This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinationalenterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that (...) improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good. (shrink)

Ignorance of one’s privileges and prejudices is an epistemic problem. While the sources of ignorance of privilege and prejudice are increasingly understood, less clarity exists about how to remedy ignorance. In fact, the various causes of ignorance can seem so powerful, various, and mutually reinforcing that studying the epistemology of ignorance can inspire pessimism about combatting socially constructed ignorance. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted. The testimony of members of oppressed groups can often help members of privileged groups overcome (...) their ignorance. This paper argues that a particular type of speaker’s trust—hopeful trust—can motivate hearers to become cognizant of their privilege and prejudice. I argue that hopeful trust is a powerful way of eliciting trust-responsiveness that can be an effective mechanism for challenging privilege and prejudice. To make this case, I draw on case studies of online attempts to challenge ignorance. While the problems of testimonial injustice, defensi... (shrink)

The Pessimistic Induction over the history of science argues that because most past theories considered empirically successful in their time turn out to be not even approximately true, most present ones probably aren’t approximately true either. But why did past scientists accept those incorrect theories? Kyle Stanford’s ‘Problem of Unconceived Alternatives’ is one answer to that question: scientists are bad at exhausting the space of plausible hypotheses to explain the evidence available to them. Here, I offer another answer, which I (...) call the ‘Problem of Misleading Evidence.’ I argue that this proposal is, in important respects, superior to Stanford’s. (shrink)

Along with many jurisdictions, Australia is struggling with the unique issues raised by genetic information in the context of privacy laws and medical ethics. Although the consequences of disclosure of most private information are generally confined to individuals, disclosure of genetic information has far-reaching consequences, with a credible argument that genetic relatives have a right to know about potential medical conditions. In 2006, the Privacy Act was amended to permit disclosure of an individual's genetic information, without their consent, to genetic (...) relatives, if it was to avoid or mitigate serious illness. Unfortunately, additional amendments required for operation of the disclosure amendment were overlooked. Public Interest Determinations —delegated legislation issued by the privacy commissioner—have, instead, been used to exempt healthcare providers from provisions which would otherwise make disclosure unlawful. This paper critiques the PIDs using documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act—specifically the impact of both the PIDs and the disclosure amendment on patients and relatives—and confidentiality and the procedural validity of subordinate laws regulating medical privacy. (shrink)

Classical Soviet Marxism-Leninism is in the process of dissolution, with some parts of the ideology being rejected, others retained in one form or another, and new components being adopted. At the same time, a wide-ranging pluralism of new objectives and forms of consciousness has emerged in Soviet intellectual life. Since both the motives for restructuring and also the braking effects acting on the process of perestrojka are significantly dependent upon intellectual and ideological developments, attentive observations of these developments is of (...) particular importance for the assessment of the evolutionary propects of the Soviet Union. At present the situation on the ideological-intellectual front can be characterized as follows: 1. Although official changes in the ideology did not begin until 1989 they have caught up to the initial perestrojka in political and cultural life. 2. Perestrojka has continually waned in importance as an ideological by-word largely under the influence of Gorbachv's 'new thinking' which has turned attention to the dramatic history of the Soviet Union and the plight of the human individual in a society with few prospects for the future. 3. In philosophy the new textbook published in 1989/90 introduces a series of crucial innovations that put paid to a number of classical shibboleths of the Marxist-Leninist world view. 4. Academic philosophy has shifted more and more to a reexamination of the history of philosophy as well as to a reappraisal of pre-revolutionary Russian thought. 5. The critique of Stalinism has gradually given way to a critique of Marxist principles generally, and even Lenin has become the subject of criticism. 6. Fast on the heels of the new thinking and the ideological deconstruction come the voices of political orientations whose differences are so pronounced as to have warranted the compilation of an 'Atlas of ideologies'. 7. The search for a new moral identity has concentrated on three sources: the reestablishment of links with classical Russian culture, the renewal of links with Europe, and the deep-seated need to commit oneself to some ideal for sacrifice. 8. The economic crisis has produced attitudes hostile to individual gain and speculation. 9. Given the nature of the Soviet crisis intellectual cooperation with the West has to take forms which promote the rekindling of a sense of all-human awareness of the transcendent and reinforce the experience of common humanity. 10. The establishment of all-European academic institutions designed in their very structure to engage in mutual cooperation could have a catalytic effect on the reconfiguration of Europe. (shrink)

