t. 1. Autographa et bibliothecae A-F -- t. 2. Bibliothecae Gdańsk-Münster.

Since I wrote my doctoral dissertation lo! these forty-seven years ago under Professor Quine, my colleague Alain Voizard thought it fitting that I comment on the paper just delivered. The invitation flattered me, I confess, as did Professor Quine's choice of a subject: free logic, a logic of which I was one of the numerous fathers thirty-five years ago. So, it is in my capacity as a commentator that I address you now, saving for tomorrow afternoon further thoughts prompted by (...) this colloquium. (shrink)

Consider a language SL having as its primitive signs one or more atomic statements, the two connectives ‘∼’ and ‘&,’ and the two parentheses ‘’; and presume the extra connectives ‘V’ and ‘≡’ defined in the customary manner. With the statements of SL substituting for sets, and the three connectives ‘∼,’ ‘&,’and ‘V’ substituting for the complementation, intersection, and union signs, the constraints that Kolmogorov places in [1] on probability functions come to read:K1. 0 ≤ P,K2. P) = 1,K3. If (...) ⊦ ∼, then P = P + P,K4. If ⊦ A ≡ B, then P = P.2. (shrink)

Je vais traiter ici des inférences dont la validité tient au rôle qu'y jouent les cinq connecteurs « ⊃ », « ∼ », « & », « V » et « ≡ », les deux quantificateurs « ∀ » et « ∃ », et le signe d'identité « = ». Qu'on me permette de rappeler que les deux conjectures présentéd dans ma première étude se sont avéré'es justes. En premier lieu, toute règle de structure et toute règie d'élimination ou d'introduction (...) pour « & » ou « V » qui vaut pour la logique classique des connecteurs vaut également pour la logique intuitionniste des connecteurs. En second lieu, tout énoncé du genre A1, A2, …, An ⊢ B qui vaut pour la logique classique des connecteurs peut s'obtenir exclusivement à l'aide des règles de structure R, P, E, S, et des règles d'elimination et d'introduction pour ceux des connecteurs « ⊃ », « ∼ », « & », « V » et « ≡ » qui figurent dans A1, A2, …, An, et B. (shrink)

Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...) of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)

Although research into the biosemiotic mechanisms underlying the purposeful behavior of brainless living systems is extensive, researchers have not adequately described biosemiosis among neurons. As the conscious use of signs is well-covered by the various fields of semiotics, we focus on subconscious sign action. Subconscious semiotic habits, both functional and dysfunctional, may be created and reinforced in the brain not necessarily in a logical manner and not necessarily through repeated reinforcement. We review literature that suggests hypnosis may be effective in (...) changing subconscious dysfunctional habits, and we offer a biosemiotic framework for understanding these results. If it has been difficult to evaluate any psychological approach, including hypnosis, this may be because contemporary neuroscience lacks a theory of the sign. We argue that understanding the fluid nature of representation in biological organisms is prerequisite to understanding the nature of the subconscious and may lead to more effective of treatments for dysfunctional habits developed through personal experience or culture. (shrink)

In this book, the extend to which we can equip artificial agents with moral reasoning capacity is investigated. Attempting to create artificial agents with moral reasoning capabilities challenges our understanding of morality and moral reasoning to its utmost. It also helps philosophers dealing with the inherent complexity of modern organizations. Modern society with large multi-national organizations and extensive information infrastructures provides a backdrop for moral theories that is hard to encompass through mere theorising. Computerized support for theorising is needed to (...) be able to fully grasp and address the inherent complexity. Using moral reasoning capacity will help us addressing the challenges that technological artefacts pose. They do not only contain information about us, they start to act on our behalves.With the increasing autonomy comes an increased need to ensure that their behaviour is in line with what we expect from them. To investigate and address these issues a laboratoy for philosophy is outlined: SophoLab. It consists of a methodology; a framework of modal logic, DEAL; and multi-agent software systems. SophoLab provides the basis for an experimental, computational philosophy. Its viability and usefulness are demonstrated through several experiments. (shrink)

In April 2020, almost six out of 10 people around the world were in lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Being locked down usually has a deleterious effect on the confined individual's mental health. In this exceptionally challenging context, finding ways to minimize negative mood about the pandemic is essential. Pandemic-related negative states (“negative mood”) and recovery experiences were investigated in a sample of 264 individuals who completed daily surveys four times per day over 7 consecutive days. MSEMs analyses revealed (...) that negative mood persisted from moment-to-moment through the day, thus showing a response lag effect. Further analyses revealed that when someone experienced pandemic-related psychological detachment, relaxation, mastery, control, pleasure, or relatedness at specific periods of the day, mood had improved at the next measured time period, suggesting a protective effect. However, the pattern displayed by singles with dependents suggests that some recovery experiences at specific periods during the day seem to have a backfiring effect and worsen subsequent mood. These findings bring new insight into the role of recovery experiences during lockdowns and suggest that many could benefit from such experiences throughout the day when self-isolating. However, for individuals with multiple risk factors such as being single with dependents, some recovery experiences, at specific periods during the day, might not bring the desired outcome and future research is needed to examine if guilt or domestic burden may explain this finding. Results contribute to our understanding of how to take care of one's mental health during the current pandemic, and concrete recommendations adapted to individual contexts are provided. (shrink)

