There is clearly a friendship between art and philosophy. Like with any friendship, the articulation of a certain difference between the two parties is an important part. Art and philosophy are not one and the same thing. However, the difference already fades in the conceptualisation of art and of philosophy. Perhaps what connects art and philosophy is that art generates a singular concept of art, and philosophy its own concept of philosophy. This publication accompanies the exhibition of the same name (...) curated by Marcus Steinweg. (shrink)

"... elegant and provocative... Exhibit[s] a subtle mastery of Heidegger's works." —Review of Metaphysics "... splendidly precise study of Heidegger... to be recommended not only to Heidegger scholars but also to those interested in the question of what philosophical thinking has as its task in the modern technological world." —Religious Studies Review "... indispensable to understanding the later Heidegger." —Choice.

Reiner Schürmann a été appelé « l’un des philosophes majeurs du xx e siècle » et « le continuateur peut-être le plus important d’une pensée de la mystique dans la lignée d’Eckhart et de Heidegger ». Nombre des chercheurs qui connurent Schürmann ou s’intéressent aujourd’hui à son œuvre souscriraient volontiers à de tels jugements, dans la mesure où cette œuvre déploie, comme nulle autre, les conséquences philosophiques et politiques de ce que Maître Eckhart et Heidegger appellent le délaissement ou (...) le laisser être ( Gelassenheit ). Pourtant, presque rien n’a été dévoilé des deux bornes entre lesquelles s’inscrit le cheminement personnel de Schürmann quant au délaissement : sa découverte de ce concept – ou, plus exactement, de ce mode de vie – lors de ses études auprès des dominicains du Saulchoir, et la manière dont le délaissement a pu façonner sa mort trois décennies plus tard. Ces parties précoce et tardive de son œuvre, consacrées au délaissement et à sa mise en acte, sont toutefois cruciales pour comprendre le parcours de Schürmann et donc pour apprécier ce qu’il peut aujourd’hui offrir à la pensée et à l’existence. Si, dans ses œuvres publiées, Schürmann minimise l’importance de l’expérience chrétienne du délaissement, voire critique en elle une figure dérivée et même trompeuse de la Gelassenheit, c’est bien elle qui lui a permis de s’engager sur son chemin de pensée. C’est elle aussi qui, à plus d’un titre, l’attendait au terme de son parcours, lequel apparaît alors comme un cercle faisant retour en soi. (shrink)

As Laudan and Fine show, and Boyd concedes, the attempt to infer the truth of scientific realism from the fact that it putatively provides the best explanation of the instrumental success of science is circular, since what is to be shown is precisely the legitimacy of such abductive inferences. Hacking's "experimental argument for scientific realism about entities" is one of the few arguments for scientific realism that purports to avoid this circularity. We argue that Hacking's argument is as dependent on (...) inference to the best explanation (IBE), and therefore as weak, as the other realist arguments. (shrink)

This is not a work of mine. For some reason, I am unable to remove it from my page. It is a list of Dr. Reiner Schürmann's lecture notes for courses that he taught at the New School for Social Research (aka The New School).

« La déconstruction, c’est la pulvérisation d’un socle spéculatif où la vie trouverait son assise, sa légitimation, sa paix. » Autrefois son élève, Reiner Schürmann identifie dans l’oeuvre de Heidegger un impensé, le principe d’anarchie. Contre cette métaphysique occidentale qu'il s'applique à déconstruire, le penseur de la présence aurait fait de l'être et de l'agir une seule et même question. Et sapé ainsi toute possibilité de définir un fondement rationnel sur lequel construire une philosophie pratique. Que l'agir humain, à (...) l'époque technologique, se trouve privé d'arché : voilà ce que cette étude majeure, lisant Heidegger à rebours, a permis de dévoiler. (shrink)

Meditations, aphorisms, maxims, notes, and comments construct a philosophy of thought congruent with the inconsistency of our reality. Those who continue to think never return to their point of departure. —Inconsistencies These 130 short texts—aphoristic, interlacing, and sometimes perplexing—target a perennial philosophical problem: Our consciousness and our experience of reality are inconsistent, fragmentary, and unstable; God is dead, and our identity as subjects discordant. How can we establish a new mode of thought that does not cling to new gods or (...) the false security of rationality? Marcus Steinweg, as he did in his earlier book The Terror of Evidence, constructs a philosophical position from fragments, maxims, meditations, and notes, formulating a philosophy of thought that expresses and enacts the inconsistency of our reality. Steinweg considers, among other topics, life as a game (“To think is to play because no thought is firmly grounded”); sexuality (“wasteful, contradictory, and contingent”); desire (”Desire has a thousand names; It's earned none of them”); reality (“overdetermined and excessively complex”); and world (“a nonconcept”). He disposes of philosophy in one sentence (“Philosophy is a continual process of its own redefinition.”) but spends multiple pages on “A Tear in Immanence,” invoking Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and others. He describes “Wandering with Foucault” (“Thought entails wandering as well as straying into madness”) and brings together Derrida and Debord. He poses a question: “Why should a cat be more mysterious than a dog?” and later answers one: “Beauty is truth because truth is beauty.” By the end, we have accompanied Steinweg on converging trains of thought. “Thinking means continuing to think,” he writes, adding “But thinking can only pose questions by answering others.” The question of inconsistency? Asked and answered, and asked. (shrink)

