In De Partibus Animalium I Aristotle sets out his philosophy of biology, discussing cause, necessity, soul, genus, and species, definition by logical division, and general methodology. In De Generatione Animalium I he applies his hylomorphic philosophy to the problem of animal reproduction. The translation is close, and includes passages from De Generatione Animalium II which complete Aristotle's theory of reproduction. The notes interpret Aristotle's arguments and discuss his views on major issues such as natural teleology. The (...) original edition was published in 1972. (shrink)

In De Partibus Animalium I Aristotle sets out his philosophy of biology, discussing cause, necessity, soul, genus, and species, definition by logical division, and general methodology. In De Generatione Animalium I he applies his hylomorphic philosophy to the problem of animal reproduction. The translation is close, and includes passages from De Generatione Animalium II which complete Aristotle's theory of reproduction. The notes interpret Aristotle's arguments and discuss his views on major issues such as natural teleology. The (...) original edition was published in 1972. (shrink)

In De Partibus Animalium I Aristotle sets out his philosophy of biology, discussing cause, necessity, soul, genus, and species, definition by logical division, and general methodology. In De Generatione Animalium I he applies his hylomorphic philosophy to the problem of animal reproduction. The translation is close, and includes passages from De Generatione Animalium II which complete Aristotle's theory of reproduction. The notes interpret Aristotle's arguments and discuss his views on major issues such as natural teleology. The (...) original edition was published in 1972. (shrink)

Der älteste griechischsprachige Kommentar zur Schrift De partibus animalium des Aristoteles wurde 1904 unter dem Namen des Michael von Ephesos in der Reihe Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca ediert. Im vorliegenden Band werden zwei voneinander unabhängige Redaktionen dieses Kommentars herausgegeben: Eine jüngere Redaktion ist Georgios Pachymeres zuzuschreiben; die ältere Redaktion ist anonym überliefert. Beide Bearbeitungen streben nach einer Aktualisierung des Kommentars und ergänzen Erläuterungen zum zweiten Buch von De partibus animalium – mit solchem Erfolg, dass für diese (...) Teile die Redaktion des Pachymeres als Text Michaels ediert wurde. In der Einleitung werden die Quellen und die Textgeschichte der beiden Redaktionen analysiert und das Umfeld der byzantinischen Gelehrten beleuchtet, die den Gehalt und die Methoden der aristotelischen Wissenschaft vom Lebendigen propagierten und weiterentwickelten. (shrink)

Until the last years of his life, Charles Darwin had actually never read Aristotle. The sole reference he makes to his naturalist forebear in _On the Origin of Species_ came in an addition to the fourth edition, published in 1866, in which he mistakenly refers to Aristotle’s summation of Empedocles’ position at _Physica_ II 8, as Aristotle’s own, and notes that ‘we see here the principle of natural selection shadowed forth’ (while disputing the specific scientific point Aristotle – though actually (...) Empedocles – was supposedly making). So when his friend William Ogle, a minor scientist and physician, and an evangelist Christian, published a translation of Aristotle’s _De partibus animalium_ in 1882 and sent a copy to Darwin, he was able to declare that he felt “some self-importance in thus being a kind of formal introducer of the father of Naturalists [Aristotle] to his great modern successor [Darwin].” Ogle, who despite his religious inclinations was nevertheless a strong proponent of Darwin’s theories, did not agree with Aristotle’s scientific theories – not least because Aristotle’s teleological model of animal development, which had been adopted as a model by many post-classical Christian scientists and theologians for centuries, was dealt a serious blow by Darwin’s theory of natural selection. So it is perhaps surprising to see Ogle produce a translation of one of Aristotle’s major biological treatises. By looking at key passages of Aristotle and Ogle’s translation, this paper will examine the reasons for Ogle’s curious choice to publish his work, setting it into the wider scientific, and Darwinian, context of late-nineteenth century Britain, and explaining how Aristotle the teleologist was used by Ogle to re-enforce Darwin’s position as a modern natural historian. (shrink)

