A recent analysis by de Barros and Suppes of experimentally realizable GHZ correlations supports the conclusion that these correlations cannot be explained by introducing local hidden variables. We show, nevertheless, that their analysis does not exclude local hidden variable models in which the inefficiency in the experiment is an effect not only of random errors in the detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-set, hidden property of the particles ("prism models"). Indeed, we present an explicit prism model (...) for the GHZ scenario; that is, a local hidden variable model entirely compatible with recent GHZ experiments. (shrink)

A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition (...) of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. (shrink)

On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only (...) if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed. (shrink)

In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called a “Reality Criterion” imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. They concluded that there must be a more complete description of physical reality involving some hidden variables that can characterize the state of affairs in the world in (...) more detail than the quantum mechanical state. This conclusion leads to paradoxical results. -/- As Bell proved in 1964, under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion that there are hidden variables implies that, in some spin-correlation experiments, the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments since the 1970s. -/- Some researchers have interpreted this result as showing that quantum mechanics is telling us nature is non-local, that is, that particles can affect each other across great distances in a time too brief for the effect to have been due to ordinary causal interaction. Others object to this interpretation, and the problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will. (shrink)

The paper sets out to offer an alternative to the function/argument approach to the most essential aspects of natural language meanings. That is, we question the assumption that semantic completeness (of, e.g., propositions) or incompleteness (of, e.g., predicates) exactly replicate the corresponding grammatical concepts (of, e.g., sentences and verbs, respectively). We argue that even if one gives up this assumption, it is still possible to keep the compositionality of the semantic interpretation of simple predicate/argument structures. In our opinion, compositionality presupposes (...) that we are able to compare arbitrary meanings in term of information content. This is why our proposal relies on an ‘intrinsically’ type free algebraic semantic theory. The basic entities in our models are neither individuals, nor eventualities, nor their properties, but ‘pieces of evidence’ for believing in the ‘truth’ or ‘existence’ or ‘identity’ of any kind of phenomenon. Our formal language contains a single binary non-associative constructor used for creating structured complex terms representing arbitrary phenomena. We give a finite Hilbert-style axiomatisation and a decision algorithm for the entailment problem of the suggested system. (shrink)

The common cause principle says that every correlation is either due to a direct causal effect linking the correlated entities or is brought about by a third factor, a so-called common cause. The principle is of central importance in the philosophy of science, especially in causal explanation, causal modeling and in the foundations of quantum physics. Written for philosophers of science, physicists and statisticians, this book contributes to the debate over the validity of the common cause principle, by proving results (...) that bring to the surface the nature of explanation by common causes. It provides a technical and mathematically rigorous examination of the notion of common cause, providing an analysis not only in terms of classical probability measure spaces, which is typical in the available literature, but in quantum probability theory as well. The authors provide numerous open problems to further the debate and encourage future research in this field. (shrink)

Greenberger. Horne. Shimony, and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the branching space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible (...) with a deterministic world nor with a world that permits correlated space-related events without a common cause. (shrink)

It is common in the literature on classical electrodynamics and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are derived from the pre-assumption that the equations of electrodynamics are covariant against these---unknown---transformation rules. There are several problems to be raised concerning these derivations. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations were completely correct, they leave open the following fundamental question: Are the so-obtained transformation rules indeed identical with the true transformation (...) rules of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities? In other words, is it indeed the case that the values calculated from the quantities in one inertial frame by means of the transformation rules we derived are equal to the values of the same quantities obtained by the same operations with the same measuring equipments when they are co-moving with the other inertial frame? This is of course an empirical question. In this paper, we will investigate the problem in a purely theoretical framework by applying what J. S. Bell calls “Lorentzian pedagogy”---according to which the laws of physics in any one reference frame account for all physical phenomena. We will show that the transformation rules of the electrodynamical quantities are indeed identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance of the equations of electrodynamics, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. Beforehand, however, we need to clarify the operational definitions of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities. As we will see, these semantic issues are not as trivial as one might think. (shrink)

While there is a longstanding discussion about the interpretation of the extended, general principle of relativity, there seems to be a consensus that the special principle of relativity is absolutely clear and unproblematic. However, a closer look at the literature on relativistic physics reveals a more confusing picture. There is a huge variety of, sometimes metaphoric, formulations of the relativity principle, and there are different, sometimes controversial, views on its actual content. The aim of this paper is to develop a (...) precise language in order to provide a precise formulation of the principle. In view of the fact that the special relativity principle is considered as a universal meta-law, which must be valid for all physical laws in all situations, we try to keep the formalism as general as possible. The benefit of the formal reconstruction is that it makes explicit all the necessary conceptual components of the principle; it brings out many subtle details and the related conceptual problems. (shrink)

