Antoni Kępiński remains an often read and quoted author even 40 years after his premature death. Usually he is read in the context of his times and his connections with contemporary philosophy. This paper aims to show other aspects of his reflections on psychiatry. His views on the position of psychiatry within medicine, its methods, psychophysical problems, and other issues are compared with current knowledge and current thought paradigms. The goal is to show that while Kępiński was obviously functioning (...) within a different scientific and philosophical paradigm many of his ideas and reflections can still be found within current debates. The important conclusion is to not hold on to the views that Kępiński held himself because he did not know as much as we do, but to see the importance of the debates that he foresaw even then and possibly learn something from his extensive clinical experience. (shrink)

Die Konzepte „Informationsmetabolismus“ von Antoni Kępiński und „Autopoiesis“ von Niklas Luhmann rekurrieren auf die Struktur biologischer Zellen. Beide Autoren übertragen diese biologischen Strukturen auf ihre jeweiligen Anwendungsfelder. Während Kępiński die Funktionsweise der Psyche zu bestimmen sucht, integriert Luhmann den biologischen Ansatz in seine Systemtheorie der lebenden und psychischen Systeme. Bei der Lektüre von Kępińskis und Luhmanns Arbeiten wird deutlich, dass beide Autoren das Verhältnis zwischen einerseits Psyche und andererseits psychischem System mit ihrer jeweiligen Umwelt näher bestimmen. In Luhmanns Werk (...) ist das Verhältnis zwischen System und Umwelt umfangreich beschrieben und ausgearbeitet. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden seine Ausführungen im Folgenden verwendet, um Kępińskis Überlegungen zum „Informationsmetabolismus“, dem Verhältnis von Psyche und Umwelt, zu reflektieren. (shrink)

The author of the article helps to understand the patient-doctor relation in the light of axiological psychiatry developed by the Polish psychiatrist, Antoni Kępiński (1918–1972). Kępiński was a doctor who, with great dedication and reverence, fulfilled his duties towards patients. First of all, he paid special attention to the uniqueness and specificity of the level of contact between a doctor and a patient and pointed out its friendly character. The article also introduces the sources of the axiological psychiatry developed (...) by Kępiński, which can be found in the philosophy of dialogue. In the light of the Cracow psychiatrist’s work, one can notice that his philosophical anthropology was saturated with the influence of dialogue thought. According to Kępiński, only a specific kind of emotional relationship based on empathy and trust can be the key to complete knowledge of a man fighting with mental illnesses. (shrink)

Antoni Kępiński, one of the most famous Polish psychiatrists, points to man as an ethical being. The philosopher is aware that particular moral norms have their different origins. According to his concept, their primary source is natural law. From it stem basic human decisions. In addition to this most important source, Kępiński also lists other sources that may also have an impact on human decisions. As one of the few professors, he points to genetic predispositions as one of the (...) possible sources of human morality. Social influences are also important to him. (shrink)

In this paper I present the explanatory potential of Antoni Kępiński’s model of information metabolism in the question of data smog (data glut, information overload). Kępiński’s model is not well known and the bibliography concerning the model of information metabolism is still rather poor. In the article I present the model as a good heuristics for explaining information exchange between the system and the environment. The particular aim of my deliberations is to use the model of information metabolism to (...) discuss the pathological, although common phenomenon of data smog. This allows for a holistic view of the problem and allows for new statements on data smog, ethical consequences and counteracting the negative consequences of information overload. (shrink)

Assuming, according to Jaspers, that the measure of truth of a philosophical system is the lifestyle of its creator as well as his ability at drawing conclusions resulting from philosophical speculation to the requirements of practical action, the question must be asked, to what extent, if at all Wojciech Słomski's book tries to recognise and name the philosophically characteristic merging of theory and practise. Despite this, it shouldn't be the superior aim of any biography, let alone the biography of a (...) philosopher. However in the case of Professor Antoni Kępiński, the connection between theoretical views and real life holds meaning not only for judging the truth of these views but most of all for a correct understanding of them. (shrink)

