The project of all philosophy may be to gain reconciliation with time, even if not every philosopher has dealt with time expressly. A confrontation with the passing of time and with human finitude runs through the history of philosophy as an ultimate concern. In this genealogy of the concept of temporality, David Hoy examines the emergence in a post-Kantian continental philosophy of a focus on the lived experience of the "time of our lives" rather than on the time of the (...) universe. The purpose is to see how phenomenological and poststructuralist philosophers have tried to locate the source of temporality, how they have analyzed time's passing, and how they have depicted our relation to time once it has been--in a Proustian sense--regained. Hoy engages with competing theoretical tactics for reconciling us to our fleeting temporality, drawing on work by Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Gadamer, Sartre, Bourdieu, Foucault, Bergson, Deleuze, iek, and Derrida. Hoy considers four existential strategies for coping with the apparent flow of temporality, including Proust's passive and Walter Benjamin's active reconciliation through memory, iek's critique of poststructuralist politics, Foucault's confrontation with the temporality of power, and Deleuze's account of Aion and Chronos. He concludes by exploring whether a dual temporalization could be what constitutes the singular "time of our lives.". (shrink)
This book serves as both an introduction to the concept of resistance in poststructuralist thought and an original contribution to the continuing philosophical discussion of this topic. How can a body of thought that mistrusts universal principles explain the possibility of critical resistance? Without appeals to abstract norms, how can emancipatory resistance be distinguished from domination? Can there be a poststructuralist ethics? David Hoy explores these crucial questions through lucid readings of Nietzsche, Foucault, Bourdieu, Derrida, and others. He traces the (...) genealogy of resistance from Nietzsche's break with the Cartesian concept of consciousness to Foucault's and Bourdieu's theories of how subjects are formed through embodied social practices. He also considers Levinas, Heidegger, and Derrida on the sources of ethical resistance. Finally, in light of current social theory from Judith Butler to Slavoj Zizek, he challenges "poststructuralism" as a category and suggests the term "post-critique" as a more accurate description of contemporary Continental philosophy.Hoy is a leading American scholar of poststructuralism. Critical Resistance is the only book in English that deals substantively with the topical concept of resistance in relation to poststructuralist thought, discussions of which have dominated Continental social thought for many years. (shrink)
Philosophical controversies within contemporary critical theory arise largely from questions about the nature, scope and limits of human reason. As the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy has increasingly given way to a sociocritical turn, traditional ideas of 'pure' reason have been left further and further behind. There is however considerable disagreement about what that shift entails for enlightenment ideals of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization. In this book two prominent philosophers bring these disagreements into focus around a set of familiar philosophical (...) issues concerning reason and the rational subject, truth and representation, knowledge and objectivity, identity and difference, relativism and universalism, the right and the good. But these "perennial problems" are resituated within the context of critical theory as it has developed from the work of the Frankfurt School in the 1930's and 1940's to the multiplicity of contemporary approaches: genealogical, hermeneutic, neopragmatist, deconstructive, and reconstructive. (shrink)
This paper explains the genealogical method as it is understood and employed in contemporary Continental philosophy. Using a pair of terms from Bernard Williams, genealogy is contrasted with phenomenology as an `unmasking' as opposed to a `vindicatory' method. The genealogical method is also compared with the method of Ideologiekritik and recent critical theory. Although genealogy is usually thought to be allergic to universals, in fact Foucault, Derrida, and Bourdieu do not shun universals, even if they approach them with caution. The (...) conclusion is that genealogy is a viable and productive approach to social criticism and self-transformation. (shrink)
Would a history of the human sciences seem strange if it featured a chapter on the history of consciousness? An argument for including such a chapter could point out that consciousness is often thought to be essential to what it is to be human. Yet the discipline that makes this.
Minimally helpful comparison of constructive interpretation with Gadamer, Derrida, and Habermas. Presents a somewhat imprecise account of Dworkin, a quite general discussion of his similarities with Gadamer, and a gloss of Derridean deconstruction with regards to the Declaration of Independence. Then offers an evaluation of Dworkin in terms of Gadamer and Derrida.
Opponents of Hegel's philosophy traditionally support their arguments against his metaphysics and dialectical methodology by implying that the lack of an ethics in his system has unfortunate consequences for personal and political life. In rebuttal, defenders of Hegel then block thead hominemcharges by pointing out examples of sound moral and political behavior in Hegel's own life and by arguing that amoral or immoral conduct is not entailed by Hegel's dialectical reasoning. The success of this defense of the biographical Hegel has (...) not yet been matched, however, by a systematic explanation of the nature of morality based on Hegel's philosophical writings themselves. Instead of supplying an alternative to Kant's conception of morality, Hegel's texts indeed seem to involve the devious strategy of attacking Kantian morality and then abruptly moving on to another topic. The shift of discussion to religion or the state appears to force commentators to conclude either that his philosophy lacks a systematic moral philosophy or that it surreptitiously preserves an essentially Kantian ethics. In the former case his system apparently permits immoral conduct, and in the latter the philosopher merely deceives us with a dialectical sleight of hand. In either case, Hegel's morals are still in doubt. (shrink)
This discussion of ?Disclosing New Worlds? by Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus raises four groups of questions. First, do skills, which are largely unreflective, need to be distinguished more sharply from strategies for social action, which are more reflective and deliberative? Second, is there a tension between the article's emphasis on the importance of background practices, which are collective and nonindividual, and its frequent appeal to examples of single individuals (the entrepreneur, the cultural hero) who are able to (...) transform these practices? Third, why does the appeal to solidarity not undermine democratic action, since solidarities compete and conflict with one another, and are often formed by excluding others? Or are the ideas of solidarity and universality not necessarily inconsistent with each other? Fourth, without universalistic values how will a theory of pluralistic solidarities explain social resistance to perceived oppression? Is the authors? notion of being willing to die for the group's commitments too extreme a test for social solidarity? Even if it were offered as only a limiting case, is it an adequate test for the value or justice of the commitments themselves? (shrink)