A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system, where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible (...) with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The story of quantum probability theory and quantum logic begins with von Neumann’s recognition1, that quantum mechanics can be regarded as a kind of “probability theory”, if the subspace lattice L of the system’s Hilbert space H plays the role of event algebra and the ‘tr’-s play the role of probability distributions over these events. This idea had been completed in the Gleason theorem 2.

I will sketch a possible way of empirical/operational definition of space and time tags of physical events, without logical or operational circularities and with a minimal number of conventional elements. As it turns out, the task is not trivial; and the analysis of the problem leads to a few surprising conclusions.

If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be accommodated in a purely physical world.

It is common in the literature on classical electrodynamics and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are derived from the hypothesis that the relativity principle applies to Maxwell's electrodynamics. As it will turn out from our analysis, these derivations raise several problems, and certain steps are logically questionable. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations were completely correct, they leave open the following questions: Is the RP a true (...) law of nature for electrodynamical phenomena? Are, at least, the transformation rules of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities, derived from the RP, true? Is the RP consistent with the laws of ED in a single inertial frame of reference? Are, at least, the derived transformation rules consistent with the laws of ED in a single frame of reference? Obviously, and are empirical questions. In this paper, we will investigate problems and. Abstract First we will give a general mathematical formulation of the RP. In the second part, we will deal with the operational definitions of the fundamental electrodynamical quantities. As we will see, these semantic issues are not as trivial as one might think. In the third part of the paper, applying what J. S. Bell calls “Lorentzian pedagogy”---according to which the laws of physics in any one reference frame account for all physical phenomena---we will show that the transformation rules of the electrodynamical quantities are identical with the ones obtained by presuming the covariance of the equations of ED, and that the covariance is indeed satisfied. Abstract As to problem, the situation is much more complex. As we will see, the RP is actually not a matter of the covariance of the physical equations, but it is a matter of the details of the solutions of the equations, which describe the behavior of moving objects. This raises conceptual problems concerning the meaning of the notion “the same system in a collective motion”. In case of ED, there seems no satisfactory solution to this conceptual problem; thus, contrary to the widespread views, the question we asked in the title has no obvious answer. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to Fine's interpretation of quantum mechanics and to show how it can solve the EPR-Bell problem. In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed to independent random detection errors, and treated by the “enhancement hypothesis.” In Fine's interpretation the detection inefficiency is an effect not only of the random errors in the analyzer + detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-settled (hidden) property of the (...) particles. I present one of Fine's 2×2 prism models for the EPR experiment and compare it with the recent experimental results. In the second part of the paper I prove the existence of a wide class of n×n prism models with reasonable detection/emission efficiencies, satisfying the usually required symmetries. Contrary to the common persuasion, the efficiencies in these models do not necessarily tend to zero if n→∞. (shrink)

According to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electrodynamics, the electromagnetic field is conceived as a real physical entity existing in space and time. The problem we address in this paper is how to understand this spatiotemporal existence, that is, how to describe the persistence of a field-like physical entity like electromagnetic field. First, we provide a formal description of the notion of persistence: we derive an “equation of persistence” constituting a necessary condition that the spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental (...) attributes of a persisting physical entity must satisfy. We then prove a theorem according to which the vast majority of the solutions of Maxwell’s equations, describing possible spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of the electromagnetic field, violate the equation of persistence. Finally, we discuss the consequences of this result for the ontology of the electromagnetic field. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to develop a proper mathematical formalism which can help to clarify the necessary conceptual plugins to the special principle of relativity and leads to a deeper understanding of the principle in its widest generality.

