In this paper, I first explore Hegel’s own distinctions between various types of idealism, most of which he explicitly rejects. I discuss his notions of subjective, transcendental and absolute idealism and present the outlines of his criticisms of the first two as well as the motivation behind his commitment to a version of absolute idealism. In particular, I argue that the latter does not share the defining features of what is now commonly called ‘idealism’, as Hegel neither denies the existence (...) of an external world nor even holds that we can only somehow indirectly infer the truth of propositions about the external world from the structure of some given mental material. I give a basic account of what Hegel’s concept of ‘the absolute idea’ is about, which lies behind his absolute idealism. In this context, I maintain that it is crucial for our understanding of Hegel and of his potential relevance for contemporary metaphysics and epistemology that the absolute idea is precisely not a mental or ‘spiritual’ (geistig) entity. Rather, it amounts to a set of methodological assumptions designed to guarantee the overall intelligibility of what there is, regardless of its actual natural, social or more broadly normative structure. (shrink)

A hugely important book that rediscovers three crucial, but long overlooked themes in German idealism: mythology, madness and laughter.

If there is a duty of justice to contribute to society, which asks individuals to produce a specific amount of goods and services that can be redistributed, we need a decision-procedure to know when we have done our part. This paper analyses and critically assesses the commonly suggested decision-procedure of relying on market prices to measure the value of one’s contribution. It is usually assumed that a high salary indicates that one’s talents are put to good use, but this presupposes (...) both that market prices of labour are correct reflections of supply and demand, and that market prices are correct reflections of social value. I criticise both assumptions and argue that the social value of a contribution cannot simply be a function of its market value, but is also influenced by the principles of justice that support the duty to contribute. Further, the market solution is incapable of valuing contributions that lack market prices, like non-marketised care labour. The market solution thus fails as a decision-procedure under other than special circumstances. This does not mean, however, that we need to give up the idea of a duty to contribute. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 4 Seiten: 792-797.

Der zweite Band der Reihe Philosophische Forschung spannt zwei Kerngebiete der Analytischen Philosophie zusammen: die Semantik und die Ontologie. Was sind die Grundbausteine unserer Ontologie? Wie beziehen wir uns sprachlich bzw. geistig auf sie? Diese und weitere Fragen werden von international renommierten Philosophen aus historischer und systematischer Perspektive diskutiert. Die Beiträge sind in Deutsch und English verfasst. Sie stammen von Christian Beyer, Johannes Brandl, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Dorothea Frede, Rolf George, Gerd Graßhoff, Peter Hacker, Andreas Kemmerling, Edgar Morscher, Kevin Mulligan, Rolf (...) Puster, Richard Schantz, Benjamin Schnieder, Oliver Scholz, Severin Schröder, Peter Simons, Thomas Spitzley, Markus Stepanians, Ralf Stoecker und Daniel von Wachter. (shrink)

Historically, the problem of realism has often been viewed as an extension of the problem of the external world. At the same time, the assumption has often been made that realism is appropriate to some domains, while antirealism is appropriate to others. I here sketch a neutral realism that rejects both of these assumptions and thereby allows us to treat the realism debate independently of the debate over naturalism. The starting point of neutral realism is indeed neutral with respect to (...) any metaphysical commitment to the existence of some single totality of objects or facts, or to any unified all-encompassing domain that might be identified with nature. The resulting view is shown to open up new prospects for the treatment of the actuality of ethical or aesthetic values as well as for the question of the metaphysical relationship between concrete and abstract entities. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s repudiation of any kind of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel argues that transcendent metaphysics is dialectically incoherent because it mistakes its own reflection for an absolute independent of reflection. Hence, it is subject to a reification of philosophical thought. This entails that the relation between logic and philosophy of nature in Hegel must not be interpreted as any kind of emanation. Otherwise, Hegel would himself be subject to his effective critique of transcendent metaphysics.

