In The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil and Its Consequences, Matthew Kramer argues that none of the standard rationales used to justify capital punishment successfully vindicates it and that a new justification, the purgative rationale, justifies capital punishment for defilingly evil offenders. In this article, it is argued, first, that a version of retributivism that adheres to the lex talionis as Kramer understands it does seem to call exclusively for the death penalty. Second, it is (...) submitted that the purgative rationale is over-inclusive inasmuch as Kramer considers it applicable to certain offenders with abusive or deprived backgrounds, some offenders indoctrinated to adhere to pernicious ideologies that have impelled their crimes, and wrongdoers who have sincerely repented. Third, doubts are expressed about whether the purgative rationale justifies the execution of any offenders. Even if it is true that the continued existence of an extravagantly evil offender represents an affront to humanity, as Kramer suggests, a moral obligation to execute him does not follow. Since repentance is intrinsically valuable and since repentance would extinguish the affront to humanity, the community in which an unrepentant evil offender abides is duty-bound to foster repentance on the part of the offender by imposing banishment or life imprisonment, sanctions that afford the offender the most extensive opportunity for repentance. The community is therefore obligated to impose one of these sanctions instead of capital punishment. (shrink)

Recorded in Ithaca, NY by Cornell University., Notes., Sponsored by: Classics, Department of., Lecture, April 1, 1986.

The Black antislavery theorist Quobna Ottobah Cugoano (c.1757–c.1791) is increasingly recognized as a noteworthy figure in the history of philosophy. Born in present-day Ghana, Cugoano was enslaved at the age of 13 and shipped to Grenada, before being taken onwards to England, where the 1772 Somerset court ruling in effect freed him. His Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery [1787/1791] broke new ground by demanding the immediate end of the slave-trade and of slavery itself, without any compensation to (...) slaveholders. Notwithstanding this, Cugoano endorsed the legitimacy of penal enslavement on principled grounds – like many other abolitionists writing in late eighteenth-century Britain. “Every free community might keep slaves, or criminal prisoners in bondage” – and even sell them. Amidst the growing literature exploring Cugoano’s abolitionism, his paradoxical justification of penal slavery has bewildered commentators. Far from an offhand inconsistency, I argue that this justification is deeply embedded within his moral and legal philosophy; constraining his antislavery arguments while simultaneously serving retaliatory aims. His two-pronged principle of just punishment – the lex talionis (‘eye for an eye, bondage for bondage’) as tempered by mercy – sometimes demands penally enslaving colonial slaveholders and slave-traders in turn. Throughout, I compare Cugoano’s justification of penal enslavement with those of other early modern philosophers, especially Locke and Kant. This helps me position Cugoano within the history of philosophy, thus making his views more accessible to a wider philosophical audience. It also indicates just how deeply theories of punishment shaped philosophical thinking about penal bondage in the period. (shrink)

This is a presentation of the utilitarian approach to punishment. It is meant for students. A note added in July, 2022 advises the reader about the author's current views on some topics in the paper. The first section discusses Bentham's psychological hedonism. The second briefly criticizes it. The third section explains abstractly how utilitarianism would determine of the right amount of punishment. The fourth section applies the theory to some cases, and brings out how utilitarianism could favor punishments more or (...) less severe than the lex talionis. (shrink)

The lex talionis of the Old Testament has been widely perceived—understandably, but mistakenly—as a barbaric law of retribution in kind. It is better understood as a seminal expression of restraint and proportionality as moral principles of punishment. This has been recognized from the earliest times. Over the intervening centuries, the lex talionis has lost neither its moral significance nor its penal relevance. This is reflected in H.L.A. Hart's synthesis of modern retributivist and utilitarian theories of punishment and, again, (...) in contemporary Canadian law through the recognition of proportionality as the fundamental principle of sentencing under the Criminal Code. The tension between this fundamental principle and Canada's increasing resort to mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment is examined briefly in this light. (shrink)

Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will (...) and moral responsibility needed to justify this view of punishment. While a number of alternatives to retributivism exist - including consequentialist deterrence, educational, and communicative theories - they have ethical problems of their own. Moving beyond existing theories, Caruso presents a new non-retributive approach called the public health-quarantine model. In stark contrast to retributivism, the public health-quarantine model provides a more human, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior. (shrink)

This paper argues that Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy contains a coherent, albeit implicit, defense of the legitimacy of capital punishment, one that refutes the most important objections leveled against it. I first show that Kant is consistent in his application of the ius talionis. I then explain how Kant can respond to the claim that death penalty violates the inviolable right to life. To address the most significant objection – the claim that execution violates human dignity – I argue (...) that motives of honor, as Kant conceives it, require a rational person to will her own execution, were she to commit murder. (shrink)