Il magistero aristotelico nella zoologia comparata rimane saldo fino a tempi di scienza moderna, perché non muta in sostanza nei secoli il metodo aristotelico costituito dalla combinazione dei dati anatomici con quelli fisiologici. Pertanto la straordinaria stabilità assunta dalla biologia aristotelica richiede una riflessione sulle fonti storiche di essa e sui fondamenti del metodo scientifico impiegato da Aristotele nel quadro del suo pensiero biologico presentato in maniera complessiva nelle opere De partibus animalium e Historia Animalium. La riflessione (...) su alcuni aspetti del suo pensiero biologico, ovvero sulla questione della causalità, della sostanza, del metodo dicotomico e comparativo, possa spiegare anche come esse abbiano a un certo punto svolto un ruolo di stimolo e di verifica anche per i temi più generali del suo pensiero filosofico. In effetti, con Aristotele il sapere teoretico della biologia ha conquistato per la prima volta in modo sistematico il grande terreno della natura vivente. Un grande merito di Aristotele filosofo e biologo è quello di aver fondato la scienza della biologia e la filosofia della biologia. (shrink)

The value and date of Vaticanus graecus 1339 , which contains many of the works of Aristotle, have been much disputed. Here I want only to argue that at the beginning of the De Partibus Animalium, the first work it contains, it is closely related to Parisinus graecus 1853 , the great tenth-century manuscript which is one of our major authorities for many of Aristotle's writings.

The value and date ofVaticanus graecus1339, which contains many of the works of Aristotle, have been much disputed. Here I want only to argue that at the beginning of theDe Partibus Animalium, the first work it contains, it is closely related toParisinus graecus1853, the great tenth-century manuscript which is one of our major authorities for many of Aristotle's writings.

Seit dem 2. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert werden die Schriften von Aristoteles kommentiert. Diese Ausgabe enthält griechische Kommentare zu seinem Werk vom 3. bis 8. Jahrhundert n. Chr., u. a. von Alexander von Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in griechischer Sprache.

In De partibus animalium A1, Aristotle presents —in a darker than usual way— decisive details of the methodology he devised for his science of nature. His indications seem to point the path along which Aristotelian biology should travel. However, numerous textual and systematic difficulties have given rise to a number of conflicting interpretations, in the context of a vigorous stream of philosophical research and debate since the last third of the last century. In this stream of studies, Michael (...) of Ephesus’s commentary on PA and his views on the subject remain relatively ignored. A complex multiplicity of factors seems to support the lack of sufficient consensus among leading contemporary specialists to explicitly consider those contributions. The purpose of this paper is to examine several of these factors and, based on the evidence provided by little explored aspects of Michael’s texts, to offer arguments in favor of that consensus against a number of alternatives. I shall argue that the contributions of this late commentator deserve to be considered —mutatis mutandis— as seriously as it is done with the main ancient Greek commentaries; in particular, in the philosophical studies of those who are currently interested in that methodology or are engaged in Aristotelian biology. (shrink)

Aristóteles foi o primeiro filósofo que articulou uma taxonomia da ciência: os quatro livros que compõem os Analíticos oferecem uma teoria do conhecimento científico e os critérios que uma disciplina deve respeitar para receber a designação de ciência. Aristóteles, porém, foi também o fundador da ciência zoológica e o pai da anatomia comparada. Trata-se de uma questão já clássica, saber se o modo pelo qual Aristóteles desenvolve sua ciência dos animais na Historia Animalium e no De Partibus (...) class='Hi'>Animalium conforma-se aos critérios científicos estabelecidos nos Analíticos Posteriores. Na primeira parte deste artigo, evidenciamos a relação entre as normas estipuladas nos Analíticos para a investigação científica e as pesquisas relatadas nos tratados naturais. Na segunda parte, examinamos a explicação fornecida pelo Estagirita acerca da função do cérebro, a qual leva o filósofo a incorrer num erro considerado escandaloso pelos pensadores que lhe sucederam. (shrink)

This edition of Michael Scot’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s De partibus animalium is part of a vast project, under the supervision of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, to publish the Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew translations of Aristotle’s works, of the Latin translations of these works, and of the medieval paraphrases and commentaries made in the context of this translation tradition. After a general introduction, the Latin text is presented, followed by a good number of excellent (...) notes, an Index latino-arabus, an Index of proper names of animals and an Index arabo-latinus. This is followed by an Index of the Greek names of plants and animals. (shrink)

