El inteligente hombre Sin lugar a dudas el más extraordinario descubrimiento que ha hecho el hombre, de lo que de por sí le es innato, es la inteligencia. Una que empezó a ser humana cuando nuestros antepasados decidieron bajar de los árboles y, algún día, ya nutridos de raíces y de frutos secos con un alto valor proteínico, observaron que el palo y la piedra que llevaban en sus manos y a los que habían recurrido para defenderse, al darles unos (...) golpes con destreza, soltaban unos pequeños trozos que, a la vez, creaban unas aristas que los convertían en instrumentos de primerísima categoría para, por ejemplo, ‘crear’ el fuego, carnear los animales cazados, atemorizarlos hasta el punto de poder domesticarlos y cultivar las plantas; creando a su alrededor un hábitat distinto al que la naturaleza les ofrecía. No había que salir a buscar el alimento todos los días recorriendo grandes distancias y exponiéndose a los peligros implícitos en esas actividades; podían valerse de los animales y plantas de la ‘granja, dejando tiempo para el ocio, el entretenimiento, el compartir con los demás integrantes del clan, amar a sus mujeres, educar a sus hijos y cultivar el arte de dejar plasmados en las paredes sus hazañas, sueños, esperanzas y temores. Todo eso gracias a su inteligencia. (shrink)

El artículo con el título “Acerca de los progymnasmata” firmado con el nombre de Diony González Rendón fue publicado en la revista Escritos, vol. 16, No. 36 (enero-junio de 2008), pp. 260-282. Después de su publicación el día 10 de 0ctubre de 2012, el profesor Jose Antonio Fernández Delgado comunicó a la jefatura de la editorial UPB que este artículo era de su autoría y consideraba que era un plagio. En consecuencia, el profesor Delgado procedió a adjuntar las evidencias necesarias (...) para determinar que se ha había incurrido en un plagio por parte del señor Diony Gonzalez, de la obra titulada: “Influencia literaria de los progymnásmata” publicado en el libro J. A. Fernández Delgado, F. Pordomingo & A. Stramaglia (Eds.), Escuela y literatura en Grecia Antigua, Cassino 2007, pp. 273-306, libro que recoge los trabajos presentados en el simposio internacional que tuvo lugar en la Universidad de Salamanca del 17 al 19 de noviembre de 2004. Dicho libro se terminó de imprimir en mayo de 2007, según consta en sus datos de copy rightajun. (shrink)

A través del presente ejercicio investigativo y hermenéutico se busca proponer la beneficencia como principio articulador entre la Teología Moral de la Persona, la Bioética y las Prácticas Biomédicas, con el fin de salvaguardar al ser humano de forma integral y desde el ámbito interdisciplinar, frente a la manipulación y menoscabo de la persona en su: dignidad, status antropológico, verdad ontológica y trascendente, lo cual nos lleva a proponer alternativas, dadas las nuevas circunstancias por las que atraviesa la humanidad; y (...) es aquí donde adquiere resonancia proponer la Beneficencia como principio articulador entre estas tres ciencias, dado que ella, como principio, está en los tres saberes de forma implícita y explícita y, las cuales, por su misma esencia, tienen puntos de convergencia como son: la determinación de su carácter moral, su estatuto de servicio, la salvaguarda de la riqueza de la vida, el reconocimiento y respeto por la dignidad humana, el reconocimiento de la multidimensionalidad del ser, y el cuidado que requiere toda persona humana en su fragilidad y vulnerabilidad. Además de lo anterior se cuenta con un abordaje teórico sobre la bioética como saber interdisciplinar; los principios de la bioética y la relación de la teología moral de la persona con la bioética. El presente ejercicio investigativo fue llevado a cabo en un lapso de dos años. (shrink)

We present a mathematical approach to defeasible reasoning based on arguments. This approach integrates the notion of specificity introduced by Poole and the theory of warrant presented by Pollock. The main contribution of this paper is a precise, well-defined system which exhibits correct behavior when applied to the benchmark examples in the literature. It aims for usability rather than novelty. We prove that an order relation can be introduced among equivalence classes of arguments under the equi-specificity relation. We also prove (...) a theorem that ensures the termination of the process of finding the justified facts. Two more lemmas define a reduced search space for checking specificity. In order to implement the theoretical ideas, the language is restricted to Horn clauses for the evidential context. The language used to represent defeasible rules has been restricted in a similar way. The authors intend this work to unify the various existing approaches to argument-based defeasible reasoning. (shrink)

KOINONIA/ASETT MINGA/MUTIRÃO DE REVISTAS DE TEOLOGIA LATINO-AMERICANAS Teología de la Liberación y movimiento ecuménico: breve reflexión desde una práctica (Liberation Theology and ecumenical movement: a brief reflection from praxis).

