Este artigo debate a crítica elaborada por Edgard Morin sobre o Discurso do Método de René Descartes e suas consequências, que se estendem desde a modernidade, até os dias atuais, o texto vislumbra ainda novas possibilidades para uma epistemologia contemporânea com o matiz da complexidade.

Neste ensaio, argumenta-se que as diferenças entre a epistemologia da era Gettier e a epistemologia pós-Gettier podem ser amplamente reduzidas a diferenças em metodologia. Faremos uma “reconstrução racional” do modo como fazíamos as coisas então, do modo como fazemos agora e de quais considerações nos levaram a fazer as coisas de modo diferente. Em resumo, durante a era Gettier a metodologia da epistemologia era basicamente o que Chisholm chamou de “particularismo” e Rawls chamou de “o método do (...) equilíbrio reflexivo”. Diversos desenvolvimentos forçaram o abandono dessa metodologia da era Gettier, em favor de diversas novas exigências a uma teoria adequada do conhecimento. Perguntas sobre a natureza da normatividade epistêmica, as relações entre conhecimento e ação, o valor do conhecimento e as dimensões sociais do conhecimento, todas essas se tornaram importantes para julgar entre teorias do conhecimento em competição. Com efeito, isso se mostrou apropriado, uma vez que a metodologia antiga era de fato inadequada. A nova metodologia contempla a maior riqueza e profundidade que vemos na epistemologia hodierna. (shrink)

RESUMO: Pretende-se, com este artigo, analisar como a noção de epistemologias do Sul possibilita pensar também em um ethos sulista, no sentido de que a crise ambiental que assola a civilização tecnológica, crescida sob os auspícios do saber científico moderno, acabou por levar ao maior impasse ético da história humana, aquele que põe em xeque a própria possibilidade de sua existência no futuro. Dessa forma, almeja-se analisar como as comunidades tradicionais representam a concretização fática daquilo que o filósofo alemão Hans (...) Jonas descreveu, em sua proposta de uma ética para a civilização tecnológica: um tipo de vida baseado na frugalidade e na temperança, diante da emergência da crise climática e da urgência de uma nova ética amparada na responsabilidade.: In this article we intend to analyze how the notion of epistemologies of the south enables us to think also of a southern ethos, in the sense that the environmental crisis that plagues the technological civilization, grown under the auspices of modern scientific knowledge ended up leading to the greatest impasse ethics of human history, one that calls into question the very possibility of its existence in the future. In this way, we intend to analyze how traditional communities represent the factual fulfillment of what the German philosopher Hans Jonas described in his proposal for an ethics for technological civilization: a type of life based on frugality and temperance in the face of the emergence of the climate crisis and the urgency of a new ethics based on responsibility. (shrink)

A reflexão que apresento em homenagem ao historiador das Ideias, o filósofo José Esteves Pereira, procura relevar, pela via hermenêutica do seu pensamento epistémico desenvolvido desde os primeiros escritos na década de 1980 até à reflexão de 2016, os núcleos eidéticos que marcam o modo de fazer da História das ideias. Seguindo o seu discurso, procurei mostrar como nele a epistemologia se enquadra no domínio da History of Ideas, ultrapassando-a, nomeadamente no âmbito da multi e da transdisciplinaridade, bem como (...) ao nível da abrangência das linhas de investigação. A sua epistemologia constituiu a pedra de toque da “escola” que na NOVA FCSH iniciou o percurso neste modo de fazer história, permitindo a abertura a formações diversas e complementares do saber filosófico, matriz da ideia que o historiador pesquisa enquanto factum incarnado na temporalidade histórica. (shrink)

Este ensaio teórico, indico a epistemologia do uso de Arley Moreno, apoiada em Kant, Granger e Wittgenstein, como atividade terapêutica que possibilita “curar” concepções educacionais de problemas existentes quando apoiadas em teorias dogmáticas e, assim, analisar a questão do ensino e da aprendizagem a partir de uma de uma nova concepção filosófica. Para atingir esse objetivo, situo a epistemologia do uso de Moreno no campo teórico e abordo seus fundamentos filosóficos, alguns conceitos, a partir dos quais passo (...) às perspectivas educacionais, onde destaco novas reflexões sobre o uso e o contexto, o treino como atividade para a aprendizagem, bem como sobre o papel do professor. (shrink)