Assuming, according to Jaspers, that the measure of truth of a philosophical system is the lifestyle of its creator as well as his ability at drawing conclusions resulting from philosophical speculation to the requirements of practical action, the question must be asked, to what extent, if at all Wojciech Słomski's book tries to recognise and name the philosophically characteristic merging of theory and practise. Despite this, it shouldn't be the superior aim of any biography, let alone the biography of a (...) philosopher. However in the case of Professor Antoni Kępiński, the connection between theoretical views and real life holds meaning not only for judging the truth of these views but most of all for a correct understanding of them. (shrink)

This paper argues that in the case of mental illnesses whose somatic bases are not known or do not exist, a promising route to understand mental illness is to see it as the lack of a patient’s engagement with some moral values that are necessary for a good human life. The paper explains how the first-person perspective, which is constitutive for mental illnesses, makes it impossible to provide an adequate, third-person explanation of the pathological. Because of its irreducible first-personal nature, (...) mental illness must be understood in terms of a moral harm to the patient, and so an integration of ethics and psychiatry is required. This view is further illustrated with A. Kępiński’s idea of psychiatry as therapy with moral values. (shrink)

An attempt is made to develop a basic framework for an existential-phenomenological perspective on personality disorders. Its starting point is taken from the psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński and the philosopher Józef Tischner. The former provides a clinical framework capacious enough to allow ethical, existential, and phenomenological explorations. This conceptual “space” is then explicitly recognized, addressed, and fulfilled by the latter’s investigation of personality dynamics proper to “the hideout.” In order to supplement this thread of thought with a specific illustration, a (...) “case” provided by Fyodor Dostoevsky in his Notes from the Underground is investigated. Then, in turn, Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be is referred to, so that the deepest roots of personality disorders can be identified with an ontological dynamic proper to the avoidance of non-being. Finally, some brief remarks are made concerning how all the above relates to the idea of a normatively neutral science and how it can be integrated with more up to date clinical practice. (shrink)

Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie sind Bereiche medizinischer Praxis, die in besonderer Weise ethische Fragen aufwerfen. Die Beiträge des Bandes hierzu werden durch zwei übersetzte Beiträge des polnischen Psychiaters Antoni Kępiński (1918-1972) erweitert. Diese eröffnen neue Perspektiven in der Diskussion um ethische Fragen in der Psychiatrie.