Recent work in formal semantics suggests that the language system includes not only a structure building device, as standardly assumed, but also a natural deductive system which can determine when expressions have trivial truth-conditions (e.g., are logically true/false) and mark them as unacceptable. This hypothesis, called the `logicality of language', accounts for many acceptability patterns, including systematic restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. To deal with apparent counter-examples consisting of acceptable tautologies and contradictions, the logicality of language is often paired (...) with an additional assumption according to which logical forms are radically underspecified: i.e., the language system can see functional terms but is `blind' to open class terms to the extent that different tokens of the same term are treated as if independent. This conception of logical form has profound implications: it suggests an extreme version of the modularity of language, and can only be paired with non-classical---indeed quite exotic---kinds of deductive systems. The aim of this paper is to show that we can pair the logicality of language with a different and ultimately more traditional account of logical form. This framework accounts for the basic acceptability patterns which motivated the logicality of language, can explain why some tautologies and contradictions are acceptable, and makes better predictions in key cases. As a result, we can pursue versions of the logicality of language in frameworks compatible with the view that the language system is not radically modular vis-a-vis its open class terms and employs a deductive system that is basically classical. (shrink)

Bi-intuitionistic logic is the result of adding the dual of intuitionistic implication to intuitionistic logic. In this note, we characterize the expressive power of this logic by showing that the first order formulas equivalent to translations of bi-intuitionistic propositional formulas are exactly those preserved under bi-intuitionistic directed bisimulations. The proof technique is originally due to Lindstrom and, in contrast to the most common proofs of this kind of result, it does not use the machinery of neither saturated models nor elementary (...) chains. (shrink)

Lindström’s theorem obviously fails as a characterization of first-order logic without identity ( $\mathcal {L}_{\omega \omega }^{-} $ ). In this note, we provide a fix: we show that $\mathcal {L}_{\omega \omega }^{-} $ is a maximal abstract logic satisfying a weak form of the isomorphism property (suitable for identity-free languages and studied in [11]), the Löwenheim–Skolem property, and compactness. Furthermore, we show that compactness can be replaced by being recursively enumerable for validity under certain conditions. In the proofs, we (...) use a form of strong upwards Löwenheim–Skolem theorem not available in the framework with identity. (shrink)

This paper is a step toward showing what is achievable using non-classical metatheory—particularly, a substructural paraconsistent framework. What standard results, or analogues thereof, from the classical metatheory of first order logic can be obtained? We reconstruct some of the originals proofs for Completeness, Löwenheim-Skolem and Compactness theorems in the context of a substructural logic with the naive comprehension schema. The main result is that paraconsistent metatheory can ‘re-capture’ versions of standard theorems, given suitable restrictions and background assumptions; but the shift (...) to non-classical logic may recast the meanings of these apparently ‘absolute’ theorems. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the problem of existence of saturated models for first-order many-valued logics. We consider a general notion of type as pairs of sets of formulas in one free variable that express properties that an element of a model should, respectively, satisfy and falsify. By means of an elementary chains construction, we prove that each model can be elementarily extended to a $\kappa $-saturated model, i.e. a model where as many types as possible are realized. In order (...) to prove this theorem we obtain, as by-products, some results on tableaux and their consistency and satisfiability and a generalization of the Tarski–Vaught theorem on unions of elementary chains. Finally, we provide a structural characterization of $\kappa $-saturation in terms of the completion of a diagram representing a certain configuration of models and mappings. (shrink)

Under a proper translation, the languages of propositional (and quantified relevant logic) with an absurdity constant are characterized as the fragments of first order logic preserved under (world-object) relevant directed bisimulations. Furthermore, the properties of pointed models axiomatizable by sets of propositional relevant formulas have a purely algebraic characterization. Finally, a form of the interpolation property holds for the relevant fragment of first order logic.

We show that propositional intuitionistic logic is the maximal abstract logic satisfying a certain form of compactness, the Tarski union property, and preservation under asimulations.