Há uma filosofia da diferença que precisa ser mais considerada nos nossos tempos, visto que se opõe à tradição filosófica identitária dos pré-socráticos à atualidade, que se apegou obstinadamente à ideia de identidade, que vislumbra o real, somente através da referência ao idêntico. Nessa perspectiva, os anseios e peculiaridades dos mais diversos movimentos sociais precisam ser ouvidos de modo mais efetivo pela filosofia e pela ciência. Mesmo nas ciências exatas, a teoria não é eterna, quanto mais nas sociais aplicadas, como (...) é na ciência da informação, e consequentemente, na organização do conhecimento. Posto isto, este trabalho tem como objetivo inter-relacionar alguns aspectos históricos da epistemologia geral com as epistemologias feministas, destacando-se a corrente pós-estruturalista. E assim, compreendermos alguns dos seus desdobramentos na organização do conhecimento, a fim de percebermos se ela está disposta a incorporar novas práticas, a partir de reinvindicações de movimentos, como o feminista. Constatamos que além de toda historicidade das relações de poder que tem raízes profundas e muito antigas, há nos dias hodiernos um grupo despreocupado em ratificar novas práticas mais humanizadas e coerentes às várias esferas, dentre as quais está a organização do conhecimento, por questões não só políticas, mas econômicas. (shrink)

A semiótica de Peirce, por sua abrangência e rigor lógico, guarda possibilidades de aplicação que vão além da linguagem e dos processos comunicativos, estendendo-se à ciência como um todo, o que possibilita a organização de uma nova epistemologia. O presente artigo visa analisar as bases dessa proposta epistemológica, verificando seus pressupostos e seu impacto na constituição de uma ciência aberta e voltada para a complexidade.: Peirce's semiotics, in scope and logical rigor, guard application possibilities that go beyond the (...) language and communicative processes, extending to science as a whole, which enables the organization of a new epistemology. This article aims to analyze the basis of this epistemological proposal, checking their assumptions and their impact on the creation of an open and focused science to the complexity. Keywords: sign, science, paradigm. (shrink)

A substância deste artigo consiste na leitura de alguns autores que tratam do mito e do imaginário sem acatar as propostas que se fundamentam no racionalismo cartesiano e no influente positivismo do século XIX. Tais autores, como Eliade e Durand, desenvolveram no século XX um estudo do mito e da imagem com a perspectiva de uma orientação epistemológica que surgira na intenção de se constituir como uma nova abordagem científica, levando o elemento imaginativo e mítico ao encontro da realidade (...) imediata. O argumento principal dessa nova abordagem, que aqui tentamos minimamente apresentar, em torno do mito e da imagem, opõe-se ao dualismo filosófico que coloca em extremos o materialismo e o subjetivismo; dessa forma, tais autores chegaram a uma conclusão que ratifica a retórica da imagem simbólica e reafirma a força diretiva dos mitos, deixando o ditame imaginário de ser uma simples abstração ou engano, uma vez que segue regras mais profundas e é significativamente responsável pela dinâmica social ou pelas produções individuais representativas da cultura, no tempo e no espaço. Palavras-chave: Mito; Imaginário; Nova epistemologia; Século XX. ABSTRACT This article resentats some authors who treat myth and the imaginary without taking into consideration the proposals based on Cartesian rationalism and on 19th-century influent positivism. Those authors, such as Eliade and Durand, developed a study of myth and image in the perspective of an epistemological orientation aimed at elaborating a new scientific approach, promoting the encounter between imaginative and mythical elements and immediate reality. The main point in this approach in terms of myth and image, which we attempt to briefly present here, is opposed to the philosophical dualism that sets materialism and subjectivism distantly apart. Thus, those authors eventually reached a conclusion that ratifies the rhetoric of symbolic image and reaffirms the guiding strength of myths, releasing the imaginary from the restriction of being just an abstraction or a mistake, once it follows much deeper rules and is significantly responsible for social dynamics or for the individual’s culturally representative prductions in time and space. Key words: Myth; The imaginary; New epistemology; 20th century. (shrink)

Trata-se da tradução de um ensaio clássico publicado por Rudolf Carnap na revista Erkenntnis. A tradução é precedida por um texto de apresentação, que situa o ensaio e sua importância no contexto da filosofia contemporânea e na obra de Carnap. No ensaio, Carnap indica as principais características que distinguem o que ele chama de nova lógica (a lógica simbólica matemática derivada das obras de Frege, Peano e Hilbert, entre outros) da lógica filosófica tradicional e explica a sua importância como (...) novo método do filosofar. (shrink)