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal (...) binding. 2, Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 4, pp 255 - 285 This paper examines the authorship and reception of the medieval translation of Sextus Empiricus’ _Outlines of Pyrrhonism_. It is shown that its traditional ascription to Niccolò da Reggio cannot be maintained, because the translation must have circulated already in the late 1270s. Its author is difficult to identify: the closest stylistic parallels are found with the anonymous translator of Aristotle’s _De partibus animalium_. With Alvaro of Oviedo and the otherwise (...) unknown Johannes de Peretis two early readers can be named. Though a copy was accessible in Viterbo at this time and another copy possibly travelled around in Italy in the 1320s, no philosophical or other impact can be determined. A single reference is found in Peter of Auvergne’s _Quaestiones_-commentary on Aristotle’s _Politics_. Its origin is difficult to assess. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Classification and Explanation in Aristotle’s Theory of DefinitionGreg Bayer1. introductiona problem lies at the heart of Aristotle’s theory of definition. On the one hand, Aristotle says in Topics VI.4 that “the one who defines well must define by means of genus1 and differentia” (141b25–7); indeed his view of definition most often seems to be confined to its role of picking out the definiendum by indicating the class it belongs (...) to—what can be called its “class definition.”2 But on the other hand, in Posterior Analytics II.2 he makes the pronouncement that “knowing what something is ” is the same as knowing why it is ” (90a31–2), and then goes on in II.2 and 8 to argue that definition is an, “explanation” or “explanatory principle.” How can these two notions of definition be reconciled?Short of giving the full Aristotelian solution to this problem, I hope here to suggest one way in which Aristotle’s notion of class definition—especially the reformed version presented in De Partibus Animalium I.2–4—can be shown to relate to his notion of explanatory definition in APo II. The link is his notion of scientific, “problems,” as discussed in APo II. 14 and elsewhere.3 It will turn out that a class definition in effect presents a scientific problem to the scientist which can best be solved by an explanation—ultimately by an “explanatory definition”—accounting for the attributes that form the basis of [End Page 487] class membership. Or more succinctly: the class definition presents a problem that the explanatory definition solves. Further, although the discussion in PA I is meant to be a reform of the simpler but unworkable method of arriving at the genus-differentia formula based upon, “division,” I intend to argue that an important ancillary benefit of the reformed method is that it is capable of articulating scientific problems in a much clearer way than division can. In fact, it seems very well suited to the task of presenting problems and hence to the task of searching for explanatory definitions.2. scientific problemsIn APo II. 14, Aristotle begins to outline the proper procedure for formulating scientific problems. We are told that “in order to obtain problems, we must pick out the sections 4 and divisions” of the subject we are investigating, about which we are formulating a problem (98a1–3). That is, we must learn to pick out each genus in the hierarchy of genera the subject belongs to by learning to identify the attributes associated with each of these genera. This will enable us to account for each attribute we find in the subject under investigation in terms of the genus the attribute is primarily associated with. As Aristotle explains: “Let A stand for animal, B for [an attribute] of every animal, and C, D, and E some particular animal [species]; it is clear why B belongs to D—because of A” (98a9–11).This, in a sense, shows one way a scientific problem—Why does attribute B belong to D?—can be “solved”: by finding the right “division” of D that accounts for its having B. But what is important to note here is that, in fact, our investigation only begins with this process of finding the right genus. This is simply how we “obtain” the problem, strictly speaking, not the means for ultimately solving it. Indeed the problem of accounting for why an attribute belongs to a given subject is not even completely formulated until we are able to determine the proper “division,” or genus, the attribute universally belongs to. Then we can ask the more fundamental question of why the attribute belongs to this genus, i.e., why B belongs to genus A. Now this question can be analyzed further, in terms of the other attributes of the genus. Any genus (or infima species) is, in effect, designated by a regular concomitance of the many attributes that identify it—i.e., attributes that universally co-occur in it. So the scientific problem we are formulating, regarding why a certain attribute belongs to a certain subject, ultimately should be reformulated in this way: Why does... (shrink)

The core thesis of the paper is that the constitution of biological science begins with a conceptual innovation with far-reaching consequences with effect up to the present: by conceiving the parts of living beings as organs (that is, as tools), Aristotle laid the foundation stone for a functional explanation of animate nature. Comparative anatomy is thus transformed from a merely descriptive to an explanatory theory. The point of the discussion is above all that a functional explanation must not be confused (...) with the sort of teleology according to which the function of an organ is understood as the cause of its existence. The first section outlines the theoretical motives that Aristotle adduces in arguing for biology (against contemporary contempt for biological research). The second step addresses the significance of the parts of animals in Aristotle's larger collection of zoological material, the Historia animalium . The third section demonstrates how in the major explanatory work De partibus animalium the term organon takes on the status of a key methodological concept. Finally, the fourth section discusses the significance of the Aristotelian determination of the organic with respect to current discourses in natural science. (shrink)

