Comparative study of inference in logic in Indic philosophy.

'Why did the window break when it was hit by the stone? Because the window is brittle and the stone is hard; hardness and brittleness are powers, dispositional properties or dispositions.' Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. This book is a record of the debate on the nature of dispositions between three distinguished philosophers - D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place - who have been thinking about dispositions all their working lives. Their distinctive (...) accounts cover many of the issues surrounding dispositions such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation. Dispositions illuminates this central topic in analytic philosophy and at the same time highlights deeper concerns of metaphysics. (shrink)

The question of providence and contingency in contemporary Western thought: a critical study from an Islamic perspective.

Authors philosophical notes on life, conduct of life from the perspective of a life.

In some languages every statement must contain a specification of the type of evidence on which it is based: for example, whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else. This grammatical reference to information source is called 'evidentiality', and is one of the least described grammatical categories. Evidentiality systems differ in how complex they are: some distinguish just two terms (eyewitness and noneyewitness, or reported and everything else), while (...) others have six or even more terms. Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of epistemic or some other modality, nor of tense-aspect. Every language has some way of referring to the source of information, but not every language has grammatical evidentiality. In English expressions such as I guess, they say, I hear that, the alleged are not obligatory and do not constitute a grammatical system. Similar expressions in other languages may provide historical sources for evidentials. True evidentials, by contrast, form a grammatical system. In the North Arawak language Tariana an expression such as "the dog bit the man" must be augmented by a grammatical suffix indicating whether the event was seen, or heard, or assumed, or reported. This book provides the first exhaustive cross-linguistic typological study of how languages deal with the marking of information source. Examples are drawn from over 500 languages from all over the world, several of them based on the author's original fieldwork. Professor Aikhenvald also considers the role evidentiality plays in human cognition, and the ways in which evidentiality influences human perception of the world.. This is an important book on an intriguing subject. It will interest anthropologists, cognitive psychologists and philosophers, as well as linguists. (shrink)

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

al-Shirwānī's glosses on Jurjānī's glosses on al-Urmawī's Maṭāliʻ al-anwār on Arabic logic.

We show: (1) It is possible to produce the three familiar statistics without referring to the problem of distinguishability; (2) what really distinguishes elementary particles is the correlation existing among them; (3) correlations existing among quantum particles, positive for bosons and negative form fermions, are completely different in character.

Resolution is an effective deduction procedure for classical logic. There is no similar "resolution" system for non-classical logics (though there are various automated deduction systems). The paper presents resolution systems for intuistionistic predicate logic as well as for modal and temporal logics within the framework of labelled deductive systems. Whereas in classical predicate logic resolution is applied to literals, in our system resolution is applied to L(abelled) R(epresentation) S(tructures). Proofs are discovered by a refutation procedure defined on LRSs, that imposes (...) a hierarchy on clause sets of such structures together with an inheritance discipline. This is a form of Theory Resolution. For intuitionistic logic these structures are called I(ntuitionistic) R(epresentation) S(tructures). Their hierarchical structure allows the restriction of unification of individual variables and/or constants without using Skolem functions. This structures must therefore be preserved when we consider other (non-modal) logics. Variations between different logics are captured by fine tuning of the inheritance properties of the hierarchy. For modal and temporal logics IRS's are extended to structures that represent worlds and/or times. This enables us to consider all kinds of combined logics. (shrink)

This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)