Neste artigo eu ofereço uma nova abordagem para resolução do problema do regresso epistêmico. Tal problema pode ser considerado um dos mais tradicionais problemas em epistemologia, que nos segue desde a antiguidade. As teses tradicionais que tentam responder a este problema possuem dificuldades ainda não respondidas satisfatoriamente, fato que, inicialmente, serve de motivação para a procura de uma nova resposta. Primeiramente, apresento o problema do regresso epistêmico e as respostas tradicionais oferecidas na sua resolução. Como veremos todas (...) elas possuem problemas sérios que comprometem a plausibilidade das mesmas, a saber, (i) não respondem adequadamente quando é apropriado interromper o regresso e (ii) não especificam ou determinam o grau de justificação requerido para o conhecimento. Em seguida, eu argumentarei em favor da tese que chamarei de Contextualismo Justificacionista, mostrando que ela consegue responder adequadamente (i) e (ii). (shrink)

Hobbes julgava ter encontrado na ciência e na sua metodologia, especifi­camente naquelas ciências que eram consideradas como indubitáveis, o modelo que lhe permitiria construir as bases da nova sociedade. Com isto buscava evadir-se das ambiguidades predominantes no seu tempo, as quais não faziam outra coisa senão manter a sociedade num estado bélico. O presente artigo mostra como Hobbes constrói o seu pensamento político de modo geométrico, como uma ciência demonstrativa, comparando o dever-ser da ciência política com a ordem imperante (...) na matemática. O autor mostra ainda até que ponto Hobbes colocou todos os seus esforços na tarefa de dar um carácter científico à política, já que a sua pretensão era fazer dela uma ciência racional. Numa palavra, o artigo mostra de que modo Hobbes pretendeu elevar o carácter da filosofia política ao de uma verdadeira ciência política.In science – particularly in those sciences that were considered indubitable – and in its methodology, Hobbes thought to have found the pattern which would allow him to build the bases of a new society. In doing so he was trying to avoid the prevailing ambiguities of his time, which did not go beyond keeping society in an ongoing state of war. Accordingly, he builds his thought around the geometrical mode, as a demonstrative science. Thus he compares the “ought be” of political science to the prevailing order of mathematics. Hobbes took great pains to give politics a scientific character, as he tried to make a rational science out of it. By doing this, Hobbes attempted to raise the nature of political philosophy to political science. (shrink)

Este texto apresenta resultados de um levantamento sobre os principais autores que tratam sobre a epistemologia da educação física e suas principais contribuições no desenvolvimento da pesquisa sobre a formação profissional. A síntese apresentada integra a pesquisa: “A produção do conhecimento sobre a formação profissional em educação física: realidade e perspectivas superadoras”. Apontamos que os balanços teóricos das produções científicas da área estão provocando a busca de maiores níveis de qualidade nas novas pesquisas. Concluímos que as avaliações epistemológicas são (...) pertinentes como referência básica para novos estudos sobre a formação profissional no campo de Educação Física, Esporte e Lazer. (shrink)

O I Colóquio Internacional de Epistemologia e Psicologia Genéticas: atualidade da obra de Jean Piaget, organizado pelo Grupo de Estudos de Psicologia e Epistemologia Genética e Educação – GEPEGE –, em setembro de 2009, na Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências da Universidade Estadual Paulista – Unesp, na cidade de Marília –SP, teve o objetivo de promover o encontro de pesquisadores nacionais e estrangeiros, bem como de grupos de estudo e de pesquisa brasileiros, que se dedicam ao estudo da (...) obra de Jean Piaget. Os textos que agora apresentamos neste livro se referem às conferências e às palestras expostas nas mesas-redondas, durante o evento.O I Colóquio Internacional de Epistemologia e Psicologia Genéticas: atualidade da obra de Jean Piaget, organizado pelo Grupo de Estudos de Psicologia e Epistemologia Genética e Educação – GEPEGE –, em setembro de 2009, na Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências da Universidade Estadual Paulista – Unesp, na cidade de Marília –SP, teve o objetivo de promover o encontro de pesquisadores nacionais e estrangeiros, bem como de grupos de estudo e de pesquisa brasileiros, que se dedicam ao estudo da obra de Jean Piaget. Os textos que agora apresentamos neste livro se referem às conferências e às palestras expostas nas mesas-redondas, durante o evento. Com esta obra acreditamos que o I Colóquio confirme o seu propósito básico de divulgar a obra de Jean Piaget e de evidenciar a potência da sua teoria por meio do debate de novas pesquisas científicas e filosóficas. (shrink)