In classical mechanics, the Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equivalent and hold for all possible dynamical processes. In relativistic physics, on the contrary, the situation is much more complex: It will be shown that Lorentz covariance and the principle of relativity are not equivalent. The reason is that the principle of relativity actually holds only for the equilibrium quantities characterizing the equilibrium state of dissipative systems. In the light of this fact it will be argued that (...) Lorentz covariance should not be regarded as a fundamental symmetry of the laws of physics. (shrink)

In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called a “Reality Criterion” imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. They concluded that there must be a more complete description of physical reality involving some hidden variables that can characterize the state of affairs in the world in (...) more detail than the quantum mechanical state. This conclusion leads to paradoxical results. -/- As Bell proved in 1964, under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion that there are hidden variables implies that, in some spin-correlation experiments, the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments since the 1970s. -/- Some researchers have interpreted this result as showing that quantum mechanics is telling us nature is non-local, that is, that particles can affect each other across great distances in a time too brief for the effect to have been due to ordinary causal interaction. Others object to this interpretation, and the problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will. (shrink)

I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But (...) in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore. (shrink)

On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only (...) if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed. (shrink)

I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound definition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a definition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means different — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the different particular situations. In other words, probability is a (...) reducible concept, supervening on physical quantities characterising the state of affairs corresponding to the event in question. On the other hand, however, these “probability-like” physical quantities correspond to objective features of the physical world, and are objectively related to measurable quantities like relative frequencies of physical events based on finite samples — no matter whether the world is objectively deterministic or indeterministic. (shrink)

As a first principle, it is the basic assumption of the standard relativistic formulation of classical electrodynamics (ED) that the physical laws describing the electromagnetic phenomena satisfy the relativity principle (RP). According to the standard view, this assumption is absolutely unproblematic, and its correctness is well confirmed, at least in a hypothetico-deductive sense, by means of the empirical confirmation of the consequences derived from it. In this paper, we will challenge this customary view as being somewhat simplistic. In the majority (...) of cases these results are, in fact, derived merely from the covariance of the corresponding equations, by means of the transformation rules. The RP is actually used in exceptional cases satisfying some special conditions. As we will see, however, it is quite problematic how the RP must be understood in the general case of a coupled particles + electromagnetic field system. (shrink)

Withdrawn by the author! The main content of this paper has been moved into "Szabó, László E., Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time? (ID Code:1321)".

Realists, Platonists and intuitionists jointly believe that mathematical concepts and propositions have meanings, and when we formalize the language of mathematics, these meanings are meant to be reflected in a more precise and more concise form. According to the formalist understanding of mathematics (at least, according to the radical version of formalism I am proposing here) the truth, on the contrary, is that a mathematical object has no meaning; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. (...) That’s all. (shrink)

It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in (...) both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects. (shrink)

If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. In this paper, I will sketch the first steps of a physicalist philosophy of mathematics; that is, how physicalism can account for logical and mathematical facts. We will proceed as follows. First we will clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are. Then, we will discuss how (...) these facts can be accommodated in the physicalist ontology. This might sound like immanent realism (as in Mill, Armstrong, Kitcher, or Maddy), according to which the mathematical concepts and propositions reflect some fundamental features of the physical world. Although, in my final conclusion I will claim that mathematical and logical truths do have contingent content in a sophisticated sense, and they are about some peculiar part of the physical world, I reject the idea, as this thesis is usually understood, that mathematics is about the physical world in general. In fact, I reject the idea that mathematics is about anything. In contrast, the view I am proposing here will be based on the strongest formalist approach to mathematics. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the principal difference between Einstein's special relativity and its contemporary rival Lorentz-type theories was that while the Lorentz-type theories were also capable of “explaining away” the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment and other experimental findings by means of the distortions of moving measuring-rods and moving clocks, special relativity revealed more fundamental new facts about the geometry of space-time behind these phenomena. I shall argue that special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of (...) space-time, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions; it simply calls something else "space-time", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about space-time and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects. (shrink)

“In an earlier era of ‘natural philosophy’, physics and philosophy of physics were quite inseparably intertwined, but in the modern age of proliferating specialization, fruitful communication across the disciplines has become the exception rather than rule. We would like to think that the workshop1 and this volume are symptomatic of an ongoing process of reunification, one which can pave the way toward exceptional progress in this fundamental and highly challenging area, and others as well” — the editors Richard A. Healey (...) and Geoffrey Hellman write in the Preface. The main topic of the ten articles in this volume, Quantum Measurement, indeed, requires both physical and philosophical considerations. (shrink)

This paper offers some reflections on the concepts of objective and subjective probability and Lewis' Principal Principle.