Dans ce commentaire, je voudrais me referer a la solution fondamentale metodologique que propose Levinas dans ses analyses de l'experience de Dieu. La philosophie de Levinas, φιλοσοφία πρώτη, est avant tout une philosophie premiere, donc la metaphysique ; elle n'est ni l'anthropologie ni la theologie naturelle, sinon la metaphysique de l'intention. C'est pour cela quo Jean Lacroix a appele Levinas dans „Le personnalisme comme anti-ideologie" „le plus grand metaphysicien vivant de l'inspiration personnaliste". Aujourd'hui, apres la mort de Levinas survenue a (...) Noel 1995, tout le contenu de cette opinion roste actuelle, sauf quo Levinas ne seit plus contemporain. Neanmoins, il nous est proche, comme l'a suggere J. Derrida conformement a la definition de la proximite, faite par Levinas memo, comme „a-Dieu". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Isaac Barrow on the Mathematization of Nature: Theological Voluntarism and the Rise of Geometrical OpticsAntoni MaletIntroductionIsaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy embodies a strong program of mathematization that departs both from the mechanical philosophy of Cartesian inspiration and from Boyle’s experimental philosophy. The roots of Newton’s mathematization of nature, this paper aims to demonstrate, are to be found in Isaac Barrow’s (1630–77) philosophy of the mathematical sciences.Barrow’s attitude (...) towards natural philosophy evolved from his earnest interest in medicine of around 1650, when a young Cambridge graduate, to natural philosophy (apparently under Henry More’s influence); from his thesis on the insufficiency of the Cartesian hypothesis to geometrical optics and the strong program of mathematization of natural philosophy of the middle 1660s; from Lucasian professor of Mathematics to Chaplain of his Majesty and eminent Restoration divine. Contemporary accounts of Barrow’s life suggest that he grew ever more skeptical about the worth of natural philosophy and mathematics. 1 In his last years he became a prolific [End Page 265] author of sermons and theological works. Published shortly after his death by John Tillotson (1630–94), later archbishop of Canterbury, they occupy over two thousand folio pages. Overloaded with involved philosophical arguments, Barrow’s sermons were apparently not very popular, but they were highly regarded by scholars and the Anglican hierarchy. 2 It is on certain of his sermons, as well as on the philosophical discussions contained in the Mathematical Lectures that our account of Barrow’s philosophy of the mathematical sciences will rest. 3 Barrow’s understanding of the mathematical sciences will allow us to discuss together three issues often analyzed independently: the theological background to English natural philosophy, the changing notion of mixed mathematical sciences during the seventeenth century, and finally the philosophical foundations of modern geometrical optics.It has long been recognized that significant relationships exist between theological voluntarism or intellectualism and views on natural philosophy. In particular Robert Boyle’s theological voluntarism is seen as grounding his experimentalist approach to natural philosophy. It is not quite so clear, however, how well theological voluntarism may relate to a strong program of mathematization such as the one embodied in Newton’s Principia Mathematica. In fact it has been suggested that the relationship is a negative one. This is derived from the necessary character of mathematical laws, which would put unwanted restrictions on God’s absolute dominion over nature, and also from the notion that theological intellectualism is conducive to a deductive, a priori science—the paradigm of which is of course geometry. However, Barrow’s theological voluntarism lead him to heighten the role of mathematics within natural philosophy.During the seventeenth century the so-called mixed or subalternate mathematical sciences changed profoundly. In the Enlightenment mixed mathematics—meaning above all rational mechanics—became one of the most prestigious and influential disciplines. The mixed mathematics of the Enlightenment, however, was markedly different from the Aristotelian [End Page 266] mixed mathematical sciences. The differences are noticeable both in the subject matter and in the substitution of mathematical infinitesimal analysis for geometrical synthesis, but also in the way of grounding mathematical theory on empirical evidence. Barrow’s Mathematical Lectures (delivered at Cambridge from 1664 to 1666) offer a fresh insight into the metamorphosis of these sciences just when Newton’s “mathematical principles” were in the making. Not the least interesting feature of Barrow’s discussion is that God’s omnipotence allows an evaluation of the truth of mathematical theories that do not apply to this world. Therefore, Barrow is led to introduce the distinction between the internal consistency, or mathematical truth, of a mathematical theory and its physical truth. This, in turn, leads him to the notion that theories need testing.Barrow on Matter and GodRecent literature has established significant correlations between theological voluntarism and empiricism, as well as between theological intellectualism and rationalism. As E. B. Davis writes, “the Christian doctrine of creation is a dialogue between God’s unconstrained will, which utterly transcends the bounds of human comprehension, and God’s orderly intellect, which serves as the model for the human mind.” Intellectualist theology considers God’s omniscience His... (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

A cross-cultural analysis of trust and cooperation networks in Northern Ghana (NGHA) and Oaxaca (OAX) was carried out by means of ego networks and interviews. These regions were chosen because both are inhabited by several ethnic groups, thus providing a good opportunity to test the cultural group selection hypothesis. Against the predictions of this approach, we found that in both regions cooperation is grounded in personal trust groups, and that social cohesion depends on these emotional bonds. Moreover, in agreement with (...) Fiske's notion of “evolved proclivities”, we also found two distinct kinds of trust networks, one for each region, which vary in terms of the degree of ethnic interrelation. This pattern suggests that social cohesion increases when environmental resources are scarce. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 3, Page 875-887, July 2022.

No paradox exists in the fact that, in the Special Relativity, for the mass of a material body, considered in motion at constant speed, whose measure is u, the formula: m = m0/√ can be written, while for a photon the same formula holds, when between its source and the observer a state of relative motion at constant speed, whose measure is u, exists and it is observed along the direction perpendicular to the direction of his speed.