This comprehensive account of the concept and practices of deduction is the first to bring together perspectives from philosophy, history, psychology and cognitive science, and mathematical practice. Catarina Dutilh Novaes draws on all of these perspectives to argue for an overarching conceptualization of deduction as a dialogical practice: deduction has dialogical roots, and these dialogical roots are still largely present both in theories and in practices of deduction. Dutilh Novaes' account also highlights the deeply human and in fact social nature (...) of deduction, as embedded in actual human practices; as such, it presents a highly innovative account of deduction. The book will be of interest to a wide range of readers, from advanced students to senior scholars, and from philosophers to mathematicians and cognitive scientists. (shrink)

A distinction often drawn is one between conservative versus revisionary conceptions of philosophical analysis with respect to commonsensical beliefs and intuitions. This paper offers a comparative investigation of two revisionary methods: Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis as developed by S. Haslanger. It is argued that they have a number of common features, and in particular that they share a crucial political dimension: they both have the potential to serve as instrument for social reform. Indeed, they may produce improved versions of (...) key concepts of everyday life, for example those pertaining to social categories such as gender and race, which in turn may lead to social change. The systematic comparison of these two frameworks offered here, where similarities as well as differences are discussed, is likely to provide useful guidance to practitioners of both approaches, as it will highlight important aspects of each of them that tend to remain implicit and under-theorized in existing applications of these methodologies to specific questions. (shrink)

Os pressupostos teóricos de Ilya Prigogine e a epistemologia crítica – um diálogo de convergências? Resumo: Ter clareza das raízes epistemológicas dos referenciais teóricos utilizados nas pesquisas científicas é primordial para que essas investigações tenham veracidade. Entretanto, alguns autores, por diversos motivos, não explicitam tais informações em suas obras. Surge então a necessidade de se saber onde Ilya Prigogine - físico-químico e filósofo que refletiu sobre a função do tempo, do conhecimento e das leis fundamentais que governam o universo (...) - está epistemologicamente posicionado. Desta forma, a presente investigação buscou analisar, comparar e conectar as perspectivas da epistemologia crítica, uma das mais importantes vertentes da filosofia contemporânea, com as proposições teóricas de Prigogine, buscando encontrar conexões entre elas. Desta pesquisa exploratória de cunho bibliográfico, emergiram da análise de conteúdo as seguintes categorias: conhecimento, história, natureza, utilização e ciências exatas x humanas. Subsidiados pelas discussões aqui construídas, conseguimos constatar que existem intensas convergências entre a epistemologia crítica e a obra de Prigogine. Com isso, confirmamos que o entrelaçamento entre Prigogine e a epistemologia crítica é forte o suficiente para posicioná-lo como epistemólogo com vertente crítica. O arcabouço teórico aqui desenvolvido pode ser utilizado para justificar a utilização das ideias prigoginianas em trabalhos de orientação progressista e também abre espaço para novas pesquisas sobre o posicionamento epistemológico de Prigogine. Palavras-chave: Progressismo; Teoria Crítica; Relações histórico-sociais; Ciência; Natureza. Ilya Prigogine's theoretical assumptions and critical epistemology - a convergence dialogue? Abstract: Having clarity on the epistemological roots of the theoretical frameworks used in scientific research is paramount for these investigations to be true. However, some authors, for various reasons, do not explain the information in their works. The need then arises to know where Ilya Prigogine - physicist-chemist and philosopher who reflected on a function of time, knowledge and the fundamental principles that govern the universe - is epistemologically positioned. In this way, the present research sought to analyze, compare and connect with the perspectives of critical epistemology, one of the most important aspects of contemporary philosophy, with Progogine's theoretical proposals, seeking to find connections between them. From this exploratory research of a bibliographic nature, content analysis emerged as the following categories: knowledge, history, nature, use and exact x human. Supported by the discussions built here, he was able to verify that there are intense convergences between a critical epistemology and a work by Prigogine. With this, we confirm that the intertwining between Prigogine and a critical epistemology is strong or sufficient to position him as an epistemologist with critical criticism. The theoretical framework developed here can be used to justify the use of Prigoginian ideas in works of progressive orientation and also opens space for new research on Prigogine's epistemological positioning. Key-words: Progressiveness; Critical Theory; Historical-Social Relations; Science; Nature. Los supuestos teóricos y la epistemología crítica de Ilya Prigogine: ¿un diálogo de convergência? Resumen: Tener claridad sobre las raíces epistemológicas de los marcos teóricos utilizados en la investigación científica es fundamental para que estas investigaciones sean ciertas. Sin embargo, algunos autores, por diversas razones, no hacen explícita esta información en sus trabajos. Entonces surge la necesidad de saber dónde está posicionado epistemológicamente Ilya Prigogine, físico-químico y filósofo que reflexionó sobre una función del tiempo, el conocimiento y los principios fundamentales que gobiernan el universo. De esta forma, la presente investigación buscó analizar, comparar y conectar con las perspectivas de la epistemología crítica, uno de los aspectos más importantes de la filosofía contemporánea, con las propuestas teóricas de Progogine, buscando encontrar conexiones entre ellas. En esta investigación exploratoria de naturaleza bibliográfica, surgieron las siguientes categorías del análisis de contenido: conocimiento, historia, naturaleza, uso y ciencias humanas exactas. Subsidiado por las discusiones construidas aquí, pudo verificar que hay intensas convergencias entre una epistemología crítica y un trabajo de Prigogine. Con eso, confirmamos que el entrelazamiento entre Prigogine y una epistemología crítica es fuerte o suficiente para posicionarlo como un epistemólogo con crítica crítica. El marco teórico desarrollado aquí puede usarse para justificar el uso de ideas de Prigoginian en trabajos de orientación progresiva y también abre espacio para nuevas investigaciones sobre el posicionamiento epistemológico de Prigogine. Mots-clés: Progresismo ; Teoría Crítica ; Relaciones históricas ; Ciencia ; Naturaleza. Data de registro: 13/04/2020 Data de aceite: 22/09/2021. (shrink)