This replies to Block 2019 (B19), which responds to Lester 2014 (L14). The main issues in the, varyingly sized, sections are as follows. 1 Further explanations of critical rationalism, the theory of liberty, and problems with the non-aggression principle. 2.1 The relationships among law, morality, and libertarianism. 2.2 The objective invasiveness of low-level radiation and that it is therefore an initiated imposition (albeit trivial) if someone inflicts it on non-consenting people. 2.3 The objective and subjective aspects of initiated impositions; and (...) how clashes can be resolved. 2.4 How liberty relates to risk and self-ownership. 2.5 Libertarian initial acquisition versus absolute property rights by labour-mixing. 2.6 Organisational note. 2.7 Libertarianism and mens rea. 2.8 Libertarian rectification versus lex-talionis doubling. 2.9 Indirectly clashing rights, self-preservation, trespasser-hiker, flagpole-grasper, and landmine-layer. 2.10 A logical point is not a moral point. 2.11 Pacifism and libertarianism. 3.1 A weak criticism of utilitarianism. 3.2 Hedonometers; approximate interpersonal comparisons of utility imply libertarianism; what a libertarian is; libertarian rankings. 4. Libertarian philosophy versus propertarian dogma. Coda: the need to take seriously the philosophical problems with propertarian-justificationist libertarianism. (shrink)

THE NUMBINGLY HIGH RATE OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES poses a challenge to our images of justice, particularly given the indirect consequences for families and communities. Two key theological sources for justice, the lex talionis and the interpretation of Anselmian satisfaction, offer key insights for adjudicating between restoration and retribution. Yet a Christian ethical response capable of addressing mass incarceration must also examine the collateral consequences of imprisonment. This essay ultimately argues for an image of justice that, while (...) sensitive to restoration and retribution, is also attentive to community membership and the full scope of human relationality. (shrink)

So serious a matter is capital punishment that we must consider very carefully any claim regarding its justification. Brian Calvert has offered a new version of the “argument from arbitrariness,” according to which a retributivist cannot consistently hold that some, but not all, first-degree murderers may justifiably receive the death penalty, when it is conceived to be a unique form of punishment. At the heart of this argument is the line-drawing problem, and I am inclined to think that it is (...) a genuine challenge for the retributivist. I respond on behalf of the retributivist by formulating a line-drawing method that relies on the distinction between clearly deserving and not clearly deserving and is justified by a version of the lex talionis modified with an epistemic constraint. (shrink)

Talion and the Golden Rule are usually considered expressions of successive historical stages in the development of morality. The conventional wisdom is that talion-lex talionis-is a form of social control corresponding to a fairly early stage of the development of human communities. From a purely historical point of view, talion is a rule of punishment for crime according to which the retribution should strictly correspond to the harm inflicted. The rule goes back to the archaic custom of blood vengeance (...) which it supplanted. In contemporary normative research, talion is frequently interpreted more broadly as a rule of equal recompense. This is historically incorrect, but in theoretical analysis it is permissible as a general idea of a special type of control of human interrelations. It is precisely in this context that we understand the accepted opinion that as social relations develop and become richer talion is pushed to the periphery of human relations by another, more refined normative form, the Golden Rule, the appearance of which marks the emergence of morality in the contemporary sense of the word. Thus, talion is seen as a premoral form of social control, although if it is taken in the indicated strict sense then, historically, it antecedes not so much morality as institutionalized law. (shrink)

This paper criticizes one of Vlastos’ well-known articles, in which he purports to reveal what he takes to be one of Socrates’ great achievements in ethics. By using what I take to be a more appropriate way of analysing Plato’s dialogues, I show how the same paragraph which is used by Vlastos to corroborate his case proves, in fact, the opposite. What Vlastos regards as “Socrates’ Rejection of Retaliation” turns out to be nothing but an instrument used by Socrates to (...) make Crito look at his own behavior towards the polis. In a wider context, Plato’s Crito is shown to be a severe criticism of democracy, where the lex talionis is rather one of its dominant tools used both by the state and its citizens. (shrink)

