Although machine learning has been successful in recent years and is increasingly being deployed in the sciences, enterprises or administrations, it has rarely been discussed in philosophy beyond the philosophy of mathematics and machine learning. The present contribution addresses the resulting lack of conceptual tools for an epistemological discussion of machine learning by conceiving of deep learning networks as ‘judging machines’ and using the Kantian analysis of judgments for specifying the type of judgment they are capable of. At the center (...) of the argument is the fact that the functionality of deep learning networks is established by training and cannot be explained and justified by reference to a predefined rule-based procedure. Instead, the computational process of a deep learning network is barely explainable and needs further justification, as is shown in reference to the current research literature. Thus, it requires a new form of justification, that is to be specified with the help of Kant’s epistemology. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 19-54.

Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of culture has been much discussed in recent years. However, it remains unclear how it evolved from his older theory of knowledge. This study deals with this question on the basis of Cassirer's 'disposition' of a 'philosophy of the symbolic', reconstructed here for the first time. This text shows that the 'symbolic' refers to culture as a whole and to its inherent diversity. Therefore, 'the symbolic' includes the relationship between the general transcendental conditions of culture and its (...) empirical specificities in language and languages, art and the arts, myth and myths, science and disciplines. Cassirer does not comprehend this empirical and specific reality of symbolization depending on pre-existing transcendental conditions. Instead, he proceeds from the empirical diversity of the symbolisations and reflects on their simultaneously general and specific conditions. Thus, Cassirer embarks on a path that he finds paved in Kant's "Critique of Judgement": He consequently defines 'the symbolic' as the horizon for a reflective approach based on empirical findings - and not as the foundation of a systematic derivation of the diversity of culture in the style of the idealistic tradition. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy, the question of time was ordinarily formulated by asking what time is. Yet, already Kant claimed that time is only accessible to us by representing it – a term that he introduced into the philosophical tradition. Accordingly, the question of time should be transformed into: How can time be represented? Furthermore, a closer examination of Kant’s example of representing time ‘under the image of a line, which we draw in thought’, makes evident that the time (...) represented depends, at least partially, on the characteristics of the concrete form of representation. I discuss this entanglement of the ways of representation and the concepts of time they represent, using the example of Eadweard Muybridges chronophotography: a snapshot, a series of snapshots and their projected moving image. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 2 Seiten: 401-409.

Ernst Cassirers 1932 erschienene Darstellung der »Philosophie der Aufklärung« zählt zu den herausragenden Standardwerken zur Bestimmung der Leitgedanken der Epoche. »Die eigentliche ›Philosophie‹ der Aufklärung ist und bleibt«, so Cassirer, »etwas anderes als der Inbegriff dessen, was ihre führenden Denker [...] gedacht und gelehrt haben«. Entsprechend sah er das auszeichnende Merkmal seiner historischen Rekonstruktion der Epoche darin, »daß sie nicht die Geschichte der einzelnen Denker und ihrer Lehren, sondern eine reine Geschichte der Ideen der Aufklärungszeit zu geben suchte, (...) und daß sie diese Ideen selbst nicht nur in ihrer abstrakt-theoretischen Fassung darlegen, sondern in ihrer unmittelbaren Wirksamkeit aufzeigen und sichtbar machen wollte«. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Fuer unseren Begriff der Gegenstaende der Biologie ist es charakteristisch, dass diese Gegenstaende eine Geschichte haben. Das unterscheidet sie von den Grundgegenstaenden der Physik, die wir so definieren, dass sie als Elemente in geschichtliche Ablaeufe zwar eingehen, ohne dabei indes selbst historischen Wandlungen unterworfen zu sein. Deswegen ist es im Rahmen biologischer Forschungen ueblich, Erklaerungen einmal fuer Veraenderungen und einmal fuer Entstehungen eines Lebewesens (einer Art) anzustreben.