O artigo – desde uma perspectiva da educação como direito humano universal que reconhece a diversidade – realiza um recorrido panorâmico por uma série de dimensões da educação intercultural no ensino superior do Chile, especialmente universitária, discute criticamente a situação atual da interculturalização na universidade – entendida genericamente – e conclui com algumas perguntas que podem orientar pesquisas ou decisões que levem a que o ensino superior considere os direitos indígenas, permita a expressão de sua cultura, promova a interculturalidade, forme (...) os técnicos e profissionais que requerem o desenvolvimento da sociedade e das comunidades e enriqueça a docência e a ciência com outros paradigmas de conhecimento. Desse modo, que reconheça e valide a interculturalidade e os aportes das culturas indígenas a sua identidade, formação e produção de conhecimento. Trata das comunidades e dos estudantes indígenas em geral, mas aprofunda a situação desde o povo mapuche, embasando-se em projetos de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e em experiências em e desde a Região da Araucanía. A proposta se centra na ideia de que o direito à educação, desde a lei e inconstitucionalidade atual, se centra no sistema escolar formal de ensino básico e médio e não considera a educação superior ou a um sistema de educação continuado como direito universal, no qual poderia se especificar uma condição especial aos estudantes indígenas. Por isso, hoje se luta pela igualdade de oportunidades de inclusão entre indígenas e não indígenas. Palavras-chave: Ensino Superior. Interculturalidade. Cultura mapuche. (shrink)

We generalize the notion ofconsequence relationstandard in abstract treatments of logic to accommodate intuitions ofrelevance. The guiding idea follows theuse criterion, according to which in order for some premises to have some conclusion(s) as consequence(s), the premises must each beusedin some way to obtain the conclusion(s). This relevance intuition turns out to require not just a failure of monotonicity, but also a move to considering consequence relations as obtaining betweenmultisets. We motivate and state basic definitions of relevant consequence relations, both (...) in single conclusion (asymmetric) and multiple conclusion (symmetric) settings, as well as derivations and theories, guided by the use intuitions, and prove a number of results indicating that the definitions capture the desired results (at least in many cases). (shrink)

We provide a sucient frame-theoretic condition for a super bi-intuitionistic logic to have Maksimova's variable separation property. We conclude that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the property. Furthermore, we offer an algebraic characterization of the super-bi-intuitionistic logics with Maksimova's property.

In this note we study a counterpart in predicate logic of the notion of logical friendliness, introduced into propositional logic in [15]. The result is a new consequence relation for predicate languages with equality using first-order models. While compactness, interpolation and axiomatizability fail dramatically, several other properties are preserved from the propositional case. Divergence is diminished when the language does not contain equality with its standard interpretation.

En el presente trabajo examinaremos la relevancia de la categoría de decisión en el surgimiento del pensamiento impolítico contemporáneo en Italia. Con este objetivo, buscaremos elaborar una exégesis del rol de dicha noción en los desarrollos de Massimo Cacciari de finales de la década de 1970. Nuestro punto de partida se encontrará en su lectura nietzscheana sobre el diagnóstico de crisis de las categorías metafísicas y políticas tradicionales. Tal interpretación nos conducirá a estudiar su análisis de la soberanía desde una (...) “concepción criatural” del orden político. En este sentido, sostendremos que la crítica que Cacciari realiza al concepto de decisión no sólo vertebra desde sus inicios al horizonte impolítico, sino que también nos permite comprender los alcances filosóficos de su perspectiva. (shrink)

The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information can affect (...) which basic function is associated with each social role. However, Experiment 2 indicates that the normative dimension always represents the relevant commitment as an end in itself. We argue that social role concepts represent the commitments to basic functions because that information is crucial to predict the future social roles and role-dependent behavior of others. (shrink)

Este trabajo indaga en las raíces de la perspectiva impolítica de Roberto Esposito en Categorie dell’impolitico (1988). La hipótesis consiste en que la noción de impolítico como “más allá de Schmitt” resulta la estructura conceptual que vertebra la formulación de Esposito. A partir de esta interpretación, analizaré las implicancias filosóficas de la apropiación crítica de la posición schmittiana sobre el problema de la representación. Considero que, a partir de esta hipótesis, se comprenderá no sólo la relevancia de la categoría de (...) “oltre” (“más allá”) en la argumentación de Esposito, sino también el sentido mismo de lo impolítico entendido como ulterioridad. (shrink)