The article analyzes the concept of universal scope of salvation in the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher especially with the references to his early Speeches on Religion and the later treatise The Christian Faith. It moves from Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion per se to his soteriological and eschatological theories. It can be said that he understands the nature of religion apophatically as the feeling and intuition and points to an aspect of mystery, which religion contains. He rejects in the Speeches on (...) Religion the anthropomorphic understanding of God and speaks of God-universum. Finally, in the treatise Christian Faith, he reinterprets the theological concept of the original sin and depravation, and points to a natural process of development of humankind from the Godless-consciousness to the God-consciousness. This leads the German thinker to universalistic beliefs. From the Protestant-reformed tradition Schleiermacher adopts the concept of predestination. However, he rejects the so called “double predestination” to salvation and condemnation. According to him, all people are chosen to be saved “in Christ”. This way, Schleiermacher continues the Reformed tradition, however he understands the election in the universal categories. He rejects the God, who choses for salvation only some people, but accepts God-universum, who maintains the unity of humanity and leads people to the perfect, eschatological communion. In the convictions pointing to the final unity of humankind, Schleiermacher exposes his deep humanism. He assumes that it is impossible to reconcile the traditional view of the eternal hell with God’s love. Divine punishment can serve as an aspect of overall paidagogia, leading to the maturing of humanity. However, it cannot be understood as a retribution, based on God’s wrath and cruel lex talionis. Such an understanding of God is for Schleiermacher unacceptable. (shrink)

Most of the standard arguments against the retributive theory of punishment are hardly new. That the retributive view of punishment is but a rationalization of a primitive urge for revenge; that the retributivists, instead of providing an answer to the question about the source of our moral right to add a new evil to an already perpetrated one , simply assert dogmatically that punishment is an intrinsic good, i.e. something that needs no further moral justification; that it is impossible to (...) apply the lex talionis in practice; that the retributivist thesis that the criminal has a right to punishment is absurd, because the criminal himself would be the first to deny that he has any such right; that the retributive theory is incompatible with the claims of forgiveness and mercy; that the practical consequences of the theory are conservative, the theory itself being in fact an apology for the existing laws and the existing social order; that the Hegelian idea of punishment as a ‘negation’ or ‘annulment’ of crime is either unintelligible or essentially utilitarian in character–most of this had been said already in the last century, or even earlier. All these arguments are still in use. 1 But in recent literature–in a number of papers published in the last twenty years or so–we find a new argument against the retributive theory. It is only natural that this particular argument should not have been used earlier: methodologically it is typical of a philosophical orientation which emerged only in our century–analytical philosophy. (shrink)

The Retributivist approach to punishment attempts to address the challenges posed by utilitarian conception that punitive actions should strictly be associated with a costeffective means to certain independently identifiable goods at the expense of justice. Justice proffers how the guilty deserve to be punished and no moral consideration relevant to punishment outweighs an offender’s criminal desert. However, this just desert provokes difficulty in discerning proportionality between the moral gravity of each offence and the specific penalties attached. This consequently degenerates to (...) another form of ‘lex talionis’ (revenge) in punitive justice. (shrink)

The moral theory justifying punishment will shape the debate over numerous controversial issues such as the moral permissibility of the death penalty, probation, parole, and plea bargaining, as well as issues about conditions in prison and access to educational opportunities in prison. In this essay I argue that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. If I am correct, the answer to issues involving the criminal justice system (...) should be answered in large part by considering whether the practice in question furthers the infliction of suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. (shrink)

"In Getting Even, Charles Barton contends that revenge can be a form of justice that is constructive and healing for our society. Our current judiciary system, he explains, denies both victims and the accused an active role in the legal proceedings and resolution of their cases, reducing them to bystanders in what is essentially their own conflict. Barton does not argue for an individual's right to take the law into his own hands, but does show that the courts should recognize (...) the revenge motive as legitimate and rational within the rules of justice."--pub. desc. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out a version of the Forfeiture Theory of Punishment. Forfeiture Theory: Legal punishment is just or permissible because offenders forfeit their rights.On this account, offenders forfeit their rights because they infringed on someone’s rights. My strategy is to provide a version of the Forfeiture Theory and then to argue that it survives a number of initially intuitive seeming objections, most having their origins in the recent work of David Boonin.

"This book argues for a mixed view of punishment that balances consequentialism and retributivism. He has published extensively on philosophy and applied ethics. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book defends a mixed (...) view that recognizes the strength of both of these intuitions. By this account, the legislature should develop institutional policies and statutory penalties that maintain the social order, that is, consequentialism. It establishes punishment policies to deter criminal activity. By contrast, the criminal judiciary should give individual defendants what they deserve, that is, retributivism and thus expressing the community's appropriate sense of resentment at being wronged. The book justifies the two-tiered model by showing how it accords with our moral intuitions, our assumptions about how what we know affects our moral obligations, and a commonly held theory of freedom. This approach is developed by engaging classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law, and shows its advantages over competing approaches from contemporary retributivists and other mixed theorists. The work also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. It draws on cutting-edge criminological research to show how punishment theory can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug laws, and mass incarceration. The book will also be of interest to legal philosophers, social scientists, especially criminologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists"--. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Capital Punishment Conclusion Bibliography.

