THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

While not taking St. Anselm’s ontological argument in the Proslogion to be valid, this paper shows that the dismissal of the thesis by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Kant does less than justice to St. Anselm’s text. In Chapter II of the Proslogion Anselm defines God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, claiming that this notion ‘exists in the mind’. The question is does its subject, God, exist ‘in re’. Can one proceed from the mental existence to (...) real existence given that to exist in re is greater than to exist notionally? This paper sets out several of Anselm’s premises from which he concludes that the notional existence of God defined by Anselm entails God’s actual existence, Aquinas dismissed Anselm’s arguments – possibly not having Anselm’s full text at hand. Anselm maintains that if ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ can be conceived, then to deny its existence in re constitutes a self-contradiction. The present paper examines in detail the elements of which Anselm’s elegant arguments are composed: q.v. Reference is made to Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, and to Anselm’s ontology set out in Monologion. Much, for the modern reader, turns on the topical logic of ‘perfection’ and of ‘greatness’. Again: much turns on the Kantian question ‘Is existence a predicate?’ And on the question: what kinds of things can be the subject of predicates? The comparison which Anselm is making between real and conceptual existence is not like any other comparison. This may be the flaw in his arguments. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

IN Chapter 6 of the Poetics Aristotle defines tragedy as.

In the _Proslogion_, St. Anselm presents a philosophical argument for the existence of God. Anselm's proof, known since the time of Kant as the ontological argument for the existence of God, has played an important role in the history of philosophy and has been incorporated in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. Included in this edition of the_ Proslogion _are Gaunilo's "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" and St. Anselm's "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo." (...) All three works are in the original Latin with English translation on facing pages. Professor Charlesworth's introduction provides a helpful discussion of the context of the _Proslogion_ in the theological tradition and in Anselm's own thought and writing. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic. (shrink)

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

Mr. M. P. Charlesworth seems to have been too sceptical when he remarked that ‘the names of the Indian princelets given in the Periplus are unidentifiable, or rather too easily identifiable with any one, to be of any use’. Actually, the ruler mentioned in ch. 41 is identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and his date is practically certain.

Mr. M. P. Charlesworth seems to have been too sceptical when he remarked that ‘the names of the Indian princelets given in the Periplus are unidentifiable, or rather too easily identifiable with any one, to be of any use’. Actually, the ruler mentioned in ch. 41 is identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and his date is practically certain.

' I heartily recommend it to any philosopher of language interested in the issues. [] Logicians, of course, will want to savour the whole thing.' Australian Journal of Philosophy, 71:3 (1993).

Liturgy and ritual -- Structure -- Curriculum.

Semantic Indexicality shows how a simple syntax can be combined with a propositional language at the level of logical analysis. It is the adoption of such a base language which has not been attempted before, and it is this which constitutes the originality of the book. Cresswell's simple and direct style makes this book accessible to a wider audience than the somewhat specialized subject matter might initially suggest.

Adverbial modification is probably one of the least understood areas of linguistics. The essays in this volume all address the problem of how to give an analysis of adverbial modifiers within truth-conditional semantics. Chapters I-VI provide analyses of particular modifiers within a possible worlds framework, and were written between 1974 and 1981. Original publication details of these chapters may be found on p. vi. Of these, all but Chapter I make essential use of the idea that the time reference involved (...) in tensed sentences should be a time interval rather than a single instant. The final chapter (Chapter VII) was written especially for this volume and investigates the question of how the 'situation semantics' recently devised by Jon Barwise and John Perry, as a rival to possible-worlds semantics, might deal with adverbs. In addition I have included an appendix to Chapter III and an introduction which links all the chapters together. (shrink)

Over a longer period than I sometimes care to contemplate I have worked on possible-worlds semantics. The earliest work was in modal logic, to which I keep returning, but a sabbatical in 1970 took me to UCLA, there to discover the work of Richard Montague in applying possible-worlds semantics to natural lan guage. My own version of this appeared in Cresswell (1973) and was followed up in a number of articles, most of which were collected in Cresswell (1985b). A central (...) problem for possible worlds semantics is how to accommodate propositional attitudes. This problem was addressed in Cresswell (1985a), and the three books mentioned so far represent a reasonably complete picture of my positive views on formal semantics. I have regarded the presentation of a positive view as more important than the criticism of alternatives, although the works referred to do contain many passages in which I have tried to defend my own views against those of others. But such criticism is important in that a crucial element in establishing the content of a theory is that we be able to evaluate it in relation to its com petitors. It is for that reason that I have collected in this volume a number of articles in which I attempt to defend the positive semantical picture I favour against objections and competing theories. (shrink)

The paper considers the question of when the operator L of necessity in modal logic can be expressed in terms of the operator meaning it is non-contingent that.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.