These are the basic foundations of liberatory psychiatry.

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 48 Heft: 1 Seiten: 237-260.

It is shown that for every nonzero r.e. degree c there is a linear ordering of degree c which is not isomorphic to any recursive linear ordering. It follows that there is a linear ordering of low degree which is not isomorphic to any recursive linear ordering. It is shown further that there is a linear ordering L such that L is not isomorphic to any recursive linear ordering, and L together with its ‘infinitely far apart’ relation is of low (...) degree. Finally, an analogue of the recursion theorem for recursive linear orderings is refuted. (shrink)

We show, roughly speaking, that it requires ω iterations of the Turing jump to decode nontrivial information from Boolean algebras in an isomorphism invariant fashion. More precisely, if α is a recursive ordinal, A is a countable structure with finite signature, and d is a degree, we say that A has αth-jump degree d if d is the least degree which is the αth jump of some degree c such there is an isomorphic copy of A with universe ω in (...) which the functions and relations have degree at most c. We show that every degree d ≥ 0 (ω) is the ωth jump degree of a Boolean algebra, but that for $n no Boolean algebra has nth-jump degree $\mathbf{d} > 0^{(n)}$ . The former result follows easily from work of L. Feiner. The proof of the latter result uses the forcing methods of J. Knight together with an analysis of various equivalences between Boolean algebras based on a study of their Stone spaces. A byproduct of the proof is a method for constructing Stone spaces with various prescribed properties. (shrink)

Performing and listening to music occurs in specific situations, requiring specific media. Empirical research on music listening and appreciation, however, tends to overlook the effects these situations and media may have on the listening experience. This article uses the sociological concept of the frame to develop a theory of an aesthetic experience with music as the result of encountering sound/music in the context of a specific situation. By presenting a transdisciplinary sub-field of empirical studies, we unfold this theory for one (...) such frame: the classical concert. After sketching out the underlying theoretical framework, a selective literature review is conducted to look for evidence on the general plausibility of the single elements of this emerging theory and to identify desiderata. We refer to common criticisms of the standard classical concert, and how new concert formats try to overcome alleged shortcomings and detrimental effects. Finally, an empirical research program is proposed, in which frames and frame components are experimentally manipulated and compared to establish their respective affordances and effects on the musical experience. Such a research program will provide empirical evidence to tackle a question that is still open to debate, i.e., whether the diversified world of modern-day music listening formats also holds a place for the classical concert – and if so, for what kind of classical concert. (shrink)

The AGM theory of belief contraction is extended tomultiple contraction, i.e. to contraction by a set of sentences rather than by a single sentence. There are two major variants: Inpackage contraction all the sentences must be removed from the belief set, whereas inchoice contraction it is sufficient that at least one of them is removed. Constructions of both types of multiple contraction are offered and axiomatically characterized. Neither package nor choice contraction can in general be reduced to contractions by single (...) sentences; in the finite case choice contraction allows for reduction. (shrink)

The causal/explanatory exclusion argument is one of the principal weapons against the possibility of mental causes/explanations having genuine causal/explanatory power. I argue that the causal and the explanatory versions of the exlusion argument should be distinguished. There are really two arguments, one of them perhaps successful, the other one not.

Intentionality is one of the central problems of modern philosophy. How can a thought, action or belief be about something? Sachs draws on the work of Wilfrid Sellars, C. I. Lewis and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to build a new theory of intentionality that solves many of the problems faced by traditional conceptions. In doing so, he sheds new light on Sellars’s influential arguments concerning the ‘Myth of the Given’ and shows how we can build a productive discourse between American pragmatism, analytical (...) philosophy and European phenomenology. (shrink)

In what sense are the activities and properties of components in a mechanism explanatorily relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole? I articulate this problem, the problem of constitutive relevance, and I show that it must be solved if we are to understand mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. I argue against some putative solutions to the problem of constitutive relevance, and I sketch a positive account according to which relevance is analyzed in terms ofrelationships of mutual manipulability between (...) the behavior of a mechanism as a whole and the properties and activities of its components. My account is a causal-mechanical account in the sense that it is a particular expression of the idea that constitutive explanation is a matter of showing how an explanandum phenomenon is situated within the causal structure of the world. It is thus offered as a rival to epistemic (argument-centered) and psychological accounts of interlevel explanation. (shrink)

The paradox of propositions, presented in Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity of his early (...) theory of propositions. (shrink)

The paradox of propositions, presented in Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity of his early (...) theory of propositions. (shrink)

: Pragmatist truth - as advocated e.g. by Peirce and James - is usually taken to integrate four key elements: the value of truth is likened to some kind of utility; truth is naturally taken to consist in correspondence; truth is essentially linked to the possibility of knowledge; truth is not relative but absolute. Critics have never tired to question the individual and collective consistency of these four constraints. The principal challenge issued to pragmatists always consisted in developing viable interpretations (...) of the key notions utility, correspondence, knowability and absoluteness that would render the pragmatist proposal at least consistent. I shall take up that challenge developing some ideas of James in a contemporary garb.Keywords: Truth. Utility. Knowledge. JamesResumo: Verdade pragmatista - como defendida por Peirce e James, por exemplo - da forma como é considerada usualmente, integra quatro elementoschave: o valor da verdade é assemelhado a algum tipo de utilidade; a verdade é naturalmente considerada como consistindo de correspondência; a verdade está essencialmente ligada à possibilidade de conhecimento; a verdade não é relativa e sim absoluta. Os críticos nunca se cansam de questionar a consistência individual e coletiva dessas quatro limitações. O principal desafio lançado aos pragmatistas , sempre envolveu o desenvolvimento de interpretações viáveis das noções-chave: utilidade, correspondência, cognoscibilidade e integridade, que tornariam a proposta pragmatista, ao menos, consistente. Aceitarei o desafio, desenvolvendo algumas idéias de James sob uma roupagem contemporânea.Palavras-chave: Verdade. Utilidade. Conhecimento. James. (shrink)

Not all models are explanatory. Some models are data summaries. Some models sketch explanations but leave crucial details unspecified or hidden behind filler terms. Some models are used to conjecture a how-possibly explanation without regard to whether it is a how-actually explanation. I use the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential to illustrate these ways that models can be useful without explaining. I then use the subsequent development of the explanation of the action potential to show what is (...) required of an adequate mechanistic model. Mechanistic models are explanatory. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism— individualized indexical contextualism —I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement ; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that (...) attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement -data and is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic. (shrink)