This book examines the fundamental issues in neuroscience from methodological and philosophical perspectives. The reader will learn about the methodological difficulties connected with the use of neuroscientific experiments in philosophical argumentation and about the nature of scientific explanation in neuroscience. In addition, the book includes case studies of several issues lying at the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy, such as theory of mind, self-consciousness, self-deception, depression, and morality.

“Discrimination on the grounds of disability is seldom malicious, but stems more from a lack of understanding.” A disabled businessman explores the need for businesses to cultivate and implement greater disability awareness. After graduating in engineering, he gained his MBA from London Business School in 1992. He now works as a consultant, capitalising on his background in business management and his personal experience of disability to assist clients in developing anti‐discriminatory policies and practice.

Author: Sawicki Jerzy Title: THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN KANT’S METHODOLOGY (Zasada teleologiczna w metodologii Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 281-292 Keywords: KANT, THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE, FINALISM, MECHANICISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The work contains a concise of I. Kant’s views on the problem of the laws of nature and the theleological principle presented in this context, which Kant proposes in the character of a regulative methodological postulate. (...) The analysis of fundamental philosophical notions (the law of nature, necessity, causality, purpose) carried out from the position of an extreme aprioristic rationalism leads Kant to the conclusion about the basic impossibility of educing the conception of purpose (in relation to nature) from aprioristic transcendental laws, ie. such laws which the theoretical reason imposes to the nature by necessity. However, the fact of a total functioning of an organism does not fit, according to Kant, into the frames of a mechanically understood causality. Kant tries to solve this problem choosing the way of conclusion by analogy and finally he suggests to introduce into the living nature a specific causal relation in which the purposes constitute a particular kind of causes and results at the same time. That conception oscillates between mechanicism and theological finalism, and the fitting of a science system into the frames of aprioristic categories does not permit a finally decide about the supremacy of one or the other way of seeing the world. However, nevertheless, the perceiving and stressing of the peculiarity of organic symptoms, the formulation of the postulate about their unreductability to the law of a mechanical type constitute unquestionable and great merit of the author of the Criticism of the Judgment Authority. The idea of the totality of organism, though involved in subjective idealistic non consequences of Kant’s conceptions has in the given historical period all features of a deep and progressive thought, outpacing and inspiring several later research ideas, both in philosophy and in natural science. (shrink)

The old-fashioned concept of state is shown to be inadequate and misleading. Replacing it by a concept of information and taking advantage of the invariance of the mechanical description under time reversal puts the problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in a new light. A more realistic interpretation appears to be possible. Moreover, a new explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is presented, too.

Las jako zespół przyrody o określonych właściwościach pełni szereg wielorakich funkcji gospodar­czych, pośrednio gospodarczych i pozagospodar­czych. Jako przyrodnicza całość jest mało stabilny i ulega wielu czynnikom biotycznym, abiotycznym i antropogenicznym. Z praktyki ochrony lasu w granicach admini­stracyjnych Regionalnej Dyrekcji Lasów Państwo­wych w Olsztynie wynika, że szczególnie niebez­pieczne bywają owady - z grupy szkodników pier­wotnych - żerujące na drzewach żywych i pozornie zdrowych, a osłabionych działaniem jednego lub kil­ku czynników, zwykle abiotycznych. Pojawy nie­których zmuszają do podejmowania zabiegów ratow­niczych. Sposoby sprowadzania liczebności (...) trzech moty­li, tzn. brudnicy mniszki, strzygoni choinówki i zwójki zieloneczki, do poziomu przed laty nazywanego „żelaznym zapasem” przedstawia niniejsze opracowanie. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo analisa, as recentes versões, da objecção à existência de um fluxo do tempo, com base na pergunta: “Com que velocidade flui o tempo?”. O autor mostra que as soluções existentes para o problema não são plausíveis e, que em vez disso, a resolução deve ser encontrada numa nova concepção de fluxo temporal, que evite tais dificuldades. A teoria metafísica proposta desenvolve as ideias de Broad e Prior sob um novo enquadramento, que invalida a objecção resultante da questão (...) sobre o ritmo da passagem do tempo e das respostas “segundo a segundo”. Neste texto também se procura mostrar, que esta teoria metafísica, aqui proposta, possui outras virtudes que testemunham a seu favor. Palavras-chave : existência dinâmica, fluxo do tempo, presentismo, velocidade de passagem do tempoThe paper analyzes some recent versions of the objection to the existence of the flow of time based on the question: “How fast does time flow?”. It shows that the replies given to the problem are implausible and instead proposes a solution for the issue in the form of a conception of the flow of time which can avoid such a difficulty. The proposed metaphysical theory develops the ideas of Broad and Prior in a radical way and invalidates the objection resulting from the question about the rate of passage and answers “second per second”. The paper also tries to show that this metaphysical theory has other virtues which testify in favor of it. Keywords : flow of time; rate of time’s passage; presentism; dynamic existence. (shrink)

Jerzy Perzanowski s ideas were based on an original blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic, where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic. Perzanowski began as a logician, his early works being on modal logic, then gradually shifted his interest to logical philosophy, meaning not so much philosophy of logic as philosophy informed by logic. Perzanowski was a rare breed of analytical philosopher who thought that a philosophical theory of everything (...) was worthwhile. In this systematic spirit, he began with method. He presented his method of total analysis and synthesis quite simply: reduce the object of research to its simplest possible constituents, and then combine them in some way. Better still, combine them in every possible way, thereby producing a space of possibilities analogous to (and in certain cases identical with) the logical space. Thus, analysis and synthesis differ from a trivial disassembly and reassembly.". (shrink)