If classics of science were to be defined as works that mark scientific revolutions, in the sense of sharp shifts in research tradition, then none of the three works discussed in our symposium quite qualifies. I briefly indicate the fate of each. While impressed by his argument, I express some reservations about Lennox's claim to have dissolved the "problem of demonstration" for Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium. I question Finocchiaro's challenging assertion that in structuring the Dialogo as he did, (...) Galileo "operated within the restrictions" laid on him. Finally, I argue that the legacy of Newton's Opticks was in crucial respects a divided one for the generations that followed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kenneth R. Seeskin THE COMEDY OF THE GODS IN THE ILIAD "... no animai but man ever laughs." Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 673a8-9 No reader of the Iliad can fail to be struck by the great extent to which social relations among the gods resemble those which obtain among men. Zeus, the oldest and strongest of the Olympian deities, rules as an absolute monarchor patriarch. The "council" (...) meetings over which he presides are not unlike those which occur on earth. Like Agamemnon, he must assert his authority from time to time; and, like any mortal king, he must deal with problems relating to jealousy, adultery, dishonesty, and revenge. To the extent that the gods differ from mortal heroes, those differences are similar to the ones which separate mortal heroes and commoners. The gods occupy the highest place on the scale of excellence, beauty, and social status, mortals with divine ancestry occupy the next position, and so on down the line. Although the above picture is accurate in many respects, there is something about it which is bound to leave one cold, for, unlike his mortal heroes, Homer's gods often appear as clowns. One need only recall scenes like Hephaestus' bumbling attempt to wait on the other immortals (1.584 ff.), Hera's seduction of Zeus (14.157 ff.), or the famous theomachy (21.385 ff.) to see that, ironically, humans frequendy are more dignified than the gods they are trying to please. It was scenes like these which caused Longinus, in his essay On the Sublime, to remark that Homer appears to have made his men gods and his gods men (sec. 9). Now any long story is bound to contain comic relief. But for many authors (Shakespeare, for instance), comic relief is supplied by those whose social status is lower than that of the main characters, e.g., grave diggers, nightwatchmen, country bumpkins, or pettythieves. As Aristotle argued in the Poetics (sec. 2 and 5), comedy is an imitation of men worse than the average. In Book 2 of the Iliad, Homer does use Thersites 295 296Philosophy and Literature for comic effect; yet this scene is noteworthy for being the only one in the book which supports Aristotle's contention. In practically every other case, comedy is supplied by characters better than the average: it is supplied by the gods. Moreover, in the few cases where mortal aristocrats are involved in comic situations (e.g., the rambling speeches of Nestor), the teasing tends to be extremely mild. Farce and slapstick are reserved almost exclusively for the inhabitants of Olympus. Plato, for one, was outraged by passages where the gods look ridiculous and wanted them excised from the text. Not surprisingly, there is a tradition of modern scholars who feel a similar sense of outrage. Walter Leaf, for example, maintained that the theomachy is poorly written and thus not the work of Homer.1 Gilbert Murray argued that several of the scenes in question are in bad taste, exemplify the spirit of Milesian skepticism, and, again, are not the work of Homer.2 Wilamowitz constructed an elaborate theory which claimed that these passages are the work of a later rhapsode who probably was associated with Archilochus.3 Finally, George Calhoun, who exposed the flaws of those just mentioned, concluded that such passages show the influence not of a later period of skepticism but of an earlier, less refined period and were composed merely to please Homer's audience.4 Since it is not my purpose to enter the long debate over the authorship and unity of the text, let me state the guiding assumptions of this essay dogmatically. First, the passages in question are not interpolated and serve important artistic functions. Second, for whatever reason Homer decided to include them, their presence raises profound moral and religious questions. From the outset, it is clear that any anthropomorphic conception of the gods will have to fail in one important respect. The gods are immortal, humans are not. Thus even the lowliest human can do something which no god can—risk his life. For all of their quarrels, deceptive schemes, and forays into the thick of the fighting, the gods are... (shrink)

Aristotle is the first person in the history of science to see the study of nature as an articulated complex of interrelated, yet somewhat autonomous, investigations. Understanding why goes to the heart of what is philosophically distinctive about him. Why does Aristotle present the investigation of “the common cause of animal motion” as distinct and independent from a study of the causes of the different forms of animal locomotion, the announced project of De incessu animalium? This article examines the (...) puzzling complexity of Aristotle's investigations of animals, which can offer insights into his metaphysics and epistemology. It first briefly considers the range of Aristotle's writings related to animals, including Historia animalium, Dissections, De partibus animalium, De motu animalium, De incessu animalium, De Anima, and Meteorologica IV. The article then looks at his views on the limits of teleology in biology. (shrink)