《復仇觀的省察與詮釋──先秦兩漢魏晉南北朝隋唐編》一書探討先秦至唐代的「復仇觀」，為跨學科、跨領域、跨文化之研究，作者李隆獻教授運用經傳、史書、經生之詮釋、儒士之論述，以及古注、類書、地志、冥界小說等 資料，透過歷時性考察，兼採宏觀與微觀方式，省察傳統「五倫復仇觀」的源起及其歷代境況與嬗變之跡，探索復仇觀在人類演進過程中的社會、文化意涵，並與不同文化的復仇觀相互映照。全書涉及復仇理論、復仇風氣、復仇 現象、復仇觀及其嬗變、復仇觀與法律的互涉、禮法衝突、鬼靈復仇等，乃當前探討復仇觀視野較為多元、全面的專著。 全書共分六大章： 壹、〈「五倫復仇觀」的源起與嬗變〉，以先秦至漢代─復仇觀確立的關鍵時期─的儒家經典為探討對象，追溯、分析此一觀念的起源與確立過程。中國的復仇觀因儒家思想的影響，逐漸發展為超越血緣復仇的「五倫復仇觀」。 再次就不同時代的儒家經典，考察其對復仇的觀念與態度，又次則比對《春秋》三《傳》復仇觀的異同，「餘論」則舉實例略論西方的復仇觀，「結論」藉由中、西復仇觀的比較，凸顯中國復仇觀在社會化的過程中受儒家思想影 響／規範／形塑，及經典／學術化的現象。 貳、〈先秦至唐代復仇型態的省察與詮釋〉述論先秦至唐代復仇型態的諸面向與典型案例，分析、歸納復仇事件的發展為六階段：一、復仇動機；二、復仇對象；三、復仇方式；四、地方官吏對復仇的態度；五、中央政府對復仇 的態度；六、時人／史傳對復仇的評價。後三階段涉及儒家復仇理論、人情常理與法律之間的往互辯證，為一般研究復仇相關論文較少論述者，有頗多可觀之處。 參、〈兩漢復仇風氣與《公羊》復仇理論關係重探〉，旨在釐清《公羊》「復仇理論」與兩漢復仇風氣的關係，進而詮釋漢代復仇盛行的各種原因。 肆、〈兩漢魏晉南北朝復仇與法律的互涉〉，探討復仇觀在兩漢、魏晉南北朝時期的嬗變之跡以及官方的法令規範與執法態度、輿論所反映的復仇觀與復仇與法律互涉的相關問題等進行省察與詮釋。 伍、〈隋唐時期復仇與法律的互涉〉，旨在探討隋唐復仇現象／復仇觀及其與法律的互涉，透過三個關鍵復仇案例─徐元慶復仇案例與陳子昂議及柳宗元〈駁復讎議〉、張琇兄弟復仇案例、梁悅復仇案例與韓愈〈復讎狀〉─的實 際考察來探討。最後，則析論與復仇相關的二則《唐律》 陸、〈先秦至唐代鬼靈復仇的省察與詮釋〉，透過先秦至唐代具有代表性的鬼靈復仇案例，分析各時代鬼靈復仇的動機、方式、特色，及其與天道、冥府、報應等信仰交涉的情況，探索先秦至唐代民間復仇觀的具體樣貌。 附錄、〈日本復仇觀管窺─以古典文學為重心〉，本文以日本古典文學為重心，管窺日本復仇觀的淵源與嬗變之跡。.

The article claims that a person who deserves punishment deserves it because, and only because, she has performed a culpable wrongdoing . The article thus rejects the theory that the basis of deserved punishment is a bad moral character. The argument rejecting The Character Theory of Deserved Punishment is divided into two parts:1) that it is not necessarily the case that an intentional act reflects the agent's moral character, and2) that it is not necessarily the case that a culpable wrongdoing (...) reflects the agent's moral character. The article then proceeds to isolate instances of culpable wrongdoing and of bad moral character to see which of these factors accompanies the considered moral judgment that the agent deserves punishment. It concludes that our intuitions suggest deserved punishment and the amount of punishment someone deserves, correlate with culpable wrongdoing rather than with a person's bad moral character. Der Beitrag geht davon aus, daß eine Person dann und nur dann Strafe verdient, wenn sie eine rechtswidrige Tat schuldhaft begangen hat. Er wendet sich damit gegen die Auffassung, Basis für eine verdiente Strafe sei der schlechte Charakter der bestraften Person. Das Argument, das die letztere Lehre verwirft, zerfällt in zwei Teile. 1) Es ist nicht notwendigerweise so, daß eine Vorsatztat den schlechten Charakter des Handelnden, und 2) es ist nicht notwendigerweise so, daß schuldhaft begangenes Unrecht überhaupt den Charakter des Handelnden widerspiegelt. Anschließend untersucht der Beitrag Beispiele schuldhaftes Unrechttuns und Beispiele schlechten moralischen Charakters, um festzustellen, welcher dieser Faktoren das moralische Urteil, daß der Handelnde Strafe verdient, begleitet. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß unsere Intuitionen den Gedanken, jemand verdiene Strafe, und die Höhe der Strafe, die der Betreffende verdient, mit der Annahme einer schuldhaft begangenen rechtswidrigen Tat korrelieren und nicht mit der Annahme der Betreffende habe einen schlechten Charakter. (shrink)