The idea of rejection of some sentences on the basis of others comes from Aristotle, as Jan Łukasiewicz states in his studies on Aristotle's syllogistic [1939, 1951], concerning rejection of the false syllogistic form and those on certain calculus of propositions. Short historical remarks on the origin and development of the notion of a rejected sentence, introduced into logic by Jan Łukasiewicz, are contained in the Introduction of this paper. This paper is to a considerable extent a summary of papers (...) which are not easily available, even to the Polish reader: (1) J. Słupecki, Funkcja Łukasiewicza (Łukasiewicz’s function), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Seria B, nr 3 (1959), 33-40; (2) U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Teoria zdań odrzuconych (Theory of Rejected Sentences), (doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jerzy Słupecki, published as a monograph), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 5-131; (3) G. Bryll, Kilka uzupełnień teorii zdań odrzuconych (Some supplements to the theory of rejcted sentences), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Mnografie, Nr 22 (1969), 153-154. The paper also contains a good number of results which have not been published yet. Chapter I contains results presented in the papers (1)-(3). It provides an extension of Alfred Tarski’s theory of deductive systems presented by him in the papers [1930]: Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven Wssenschaften, I and Über einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik. The enriched theory is marked with T. The most essential new concept in T is the function Cn-1, whose definition was given by Słupecki in (1) on the basis of the so-called Tarski’s general theory of deductive systems. It has the form: y e Cn-1X iff Ex e X (x e Cn {y}), where Cn is Tarski’s consequence operation. In accordance with the definition: A sentence y is rejected on the basis of the sentences of the set X iff at least one of sentences of X is a consequence of y (is deducible from y). The intuitive meaning of the rejection function Cn-1: on the basis of false sentences we can reject false sentences only (while by means of the consequence operation Cn on the basis of true sentences we can deduce true sentences only). The function Cn-1 is a generalization of the notion of rejected sentences which was introduced into logic by Łukasiewicz. The essential property of the rejection function Cn-1 is that it satisfies the axioms of general Tarski’s consequence Cn, so it is a consequence operation, called the rejection consequence. In addition, it is an additive and normal operation. In Chapter I, there are given notions analogous to those of the theory of deductive systems, but they are written down by means of the symbol ‘Cn-1’ and not ‘Cn’. There are established the properties of introduced notions and differences and analogies taking place between them and properties of respective notions of the theory T. There are also given generalizations of the notions of ‘decidable system’ and ‘consistent system’ used by Łukasiewicz. The short Chapter II contains axioms of the system T’ which is equivalent to the system T. The only difference between sets of primitive notions of these systems consists in the appearance of the function Cn-1 in the system T’ instead of the function Cn. This chapter reproduces the results given in (2), but they are partially simplified. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

Descartes argumentował, wychodząc od swej słynnej tezy „Myślę, więc jestem”, o której sądził, że jest jedynym twierdzeniem niepowątpiewalnym, że udowodnił istnienie jedynie dwóch substancji: materialnej i duchowej, które są całkowicie różne, odrębne i autonomiczne w swych działaniach. Od czasu, gdy pisał swoje Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii, żywił głębokie przekonanie, że może także udowodnić nieśmiertelność duszy ludzkiej na mocy tezy o jej substancjalnej odrębności. Jednakże w trakcie pisania Medytacji, a szczególnie w rezultacie dyskusji ze swymi oponentami, przekonał się, że na gruncie (...) jego filozofii taki dowód jest po prostu niemożliwy. W artykule ukazuje się tok myślenia Descartes’a oraz proces zastępowania metafizycznego punktu widzenia etycznym punktem widzenia. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a new technique of proving undecidability results. This technique is based on the notion of a Thue tree. We also give examples of applications of this method to term rewriting, Horn implication problem and database dependencies.

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection finds application far outside biology, for which it was originally invented. Its consequences for science proved far-going, influencing practically every field from thermodynamics to the humanities. While acting on biological systems, the Darwinian mechanism is a source of progress and the local-scale abandonment of the universe’s general tendency towards chaos. However, observations of changes taking place in selection-exposed organisms show that evolutionary success requires some essential limitations. The application of this (...) reasoning to social evolution may appear thought-provoking: stable evolution requires not only intense selection but also a conservative approach to ideas. (shrink)

It follows from the proved theorems that ifM π=〈Q, ϕ〉 (whereQ={0,q 1,q 2,...,q α}) is a machine of the classM F then there exist α machinesM πi such thatM πi(〈1,c〉)=M π(〈q i,c〉) andQ i={0, 1, 2, ..., α+1} (i=1, 2, ..., α).And thus, if the way in which to an initial function of content of memoryc∈C a machine assigns a final onec′∈C is regarded as the only essential property of the machine then we can deal with the machines of the (...) formM π=〈{0, 1, 2, ..., α}, ϕ〉 and processes π(t) (wheret=〈1,c〉,c∈C) only.Such approach can simplify the problem of defining particular machines of the classM F , composing and simplifying them. (shrink)