The paper reconstructs the three main stages in the development of Carnap’s semantics in the years 1935–1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Zirkelprotokolle and his Logische Syntax der Sprache from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s approach to semantics from (...) 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church’s rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap’s shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943–1947. (shrink)

The paper deals with the concepts of measure and measurement from the point of view of philosophy as well as natural and social science. First, Hegel´s approach to these concepts is analysed. Then Hegel´s concepts are compared to Marx´s economic works where the concepts of external, inherent and manifest measure are exemplified. Finally, Newton´s Principia are compared with Marx´s economical works and their similarities and differences are outlined.

The paper tries to provide an alternative to Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of (...) scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, it compares this reconstruction with the approaches of J. Woodward and C. Hitchcock, C. Liu and with the views of M. Thalos on analytic mechanics. (shrink)

The paper tries to provide an alternative to C. G. Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the (...) types of scientific laws appearing in it. The paper makes an attempt to provide a new approach to scientific laws and scientific explanations. Based on my paper Hanzel I give a brief overview of Hempel’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation, as well as of its failures and paradoxes. As a way out, I analyze the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstruct the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, I provide a differentiated typology of scientific laws and scientific explanations. (shrink)

The article analyses the relation of E. V. Ilyenkov to the phenomenon of language. His approach, it is shown, had its roots in his explication of notion of ideal which led him to assign priority to work with respect to language at a general level as well as at the level ontogenesis of human infants. Two additional factors shaped his approach to the phenomenon of language. The first was his negative approach to disciplines investigating the structure of language: mathematical logic, (...) logical semantics, and philosophy of language. The second was his treatment of Hegel’s philosophy from which he took over only those features that were appropriated and further developed by Marx. The article gives an analysis of Ilyenkov’s view on the educational process of deafblind children and it shows that this view contradicted the views on that process presented in the works of Meshcheryakov and Sirotkin. Finally, the article provides a characterization of work, language and of their relation. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present James Woodward's conception of the philosophy of science as it has been developed during last two decades in his essays. Compared with B. van Fraassen, N. Cartwright or W. C. Salmon the views of J. Woodward are not so popular. According to the author, however, they represent an important contribution to the contemporary philosophy of science. In the first two parts of the paper the differences between Woodward's and Hempel's views of scientific (...) explanation are shown. The third part shows Woodward's approach to the problems of the causal analysis and to the philosophical problems of the so called "regression equations". In conclusion the author makes some critical commentaries and remarks on Woodward's views. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss the views, which approach the qualitative and quantitative methods in social sciences as either separable, or irreconcilable. First, the author gives an outline of those views and shows, how they deal with various aspects of the qualitative/quantitative divide. Next, he tries to identify the roots of that divide in the works of Herbert Blumer. Further, his analysis of the categories of quantity, quality, and measure is designed to show that the divide in (...) question is based on a wrong, one-sided understanding of the qualitative as well as quantitative approaches, which in fact can neither be separated nor conceived of as contradictory. (shrink)

The paper is a continuation of three previous papers , which have discussed the issues of measure and measurement, as well as the views of K. Berka and B. Ellis on this issue. This paper gives a restatement of those views from the point of view of the unity of qualitative and quantitative determinations of measure. Further it deals with Ellis’ conventionalism in measurement theory. Finally it provides a differentiated typology of measurement.

The aim of the paper is to analyze the consequences of R. Rorty’s pragmatic cum linguistic turn for the understanding of natural and human sciences. The author analyzes first this turn and tries to show that it represents an intersubjectivist type of antirealism. Then he deals with Rorty’s approach to hermeneutics and his understanding of its place in natural and human sciences. Finally, he discusses the consequences of Rorty’s intersubjectivist antirealism for human sciences and tries to show that, on one (...) hand, it represents the philosophical basis of the so-called idea-lism of interpretative human science and on the other hand, it enables us to see the latter’s foundations from a new, fresh perspective. (shrink)

Acknowledgements Several persons institutions and were helpful in writing this book. Chapter 3 was written at the University of Potsdam in Germany, ...

The aim of this paper is to show the incompleteness of the exclusively logico-syntactical and logico-semantical approaches to one of the core issues of philosophy of science, namely, scientific laws and scientific explanation in C. G. Hempel’s works. I start with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel’s approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and then analyze the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. Next, I trace these characteristics back to Hempel’s and Carnap’s attempts (...) to ground the concepts of scientific law and explanation exclusively on logic , which led to a highly normative approach alienated from the practice of real science. (shrink)

The article analysis the views approaching quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences as separable or irreconcilable. First, we characterize these views and show how they deal with this divide and how they view the aspects of the latter. Next, we identify the works of Herbert Blumer as the basis of that divide and subject them to an analysis. Finally, by means of categories like quantity, quality, and measure, we show that the qualitative-quantitative divide is based on a wrong approach (...) to these categories and the quantitative and qualitative methods. (shrink)

The paper, as a continuation of the paper Hanzel , provides a methodological generalization of Newton’s method of theory construction as applied in Book I and Book III of his Principia. It reconstructs also the method of measures applied in those books. Finally, it shows how the term “harmonic law” changes its meaning in the Principia.