In "Kant on Freedom and the Appropriate Punishment," the author begins by noting that in The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant asserts that a wrongdoer should be given a punishment that is similar to his wrongdoing. He then makes two interpretive claims with regard to this assertion.First, he claims that the best way to understand this assertion in the context of other things Kant says is that the state is obligated to punish a wrongdoer in a way that imposes on (...) the wrongdoer an amount of suffering equal to what he caused and through an action that is similar in type to the wrongdoer's offense. The argument in support of this claim occurs in section II and rests on two more specific interpretive claims about Kant's theory: that state punishment should resemble the wrongdoer's acts and should involve the same level of suffering as was involved in the original wrongdoing and that punishment in accordance with these constraints is an obligatory duty.Second, the author claims that on Kant's theory this principle of appropriate punishment is justified because it restores equality in the distribution of freedom for members of the state. The argument in support of this claim occurs in section III. The argument rests in part on Kant's justification of the state and coercion in terms of the value of equalized freedom. By applying this same justification to Kant's principle of appropriate punishment, the author claims to be able to account for the principle as well as to relate the principle to Kant's political theory. Der vorliegende Beitrag beginnt mit der Feststellung, daß Kant in der Metaphysik der Sitten geltend macht, ein Übeltäter solle eine Bestrafung erleiden, die mit seiner Tat vergleichbar ist. Im Hinblick auf diese Forderung Kants werden zwei Thesen aufgestellt.Erstens wird behauptet, die genannte Forderung sei vor dem Hintergrund sonstiger Äußerungen Kants am besten dahingehend zu verstehen, daß der Staat verpflichtet sei, einen Übeltäter in einer Weise zu bestrafen, die diesem ein Maß von Leid zufügt, das dem von ihm selbst verursachten gleichkommt. Geschehen müsse dies durch eine Handlung, die in ihrer Art dem vom Übeltäter begangenen Verbrechen entspricht. Die Begründung dieser These erfolgt in Abschnitt II und stützt sich wiederum auf zwei mehr in die Einzelheiten gehende Thesen zu Kants Theorie: Staatliche Bestrafung sollte den Handlungen des Übeltäters ähneln und Leid in einer Größenordnung mit sich bringen, wie es auch die ursprüngliche Tat zur Folge hatte. Bestrafung in Übereinstimmung mit diesen Bedingungen ist eine Pflicht.Zweitens wird die Auffassung vertreten, dieses Prinzip angemessenen Strafens sei im Rahmen der Theorie Kants gerechtfertigt, weil es für die Mitglieder des Staates die Gleicheit in bezug auf die Verteilung der Freiheit wiederherstelle. Die Begründung dieser These findet sich in Abschnitt III und beruht zum Teil auf Kants Rechtfertigung von Staat und Zwang durch den Verweis auf den Wert gleichmäßig verteilter Freiheit. Die Übernahme eben dieser Rechtfertigung auch für Kants Theorie angemessenen Strafens soll sowohl dazu dienen, das Prinzip selbst zu begründen, als auch dazu, es in Kants politische Theorie einzuordnen. (shrink)

Retributivism is the notion that punishment is justified because, and only because, the wrongdoer deserves it. Proportionality is central to retributivism. A proportional punishment is one in which the severity of a punishment is proportional to the seriousness of the offense (for example, its wrongness or harmfulness). Michael Tonry’s collection is must reading for punishments theorists. The articles are well-chosen and the reflections of theorists such as Andreas von Hirsch, R. A. Duff, and Douglas Husak who have shaped punishment theory (...) and who now consider the future of the principles that have governed their work, makes for interesting reading. The tie-in between retributivism and the practice of punishment is enlightening and sometime too often absent in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Recent scholarship suggests that Descartes’s effort to establish a truth criterion is not viciously circular (notwithstanding its reputation)---a fact that invites closer scrutiny of his epistemological program. One of the least well understood features of the project is his deduction of a truth criterion from theistic premises, a demonstration Descartes says he provides in the Fourth Meditation: the alleged proof is not revealed by a casual reading, nor have commentators fared any better; in general, the relevance of the Fourth Meditation (...) has not been duly appreciated. This paper reconstructs the argument of the Fourth Meditation, detailing the steps in the demonstration of the criterion and clarifying its role in the larger program. Surprisingly, Descartes deduces a truth criterion more fundamental than clarity and distinctness; this more fundamental criterion helps explain what are otherwise cryptic (though central) epistemological moves in the Sixth Meditation. (shrink)