The article deals with some textual issues related with Aristotle’s treatise “On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death. This text is conventionally included in the so-called “small scientific works”. In the article I considers the title variants testified in the sources as well as the place the treatise occupies within the set of Aristotle’s scientific works. I trace the parallels of this treatise with another Aristotle’s works, such as “De longitudine et brevitate vitae” and “De anima”. The treatise is (...) further compared with Aristotle’s works on physics and biology, esp. “De partibus animalium”, “De motu animalium”, “De generatione animalium”. I discuss the concept of life, functions of the vegetative soul, its “medial” location, and Aristotle’s definition of the soul’s and body’s «midpoint» in respect to the «upward» and «downward» directions. For understanding the meaning of the term «innate natural heat» it is proposed to compare it with the terminology of such Aristotelian works as “De motu animalium” and “De generatione animalium”. (shrink)

The phrase koine aisthesis appears, as far as I can see, very rarely in Aristotle. There is one definite use of the phrase in the De Anima, at 425a27. The word koine without aisthesis but such that the latter must be supplied may possibly occur at 431b5, but the text is uncertain there, and there is every reason why the word should be deleted from the text. This leaves us with a single occurrence of the phrase koine aisthesis in the (...) De Anima and it is used explicitly to deal with perception of the koina, the so-called common sensibles. Outside the De Anima, the phrase occurs at De Memoria 450a10, and at De Partibus Animalium 686a27, and I think nowhere else. Of these two passages that from the De Memoria is, although somewhat obscure, in line with the De Anima reference; it seems to invoke the common sense for the perception of magnitude, motion and time, and also says that an image is a pathos of the common sense, presumably because an image must be of a magnitude. The De Partibus Animalium passage is somewhat more eccentric. It is concerned with the fact that man is the only animal to walk upright, and associates this with the fact that man can think. This would not be easy if he had much of his body weighing down on him from above, for weight makes unresponsive thought and the common sense- τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν. Whatever be the other curiosities in this passage, the close association of thought and the common sense is itself at first sight rather strange. If any account can be given of it, it is presumably because of the facts adduced in the De Memoria passage, that thinking involves images, and these the koine aisthesis. (shrink)

Although there are those who understand that the debates about the morality of the interruption of pregnancy are newly born, when analyzing some passages of the classical sources, the antiquity of such discussions is revealed. Likewise, as the legal, political and moral conclusions in such respects are often based on a metaphysical, anthropological, theological or biological position, it is necessary to enter these fields in order to fully explore the different edges of such a complicated object. In this way, this (...) work aims to show the terminological pitfalls that the words embryon and kyema generate for the understanding of Aristotelian embryology, which is the basis for understanding his position on abortion, as well as the scholastic debates that use this as a source. We aspire to analyze the various appearances of both terms in various works of Aristotle - fundamentally De generatione animalium and De partibus animalium - and show how there is no criterion to distinguish them in most contexts. (shrink)

Unlike most anthologies in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, the present selection does not try to collect representative extracts from the writings of most, or even many, important aestheticians throughout the ages. It aims for depth rather than width and tries to do as much justice as possible to those aestheticians which it does include, without bothering much about those left out. The result is really impressive. No less than 138 pages are devoted to Plato and Aristotle alone, where (...) the reader may find not only the usual passages from the Poetics and the Rhetoric but also relevant material from De Partibus Animalium and Politica. Such an anthology, so it seems, must be an opinionated one. Thus, while it contains some 70 pages of Dewey's Art as Experience, there is not a single line of Santayana in it. Although I disagree with the choice made in this case, I cannot but admire the courage it took to make it. Another surprise is the inclusion of the relatively obscure mediaeval thinker, Marsilio Ficino, in an anthology which excludes Baumgarten, Lessing, Burke, Schiller, Coleridge, Bosanquet and Alexander, to mention but few, and whose sole contemporary representative is Heidegger. The extracts from Ficino's commentary on Plato prove, however, to be highly interesting and relatively original, too. Thus, even if Ficino is not as great as some of the aestheticians not included in this volume, I, for one, would not regret this mark of personal, off-beat, taste. The last selection, Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," appearing for the first time in English translation, comes as special bonus to the reader. The editors' introductions to each selection are generally concise, precise, and very helpful. Sometimes, however, one may find an exception: in their introduction to the Heidegger translation, the editors characterize the Kehre as a "reversal... from the stress on anxiety, nothingness... to a stress on more affirmative moods." This is, to say the least, a grossly misleading remark, which is likely to confuse the student of the later Heidegger rather than help him.—E. M. Z. (shrink)