Wetenschappelijke bezinning op de betekenis van de ethiek van de humanistische psycholoog (1900-1980) o.a. door vergelijking met de ethiek van Marx en de existentiefilosofie.

Resumo: A superstição é definida por Bayle, em diversos momentos e diversas obras do filósofo francês, como: a) algo característico da corrupção natural humana; b) a prova da facilidade do homem em se ater às mais diversas crendices, logo, estando sujeito não só a uma, mas a todo tipo de superstições; c) o fenômeno que se instaurou e se disseminou na sociedade, perseguindo a todos e gerando ilusões por toda parte, através de presságios, profecias, prodígios, e sinais. Nesse quadro de (...) diversas e intangíveis absurdidades, a superstição ganha forma, indo para além dos domínios da razão e, assim, Bayle, em seus escritos, torna manifesta a oposição entre a filosofia e a ignorância supersticiosa, entre o entendimento e a imaginação e entre as explicações científicas e os relatos fantásticos.: Superstition is defined by Bayle at various times and in various works as: a) something characteristic of natural human corruption; b) proof of the ease of man in adhering to the most diverse beliefs, being subject not only to one but to all kinds of superstitions; c) a phenomenon which arose and spread in society, following everyone and creating illusions everywhere by means of omens, prophecies, miracles, and signs. In this context of the diverse and intangible absurdities in which superstition takes shape, going beyond the realms of reason, Bayle in his writings makes manifest the opposition between philosophy and superstitious ignorance, between understanding and imagination, and between scientific explanations and fantastic tales. (shrink)

Comment redonner vie à ces deux notions, dont la désuétude fait penser à Baudelaire : Vois se pencher les défuntes années, Sur les balcons du ciel, en robes surannées, mais qui de ce fait méritent quelque égard, tant elles occupèrent les philosophes du passé? Faut-il choisir entre le dualiste, qui s’écrit "j’ai un corps" et affirme la séparabilité de l’âme et du corps, et le moniste qui dit leur inséparabilité, et s’écrit : "je suis mon corps"? Nous proposerons qu’entre le (...) dualisme et le monisme il soit urgent de ne pas choisir, et que le corps se situe à la limite de l’être et de l’avoir, limite toujours mouvante, tant il est vrai qu’il est des moments du jour où il nous semble que nous avons un corps, et d’autres où il nous semble que nous sommes notre corps. Car le corps en bonne santé, oubliable et silencieux, n’est pas le corps souffrant, inoubliable et auquel on est comme assigné. Car le corps regardé n’est pas le même que celui qui ne l’est pas. De sorte qu’il ne faudrait pas prendre ce qui phénoménologiquement apparaît pour des réalités ontologiques! Inspiré par les traditions aristotélicienne et chrétienne, cet essai se voudrait une contribution à une anthropologie résolument philosophique, et au fond une méditation sur la pensée de Pascal selon laquelle "l’homme n’est ni ange ni bête", ayant entre angélisme et bestialité "ses allées et venues"... (shrink)

Every healthcare organisation enacts a multitude of policies, but there has been no discussion as to what procedural and substantive requirements a policy writing process should meet in order to achieve good outcomes and to possess sufficient authority for those who are asked to follow it.Using, as an example, the controversy about patient’s refusal of blood transfusions, I argue that a hospital wide policy is preferable to individual decision making, because it ensures autonomy, quality, fairness, and efficiency.Policy writing for morally (...) controversial medical practices needs additional justification compared to policies on standard medical practices and secures legitimate authority for HCO members by meeting five requirements: all parties directed by the policy are represented; the deliberative process encompasses all of the HCO’s obligations; the rationales for the policy are made available; there is a mechanism for criticising, and for evaluating the policy. (shrink)