First published in 1689, John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is widely recognised as among the greatest works in the history of Western philosophy. The Essay puts forward a systematic empiricist theory of mind, detailing how all ideas and knowledge arise from sense experience. Locke was trained in mechanical philosophy and he crafted his account to be consistent with the best natural science of his day. The Essay was highly influential and its rendering of empiricism would become the standard for (...) subsequent theorists. This Companion volume includes fifteen new essays from leading scholars. Covering the major themes of Locke's work, they explain his views while situating the ideas in the historical context of Locke's day and often clarifying their relationship to ongoing work in philosophy. Pitched to advanced undergraduates and graduate students, it is ideal for use in courses on early modern philosophy, British empiricism and John Locke. (shrink)

In many countries attention for fostering research integrity started with a misconduct case that got a lot of media exposure. But there is an emerging consensus that questionable research practices are more harmful due to their high prevalence. QRPs have in common that they can help to make study results more exciting, more positive and more statistically significant. That makes them tempting to engage in. Research institutions have the duty to empower their research staff to steer away from QRPs and (...) to explain how they realize that in a Research Integrity Promotion Plan. Avoiding perverse incentives in assessing researchers for career advancement is an important element in that plan. Research institutions, funding agencies and journals should make their research integrity policies as evidence-based as possible. The dilemmas and distractions researchers face are real and universal. We owe it to society to collaborate and to do our utmost best to prevent QRPs and to foster research integrity. (shrink)

The move towards having more teaching of business ethics comes in part from a tendency to view managers negatively, drawing on anti-management theories that are presently popular in business schools. This can lead to a misdiagnosis of the causes of contemporary business problems. Teaching business ethics can, however, be ineffectual and counter-productive. Education in ethical philosophy can lead managers to be indecisive, sceptical or to rationalize poor conduct. The ethics of academics become salient and lapses in them undercut their claims (...) to authority. The philosophical viewpoint that stresses free choice runs contrary to the social science mission to reveal the causes that determine human behaviour and provide solutions to problems. Pro-management theory offers a more positive appreciation of managers, with its three components of structural functionalism, strategic functionalism and stewardship. (shrink)

This essay addresses two main aspects of Descartes’s views on the mind’s voluntary control over judgment. First, I argue that in his view, the mind’s control over judgment is indirect: rather than believing things directly at will, the mind’s voluntary control is exercised by directing its attention to reasons—the reasons then doing the work of determining either assent, dissent, or suspension. Second, I argue that the foregoing indirect voluntarism account undermines an influential line of argument purporting to show that Descartes (...) holds a compatibilist account of the mind’s liberty in its judgment formation. On the broader interpretation that emerges, Descartes assigns a more significant role to attention in proper judgment formation than has generally been acknowledged. (shrink)

Both scientists and society at large have rightfully become increasingly concerned about research integrity in recent decades. In response, codes of conduct for research have been developed and elaborated. We show that these codes contain substantial pluralism. First, there is metaphysical pluralism in that codes include values, norms, and virtues. Second, there is axiological pluralism, because there are different categories of values, norms, and virtues: epistemic, moral, professional, social, and legal. Within and between these different categories, norms can be incommensurable (...) or incompatible. Codes of conduct typically do not specify how to handle situations where different norms pull in different directions. We review some attempts to develop an ordering of different sorts of norm violations based on a common measure for their seriousness. We argue that they all fail to give adequate guidance for resolving cases of incommensurable and conflicting norms. We conclude that value pluralism is inherent to codes of conduct in research integrity. The application of codes needs careful reasoning and judgment together with an intellectually humble attitude that acknowledges the inevitability of value pluralism. (shrink)