In an article which appeared a few years ago, entitled ‘God's Death’ , A.D. Smith launched one of the most interesting of recent attacks on the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation. Focusing on the death of Christ, he claimed to demonstrate the logical impossibility of Jesus having been both human and divine. Each of the premises of his argument was said to be a commitment of orthodox theology. He thus presented his reasoning as displaying an internal incoherence in that way (...) of thinking about divinity, humanity, and the person of Christ. The argument was basically quite simple: According to Christian theology and in concurrence with general thought on the matter, we must hold that human death involves the possibility of annihilation. As a man, Jesus of Nazareth faced and underwent a human death. He thus faced the possibility of annihilation. But orthodox theologians hold God to be of such an ontological status that no divine being could even possibly be annihilated. So no divine person could die a human death. From this follows the impossibility of the traditional claim that the Second Person of the divine Trinity became a man, lived a human life, and died a human death for us and our salvation. The qualitative difference between God and man is such as to render incarnational christology an incoherent theological stance. (shrink)

This article addresses some critical aspects of the relationship between aesthetic medicine (AM) and ethics and proposes a possible deontological ethical line to pursue based on current practices. The role of AM has always been controversial and suffers from unclear practical and moral boundaries, even within academic settings, since it aims to improve the appearance of individuals, not to cure a disease. Today, it is essential and pertinent to discuss these issues, as AM specialists are dealing with a growing and (...) increasingly demanding patient population that has undergone profound evolution in recent years. Current challenges within the field of AM include a lack of global uniformity concerning the education of AM specialists, an increasing number of physicians practicing AM with diverse training backgrounds, the spread of AM being practiced outside of medical practice or hospital settings, and the influence of social media where the success is modelled and dictated by the identification of a youthful appearance). By the field of action enriched by technologies that aim not only at enhancement per se but also at the preservation and regeneration of tissues, it is necessary to establish an active multidisciplinary discussion on the definition of shared ethical limits. This discussion would allow AM to fully reclaim its identity as a specialty that aims to improve patient well-being whilst maintaining respect for patient aesthetic harmony, the expertise of specialists who practice AM, the essential role of safety, and awareness of the importance of a confidential doctor−patient relationship. (shrink)

Les exégètes médiévaux ont-ils une attitude particulière à l’égard des récits de la Bible que nous faisons aujourd’hui entrer dans la catégorie du « mythe »? On voudrait répondre à cette question à partir de l’étude des généalogies des chapitres 4 et 5 de la Genèse dans les commentaires composés entre le xii e et le xiv e siècles en Occident. Celles du chapitre 4 (v. 17-22) sont considérées comme un mythe sur les origines de la culture – la vie (...) pastorale, le travail des métaux, la musique, le tissage –, celles du chapitre 5 posent des problèmes divers, notamment du fait de la longueur de la vie des personnages nommés. Il semble que les commentateurs du Moyen Âge soient moins sensibles à la dimension « historique » de ces textes qu’aux enseignements que nous pouvons en tirer sur les fondements de la conduite humaine. L’analyse qu’ils font des structures de ces textes (utilisant notamment la valeur symbolique attachée aux nombres et mettant en relief les différences d’agencement) et les applications tropologiques qu’ils en tirent, puisznt dans l’Écriture sainte les enseignements d’une Parole adressée en permanence à l’homme, permettent de constater que les procédures qu’ils mettent en œuvre sont proches de celles d’une certaine analyse des mythes aujourd’hui. (shrink)

After learning about the concept of determinism, a natural tendency is to conclude that if anyone actually believed in the determinism of human nature, then all future human actions are "set out for us" or "cut and dried" and, in some sense, utterly unavoidable. Another way of referring to such inevitability is that human action appears to be..

The construct of “choking under pressure” is concerned with the phenomenon of unexpected, sudden, and significant declines in individual athletes’ performances in important situations and has received empirical attention in the field of sport psychology. Although a number of theories about the reasons for the occurrence of choking under pressure exist and several intervention approaches have been developed, underlying mechanisms of choking are still under debate and the effectiveness of existing interventions remains contested. These sudden performance declines also occur in (...) team sport. “Collective sport team collapse,” which describes the situation when an entire sport team underperforms significantly within an important competitive situation, has received less empirical attention, in comparison to individual choking research. While there are a few studies that have investigated causes of collective team collapse, understandably, there has been limited empirical investigation of preventative and intervention strategies. Although the two constructs appear to share several similar characteristics and mechanisms, research has not yet examined the conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and practical links between choking under pressure and collective sport team collapse. In this review article, we seek to examine these similarities and differences and identify new ways of thinking about future interventions. Furthermore, current empirical understandings in the field of choking under pressure and collective sport team collapse are presented and the most effective intervention approaches for both constructs are introduced. On the basis of this examination, we modestly make some initial recommendations for sport psychological practitioners and future research. (shrink)