This paper discusses a challenge to the claims made by biocentrists and some ecocentrists that some nonsentient biological entities qualify as candidates for moral considerability. This challenge derives from Wayne Sumner’s critique of “objective theories of welfare” and, in particular, from his critique of biocentrists’ and ecocentrists’ biofunction-based accounts of the “good of their own” of nonsentient biological entities. Sumner’s critique lends support to animal ethicists’ typical skepticism regarding those accounts, by contending that they are more plausibly interpreted as accounts (...) of the perfectionist value than of the welfare of nonsentient biological entities. In response to this critique and its implication that those function-based accounts would fail to qualify nonsentient biological entities as candidates for moral considerability, it is argued that those accounts should be interpreted as ones of the health of biological entities rather than ones of their perfectionist value. It is suggested that their being bearers of health may be sufficient for nonsentient biological entities to qualify as candidates for moral considerability, such that biocentrists and ecocentrists could grant Sumner and animal ethicists’ contention that the function-based accounts of the good of their own of nonsentient biological entities are not accounts of their welfare, while not giving up on the project of defending those entities’ moral considerability. | : Cet article discute d’une objection à la thèse défendue par plusieurs biocentristes et écocentristes selon laquelle les entités biologiques non sentientes se qualifieraient comme candidates à la considérabilité morale. Cette objection découle de la critique des « théories objectives du bien-être » formulée par Wayne Sumner et, plus particulièrement, de sa critique des théories du « bien propre » défendues par les biocentristes et les écocentristes, lesquelles définissent ce bien en relation avec les concepts biologiques de fonction et de téléologie. La critique de Sumner offre un certain appui au scepticisme généralement suscité par ces théories chez les auteur-e-s oeuvrant dans le domaine de l’éthique animale, en ce qu’elle fait valoir que celles-ci sont plus plausiblement interprétées comme concernant une forme de valeur perfectionniste s’appliquant aux entités biologiques non sentientes que comme concernant leur bien-être. Cet article soutient que la manière la plus prometteuse de répondre à cette critique pour les biocentristes et les écocentristes consiste à faire valoir d’une part, que les théories du bien propre qu’elles et ils défendent doivent être interprétées comme des théories de la santé des entités biologiques plutôt que comme des théories de leur valeur perfectionniste, et d’autre part, que la possibilité pour les entités biologiques non sentientes d’être en plus ou moins bonne santé suffit à les rendre candidates à la considérabilité morale. (shrink)

The quantitative problem of old evidence is the problem of how to measure the degree to which e confirms h for agent A at time t when A regards e as justified at t. Existing attempts to solve this problem have applied the e-difference approach, which compares A's probability for h at t with what probability A would assign h if A did not regard e as justified at t. The quantitative problem has been widely regarded as unsolvable primarily on (...) the grounds that the e-difference approach suffers from intractable problems. Various philosophers have proposed that 'Bayesianism' should be rejected as a research strategy in confirmation theory in part because of the unsolvability of this problem. I develop a version of the e-difference approach which overcomes these problems and possesses various advantages (but also certain limitations). I develop an alternative 'theistic' approach which handles many cases that my development of the e-difference approach does not handle. I conclude with an assessment of the significance of the quantitative problem for Bayesianism and argue that this problem is misunderstood in so far as it is regarded as unsolvable, and in so far as it is regarded as a problem only for Bayesians. (shrink)

Most authors who work with moral status automatically dismiss the possibility that plants are the kinds of entities that have moral status. This dismissal coheres with our intuitions about common-sense morality: if plants do not have moral status then we do not have any direct moral obligations to plant life. An implication of such a view is that any suggestion otherwise commits one to be in favour of an absurd conclusion. However, given the recent literature and empirical evidence on plant (...) minds, there are reasons to accept a different perspective that finds the absurd conclusion plausible. (shrink)

The healthcare crisis that has developed in the last two decades during China's economic reform has caused healthcare and hospital financing reforms to be largely experienced by patients as a crisis in the patient–healthcare professional relationship (PPR) at the bedside. The nature and magnitude of this crisis were epitomized by the "Harbin Scandal"—an incident that took place in August 2005 in a Harbin teaching hospital in which the family of an elderly patient hospitalized in the intensive care unit (ICU) for (...) 66 days paid over RMB ¥6 million. The news was publicized globally and ended in the firing of six top hospital administrators including the hospital president and the ICU director. This paper seeks to show that the Chinese healthcare crisis is ultimately linked to a conflict of interests between patients and healthcare professionals (HCPs), which is inherent in the reformed healthcare system of China. Hence the crisis is, at its core, a crisis of fidelity and confidence that must be restored to the PPR. At the "macro" level, it is simplistic to blame the crisis on the failure of the market system, and at the "micro" level, it is naïve to expect that a contractual understanding of the PPR will effectively restore the confidence of patients. This paper will show that the fiduciary relationship and medical professionalism share similar attributes, with fidelity being the core value of both. It concludes that the loss of medical fidelity implies the dissolution of the PPR and the demise of the medical profession and challenges Chinese HCPs to keep their fidelity as a means to both protect their patients’ interests and to preserve their profession's survival. (shrink)

In R. C. Flickinger's (3rd ed. second impression 1929) we read on pp. 171In the iambic trimeters written by Aeschylus a trisyllabic substitution (tribrach, anapaest or dactyl) for the pure disyllabic iambus occurs only once in about twenty-five verses.Tragic Drama of the Greekstrimeters’ lines like.