In this paper we argue for a unified semantics for hypothetical conditionals, hc s, e.g. _if it rains, we’ll cancel the picnic_, and biscuit conditionals, bc s, e.g., _if you are hungry, there are biscuits on the sideboard_. We side with recent literature in proposing that differences in the interpretation are related to (in)dependence between antecedent and consequent, but we move beyond current accounts in spelling out a characterization of independence that is actually predictive. We further establish a systematic link (...) between _if_-constructions and discourse structure, providing a dynamic update model that integrates the QUD, and thus the intentional discourse-structure. We argue that in bc s the antecedent sets up the question that is addressed by the consequent, and show that rescuing (Gricean) relevance in face of independence gives rise to implicatures corresponding to the different flavors associated with bc s. Crucially, we argue, this is the same mechanism responsible for our understanding that in the hc above, for example, it is the rain that will cause the cancellation of the picnic. Along the way we notice how the phenomena observed in _if_-constructions are also replicated in other quantificational structures. Ultimately, there is not much that is biscuit-specific. Their interpretation is the result of a conspiracy among semantics, dynamic update and intentional discourse-structure. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 19-54.

The reflexivity of images is often dealt with in theoretical discourse on art and image. Yet what reflexivity consists of and how it proceeds within images is seldom clarified. Following a basic idea taken from Niklas Luhmann, this article proposes a model of reflexivity, namely: Each self-reference often proceeds by a conspicuous iconic element, which is concretely determined within the visual arrangement and thus draws the beholder’s attention not to the image as a whole, but to one of its specific (...) aspects. This model characterizes reflexivity as a dimension of iconic representation in general and distinguishes it from mere artistic reflection and thematic self-reference. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 166-171.

The historical beginnings of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture remain unclear. For it is not apparent how his major philosophy of culture and the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, published in the 1920s, emerged from his earlier epistemological work and Substance and Function from 1910. However, this gap can be filled to a certain extent by the “Disposition” of a “Philosophy of the Symbolic” from 1917 that could be reconstructed from Cassirer’s literary estate and is documented in this contribution. In the (...) preceding “Introduction” an overview of Cassirer’s text is given and some consequences for our general understanding of Cassirer’s project of a philosophy of culture are put up for discussion. (shrink)

Das Lehrbuch, das neuartige Zugänge bietet, die sowohl die Politikgestaltung beeinflussen, als auch der Politikwissenschaft ein komplexes kritisch-rationales Handlungs- und Orientierungswissen bereitstellen. Das Werk eignet sich sowohl für das Selbststudium als auch für den akademischen Unterricht.

Dieses Buch schlägt - unter dem Titel "synthetischer Materialismus" - einen neuen Weg zur Klärung des Geist-Materie-Problems vor. Ausgangspunkt ist die These, dass wir als Betrachter der Welt frei sind, dieselben Gegenstände in unterschiedlich komplexe raum-zeitliche Zusammenhänge einzuordnen, und dass sich daraus unterschiedliche Möglichkeiten der Klassifikation von Gegenständen ergeben können: Wenn wir von "Lebewesen", "Handlungssubjekten" und "Personen" sprechen, und ihnen psychische Phänomene zuschreiben, nutzen wir den Umstand, dass die Konstellationen von Kohlehydraten, Eiweißen, Wasser und Nukleinsäuren, die jene Entitäten auch sind, (...) in einer besonderen Weise mit Teilen ihrer Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Verbindung gebracht werden können. Der synthetische Materialismus vermag so zu zeigen, dass es zwischen einem ausschließlich "materialistischen" Verständnis der Welt und jenen Sichtweisen, innerhalb derer wir manche Komplexe von materiellen Phänomenen als Individuen mit ihnen selbst bewussten Empfindungen, Absichten und Überzeugungen verstehen, Übergänge gibt, die methodisch-wissenschaftlich nachvollzogen werden können und die nicht zu nutzen töricht wäre. (shrink)

This paper reviews the debate on the notion of biological function and on functional explanation as this takes place in philosophy. It describes the different perspectives, issues, intuitions, theories and arguments that have emerged. The author shows that the debate has been too heavily influenced by the concerns of a naturalistic philosophy of mind and argues that in order to improve our understanding of biology the attention should be shifted from the study of intuitions to the study of the actual (...) practice of biological inquiry. (shrink)