The aim of this paper is to give a description of the free algebras in some varieties of Glivenko MTL-algebras having the Boolean retraction property. This description is given (generalizing the results of [9]) in terms of weak Boolean products over Cantor spaces. We prove that in some cases the stalks can be obtained in a constructive way from free kernel DL-algebras, which are the maximal radical of directly indecomposable Glivenko MTL-algebras satisfying the equation in the title. We include examples (...) to show how we can apply the results to describe free algebras in some well known varieties of involutive MTL-algebras and of pseudocomplemented MTL-algebras. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is the variety generated by the class of finite simple bounded BCK-algebras. To obtain these results we prove that every simple algebra in the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is also a relatively simple bounded BCK-algebra. Moreover, we show that every simple bounded BCK-algebra can be embedded into a simple integral commutative bounded residuated lattice. We extend our main results to some richer subreducts of the class (...) of integral commutative bounded residuated lattices and to the involutive case. (shrink)

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

By measuring the level of CSR communication carried out by hotels located in the Colombian Caribbean region and identifying the main determinant factors influencing this level (including pressure from the different stakeholders), this paper contributes to deepening our understanding of the antecedents of CSR communication in small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in emerging economies and, particularly, in the hotel industry, for which no previous studies on this topic could be uncovered. The results reveal that the level of CSR disclosure (...) is low in the region and that the size of the hotel, the pressure from government agencies, and the age and educational background of the hotel’s top manager have a significant influence on the level of CSR communication. Results indicate a reactive approach to CSR communication confirming the prominent role played by government agencies, thus contributing to gain a richer understanding of institutional influences on CSR in Latin American countries. In terms of practical implications, findings suggest that governments should play a more active role in stimulating CSR communication in emerging countries, particularly in the case of SMEs. (shrink)

Let ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ denote the variety of commutative integral bounded residuated lattices (bounded residuated lattices for short). A Boolean retraction term for a subvariety ${\mathbb{V}}$ of ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ is a unary term t in the language of bounded residuated lattices such that for every ${{\bf A} \in \mathbb{V}, t^{A}}$ , the interpretation of the term on A, defines a retraction from A onto its Boolean skeleton B(A). It is shown that Boolean retraction terms are equationally definable, in the sense that there is (...) a variety ${\mathbb{V}_{t} \subsetneq \mathbb{BRL}}$ such that a variety ${\mathbb{V} \subsetneq \mathbb{BRL}}$ admits the unary term t as a Boolean retraction term if and only if ${\mathbb{V} \subseteq \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ . Moreover, the equation s(x) = t(x) holds in ${\mathbb{V}_{s} \cap \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ . The radical of ${{\bf A} \in \mathbb{BRL}}$ , with the structure of an unbounded residuated lattice with the operations inherited from A expanded with a unary operation corresponding to double negation and a a binary operation defined in terms of the monoid product and the negation, is called the radical algebra of A. To each involutive variety ${\mathbb{V} \subseteq \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ is associated a variety ${\mathbb{V}^{r}}$ formed by the isomorphic copies of the radical algebras of the directly indecomposable algebras in ${\mathbb{V}}$ . Each free algebra in such ${\mathbb{V}}$ is representable as a weak Boolean product of directly indecomposable algebras over the Stone space of the free Boolean algebra with the same number of free generators, and the radical algebra of each directly indecomposable factor is a free algebra in the associated variety ${\mathbb{V}^{r}}$ , also with the same number of free generators.A hierarchy of subvarieties of ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ admitting Boolean retraction terms is exhibited. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

In this article we consider certain elements of the normative theory of Jürgen Habermas in the light of the proposals of Bruce Ackerman, with a view to strengthening a concept of deliberative democracy applied to the legitimation of juridical rules. We do not construct a hierarchy of the two positions, but seek to bring together certain elements to achieve a common project. As the starting point for examining the work of the two authors, we take the scheme proposed by Habermas (...) in Faktizität und Geltung. In this connection, through the work of Ackerman, we intend to fill in some of the gaps that Habermas appears to have left in the theory of radical democracy applied to the law. The work of Ackerman can make a significant contribution to deliberative democracy, to the discourse principle that Habermas defines, and to the contractualist theories from a liberal perspective. The study of these contributions makes possible a critical judgment that enables the legitimation of juridical rules carried out by Habermas to acquire greater practicity. In examining the epistemological status of juridical science and law, we attempt to determine the weight and the performance of normative democracy. In Tarr's view, it is a matter for philosophers to examine direct democracy and its desirability. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

We give a presentation of Post algebras of ordern+1 (n1) asn+1 bounded Wajsberg algebras with an additional constant, and we show that a Wajsberg algebra admits a P-algebra reduct if and only if it isn+1 bounded.