In his famous paper, An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory, Alonzo Church identified the intuitive notion of effective calculability with the mathematically precise notion of recursiveness. This proposal, known as Church's Thesis, has been widely accepted. Only a few papers have been written against it. One of these is László Kalmár's An Argument Against the Plausibility of Church's Thesis from 1959. The aim of this paper is to present Kalmár's argument and to fill in missing details based on (...) his general philosophical thoughts on mathematics. (shrink)

Anything other than paraphrasing the well-known Heraclitean aphorism would not be more appropriate to portray the crux of the contribution of the three philosophers of the Budapest School, Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Miklós Rédei and Lázló E. Szabó, in the ongoing discussion of the principle of the common cause . Indeed, ‘common causes love to hide’ and for that reason critics and aspirant falsifiers of PCC find correlations which, at a first level of analysis, might lack a common cause explanation. (...) But as the authors argue such correlations do not amount to disconfirming evidence for the principle, since PCC does not specify where to search for a common cause of a correlation; it just states that there is one. PCC is neither falsifiable, nor verifiable; it is a metaphysical doctrine that can only be assessed for its plausibility in the light of theories of empirical science. This idea fosters the investigation of the existence of common causes of correlations in two fundamental physical t .. (shrink)

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two (...) claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for. (shrink)

The relationship between humans and non-human animals has received considerable attention recently. Animal advocates insist that non-human animals must be included in the moral community. Consequently, eating meat is, at least in most cases, morally bad. In an article entitled “In Defense of Eating Meat”, Hsiao argued that for the membership in the moral community, the “root capacity for rational agency” is necessary. As non-human animals lack this capacity, so the argument runs, they do not belong to the moral community. (...) Consequently, harming non-human animals for human nutrition can be justified. In this short comment I would like to highlight some of the most important errors of the above argument, primarily from the perspective of a biologist. I conclude that assuming the existence of a mysterious “root capacity for rational agency” is a biological nonsense. It cannot be verified, and it only obscures reality. In my opinion, the greatest problem with Hsiao’s argument is that it tries to defend anthropocentrism, a view that has presumably been the very cause of the spoiled non-human–human relationships. Perhaps adopting a vegan lifestyle is a better solution than quieting one’s conscience. (shrink)

Each work of Kafka's is so rich in "interrelationships" that it is virtually impossible to engage in reasoning about them without analysis of notions "pertaining to content." Here an estheticist, even one who regards the immanent approach as obligatory, faces a dilemma that, as a general rule, confronts only someone just starting a career as critic: whether, upon having analyzed a work, to leave it to the reader himself to draw the conclusions in social philosophy, or whether to construct his (...) analysis directly on the basis of historical, sociological, philosophical, esthetic, and psychological reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of the space of possible analyses of the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction, together with a set of considerations which militate against all but our own proposal. Among the many accounts we consider and reject are the ‘explicit’ approach to quantifier domain restric‐tion discussed, for example, by Stephen Neale, and the pragmatic approach to quantifier domain restriction proposed by Kent Bach. Our hope is that the exhaustive discussion of this special case of (...) context‐dependence will provide guidelines for how to decide, for an arbitrary case of context‐dependent discourse, whether it should be treated syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. (shrink)

It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to (...) show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict. (shrink)

The worldwide development of the revolution in science and technology is still in its initial stage. However, the characteristics of a qualitatively higher stage are already becoming evident in the area of the development of the system of labor, and therefore systematic philosophical study on the basis of the available data is a pressing task. Theory plays a special role precisely in periods when a phenomenon is not yet evident in final form. It is especially then that an acute need (...) arises for scientifically foreseeing, in its major outlines, the course of its development in the future. Within the bounds of the present article we shall attempt to do this with respect to certain aspects of the process of interaction between man and nature. (shrink)

How are ownership relationships distributed in the geographical space? Is physical proximity a significant factor in investment decisions? What is the impact of the capital city? How can the structure of investment patterns characterize the attractiveness and development of economic regions? To explore these issues, we analyze the network of company ownership in Hungary and determine how are connections are distributed in geographical space. Based on the calculation of the internal and external linking probabilities, we propose several measures to evaluate (...) the attractiveness of towns and geographic regions. Community detection based on several null models indicates that modules of the network coincide with administrative regions, in which Budapest is the absolute centre, and where county centres function as hubs. Gravity model-based modularity analysis highlights that, besides the strong attraction of Budapest, geographical distance has a significant influence over the frequency of connections and the target nodes play the most significant role in link formation, which confirms that the analysis of the directed company-ownership network gives a good indication of regional attractiveness. (shrink)