Bernard Bolzano criticised Kant's philosophy so vehemently that his pupil Franz Prihonsky called him "Anti-Kant". One of his criticisms concerns Kant's cosmological antinomies. The context of this critique is the problem of limits of knowledge. Kant wanted to prove that there are such boundaries, and to show where these are located. In this paper we will schematize Kant's antinomies and summarize Bolzano's criticism, which is distributed over his and his student's work. At the beginning we will work out the theoretical (...) differences between Kant's and Bolzano's philosophy to see what roles these play in the construction of the antinomies. (shrink)

Historically, the connection between law and practical reason has been subject to at least two expositions. According to the first, the law is the deposit of the moral reasons people have to create a set of institutions. The existence of law is, thus understood, a consequence of potentially universal reasons for action (and a wellspring of further such reasons). Alternately, practical reason can be seen as relevant to positive law in the dual role to limit the tolerable content of positive (...) law and to explain the significance of moral arguments in legal reasoning. The article explores a third perspective that views the emergence of the legal relation as a consequence of the self-critique of practical reason. (shrink)

Mit Blick auf Móu Zōngsāns erkenntnistheoretische Schriften untersucht Rafael Suters die Frage, ob es diesem gelungen ist, die kritische Philosophie Kants mit der konfuzianischen so zu vermitteln, dass sich von einer kritischen Transformation konfuzianischen Denkens sprechen läßt, oder ob er im Versuch, dies zu tun, nicht letztlich in einen kritikfernen Intuitionismus zurückgefallen ist, gegen den der Kritizismus Kants doch gerade gerichtet war. Aus der Konstellation, die diese Untersuchung mit den beiden vorhergehenden bildet, wird deutlich, dass dies eine Frage von beträchtlicher (...) moralphilosophischer und auch politischer Relevanz ist. (shrink)

IN THE SPRING OF 1928, approximately one year after the publication of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger concludes a seminar on Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft with the following remark.