Among the more notorious of Cartesian doctrines is thebête machinedoctrine — the view that brute animals lack not only reason, but any form of consciousness. Recent English commentaries have served to obscure, rather than to clarify, the historical Descartes's views. Standard interpretations have it that insofar as Descartes intends to establish thebête machinedoctrine his arguments are palpably flawed. One camp of interpreters thus disputes that he even holds the doctrine. As I shall attempt to show, not only does Descartes affirm (...) the doctrine, his supporting arguments are not palpably flawed — even if they ultimately come up short. It will indeed emerge that, in making his case, Descartes employs interesting argumentative strategies that have not been duly appreciated. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is increasing evidence that research misbehaviour is common, especially the minor forms. Previous studies on research misbehaviour primarily focused on biomedical and social sciences, and evidence from natural sciences and humanities is scarce. We investigated what academic researchers in Amsterdam perceived to be detrimental research misbehaviours in their respective disciplinary fields.MethodsWe used an explanatory sequential mixed methods design. First, survey participants from four disciplinary fields rated perceived frequency and impact of research misbehaviours from a list of 60. We then (...) combined these into a top five ranking of most detrimental research misbehaviours at the aggregate level, stratified by disciplinary field. Second, in focus group interviews, participants from each academic rank and disciplinary field were asked to reflect on the most relevant research misbehaviours for their disciplinary field. We used participative ranking methodology inducing participants to obtain consensus on which research misbehaviours are most detrimental.ResultsIn total, 1080 researchers completed the survey (response rate: 15%) and 61 participated in the focus groups (3 three to 8 eight researchers per group). Insufficient supervision consistently ranked highest in the survey regardless of disciplinary field and the focus groups confirmed this. Important themes in the focus groups were insufficient supervision, sloppy science, and sloppy peer review. Biomedical researchers and social science researchers were primarily concerned with sloppy science and insufficient supervision. Natural sciences and humanities researchers discussed sloppy reviewing and theft of ideas by reviewers, a form of plagiarism. Focus group participants further provided examples of particular research misbehaviours they were confronted with and how these impacted their work as a researcher.ConclusionWe found insufficient supervision and various forms of sloppy science to score highly on aggregate detrimental impact throughout all disciplinary fields. Researchers from the natural sciences and humanities also perceived nepotism to be of major impact on the aggregate level. The natural sciences regarded fabrication of data of major impact as well. The focus group interviews helped to understand how researchers interpreted ‘insufficient supervision’. Besides, the focus group participants added insight into sloppy science in practice. Researchers from the natural sciences and humanities added new research misbehaviours concerning their disciplinary fields to the list, such as the stealing of ideas before publication. This improves our understanding of research misbehaviour beyond the social and biomedical fields. (shrink)

This book tells an overlooked story in the history of the will, a contested idea in both politics and philosophy of mind. For it is Cicero, statesman and philosopher, who gives shape to the notion of will as it would become in Western thought and who invents the idea of 'the will of the people'. In a single word – voluntas – he brings Roman law in contact with Greek ideas, chief among them Plato's claim that a rational elite must (...) rule. When the republic falls to Caesarism, Cicero turns his political argument inward: will is a force to win the virtue in the soul that was lost on the battlefield, the marker of inner freedom in an unfree age. Though his vision of a free republic failed in his time, Cicero's ideal of rational elitism has shaped and fractured the modern world – and Ciceronian creativity may yet save it. (shrink)

The present study evaluates the cognitive representation of a kicking movement performed by a human and a humanoid robot, and how they are represented in experts and novices of soccer and robotics, respectively. To learn about the expertise-dependent development of memory structures, we compared the representation structures of soccer experts and robot experts concerning a human and humanoid robot kicking movement. We found different cognitive representation structures for both expertise groups under two different motor performance conditions . In general, the (...) expertise relies on the perceptual-motor knowledge of the human motor system. Thus, the soccer experts’ cognitive representation of the humanoid robot movement is dominated by their representation of the corresponding human movement. Additionally, our results suggest that robot experts, in contrast to soccer experts, access functional features of the technical system of the humanoid robot in addition to their perceptual-motor knowledge about the human motor system. Thus, their perceptual-motor and neuro-functional machine representation are integrated into a cognitive representation of the humanoid robot movement. (shrink)

Widespread scholarly agreement has it that Descartes' theory of judgment favors a compatibilist interpretation. This essay explains and rebuts the standard arguments made on behalf of compatibilist readings, while explaining and defending a libertarian interpretation. Along with relevant Fourth Meditation doctrines and texts, my analysis encompasses a much discussed 1645 letter discussing his account. Although some scholars view the letter as departing from the account of theMeditations, I argue that the two works present a consistent view – allowing us to (...) take at face value that the letter purports to elaborate Descartes' intended meaning in the associated Fourth Meditation passage. (shrink)

Janet Broughton’s Descartes’s Method of Doubt1 is a systematic study of the role of doubt in Descartes’s epistemology. The book has two parts. Part 1 focuses on the development of doubt in the First Meditation, exploring such topics as the motivation behind methodic doubt; the targeted audience; the method’s game-like character (on her view); its relations to ancient skepticism, its reasonableness; the method’s presuppositions relative to commonsense belief; Michael Williams’s recent criticisms of Descartes; and more. Part 2 focuses on how (...) doubt figures in the constructive epistemology of the Meditations—on how Descartes employs doubt as a tool for founding knowledge. I’ll have much more to say about part 2. A careful treatment of the topics of this book has been long overdue. Broughton’s ideas are innovative, engaging, and clearly developed at every stage. The wide-ranging issues addressed remind the reader of why Descartes’s thought is of continuing philosophical interest. Throughout, her interpretation is sensitive to the exegetical concerns of scholars. This rich book deserves the attention of every serious student of Descartes. The present paper is a critical study of part 2—the more ambitious part of this highly ambitious book. I begin with an overview of Broughton’s account. Sections 2–4 contain my analysis. (shrink)

This book shows that atheism need not be only reactionary (against religion and God), but rather provides a clear set of constructive principles to live by that establish atheism as a positive worldview. The book encourages and guides the reader through the process of formulating his or her own set of personal beliefs.

