkers, Jullienfollows its appearance from one field to another: from military strategy to politics; from theaesthetics of calligraphy and painting to the theory of literature; and from reflection on historyto "first philosophy."At the point where these various domains intersect, a fundamental intuitionassumed self-evident for centuries emerges, namely, that reality - every kind of reality - may beperceived as a particular deployment or arrangement of things to be relied upon and worked to one'sadvantage. Art or wisdom, as conceived by the Chinese, lies in strategically exploiting thepropensity that emanates from this particular configuration of reality. (shrink)

I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.

Oscar Horta has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of “speciesism” that speciesism is unjustified just as it stems from the definition of “murder” that murder is illegal. The present paper is a case against this conception. I distinguish two issues: one is descriptive and the other normative. Relying on (...) philosophers’ use of the term, I first answer the descriptive question negatively: speciesism is a purely descriptive concept. Then, based on both its main functions in the philosophical and public debates and an analogy with racism, I answer the normative question negatively: speciesism should remain a purely descriptive concept. If I am correct, then speciesism neither is nor should be wrong by definition. (shrink)