Formal languages are widely regarded as being above all mathematical objects and as producing a greater level of precision and technical complexity in logical investigations because of this. Yet defining formal languages exclusively in this way offers only a partial and limited explanation of the impact which their use actually has. In this book, Catarina Dutilh Novaes adopts a much wider conception of formal languages so as to investigate more broadly what exactly is going on when theorists put these tools (...) to use. She looks at the history and philosophy of formal languages and focuses on the cognitive impact of formal languages on human reasoning, drawing on their historical development, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. Her wide-ranging study will be valuable for both students and researchers in philosophy, logic, psychology and cognitive and computer science. (shrink)

RESUMO Ernest Sosa é um dos mais importantes filósofos da contemporaneidade. Em plena atividade há mais de cinco décadas, sua obra toma agora a forma de uma teoria da normatividade télica, com a qual Sosa pretende coroar sua procura por uma "knowledgefriendly epistemology". Pretendemos mostrar que esta nova forma teórica instala-se bem no conjunto de sua reflexão epistemológica, procurando Sosa agora, de modo ainda mais preciso, dar resposta, por exemplo, às questões decorrentes do problema de Gettier, da intencionalidade e (...) das modalidades epistêmicas. Entre as novidades de sua atual formulação, analisaremos de modo mais específico neste texto alguns problemas colocados pelo exemplo do arqueiro, ao transformar-se este em um modelo teórico ilustrativo da noção de normatividade télica, bem como alguns aspectos da singular taxonomia do conhecimento feita por Sosa. ABSTRACT Ernest Sosa is one of the most outstanding philosophers in our contemporaneity. Working intensively for over five decades, his work now takes the form of a theory of telic normativity with which he intends to crown his search for a "knowledge friendly epistemology". We intend to show that this new theoretical form is well settled in the whole of his epistemological reflection, being Sosa interested now in providing, more precisely, an answer, for instance, to questions derived from Gettier’s problem, from intentionality, and from epistemic modalities. Among the innovations of his present formulation, we shall analyze, more specifically in this text, some problems expressed through the archer’s example, when it turns to be an illustrative theoretical model of the telic normative notion, as well as some aspects of Sosa’s singular taxonomy of knowledge. (shrink)

The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative for. The claim is that, rather than mono-agent mental processes, logic in fact comprises norms for quite specific situations of multi-agent dialogical interactions, in particular special forms of debates. This reconceptualization is inspired by historical developments in logic and mathematics, in particular the pervasiveness of such (...) dialogical conceptions in the early days of logic in ancient Greece. The multi-agent, dialogical perspective then allows for the formulation of compelling 'bridge principles’ between the relation of logical consequence and dialogical normative principles, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve in a mono-agent setting pertaining exclusively to thought and belief. The upshot is also that the truth-preserving rules of logic generally do not have a primary normative bearing on mono-agent mental processes, and in this sense the paper sides with Harman's critique of the idea that logic has a normative import for thought and belief. (shrink)

This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention.Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed (...) with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate ‘translations' into modern terms.Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics.The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal (...) as schematic; the formal as indifference to particulars; the formal as topic-neutrality; the formal as abstraction from intentional content; the formal as de-semantification. To the second cluster belong the formal as computable; the formal as pertaining to regulative rules; the formal as pertaining to constitutive rules. I analyze each of these eight variations, providing their historical background and raising related philosophical questions. The significance of this work of ?conceptual archeology? is that it may enhance clarity in debates where the notion of the formal plays a prominent role (such as debates where it is expected to play a demarcating role), but where it is oftentimes used equivocally and/or imprecisely. (shrink)