I will limit myself to a brief description of a phenomenon which could perhaps be perceived as a distortion or perversion of caring. What I have in mind is something which is distinguished from volitional necessity. Being guided by volitional necessity is a form of being active because I am governed in my actions by something I really care about. This, however, could be contrasted with a phenomenon which perhaps does not occur in your work, but I was wondering what (...) you would say about it. What I have in mind is the desire of people to be identified with something that may be very different from what they actually are. (shrink)

Autonomy, self-determination, self-affirmation, emancipation: all these words refer to an ideal that orients the way in which our contemporary culture speaks about many moral and political problems. The importance of this ideal for us can be seen in the way we accept as obvious a number of ideas that follow from it. Most of us would certainly tend to accept that no universally valid answer can be given to the question of what kind of human life is truly meaningful or (...) valuable and that, because of this, people should be granted as much freedom as possible to pursue a life that best corresponds with their own personal tastes and preferences. Many would go a step further and claim that people should also be encouraged to live as much as possible according to what they have themselves chosen, and that they should give up traditional forms of life and role patterns.One aspect of this cult of individual freedom or autonomy is the idea that we should develop a critical attitude towards anything established, accepted or traditional: every form of power or authority, prevailing moral norms and educational customs, traditional role patterns, etc. A further feature of this is the tendency to describe any improvement in the fortunes of the weak, the vulnerable and the less well off as an ‘emancipation’. The idea that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly should receive more support, assistance, respect and attention is translated by the assertion that they, too, should be ‘liberated’.The ideals that we associate with words like ‘emancipation’ or ‘self-affirmation’ were at one time innovative and revolutionary, but they gradually became established as accepted ways of thinking and thus became part of a new common sense. Nowadays, anyone wanting to be provocative will attain their goal more easily by scoffing at everything falling under the rubric of emancipation than by speaking out in its defence.This fact is characteristic of an ambiguity in our culture. While the ideals of self-affirmation and emancipation enjoy enormous popularity, in certain intellectual circles they are treated with suspicion. At stake here is the general image of humanity associated with these ideals. Thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida or Baudrillard have, each in their own way, attacked the idea of the autonomous subject and stressed that people’s most intimate thoughts and desires are determined by something that transcends them: by the language they speak or the culture to which they belong.Rejecting the idea of the autonomous subject is usually one aspect of a more general critique of ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. The question whether and to what extent this critique is justified occupies a central position in many contemporary philosophical discussions, and much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy can be described in terms of the opposition between those who would defend Enlightenment ideals and those who would reject or cast doubt on those ideals.What I would like to discuss here undoubtedly fits into a framework that could be called ‘antiliberal’ or ‘anti-humanist’. However, it is certainly not my intention to criticize humanism or liberalism directly and systematically. (shrink)

This paper does not question the thesis that the phenomena associated with the phrase 'moral luck' point to an important philosophical problem. The aim is, rather, to sketch an interpretation of these phenomena. It is argued that the notion of symbolic restoration is the key we need to understand why the out-come of our actions has a moral significance that is not reducible to the moral significance of the mental states from wich these actions arise.