Academic journal publications may be retracted following institutional investigations that confirm allegations of research misconduct. Retraction notices can provide insight into the role institutional investigations play in the decision to retract a publication. Through a content analysis of 7,318 retraction notices published between 1927 and 2019 and indexed by the Web of Science, we found that most retraction notices (73.7%) provided no information about institutional investigations that may have led to retractions. A minority of the retraction notices (26.3%) mentioned an (...) institutional investigation either by journal authorities (12.1%), research performing organizations (10.3%), joint institutions (1.9%), research integrity and ethics governing bodies (1.0%), third-party institutions (0.5%), unspecified institutions (0.4%), or research funding organizations (0.1%). Comparing retraction notices issued before and after the introduction of retraction guidelines by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) in 2009 revealed that those published after the guidelines’ publication were more likely to report investigations by journal authorities. Comparing retraction notices from different disciplines revealed that those from social sciences and the humanities were more likely to disclose investigations by research performing organizations than those from biomedical and natural sciences. Based on these findings, we suggest that the COPE retraction guidelines in the future make it mandatory to disclose in retraction notices institutional investigations leading to retractions. (shrink)

Hedgehog (HH) signaling is a conserved pathway that drives developmental growth and is essential for the formation of most organs. The expression of HH target genes is regulated by a dual switch mechanism where GLI proteins function as bifunctional transcriptional activators (in the presence of HH signaling) and transcriptional repressors (in the absence of HH signaling). This results in a tight control of GLI target gene expression during rapidly changing levels of pathway activity. It has long been presumed that GLI (...) proteins also repress target genes prior to the initial expression of HH in a given tissue. This idea forms the basis for the limb bud pre‐patterning model for regulating digit number. Recent findings indicate that GLI repressor proteins are indeed present prior to HH signaling but contrary to this model, GLI proteins are inert as they do not regulate transcriptional responses or enhancer chromatin modifications at this time. These findings suggest that GLI transcriptional repressor activity is not a default state as assumed, but is itself regulated in an unknown fashion. We discuss these findings and their implications for understanding pre‐patterning, digit regulation, and HH‐driven disease. (shrink)

Locke's treatment of substratum is notoriously difficult. Accordingto one commentator, ‘nothing else in the writings of any philosopher matches the doubleness of attitude of the passages about substratum in Locke's Essay’ (Bennett 1987, 197). The aim of the present paper is to render consistent Locke's seemingly divergent strands on the subject. My efforts are organized around three levels of apparent duplicity. At each level, I argue that the doubleness of attitude in Locke's treatment is merely apparent. I argue further that (...) Locke means to ground an empiricist‐friendly idea of substratum in the customary experience of simple ideas that ‘go constantly together.’. (shrink)

René Descartes (1596-1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of Descartes' famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy.

Interpreters of Locke’s Essay are divided over whether to attribute to him a Representational Theory of Perception (RTP). Those who object to an RTP interpretation cite (among other things) Locke’s Book IV account of sensitive knowledge, contending that the account is incompatible with RTP. The aim of this paper is to rebut this kind of objection – to defend an RTP reading of the relevant Book IV passages. Specifically, I address four influential assumptions (about sensitive knowledge) cited by opponents of (...) an RTP interpretation and argue that in each case the assumption is false. (shrink)

Recent scholarship suggests that Descartes’s effort to establish a truth criterion is not viciously circular ---a fact that invites closer scrutiny of his epistemological program. One of the least well understood features of the project is his deduction of a truth criterion from theistic premises, a demonstration Descartes says he provides in the Fourth Meditation: the alleged proof is not revealed by a casual reading, nor have commentators fared any better; in general, the relevance of the Fourth Meditation has not (...) been duly appreciated. This paper reconstructs the argument of the Fourth Meditation, detailing the steps in the demonstration of the criterion and clarifying its role in the larger program. Surprisingly, Descartes deduces a truth criterion more fundamental than clarity and distinctness; this more fundamental criterion helps explain what are otherwise cryptic epistemological moves in the Sixth Meditation. (shrink)