The meaning that expressions take on particular occasions often depends on the context in ways which seem to transcend its direct effect on context-sensitive parameters. ‘Truth-conditional pragmatics’ is the project of trying to model such semantic flexibility within a compositional truth-conditional framework. Most proposals proceed by radically ‘freeing up’ the compositional operations of language. I argue, however, that the resulting theories are too unconstrained, and predict flexibility in cases where it is not observed. These accounts fall into this position because (...) they rarely, if ever, take advantage of the rich information made available by lexical items. I hold, instead, that lexical items encode both extension and non-extension determining information. Under certain conditions, the non-extension determining information of an expression e can enter into the compositional processes that determine the meaning of more complex expressions which contain e. This paper presents and motivates a set of type-driven compositional operations that can access non-extension determining information and introduce bits of it into the meaning of complex expressions. The resulting multidimensional semantics has the tools to deal with key cases of semantic flexibility in appropriately constrained ways, making it a promising framework to pursue the project of truth-conditional pragmatics. (shrink)

This paper defines a Sahlqvist fragment for relevant logic and establishes that each class of frames in the Routley-Meyer semantics which is definable by a Sahlqvist formula is also elementary, that is, it coincides with the class of structures satisfying a given first order property calculable by a Sahlqvist-van Benthem algorithm. Furthermore, we show that some classes of Routley-Meyer frames definable by a relevant formula are not elementary.

Through the study of the behaviour of the protagonists in the work of Franz Kafka, we will try to expose the control mechanisms used by the administrative authorities, providing at the same time with an antidote to uncritical submission. A thorough observation of the configuration of diegetic situations will allow to reverse the situations of forced compliance to proffer, in the voice of the so-called secondary figures, a critical understanding to enable the recovery of individual freedom.

ABSTRACTDo truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than (...) any one logic being privileged, then, on this count partisans across the logical spectrum are in relatively similar dialectical positions. (shrink)

Recent work in formal semantics suggests that the language system includes not only a structure building device, as standardly assumed, but also a natural deductive system which can determine when expressions have trivial truth‐conditions (e.g., are logically true/false) and mark them as unacceptable. This hypothesis, called the ‘logicality of language’, accounts for many acceptability patterns, including systematic restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. To deal with apparent counter‐examples consisting of acceptable tautologies and contradictions, the logicality of language is often paired (...) with an additional assumption according to which logical forms are radically underspecified: i.e., the language system can see functional terms but is ‘blind’ to open class terms to the extent that different tokens of the same term are treated as if independent. This conception of logical form has profound implications: it suggests an extreme version of the modularity of language, and can only be paired with non‐classical—indeed quite exotic—kinds of deductive systems. The aim of this paper is to show that we can pair the logicality of language with a different and ultimately more traditional account of logical form. This framework accounts for the basic acceptability patterns which motivated the logicality of language, can explain why some tautologies and contradictions are acceptable, and makes better predictions in key cases. As a result, we can pursue versions of the logicality of language in frameworks compatible with the view that the language system is not radically modular vis‐á‐vis its open class terms and employs a deductive system that is basically classical. (shrink)

Despite recognizing the importance of impact investing in combating complex societal challenges, researchers have yet to examine the capacity of the field to address systemic inequality. While impact investments are intended to benefit vulnerable stakeholders, the voices of those stakeholders are generally overlooked in the design and implementation of such investments. To resolve this oversight, we theorize how the fields’ design—through its tools, organizations, and field-level bodies—influences its capacity to address inequality by focusing on the concept of giving voice, which (...) we define as the inclusive participation of vulnerable stakeholders in decision-making processes. We build from stakeholder engagement research to show how the design of impact investing can address inequality using three illustrative cases: social impact bonds, impact investing funds, and national advisory boards. We conclude with a discussion of how the ethical decision of giving voice to vulnerable stakeholders will determine the capacity of the field to address inequality, as well as provide implications for future research and practice. (shrink)

In this note we provide a simple proof of the incompactness over Routley-Meyer B-frames of the A1 fragment of the second order propositional relevant language.

La definición de un “mundo posible” de Robert Adams es paradójica, de acuerdo con Selmer Bringsjord, Patrick Grim y Cristopher Menzel. Las pruebas de Bringsjord y Grim utilizaban el axioma del Conjunto Potencia; Cristopher Menzel objetó que, mientras este fuese el caso, todavía existía esperanza para la definición de Adams, pero Menzel desempolvó una vieja paradoja de Russell para demostrar que podíamos obtener las mismas conclusiones sin apelar a otra teoría de conjuntos que el Axioma de Separación. Sin embargo, el (...) resultado de Menzel mostraba solo que no existía el mundo actual. En este trabajo intentamos generalizar la paradoja de Russell a mundos posibles arbitrarios sin necesidad de introducir conceptos modales en la discusión. (shrink)