Je considère la relation entre le « Tournant » (die Kehre) de Heidegger et le réalisme. Je commence par décrire comment la critique heideggerienne du problème du monde extérieur anticipe le nouveau réalisme. J’élabore une reconstruction de l’auto-critique heideggerienne d’Être et temps en montrant comment cette œuvre manifeste un anti-réalisme de plus haut niveau. Ensuite, je montre comment le Tournant heideggerien est motivé par l’inadéquation de ce premier anti-réalisme. Dans sa philosophie de l’événement, Heidegger va vers une ontologie réaliste en (...) développant des concepts tels que celui de destin (Geschick), qu’il comprend comme indépendant de toute attitude humaine. Heidegger en dernier lieu retombe cependant dans un anti-réalisme, parce que l’être reste dépendant de l’implication des êtres humains. Je conclue donc cet essai en exposant brièvement ma propre conception du nouveau réalisme, selon laquelle les objets sont remplis de signification d’une manière qui est indépendante de nos attitudes vis-à-vis d’eux. (shrink)

Since it can reasonably be taken for granted that the Gods of pagan mythology have been products of human cognitive activities, there is an obvious relation between our most general concepts of consciousness and the possibility of an understanding of mythology. In order to hint at the insuffiency of the modern idea of an autonomous subject, which is devoid of any content that cannot be construed as a moment of self-conscious reflection, it is necessary to go back to both ancient (...) greek metaphysics and mythology. Ancient metaphysics does not yet fully articulate the idea of an autonomous subjectivity. Therefore, it is better understood in terms of ontonomy, i.e. metaphysical thought of what there ultimately is. In the paper it is argued that metaphysical ontonomy has its origin in mythological theonomy. The very idea of an emancipation of logos from myth is itself mythological. Hence, self-consciousness may be interpreted as a self-explication of mythology. In the very act of reflecting itself in human consciousness, the “Being” hides its mythological, artistic nature. However, this could not be made intelligible without the help of mythology itself because it is impossible to talk about Ontonomy let alone Theonomy in theoretical propositions. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo presenta una reconstrucción sistemática del esquema de El destino del hombre, de Fichte, a la luz de algunos desarrollos recientes en la metafísica de la intencionalidad. Me propongo mostrar cómo Fichte descubre una doble "verdad del escepticismo". En primer lugar, el escepticis..

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s repudiation of any kind of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel argues that transcendent metaphysics is dialectically incoherent because it mistakes its own reflection for an absolute independent of reflection. Hence, it is subject to a reification of philosophical thought. This entails that the relation between logic and philosophy of nature in Hegel must not be interpreted as any kind of emanation. Otherwise, Hegel would himself be subject to his effective critique of transcendent metaphysics.

In my contribution I argue that globalization cannot be reduced to an economic process that takes place regardless of the participant’s conceptualizations of it. The very process of globalization as such has repercussions in the symbolic order where agents represent the meaning of sociopolitical events to themselves. In particular, this feature becomes manifest when reflecting on the fact that theories of globalization bear all the marks of the phenomenon they aim at characterizing. The global market of ideas, which globalization is, (...) is inscribed in globalization as its symbolic counterpart, without which the phenomenon itself would have been something different. This leads me to the conclusion that an ontology of a plurality of worlds is an apt way of making sense of the profound conceptual changes forced upon social scientists and philosophers alike when it comes to theorizing about globalization. (shrink)

Miles Burnyeat famously argued that there could, in principle, be no idealism in Greek philosophy, because it was not yet prepared to regard the existence of an external world beyond our veil of perception as a serious philosophical problem. I believe that this thesis is historically and systematically false. Burnyeat’s claim is backed up by a short sketch of the most important philosophical systems in Greek philosophy that might seem to contradict his no-idealism view, viz. ancient skepticism and Neo-Platonism. In (...) this paper, I argue against Burnyeat’s view on the basis of a reconstruction of Sextus Empiricus’ epistemological skepticism regarding the external world. Then, I try to show that Plotinus’ idealism and his theory of νοῦς are built on the assumption that metaphysical realism entails the problem of the external world and is, therefore, potentially inconsistent because of its skeptical results. Plotinus shows how skepticism about the external world can be avoided by idealism which can, thus, be seen as an explicit overcoming of epistemological skepticism. This whole train of thought explicitly refers to the problem of an external world. Therefore, Plotinus can be seen as answering the skeptical challenge with an idealistic metaphysic of experience. (shrink)

Miles Burnyeat famously argued that there could, in principle, be no idealism in Greek philosophy, because it was not yet prepared to regard the existence of an external world beyond our veil of perception as a serious philosophical problem. I believe that this thesis is historically and systematically false. Burnyeat's claim is backed up by a short sketch of the most important philosophical systems in Greek philosophy that might seem to contradict his no-idealism view, viz. ancient skepticism and Neo-Platonism. In (...) this paper, I argue against Burnyeat's view on the basis of a reconstruction of Sextus Empiricus' epistemological skepticism regarding the external world. Then, I try to show that Plotinus' idealism and his theory of νος are built on the assumption that metaphysical realism entails the problem of the external world and is, therefore, potentially inconsistent because of its skeptical results. Plotinus shows how skepticism about the external world can be avoided by idealism which can, thus, be seen as an explicit overcoming of epistemological skepticism. This whole train of thought explicitly refers to the problem of an external world. Therefore, Plotinus can be seen as answering the skeptical challenge with an idealistic metaphysic of experience. (shrink)

