Notre science ne saurait être qu’inachevable et infondable. Qu’implique cette situation du discours scientifique selon Pascal? Et quelles significations, existentielles et épistémologiques, accorder au recours inévitable à la « nature »? En quoi la nature est-elle en nous relais du discours?

La notion d’expérience transcendantale correspond dans l’œuvre de Husserl à une reprise radicalement nouvelle du projet classique d’une philosophie première, autre terme employé pour désigner la métaphysique en tant que recherche sur le sens de l’être et sur les principes premiers de sa connaissance. Une telle notion correspond très précisément à ce que Husserl appelle la réflexion phénoménologique transcendantale. Dans ses Méditations cartésiennes, il en livre à la fois le projet et la signi...

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it 'justificatory moral pluralism' - it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

The Jordan decomposition theorem states that every function $f \colon \, [0,1] \to \mathbb {R}$ of bounded variation can be written as the difference of two non-decreasing functions. Combining this fact with a result of Lebesgue, every function of bounded variation is differentiable almost everywhere in the sense of Lebesgue measure. We analyze the strength of these theorems in the setting of reverse mathematics. Over $\mathsf {RCA}_{0}$, a stronger version of Jordan’s result where all functions are continuous is equivalent to (...) $\mathsf {ACA}_0$, while the version stated is equivalent to ${\textsf {WKL}}_{0}$. The result that every function on $[0,1]$ of bounded variation is almost everywhere differentiable is equivalent to ${\textsf {WWKL}}_{0}$. To state this equivalence in a meaningful way, we develop a theory of Martin–Löf randomness over $\mathsf {RCA}_0$. (shrink)

Instrumental stakeholder theory seeks to explain how managing stakeholders effectively can yield competitive advantage for incumbent firms. We extend instrumental stakeholder theory to explain and predict future competition operationalized as new entrepreneurial entries. Our study is among the first to empirically examine the relationships between aggregate stakeholder management performance and the entrepreneurial entries of individuals. Using a combined U.S. dataset from 2003 to 2013 from the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Index, Compustat, and Kauffman’s Entrepreneurship Survey, we find support for three (...) hypotheses. First, higher levels of stakeholder management performance are related to lower rates of entrepreneurial entry. Second, a curvilinear relationship exists between stakeholder management performance and entrepreneurial entry, where both low and very high stakeholder management performance increase entrepreneurial entry. Third, the greater the variance in stakeholder management performance across stakeholders, the more entrepreneurial entry. Our findings suggest that managing for stakeholders can help to avoid future competition. We add an entrepreneurship lens to the business ethics of stakeholder theory showing how incumbent stakeholder management performance shapes opportunities for entrepreneurs, a largely neglected stakeholder group. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

DRACO.WOLFANDDOTCOM.INFO is an interactive proto-videogame installation that immerses users, personified as abstract dragons in a cathartic, stochastic, full-body immersive videogame experience, in cyberspace. The work attempts to playfully shift user consciousness towards non-human embodiment, by real-time 3D meshing the data from the human body into a mirrored abstract, ill-defined dragonic 3D shape. It gifts humans with special virtual powers, such as flying and cusping fireballs, as they fight for their progression in the game-space and facing annihilation, through invisible, interactional camera-based (...) technologies which will be exposed in this paper. Inside the piece’s virtual world, users play as endangered dragons in the XXIst century populated by companies, websites and humanoids eager to stop the mythological beasts. The dragons progress in the game-space by inflicting damage upon the city’s landscape. The stochastic game-space ascends in difficulty as the levels progress, slowly changing the joystick’s response into faster speeds and generating larger city-scapes, inducing the game’s ultimate goal of a cathartic ilinxian state of disruption and otherness in human perception. (shrink)