Of course you know the movie, just by cultural assimilation if not by having seen it. There’s this young elephant, Dumbo, who has laughably big ears and has been pitiably separated from his mom. He’s aided by a friendly talking mouse[ii] into translating those otherwise hapless ears into the power of flight, which he eventually uses to rescue his mom and live happily ever after. The way the wily mouse gets Dumbo to believe that he could fly is to give (...) him a “magic feather” which, held in his trunk, demonstrably imparts the gift of flight. Naturally the mouse believes throughout all this that Dumbo can fly anyway, but he also knows that Dumbo needs the feather as a confidence-builder to do so. At the critical juncture of the tale Dumbo loses the feather after being pushed off a precipice, and he thus plummets perilously towards earth—only to find at the last moment that he can indeed fly on his own. (shrink)

All right, first off I need to disappoint some people who despise reading the fine print on things or just plain love to speed-read only large fonts: this is not only not my last lecture, I m not even retiring anytime soon. So sorry to those of you poised to shout Good riddance to bad rubbish! at the end of this soliloquy. You re going to have to be patient a while longer.

Of course you know the movie, just by cultural assimilation if not by having seen it. There’s this young elephant, Dumbo, who has laughably big ears and has been pitiably separated from his mom. He’s aided by a friendly talking mouse2 into translating those otherwise hapless ears into the power of flight, which he eventually uses to rescue his mom and live happily ever after. The way the wily mouse gets Dumbo to believe that he could fly is to give (...) him a “magic feather” which, held in his trunk, demonstrably imparts the gift of flight. Naturally the mouse believes throughout all this that Dumbo can fly anyway, but he also knows that Dumbo needs the feather as a confidence-builder to do so. At the critical juncture of the tale Dumbo loses the feather after being pushed off a precipice, and he thus plummets perilously towards earth—only to find at the last moment that he can indeed fly on his own. (shrink)

“Men can never be free, because they’re weak, corrupt, worthless and restless. The people believe in authority; they’ve grown tired of waiting for miracle or mystery. Science is their religion; no greater explanation exists for them.” (Cigarette Smoking Man, "Talitha Cumi" The X-Files 3X24).

Harry Frankfurt's famous examples of overdetermined moral agents who are nevertheless responsible for their actions and omissions have long been hailed as proofs that the ability and/or opportunity to do otherwise is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In this paper I use recent clarifications of some of these examples by Frankfurt himself to show that their force relies in part on tacit ceteris paribus assumptions concealing a reliance on PAP that concerns matters of fairness in assessing moral responsibility.

Analysis shows that statements of ability are disguised conditionals. More exactly, the correct analysis of 'X could have done A' is 'If X h decided (chosen, willed ...) to do A, X would have done A'. Therefore having acted freely--having been able to act otherwise than one fact did--is compatible with determinism (with the causal determination of one's acts).

Hud Hudson has argued that with a few assumptions one can prove that superluminal objects exist. I argue that even if the assumptions are true that his argument, if sound, leads to a proliferation of movers packing given spaces. I further argue that his argument as it stands cannot in fact entail that objects moving at any speed exist.

The author examines the single topic approach to the construction of introductory philosophy courses. The author considers the single topic approach to be an alternative to more historically- and topically-based approaches. The traditional approach to philosophy is often broad and difficult for students to engage with in classroom discussion. A narrow and detailed treatment of a standard area or topic facilitates classroom discussion and allows students to transfer insights and skills in areas of their own disciplines. The author outlines a (...) methodology that treats philosophical texts in an interdisciplinary context, which emphasizes to students that philosophy is not a detached field of study. (shrink)

In this paper we present an executable approach to model interactions between agents that involve sensitive, privacy-related information. The approach is formal and based on deontic, epistemic and action logic. It is conceptually related to the Belief-Desire-Intention model of Bratman. Our approach uses the concept of sphere as developed by Waltzer to capture the notion that information is provided mostly with restrictions regarding its application. We use software agent technology to create an executable approach. Our agents hold beliefs about the (...) world, have goals and commitment to the goals. They have the capacity to reason about different courses of action, and communicate with one another. The main new ingredient of our approach is the idea to model information itself as an intentional agent whose main goal it is to preserve the integrity of the information and regulate its dissemination. We demonstrate our approach by applying it to an important process in the insurance industry: applying for a life insurance. In this paper we will: (1) describe the challenge organizational complexity poses in moral reasoning about informational relationships; (2) propose an executable approach, using software agents with reasoning capacities grounded in modal logic, in which moral constraints on informational relatio nships can be modeled and investigated; (3) describe the details of our approach, in which information itself is modeled as an intentional agent in its own right; (4) test and validate it by applying it to a concrete ‘hard case’ from the insurance industry; and (5) conclude that our approach upholds and offers potential for both research and practical application. (shrink)