The focus of AI ethics has recently shifted towards the question of whether and how the use of AI technologies can promote sustainability. This new research question involves discerning the sustainability of AI itself and evaluating AI as a tool to achieve sustainable objectives. This article aims to examine the justifications that one might employ to advocate for promoting sustainable AI. Specifically, it concentrates on a dimension of often disregarded reasons — reasons of “meaning” or “meaningfulness” — as discussed more (...) recently in the “meaning in life” literature of analytic ethics. To proceed, the article first elucidates the working definitions of “sustainable AI” and “meaning in life”, while also setting the criteria for evaluating the plausibility of these reasons. Subsequently, it presents and scrutinises three arguments for the claim that one has reasons to care about sustainable AI from a perspective of meaning: the Meaning-conferring-action Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Harm Argument. In conclusion, this article asserts that only the Harm Argument presents a viable line of reasoning. However, it also outlines the presuppositions of this argument and the additional steps necessary to make it compelling. (shrink)

This paper describes the interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross to support a hospital in Afghanistan during the mid 1990s. We present elements of the interventions introduced in Ghazni, Afghanistan, and consider a number of ethical issues stimulated by this analysis. Ethical challenges arise whenever humanitarian interventions to deal with complex political emergencies are undertaken: among those related to the case study presented are questions concerning: a) whether humanitarian support runs the risk of propping up repressive and (...) irresponsible governments; b) whether humanitarian relief activities can legitimately focus on a narrow range of interventions, or need to broaden to address the range of challenges facing the health system; and c) whether sustainability and quality of care should be routinely considered in such settings. The paper concludes by highlighting the value of case studies, suggesting mechanisms for extending transparency and accountability in humanitarian health interventions, and highlighting the need of contextualising humanitarian work if the interventions are to be successful. (shrink)

The basic human ability to treat quantitative information can be divided into two parts. With proto-arithmetical ability, based on the core cognitive abilities for subitizing and estimation, numerosities can be treated in a limited and/or approximate manner. With arithmetical ability, numerosities are processed (counted, operated on) systematically in a discrete, linear, and unbounded manner. In this paper, I study the theory of enculturation as presented by Menary (2015) as a possible explanation of how we make the move from the proto-arithmetical (...) ability to arithmetic proper. I argue that enculturation based on neural reuse provides a theoretically sound and fruitful framework for explaining this development. However, I show that a comprehensive explanation must be based on valid theoretical distinctions and involve several stages in the development of arithmetical knowledge. I provide an account that meets these challenges and thus leads to a better understanding of the subject of enculturation. (shrink)

Die Hauptthese von Sinn im Leben (SIL) besagt, dass die individuelle Orientierung am Quadrivium des Wahren, Schönen, Guten und Moralischen den Kern dessen ausmacht, was wir als sinnvolles Leben begreifen. Das, was unserem Leben Sinn verleiht, sind unter anderem Handlungen, die darauf abzielen, zum wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt beizutragen, künstlerische Projekte zu verwirklichen, anderen Menschen zu helfen oder die Welt gerechter zu gestalten. In diesem Kontext ist es nicht überraschend, dass ich die wissenschaftliche Suche nach einer philosophisch gerechtfertigten Sinntheorie selbst als sinnstiftend (...) betrachte. Daher bin ich Beatrix Himmelmann und Christoph Horn dankbar dafür, dass sie durch ihre kritischen Nachfragen meine Suche angeregt und vertieft haben, um hoffentlich dadurch zum Diskurs über das sinnvolle Leben beizutragen. Um auf die unterschiedlichen Fragen einzugehen, habe ich meine Antworten in drei Themenbereiche unterteilt. Ich hoffe, damit die meisten strittigen Diskussionspunkte zu adressieren und meine eigene Sichtweise klarer darzustellen. Es sollte selbstverständlich sein, dass dies nur der Beginn einer Diskussion und nicht ihr Ende ist. (shrink)