Within the context of exploring new electronic arts' aesthetic regions and unexampled connections between generative art, games and mythology, my practical artistic research was led to focus on labyrinthine structures as exquisite legendary spatial gaming devices and as possible pathways to gain deeper humane insights, resulting into discoveries of original methods of labyrinth formation by means other than human. Labyrinths and mazes are inextricable paths, human made millennial structures that provide spatial challenges often connected with feedback, compression, entanglement and hyper (...) complexification of goal oriented displacement. They are perhaps the most ancient example of structure for spatial and serious games. Novel methods for labyrinth creation ‐ non-human methods ‐ are introduced and exemplified through artistic constructs. These new methods utilize non-human bioelectronic techniques and are initially grouped into three distinct sub-categories: the 'open' method, the 'mathematical flower' method, the 'animal' method. Four case examples of artistic non-human labyrinths resorting to the introduced novel methods are explored: k. video games (2007, 2010), Wolfanddotcom video game (2017), 8-bit Maze Gardens vegetable paintings (2018‐present), Ant Ennae Labyrinths bio-electronic apparatus (2019‐present). (shrink)

Cette étude entreprend dans une première partie l’essai de distinguer trois modalités du concept de «reprise» dans la Logique de la philosophie d’Eric Weil : la reprise «redon­dante», la reprise «confondante», et la reprise «innovante», en en donnant des exemples. Dans la seconde partie, l’auteur montre en quel sens la dialectique spéculative hégélienne comporte elle-même des processus de «reprises» spécifiques, en les comparant aux moda­lités weiliennes de la reprise. Enfin, la troisième partie s’attache à déterminer en quel sens la «dialectique (...) réflexive» mise en œuvre dans les propres recherches métaphysiques de l’auteur implique également des processus de «reprise», parents mais distincts des reprises au sens de Weil et de Hegel. La conclusion s’efforce de procéder de façon résumée à une confrontation en réciprocité de ces trois positions de la pensée. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

Introduction:Episodic memory is a cognitive process that allows the recall of experiences, learning, and the pursuit of future goals. During the aging process, episodic memory declines negatively, impacting social and psychological aspects in the elderly. Such intervention strategies as cognitive training are non-pharmacological ways of reducing these losses.ObjectiveWe systematically reviewed studies of the cognitive training of episodic memory in healthy elderly individuals and elderly individuals with clinical conditions.MethodWe systematically searched the PubMed, PsycNET, Web of Science, and SciELO databases using the (...) descriptors “Episodic Memory” AND “Training” AND “Elderly” OR “Aging” OR “Dementia” in English and translated into Portuguese.ResultsOf the 572 articles that were identified by the search, 23 were included in the final analysis. The main variables that comprised the intervention protocols were investigated, as well as the outcome variables, efficacy, and risk of bias. The main results indicated effectiveness with regard to different forms of the cognitive training of episodic memory.ConclusionEpisodic memory training among the elderly can mitigate the negative effects of cognitive decline in dementia and healthy subjects promoting impacts at social, psychological, and economic levels. Although it is a widely studied topic, further empirical studies on the utility of episodic memory training in healthy elderly individuals and elderly individuals with clinical conditions are still needed. (shrink)

Human multitasking suffers from a central attentional bottleneck preventing parallel performance of central mental operations, leading to profound deferments in task performance. While previous research assumed that the deferment is caused by a mere waiting time, we show that the bottleneck requires executive functions accounting for a profound part of the deferment. Three participant groups with EF impairments showed worse multitasking performance than respective control groups. Three further groups with EF improvements showed improved multitasking. Finally, three groups performed a dual-task (...) and different measures of EF and showed significant correlations between multitasking performance and working memory capacity. Demands on EF during multitasking may cause more errors, mental fatigue and stress, with parts of the population being considerably more prone to this. (shrink)

This reconsideration of Hume’s classic essay “Of Miracles” via the lens of American pragmatist ways of thinking about history and power shifts our attention from Hume’s epistemic concerns about the legitimacy of witnesses and testimony to his distaste for sacred history, his critical stance regarding the social force of revelation, and his disdain for religious authority. To view Hume’s essay both as an articulation of a critical philosophy of history and as an exercise in moral dynamism (social power or, authority, (...) is a result of epistemic transactions), is to intervene in both Hume studies and Contemporary Pragmatism. (shrink)

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive luck. (...) In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings. (shrink)