Genealogical anxiety is the worry that the origins of beliefs, once revealed to be influenced by “irrelevant” factors such as personal histories and circumstances of upbringing, will undermine or cast doubt on those beliefs. Discussions on these irrelevant influences in the epistemological literature have so far primarily focused on their contingency. But there is another issue that merits further examination: the fact that epistemic environments condition beliefs suggests that epistemic agency is significantly curtailed. I present a model of belief-forming processes (...) that highlights how networks of attention and trust/distrust influence these processes. The model suggests that, while there is a lot happening beyond our control that shapes what we come to believe, we still retain some degree of agency to the extent that we can rewire our networks of attention and trust/distrust. I conclude that, surprisingly, genealogical anxiety may in fact increase agency insofar as it may encourage critical resistance. (shrink)

This volume, the first dedicated and comprehensive companion to medieval logic, covers both the Latin and the Arabic traditions, and shows that they were in fact sister traditions, which both arose against the background of a Hellenistic heritage and which influenced one another over the centuries. A series of chapters by both established and younger scholars covers the whole period including early and late developments, and offers new insights into this extremely rich period in the history of logic. The volume (...) is divided into two parts, 'Periods and Traditions' and 'Themes', allowing readers to engage with the subject from both historical and more systematic perspectives. It will be a must-read for students and scholars of medieval philosophy, the history of logic, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Explication is the conceptual cornerstone of Carnap’s approach to the methodology of scientific analysis. From a philosophical point of view, it gives rise to a number of questions that need to be addressed, but which do not seem to have been fully addressed by Carnap himself. This paper reconsiders Carnapian explication by comparing it to a different approach: the ‘formalisms as cognitive tools’ conception. The comparison allows us to discuss a number of aspects of the Carnapian methodology, as well as (...) issues pertaining to formalization in general. We start by introducing Carnap’s conception of explication, arguing that there is a tension between his proposed criteria of fruitfulness and similarity; we also argue that his further desideratum of exactness is less crucial than might appear at first. We then bring in the general idea of formalisms as cognitive tools, mainly by discussing the reliability of so-called statistical prediction rules, i.e. simple algorithms used to make predictions across a range of areas. SPRs allow for a concrete instantiation of Carnap’s fruitfulness desideratum, which is arguably the most important desideratum for him. Finally, we elaborate on what we call the ‘paradox of adequate formalization’, which for the Carnapian corresponds to the tension between similarity and fruitfulness. We conclude by noting that formalization is an inherently paradoxical enterprise in general, but one worth engaging in given the ‘cognitive boost’ it affords as a tool for discovery. (shrink)

The thought of François Jullien has made valuable contributions to contemporary philosophy, primarily by enriching the interpretation of certain classic themes through the uniqueness of ancient Chinese wisdom. This approach has revealed aspects that Western philosophy, with its metaphysics focused on being, has overlooked. Among these aspects, Jullien has drawn attention to how a series of resources of what could be called ‘Christian thought’ have remained unthought-of, at least from a philosophical perspective. The central question of this research is whether (...) this Christian logic represents just another resource, among several, that Jullien has utilized in his intellectual work, or if it also constitutes one of the fundamental sources of his own work and the beginnings of possible de-coincidence from the philosophy of being. The conclusions indicate a notable and indispensable presence of these Christian notions in his argumentative proposal, albeit without resorting to faith. This study will begin by reviewing the main theses of the French philosopher and, at the same time, will describe how he has been relating and discussing them with Christian doctrine. (shrink)

Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument (...) with two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by authoritarian politicians. (shrink)

In describing numerosity as “a kind of ersatz number,” Clarke and Beck fail to consider a familiar and compelling definition of numerosity, which conceptualizes numerosity as the cognitive counterpart of the mathematical concept of cardinality; numerosity is the magnitude, whereas number is a scale through which numerosity/cardinality is measured. We argue that these distinctions should be considered.

