The origins of the unrest among the Pannonian legions in A.D. 14 are easily discerned. The great war in Illyricum of A.D. 6–9 involved the legions in a series of extremely arduous campaigns extending across the western half of the Balkan Peninsula, in particular the impenetrable forests of Bosnia and the rugged karst of Dalmatia. The nearness of this area to Italy made the war a great crisis in the reign of Augustus: conquest of Illyricum was the keystone of Augustus' (...) northern frontier policy and no efforts were spared to achieve this. Advances in Germany could be determined from expediency but the subjugation of the Bosnian tribes was a necessity. During the war the need for men was so great that conscription was introduced in Italy and even freedmen were enlisted when ordinary citizen volunteers were not forthcoming. Cassius Dio speaks of the low morale and outbreaks of mutiny in the army of Tiberius during the last season of the war. (shrink)

Cognitive control is easy to identify in its effects, but difficult to grasp conceptually. This creates somewhat of a puzzle: Is cognitive control a bona fide process or an epiphenomenon that merely exists in the mind of the observer? The topiCS special edition on cognitive control presents a broad set of perspectives on this issue and helps to clarify central conceptual and empirical challenges confronting the field. Our commentary provides a summary of and critical response to each of the papers.

Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained (...) and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. This book should be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists. (shrink)