The aim of the paper is to investigate, from the point of view of philosophy of science and philosophy of social science, the turn in the ape language project as accomplished in the works of Sue Savage- Rumbaugh and her collaborators. In this project took place a highly interesting turn from the orientation of research on natural sciences to that on humanities. We shall analyze all the relevant works of Savage-Rumbaugh from the point of view of the two central levels (...) of ALP: its scientific level and the methodological level. (shrink)

The paper analyses Frege's approach to the identity conditions for the entity labelled by him as Sinn. It starts with a brief characterization of the main principles of Frege's semantics and lists his remarks on the identity conditions for Sinn. They are subject to a detailed scrutiny, and it is shown that, with the exception of the criterion of intersubstitutability in oratio obliqua, all other criteria have to be discarded. Finally, by comparing Frege's views on Sinn with Carnap's method of (...) extension and intension and the method of intensional isomorphism, it is proved that these methods do not provide a criterion for the identity of Frege's Sinn, even for extensional contexts, that the concept of intension does not coincide, as stated by Carnap, in these contexts, with Frege's concept of Sinn, and that Carnap's claim that in oratio obliqua Frege's semantics leads to an infinite hierarchy of Sinn entities can be questioned at least hypothetically in the light of certain new historical facts. (shrink)

I shall compare John McDowell’s Mind and World with Hegel’s later philosophy in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline. I begin by presenting McDowell’s epistemology. I then delineate the most important aspects of Hegel’s epistemology and, because McDowell claims that he draws on Kant’s views on the relation between receptivity and spontaneity, their relation to Kant’s epistemology. Here, I suggest that even if Hegel’s epistemology displays idealistic features which determine the construction of the category-clusters (...) in the Science of Logic and Encyclopedia, these clusters can make a valuable contribution to epistemology once subjected to a realistic reinterpretation. Next I compare Hegel’s epistemology with that of McDowell and show that under this reinterpretation Hegel’s epistemology can be used to overcome the limitations of the epistemology presented by McDowell. Finally I propose a return to the reconstruction of categories as the direction towards which the future development of epistemology should go. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon’s concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author’s (...) contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon’s philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science. (shrink)

The paper, as a continuation of the paper Hanzel , provides a methodological generalization of Newton’s method of theory construction as applied in Book I and Book III of his Principia. It reconstructs also the method of measures applied in those books. Finally, it shows how the term “harmonic law” changes its meaning in the Principia.

The paper reconstructs three main stages in the development of Carnap’s approach to language in the years 1931 – 1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Viennese Zirkelprotokolle and his Logische Syntax der Sprache from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s (...) approach to semantics from 1935 until 1943. Finally, it analyzes Church’s rediscovery of Frege and its impact on Carnap’s shift to the extension/intension distinction in his semantics in the years 1943 – 1947. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic, and which can be applied to the issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the (...) author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate, from the point of view of philosophy of science and philosophy of social science, the turn in the ape language project as accomplished in the works of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and her collaborators. In this project a highly interesting turn from the orientation of research on natural sciences to that on humanities took place. We shall analyze all the relevant works of Savage-Rumbaugh from the point of view of the three central levels of (...) ALP: its scientific, metascientific and methodological levels. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the concept of natural necessity upon which the empirical causal type of a scientific law rests and to enlarge the notion of the conditions of a scientific law. According to regularity theory, what counts in the investigation of causation is the universality of causal proposition. So in this theory priority is given to the explication of the concept “scientific law”. Such an explication was provided by Popper in the first edition of his (...) Logik der Forschung. He defines here the concept “scientific law” by distinguishing between strictly universal propositions and numerical propositions. Later Popper, drawing upon W. Kneale´s criticism, proposed another definition of natural necessity. He expounds his revised view in Chapter X* of the new appendices of the Logic of Scientific Discovery by means of the famous moa-example. He views statement “All moas die before the age of fifty years” as not physically necessary because its truth depends on the presence of conditions different from singular initial conditions. Ba distinguishing between singular initial conditions and modification conditions I, contrary to Popper, claim that that statement can be viewed as naturally necessary. (shrink)