Overdoing Democracy is an important contribution to the literature on (deliberative) democracy, as it offers a sobering diagnosis of the risks and pitfalls of (overdoing) democracy in the form of internal critique. But the book does not go far enough in its diagnosis because it is not sufficiently critical towards some of the basic assumptions of deliberative conceptions of democracy. In particular, Talisse does not sufficiently attend to the inevitable power struggles in a society, where different groups and individuals must (...) protect their own (often conflicting) interests instead of working towards a ‘common good.’ In this essay, I contrast two different visions of democracy and politics, one based on ideals of consensus and cooperation, and another on the inevitability of perennial conflict. I then briefly present an alternative to deliberative conceptions of democracy that has gained traction in recent decades, known as agonism. Next, I offer a short reconstruction of Talisse’s proposal, and finally I sketch a critical assessment of some of his main claims and assumptions from an agonistic perspective. (shrink)

Can arguments change minds? Philosophers like to think that they can. However, a wealth of empirical evidence suggests that arguments are not very efficient tools to change minds. What to make of the different assessments of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, we must take into account the broader contexts in which arguments occur, in particular the propagation of messages across networks of attention, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content (...) and information, which are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness. Arguments can change minds, but only under conducive, favourable socio-epistemic conditions. (shrink)

In the scholarship on medieval logic and semantics of the last decades, Ockham’s theory of supposition is probably the most extensively studied version of such theories; yet, it seems that we still do not fully understand all its intricacies. In this paper, I focus on a phrase that occurs countless times throughout Ockham’s writings, but in particular in the sections dedicated to supposition in the Summa logicae: the phrase ‘denotatur’. I claim that an adequate understanding of the role of the (...) concept of denotatur within Ockham’s supposition theory shall yield a deeper understanding of the theory as a whole. Here, I first examine a few uses of the term ‘denotatur’ and its variants by other authors. I then turn to Ockham: first I briefly mention some uses of the term in contexts other than his theory of supposition. Following that, I focus on his supposition theory, in particular on how ‘denotatur’ allows him to deal with two crucial puzzles, namely the supposition of empty terms and the supposition of terms in false affirmative propositions. The treatment of these two puzzles suggests that Ockham’s theory of supposition must be understood as a theory chiefly intended for the generation of the meanings of propositions. (shrink)

The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in (...) particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as 'logical hylomorphism as we know it'—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular, this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions. (shrink)

It is well known that reductio ad absurdum arguments raise a number of interesting philosophical questions. What does it mean to assert something with the precise goal of then showing it to be false, i.e. because it leads to absurd conclusions? What kind of absurdity do we obtain? Moreover, in the mathematics education literature number of studies have shown that students find it difficult to truly comprehend the idea of reductio proofs, which indicates the cognitive complexity of these constructions. In (...) this paper, I start by discussing four philosophical issues pertaining to reductio arguments. I then briefly present a dialogical conceptualization of deductive arguments, according to which such arguments are best understood as a dialogue between two participants—Prover and Skeptic. Finally, I argue that many of the philosophical and cognitive difficulties surrounding reductio arguments are dispelled or at least further clarified once one adopts a dialogical perspective. (shrink)

Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines (...) whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them. (shrink)

It is often remarked that first-order Peano Arithmetic is non-categorical but deductively well-behaved, while second-order Peano Arithmetic is categorical but deductively ill-behaved. This suggests that, when it comes to axiomatizations of mathematical theories, expressive power and deductive power may be orthogonal, mutually exclusive desiderata. In this paper, I turn to Hintikka’s :69–90, 1989) distinction between descriptive and deductive approaches in the foundations of mathematics to discuss the implications of this observation for the first-order logic versus second-order logic divide. The descriptive (...) approach is illustrated by Dedekind’s ‘discovery’ of the need for second-order concepts to ensure categoricity in his axiomatization of arithmetic; the deductive approach is illustrated by Frege’s Begriffsschrift project. I argue that, rather than suggesting that any use of logic in the foundations of mathematics is doomed to failure given the impossibility of combining the descriptive approach with the deductive approach, what this apparent predicament in fact indicates is that the first-order versus second-order divide may be too crude to investigate what an adequate axiomatization of arithmetic should look like. I also conclude that, insofar as there are different, equally legitimate projects one may engage in when working on the foundations of mathematics, there is no such thing as the One True Logic for this purpose; different logical systems may be adequate for different projects. (shrink)

In The Enigma of Reason, Mercier and Sperber (M&S) present and defend their interactionist account of reason. In this piece, I discuss briefly the points of agreement between M&S and myself and, more extensively, the points of disagreement, most of which pertain to details of the evolutionary components of their account. I discuss in particular the purported modular nature of reason; their account of myside bias as an optimum/adaptation; and the claim that reason thus construed must be an individual‐level and (...) not a group‐level adaptation. In the final section, I offer brief considerations on an alternative account of reasoning, where the focus is on how sociocultural environments may tune the social production and evaluation of arguments. (shrink)