André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity is a detailed, well-written presentation and defense of one attempt to solve many of the recently much discussed puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects. It is engaging not only for Gallois’s ingenious attempt to defend his view that objects can be “occasionally identical”—identical at one time but not another —but for his discussion throughout of the puzzles and of alternative solutions. Gallois does a fine job of keeping the motivations for a position, whether (...) his own or others’, in view while working out details and responding to objections. Even where one disagrees, there is excellent food for thought and discussion here. (shrink)

Judith Andre examines the issue of the scope of the market. She offers a framework for thinking about the issue of blocked exchanges that draws upon concepts of ownership, alienation, and the impact of the market on exchanges, interactions, and market participants. She shows where Michael Walzer's notion of dominance fits into her wider taxonomy of the limits of the market.

Background This study introduces an empirical approach for studying the role of prudence in physician treatment of end-of-life (EOL) decision making.Methods A mixed-methods analysis of transcripts from 88 simulated patient encounters in a multicenter study on EOL decision making. Physicians in internal medicine, emergency medicine, and critical care medicine were asked to evaluate a decompensating, end-stage cancer patient. Transcripts of the encounters were coded for actor, action, and content to capture the concept of Aristotelian prudence, and then quantitatively and qualitatively (...) analyzed to identify actions associated with preference-concordant treatment.Results Focusing on codes that describe characteristics of physician-patient interaction, the code for physicians restating patient preferences was associated with avoiding intubation. Multiple codes were associated with secondary measures of preference-concordant treatment.Conclusions Prudent actions can be identified empirically, and research focused on the virtue of prudence may provide a new avenue for assessment and training in EOL care. (shrink)

En droit pénal, le « parricide » et l’« infanticide » figurent parmi les circonstances aggravantes d’un crime. En 2014, les associations féministes ont sollicité la Délégation aux droits des femmes de l’Assemblée nationale afin que le « féminicide » soit également introduit dans le Code pénal en France. Dans la langue, le mot « féminicide » n’est entré au Robert qu’en 2015. Des dates, des définitions, des lois, des coutumes, des cas, voilà le point de départ de ce livre (...) d’une actualité tragiq... (shrink)

Analisaremos o comentário produzido por Leo Strauss a partir dos textos de Maquiavel no livro Thoughts on Machiavelli. Com base na crítica do método de leitura e escrita dos textos filosóficos de Strauss, podemos perceber que a operação interpretativa de Strauss consiste na construção de uma nova figuração do velho maquiavelismo que assaltou a obra de Maquiavel desde que passou a ser censurada pelos padres. A enunciação da tese de que o ensinamento de Maquiavel é diabólico consiste apenas no traço (...) mais superficial e evidente da interpretação teológica de Strauss, pois sob a sua nova figuração do “maquiavelismo” podemos ver ao fundo o seu projeto de destruição da filosofia moderna para insinuar uma certa e determinada filosofia contemporânea como se fosse o reestabelecimento da filosofia política clássica. (shrink)

“Christ awaketh the church,” my Victorian edition of The Authorized Version glosses the fifth chapter of The Songs of Songs, but what an awakening: “I sleep, but my heart waketh: it is the voice of...

My topic is extraterrestrial intelligence. Following current conventions, I use the abbreviation ‘ETI’ to stand for three related concepts: the abstract idea of extraterrestrial intelligence, individuals who are both extraterrestrial and intelligent, and the hypothesis that there are ETIs. SETI is the search for ETIs, and CETI is the attempt to communicate with ETIs. In this paper, I will try to answer the two most basic questions in extraterrestrial studies. First, what is the status of the ETI hypothesis? In the (...) light of what we know, how likely is it that there are ETIs? Secondly, what is the value of pursuing SETI? Are the expected epistemic and pragmatic payoffs sufficient to warrant an extensive search? The first, substantive question is discussed in Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4. The second, ‘program evaluation’ question is the subject of Section 5 and Section 6. But first we'll take a brief look at some of the early history of the topic. (shrink)

To overcome the ‘expectation gap’ the auditor has to encourage the auditee to enter into a dialogue. The author is Professor of Accounting and Auditing at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Vice‐President of the American Accounting Association.

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)