I argue that there are at least four different ways in which the term ‘function’ is used in connection with the study of living organisms, namely: function as activity, function as biological role, function as biological advantage, and function as selected effect. Notion refers to what an item does by itself; refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a complex activity or capacity of an organism; refers to the value for the organism of an item having a (...) certain character rather than another; refers to the way in which a trait acquired and has maintained its current share in the population. The recognition of a separate notion of function as biological advantage solves the problem of the indeterminate reference situation that has been raised against a counterfactual analysis of function, and emphasizes the importance of counterfactual comparison in the explanatory practice of organismal biology. This reveals a neglected problem in the philosophy of biology, namely that of accounting for the insights provided by counterfactual comparison. (shrink)

I argue that there are at least four different ways in which the term ‘function’ is used in connection with the study of living organisms, namely: function as activity, function as biological role, function as biological advantage, and function as selected effect. Notion refers to what an item does by itself; refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a complex activity or capacity of an organism; refers to the value for the organism of an item having a (...) certain character rather than another; refers to the way in which a trait acquired and has maintained its current share in the population. The recognition of a separate notion of function as biological advantage solves the problem of the indeterminate reference situation that has been raised against a counterfactual analysis of function, and emphasizes the importance of counterfactual comparison in the explanatory practice of organismal biology. This reveals a neglected problem in the philosophy of biology, namely that of accounting for the insights provided by counterfactual comparison. (shrink)

Auf die Rede von Begriffen und vergleichbaren Entitäten, so behauptet Quine, könne man verzichten. Mit einer solchen Einstellung handelt Quine sich jedoch Schwierigkeiten ein, die z.B. an seinem Konzept des Setzens von Gegenständen sowie an seinem Verständnis von Existenzaussagen sichtbar werden (§ 1 und 2). Im Hintergrund jener Einstellung steht ein unzureichendes Verständnis der Funktion von Begriffen (§ 3). Zudem hat Quine bisher nicht zur Kenntnis genommen, daß Wittgenstein in seiner Spätphilosophie Vorschläge zum Verständnis der Rede von Begriffen entwickelt hat, (...) welche es erlauben, zahlreiche Defizite des neuzeitlichen Verständnisses von Begriffen zu beheben (§ 4). (shrink)

Thesis--Fribourg. Cf. Das Schweizer Buch. Serie B. 1966.

Performing Philosophy in Asian Traditions.

Background: Gait analysis after total ankle replacement and ankle arthrodesis is usually measured barefoot. However, this does not reflect reality. The purpose of this study was to compare patients barefoot and with footwear. Methods: We compared 126 patients (total ankle replacement 28, ankle arthrodesis 57, and tibiotalocalcaneal arthrodesis 41) with 35 healthy controls in three conditions (barefoot, standardized running, and rocker bottom shoes). Minimum follow-up was 2 years. We used dynamic pedobarography and a light gate. Main outcome measures: relative midfoot (...) index, forefoot maximal force, walking speed. Findings: The relative midfoot index decreased in all groups from barefoot to running shoes and again to rocker bottom shoes (p < 0.001). The forefoot maximal force increased wearing shoes (p < 0.001), but there was no difference between running and rocker bottom shoes. Walking speed increased by 0.06 m/s with footwear (p < 0.001). Total ankle replacement and ankle arthrodesis were equal in running shoes but both deviated from healthy controls (total ankle replacement/ankle arthrodesis smaller RMI p = 0.07/0.017; increased forefoot maximal force p = 0.757/0.862; slower walking speed p < 0.001). In rocker bottom shoes, this ranking remained the same except the relative midfoot index merged to similar values. Tibiotalocalcaneal arthrodesis were inferior in both shoes. Interpretation: Runners are beneficial and the benefit is greater for fusions and replacements. Rocker bottom shoes have little added benefit. Total ankle replacement and ankle arthrodesis were equal but inferior to healthy controls. Tibiotalocalcaneal arthrodesis has an inferior outcome. (shrink)

Auf die Rede von Begriffen und vergleichbaren Entitäten, so behauptet Quine, könne man verzichten. Mit einer solchen Einstellung handelt Quine sich jedoch Schwierigkeiten ein, die z.B. an seinem Konzept des Setzens von Gegenständen sowie an seinem Verständnis von Existenzaussagen sichtbar werden (§ 1 und 2). Im Hintergrund jener Einstellung steht ein unzureichendes Verständnis der Funktion von Begriffen (§ 3). Zudem hat Quine bisher nicht zur Kenntnis genommen, daß Wittgenstein in seiner Spätphilosophie Vorschläge zum Verständnis der Rede von Begriffen entwickelt hat, (...) welche es erlauben, zahlreiche Defizite des neuzeitlichen Verständnisses von Begriffen zu beheben (§ 4). (shrink)

Bd. 1. Antike, Spätantike und Mittelalter -- Bd. 2. Neuzeit -- Bd. 3. Moderne.

