Kant: Schematism

: Usually, when studying schematism we devote almost exclusive attention to the study of the modifications that the categories suffer when combined with time. Instead, we have focused our attention on the determinations that time receives when combined with the categories. Departing from the definition of the transcendental schemata as “determinations of time”, an attempt is made to establish the various determinations that time receives from each one of the categories, as these perform the determination of time in schematism. The (...) categories of quantity allow us to think of time as a series of homogeneous unities; the categories of quality show each instant of time as a receptacle able to receive the different intensities of the real; the categories of relation establish a rule-dependent order on the flow of time; finally, the categories of modality determine the whole of time forming a collective unity that gathers or embraces each one of the instants of time preserving its specificity. (shrink)

El objetivo de nuestro artículo es ofrecer una interpretación del capítulo sobre “El esquematismo de los conceptos puros del entendimiento” de la Crítica de la razón pura de Immanuel Kant. Nuestra hipótesis es que en la doctrina del esquematismo se decide la posibilidad de la constitución ontológica del objeto como objeto. Consiguientemente, mostraremos que únicamente con los esquemas trascendentales nos encontramos con los predicados ontológicos fundamentales de la objetividad. Esto se demuestra estableciendo que solo gracias a la doctrina del esquematismo (...) se pone de manifiesto el dinamismo interno de la cooperación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento que da lugar al conocimiento objetivo. (shrink)

SummaryThe paper is concerned with the connection between Kant's conception of transcendental schematism and his analysis of the conditions of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. After dealing with some of the standard objections to Kant's theory, I argue that transcendental schemata must be construed as pure intuitions. I then point out that the Principles of Pure Understanding are a set of synthetic a priori judgments which assert the function of the various schemata as necessary conditions of the possibility (...) of experience, and that each of these judgments involves the relation of a pure concept to pure intuition . Finally, I argue that the connection between a category and its schema must itself be both synthetic and a priori. It therefore requires a “deduction”, which Kant himself does not provide, but which I endeavor, in part, to provide for him. (shrink)

Plato's Republic: the argument with Polemarchus.--Plato's Republic: the argument with Thrasymachus.--Plato's Republic: the nature of the soul.--Plato's Republic: the comparison between the soul and the state.--Plato's Republic: the proof that the most just man is the happiest.--Aristotle's definition of moral virtue and Plato's account of justice in the soul.--Purposive action.--A comparison of Kant's idealism with that of Berkeley.--The syntheses of sense and understanding in Kant's Kritik of pure reason.--The schematism of the categories in Kant's Kritik of pure reason.--The concept of (...) evolution. (shrink)

Most commentators agree that the Schematism chapter plays a very important role in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). But there is little agreement on what role, exactly, the Schematism is supposed to play and how successfully it plays that role. Many commentators consider it a failure. My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of the role of the Schematism and a qualified defense of its main doctrines. The topic of the Schematism is the “subsumption” of objects (...) under concepts, as the first sentence announces: “in all subsumptions of an object under a concept [. . .]“ (A137/B176). Its primary aim is to explain how it is possible for sensible objects to be subsumed specifically under the pure concepts of the understanding (categories). That much is relatively clear. However, “subsumption” admits of two different readings, which previous commentators have not carefully distinguished. In one sense, an object a can be said to be subsumed under a concept F just in case some subject thinks of a that it is F. In another sense, though, an object is only said to be subsumed under a concept when it instantiates that concept, e.g. when a is F. The first notion of subsumption is neutral on the truth of subsumption, whereas, on the second reading, subsumptions as such are true. In this paper I argue that this ambiguity in “subsumption” is the key that unlocks the argument of the Schematism. (shrink)

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third-man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid-way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.

Vor dem Hintergrund der Debatte um nichtbegriffliche Vorstellungsinhalte sucht diese Arbeit ein adäquates Verständnis von Kants Lehre der Erkenntnisquellen, Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, und der Ungleichartigkeit der anschaulichen und begrifflichen Vorstellungsweise, speziell bezüglich der Transzendentalen Ästhetik, der Lehre der transzendentalen Synthesis der Einbildungskraft (Selbstaffektion) und der Theorie des transzendentalen Schematismus. -/- Engaging in the Kantian debate on the existence of non-conceptual content, this work attempts to provide an adequate understanding of Kant’s doctrine of the two sources of human knowledge, sensibility and (...) understanding, and of their heterogeneous ways of representing, through intuitions and concepts. It elaborates on a consistent reading of this dualism in relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic, the synthesis of imagination, and the schematism. (shrink)