On the basis of passages from John Buridan's Summula Suppositionibus and Sophismata, E. Karger has reconstructed what could be called the 'Buridanian theory of inferential relations between doubly quantified propositions', presented in her 1993 article 'A theory of immediate inference contained in Buridan's logic'. In the reconstruction, she focused on the syntactical elements of Buridan's theory of modes of personal supposition to extract patterns of formally valid inferences between members of a certain class of basic categorical propositions. The present study (...) aims at offering semantic corroboration 'a proof of soundness' to the inferential relations syntactically identified by E. Karger, by means of the analysis of Buridan's semantic definitions of the modes of personal supposition. The semantic analysis is done with the help of some modern logical concepts, in particular that of the model. In effect, the relations of inference syntactically established are shown to hold also from a semantic point of view, which means thus that this fragment of Buridan's logic can be said to be sound. (shrink)

A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...) to do so is to isolate a number of key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which participants do or do not follow them in reasoning tasks. Another way is to take relevant existing results and check whether a particular formal model predicts these results. The present investigation provides an illustration of the second kind of empirical testing by comparing two formal models for reasoning – namely the non-monotonic logic known as preferential logic; and a particular version of belief revision theories, screened belief revision – against the reasoning phenomenon known as belief bias in the psychology of reasoning literature: human reasoners typically seek to maintain the beliefs they already hold, and conversely to reject contradicting incoming information. The conclusion of our analysis will be that screened belief revision is more empirically adequate with respect to belief bias than preferential logic and non-monotonic logics in general, as what participants seem to be doing is above all a form of belief management on the basis of background knowledge. The upshot is thus that, while it may offer valuable insights into the nature of human reasoning, preferential logic is ultimately inadequate as a formal model of the phenomena in question. (shrink)

A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...) to do so is to isolate a number of key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which participants do or do not follow them in reasoning tasks. Another way is to take relevant existing results and check whether a particular formal model predicts these results. The present investigation provides an illustration of the second kind of empirical testing by comparing two formal models for reasoning – namely the non-monotonic logic known as preferential logic; and a particular version of belief revision theories, screened belief revision – against the reasoning phenomenon known as belief bias in the psychology of reasoning literature: human reasoners typically seek to maintain the beliefs they already hold, and conversely to reject contradicting incoming information. The conclusion of our analysis will be that screened belief revision is more empirically adequate with respect to belief bias than preferential logic and non-monotonic logics in general, as what participants seem to be doing is above all a form of belief management on the basis of background knowledge. The upshot is thus that, while it may offer valuable insights into the nature of human reasoning, preferential logic is ultimately inadequate as a formal model of the phenomena in question. (shrink)

Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the 15th century) and the last 100 years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. (...) I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation. (shrink)

In Bad Beliefs, Levy presents a picture of belief-forming processes according to which, on most matters of significance, we defer to reliable sources by relying extensively on cultural and social cues. Levy conceptualizes the kind of evidence provided by socio-cultural environments as higher-order evidence. But his notion of higher-order evidence seems to differ from those available in the epistemological literature on higher-order evidence, and this calls for a reflection on how exactly social and cultural cues are/count as/provide higher-order evidence. In (...) this paper, I draw on the three-tiered model of epistemic exchange that I have been developing recently, which highlights the centrality of relations of attention and trust in belief-forming processes, to explicate how social and cultural cues provide higher-order evidence. I also argue that Levy’s account fails to sufficiently address the issue of strategic actors who have incentives to pollute epistemic environments for their benefit, and more generally the power struggles, incentives, and competing interests that characterize human sociality. Levy’s attempted reduction of the political to the epistemic ultimately fails, but his account of social and cultural cues as higher-order evidence offers an insightful perspective on epistemic social structures. (shrink)

I argue that the medieval form of dialectical disputation known as obligationes can be viewed as a logical game of consistency maintenance. The game has two participants, Opponent and Respondent. Opponent puts forward a proposition P; Respondent must concede, deny or doubt, on the basis of inferential relations between P and previously accepted or denied propositions, or, in case there is none, on the basis of the common set of beliefs. Respondent loses the game if he concedes a contradictory set (...) of propositions. Opponent loses the game if Respondent is able to maintain consistency during the stipulated period of time. The obligational rules are here formalised by means of familiar notational devices, and the application of some game-theoretical concepts, such as (winning) strategy, moves, motivation, allows for an analysis of some crucial properties of the game. In particular, the primacy of inferential (syntactic) relations over semantic aspects and the dynamic character of obligations are outlined. (shrink)