Remarks on the Relations between Neurophysiology and Psychology. In the last decades of Analytical Philosophy, contributions to the so-called mind-body-problem have been suffering by several serious methodological misunderstandings: they have failed, for instance, to distinguish between explanations of particular and strictly general ("necessary") properties and between two important senses of existential statements; and they have overlooked the role conceptual explanations play in the development of science. Changing our methodological premisses, we should be able to put questions like that of the (...) relation between (neuro)physiological and psychological phenomena in a new way - and we should be able to see that such newly understood questions allow answers which evade the pitfalls of both reductionist and holistic positions. The paper tries to illustrate and to defend these contentions by reference to a very elementary example: the rational re-building of our concepts to identify behaviour by which a subject controls the position of his body in space. (shrink)

Remarks on the Relations between Neurophysiology and Psychology. In the last decades of Analytical Philosophy, contributions to the so-called mind-body-problem have been suffering by several serious methodological misunderstandings: they have failed, for instance, to distinguish between explanations of particular and strictly general properties and between two important senses of existential statements; and they have overlooked the role conceptual explanations play in the development of science. Changing our methodological premisses, we should be able to put questions like that of the relation (...) between physiological and psychological phenomena in a new way - and we should be able to see that such newly understood questions allow answers which evade the pitfalls of both reductionist and holistic positions. The paper tries to illustrate and to defend these contentions by reference to a very elementary example: the rational re-building of our concepts to identify behaviour by which a subject controls the position of his body in space. (shrink)

In den empirischen Wissenschaften wird von unterschiedlichen Arten von Erklärungen Gebrauch gemacht. Einige dieser Erklärungen dienen dazu, das Eintreten von Veränderungen zu erklären. Andere – die mereologischen Erklärungen – sollen die interne Struktur eines aus Teilen zusammengesetzten Ganzen einsichtig machen. Stellt man dies in Rechnung, lassen sich die Probleme, welche Phänomene mentaler Verursachung aufzuwerfen scheinen, beheben. -/- Empirical sciences use not only one but various types of explanations. One of these explanations are the well known transition explanations. Others consist of (...) mereological explanations – explanations that serve to give insight in the relations between complex wholes and their parts. The problems which seem to be inherent to cases of mental causation may be solved when these cases are seen as objects of mereological explanations, or as objects of combinations of mereological and transition explanations. -/- . (shrink)

There are currently two different views about the relation between philosophy and the empirical sciences. One of them – the “Quinean” view – holds that there is only a difference in degree: both are trying to gain insights in parts of the world, but philosophy, in opposition to the empirical sciences, which deal with concrete parts of the world, tries to find out insights of a very general type. The other view – which has a century old history, beginning with (...) Socrates/Plato and ending, in a certain sense, with the late Wittgenstein – holds that philosophy and the empirical sciences are separated by a sharp categorical difference: Empirical sciences deal with parts of the world, and philosophy deals with concepts, that is with our habits of distinguishing and classifying things, which enable us to deal empirically with the world. This paper tries to develop some arguments in favour of the second view, and, furthermore, tries to suggest some implications of this view. One of these implications is that there are three special tasks of philosophy as a concept-reflecting enterprise: the descriptive, the explanatory and the critical. It is remarkable to see that within these aims empirical insights come again to play a certain, although limited role. (shrink)

In his book Logical Forms Chateaubriand proposes, among other things, a theory of truth according to which a true statement describes some aspect of the world. The aim of this paper is to assess Chateaubriand’s claim that his theory of truth is compatible with the main intuition underlying the correspondence theory.

Quine, em seu livro Philosophy of Logic, identifica lógica com lógica de primeira ordem e defende a concepçáo segundo a qual a completude é uma propriedade necessária dos sistemas lógicos. O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir a argumentaçáo de Quine e mostrar que suas idéias a respeito da natureza da lógica apresentam diversos problemas tanto conceituais, como técnicos.