It has become typical to read Kant and Merleau-Ponty as offering competing approaches to perceptual experience. Kant is interpreted as an ‘intellectualist’ who regards perception as conceptual ‘all the way out’, while Merleau-Ponty is seen as Kant’s challenger, who argues that perception involves non-conceptual, embodied ‘coping’. In this paper, however, I argue that a closer examination of their views of perception, especially with respect to the notion of ‘schematism’, reveals a great deal of historical and philosophical continuity between them. By (...) analyzing Kant’s theory of schematism, the interpretation of it by the Neo-Kantian Pierre Lachièze-Rey, and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body schema, we find that aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception are better understood as a development of Kant’s theory of perception. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to offer a systematic analysis of a feature of Kant’s theory of perception that tends to be overlooked, viz., his account of how the imagination forms images in perception. Although Kant emphasizes the centrality of this feature of perception, indeed, calling it a ‘necessary ingredient’ of perception, commentators have instead focused primarily on his account of sensibility and intuitions on the one hand, and understanding and concepts on the other. However, I show that careful (...) attention to what he says about the nature of images, their connection to the imagination, and their role in perception in his Metaphysics Lectures, as well as in the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the first Critique reveals that Kant is working with a richer, more nuanced framework for perception than is often attributed to him. I contend that it is only once we have a revised framework for Kant’s theory of perception in place that we will be able to make further headway in debates, e.g., about whether or not he is a conceptualist about perception. (shrink)

IN THE FIRST EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION of the categories Kant does not mention the logical functions of judgment. In the second edition the Deduction can be said to be dominated by the logical functions of judgment. A transcendental deduction supplies a method for showing that pure concepts can have applicability. My contention is that the two deductions constitute exactly the same method, and so are the exact same deduction. The difference between them, rather, is in the characterization of the pure (...) concepts that the method is supposed to be a method for. The undifferentiated categories of the A edition become the logical functions together with their schemata in the B edition. This does not mean that Kant has split the A edition notion of categories since the A edition categories are equivalent to just the schemata themselves. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally as Kunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the term Kunst in the Critique of Judgment we gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its (...) connection to Kant's concerns in the third Critique. (shrink)

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A pesar de las escasas referencias al lenguaje en la obra de Kant, cabe plantear la existencia de una concepción semántica latente en el conjunto de la filosofía trascendental. La cuestión del significado se corresponde en Kant a la pregunta por el fundamento de la relación entre una representación universal (o tipo) y el particular que le corresponde. De acuerdo con lo presentado en el parágrafo 59 de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, dos son los modelos que nos (...) permiten pensar toda posible relación particular-tipo (hipotiposis): la exposición esquemática y la exposición simbólica. El objetivo principal del presente artículo es analizar la naturaleza, función y lugar sistemático de la noción de exposición esquemática en cuanto modelo de significación operante en el dominio teórico, mostrando a su vez la crítica implícita a la comprensión del funcionamiento de nuestros conceptos en autores como Locke, Berkeley y Hume. Se ubicará asimismo el concepto de exposición simbólica en el contexto de la problemática de una exposición de las ideas de razón. (shrink)

According to Kant the figurative synthesis and the schemata are both serving the mediation of intuition and concept. In this article, I investigate their respective functions and the special manner of their cooperation in the process of knowledge. Kant prefers geometrical concepts as examples for schemata. The schema of a triangle is a rule to construct it, that is a rule which is able to produce an image. The representation of a triangle requires a construction, which is an action of (...) the pure productive imagination: the figurative synthesis connects the manifold in pure intuition following the rules for construction. But important aspects remain hidden in mathematical examples. It is after all the same figurative synthesis which enables us to apprehend an object with the use of empirical concepts (A 224/B 271). This action of imagination and its cooperation with schematization becomes especially clear in the use of empirical concepts. (shrink)

This contribution first proposes to link the transcendental deduction to the problematic function of the understanding, and the transcendental schematism to the assertoric function of the faculty of judgment. Then it deals with classical objections against the irrelevance of schematism and the doctrine of subsumption, and concludes that the universal character of the transcendental scheme is not the same as the universal character of the concept (which lies in the extension, hence in a relation of subordination), but results necessarily from (...) a synthesis of representations in the pure "a priori" imagination (relation of coordination). (shrink)

In this paper we analyze an ambiguity concealed in the concept of determination as used by Kant in his characterization of the transcendental schema as “transcendental time-determination”. We claim that, in this context, “determination” can be understood in a dynamic way as well as in a static manner. In the first case, transcendental schemata are procedures of synthesis or temporal determination of the empirical manifold. In the second case, transcendental schemata are the basic temporal properties or determinations produced by those (...) procedures. (shrink)

In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not (...) provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self-consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the ‘I think’). (shrink)

This entirely new translation of Critique of Pure Reason by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood is the most accurate and informative English translation ever produced of this epochal philosophical text. Though its simple, direct style will make it suitable for all new readers of Kant, the translation displays a philosophical and textual sophistication that will enlighten Kant scholars as well. This translation recreates as far as possible a text with the same interpretative nuances and richness as the original.

In the early steps of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant briefly addresses the threat posed by usurpatory concepts such as 'fate' and 'fortune'. Commentators have largely passed over these remarks, but in this paper I argue that a careful analysis of the reasons why 'fate' and 'fortune' are usurpatory reveals an important point about the relation between the Deduction and the Principles chapters of the Critique. In particular, I argue that 'fate' and 'fortune' are usurpatory (...) because they are unable to discriminate between the particular contents of experience, and that this requires that Kant provide an account of how the categories are able to accomplish this task. And this in turn shows that the justificatory work begun in the Deduction can be completed only in the Schematism and Principles. (shrink)