Two perspectives on religion are contrasted. From the internalist perspective religion is not in need of any neutral justification: its point is manifest within religious life itself, just as the point of morality is manifest within moral life. From the externalist perspective religious practices and attitudes are dependent on the truth of certain assumptions about supernatural realities. It is argued that there are good reasons for endorsing internalism and, consequently, for radically dissociating religion from belief: if religious discourse is non-literal (...) (as the internalist claims), belief becomes dispensable. Finally, however, it is admitted that the internalist, by drawing a sharp line between literal and non-literal language, might miss an important truth about religion. (shrink)

One can assign three different aims to the desire for knowledge : utility, pleasure, truth-for-truth's-sake. Whereas the first two aims have a concretely determinable content and therefore look evident, the third one has been looked upon as strange and problematic : it is not immediately clear what kind of value is defended in this case. Popper is one of the recent defenders of the traditional ideal of truth-for-truth's-sake. He wants to defend the ideal against three positions : a primitive taboo-ridden (...) fear for knowledge and truth, relativism, instrumentalism. Analysing Popper's ethic of cognition we do not agree with the instrumentalist's critique of it. However, precisely in advocating a non-instrumentalist value, Popper's position is not unique, but paradoxically resembles the „primitive” position. Popper's belief that there is an objective or absolute truth is, in his opinion, implied by the belief that the search for knowledge makes sense. We try to show that this thesis of absolute truth is based on a conceptual mistake. In opposition to Popper's view, we sketch a form of relativism avoiding this confusion, without doing away with any concrete possibility of discussion or search for truth. At the same time, we try to understand Popper's aversion to relativism as well as the appeal of his position, in that it is a strange mixture of a heroic cognitive ethic and a desire for imaginary control over the uncontrolable. We argue that the form of relativism we advocate easily and perhaps better fulfilb the „heroic” readiness to forsake security in cognitive matters. (shrink)

Although bone development during embryogenesis and bone repair after injury have a number of features which appear similar, they are distinctly different processes which involve separate controlling elements and cuing parameters. Repair of bone is influenced by bioactive factors which reside in bone itself; some of these factors are not present when embryonic mesenchymal cells first differentiate. For example, a bone protein which induces the conversion of mesenchymal cells into cartilage cells is not present in the embryo at the site (...) where cartilage first differentiates into the anlagen for future bone. Ultimately, the sequence of cellular and molecular events which controls the success of bone repair is dependent on the prior embryologic and developmental packaging of bioactive factors into bone and the release of these factors at a bone break site. The success of the reparative events depends not only upon the release of these bone‐derived factors but also on systemic factors and the identity and numbers of responding cells at the repair site. (shrink)

Many have tackled the question ‘What (if anything) is analytic philosophy?’ I will not attempt to answer this vexed question. Rather, I address a smaller, more manageable set of interrelated questions: first, when and how did people begin using the label ‘analytic philosophy’? Second, how did those who used this label understand it? Third, why did many philosophers we today classify as analytic initially resist being grouped together under the single category of ‘analytic philosophy’? Finally, for the first generation who (...) described themselves as analytic philosophers, what was their intended contrast class? Relatedly, when did ‘continental philosophy’ become the standard opposition? Some evidence I present justifies received answers to these questions; other evidence supports surprising and unorthodox answers to these questions. (shrink)

Confused terms appear to signify more than one entity. Carnap maintained that any putative name that is associated with more than one object in a relevant universe of discourse fails to be a genuine name. Although many philosophers have agreed with Carnap, they have not always agreed among themselves about the truth-values of atomic sentences containing such terms. Some hold that such atomic sentences are always false, and others claim they are always truth-valueless. Field maintained that confused terms can still (...) refer, albeit partially, and offered a supervaluational account of their semantic properties on which some atomic sentences with confused terms can be true. After outlining many of the most important theoretical considerations for and against various semantic theories for such terms, we report the results of a study designed to investigate which of these accounts best accords with the truth-value judgments of ordinary language users about sentences containing these terms. We found that naïve participants view confused names as capable of successfully referring to one or more objects. Thus, semantic theories that judge them to involve total reference failure do not comport well with patterns of ordinary usage. (shrink)

The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, (...) encounters difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply signifying terms are also presented, and I discuss the relative merits of the three semantics briefly. Finally, possible modifications to the standard logical regimentation of the notion of existence are considered. (shrink)