Meditations, maxims, aphorisms, notes, and comments address topics that range from pathos and genius to careerism and club sandwiches. Marcus Steinweg's capacity to implicate the other is beautiful, bright, precise, and logical, grounded in everyday questions, which to him are always big questions. —from the foreword by Thomas Hirschhorn The houses of philosophy need not be palaces. —Marcus Steinweg, “House,” The Terror of Evidence This is the first book by the prolific German philosopher Marcus Steinweg to be (...) available in English translation. The Terror of Evidence offers meditations, maxims, aphorisms, notes, and comments—191 texts ranging in length from three words to three pages—the deceptive simplicity of which challenges the reader to think. “Thinking means getting lost again and again,” Steinweg observes. Reality is the ever-broken promise of consistency; “the terror of evidence” arises from the inconsistency before our eyes. Thinking is a means of coping with that inconsistency. Steinweg is known for his collaborations with Thomas Hirschhorn and the lectures and texts he has provided for many of Hirschhorn's projects. This translation of The Terror of Evidence includes a foreword by Hirschhorn written especially for the MIT Press edition. The subjects of these short texts vary widely. (“The table of contents is in itself excessive and ambitious,” writes Hirschhorn.) They include pathos, passivity, genius, resentment, love, horror, catastrophe, and racism. And club sandwiches (specifically, Foucault's love for this American specialty), blow jobs, and dance. Also: “Two Kinds of Obscurantism,” “Putting Words in Spinoza's Mouth,” “Note on Rorty,” and “Doubting Doubt.” The Terror of Evidence can be considered a guidebook to thinking: the daily journey of exploration, the incessant questioning of reality that Steinweg sees as the task of philosophy. (shrink)

The article presents the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD). SKAD, which has been in the process of development since the middle of the 1990s, is now a widely used framework among social scientists in discourse research in the German-speaking area. It links arguments from the social constructionist tradition, following Berger and Luckmann, with assumptions based in symbolic interactionism, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, and the concepts of Michel Foucault. It argues thereby for a consistent theoretical and methodological grounding of (...) a genuine social sciences perspective on discourse interested in the social production, circulation and transformation of knowledge, that is in social relations and politics of knowledge in the so-called ‘knowledge societies’. Distancing itself from Critical Discourse Analysis, Linguistics, Ethnomethodology inspired discourse analysis and the Analysis of Hegemonies, following Laclau and Mouffe, SKAD’s framework has been built up around research questions and concerns located in the social sciences, referring to public discourse and arenas as well as to more specific fields of (scientific, religious, etc.) discursive struggles and controversies around problematizations (Foucault). (shrink)

The text presented here is an edited transcription of a thirteen-page unpublished typescript titled “Heidegger and the Mystical Tradition” by Reiner Schürmann. It dates back to the time following the completion of Schürmann’s book on Meister Eckhart and exhibits the preliminary conception of the former’s famous ‘practical a priori.’ Focusing on the relation between Heidegger’s meditative thinking and a mystical tradition inaugurated by Meister Eckhart, the text retrieves the steps of the latter’s path to Releasement as a practical transformation (...) of existence (Part I). In so doing, it provides a detailed account of Releasement as the condition for a peculiar experience of thinking “in which one fundamental attitude manifests itself throughout an itinerary of human existence and which tends to make this itinerary the very condition for the understanding of truth.” By hinging on Heidegger’s different acceptations of ‘letting-be’—as well as on his verbal understanding of Being as Anwesen (presencing) and Ereignis (appropriation-event)—the text indicates Releasement as the coincidence of Being’s and man’s ways to be and shows how it is in the very “urgency of a new existence and thought” that the proximity between Heidegger and Meister Eckahrt’s mystical tradition comes to the fore. (shrink)

The preceding Preface, which Professor William Frankena had the great kindness to write as an introduction for the readers of the present English translation of my major work, still requires several supplementary com­ ments on my part. Professor Frankena rightly considered it to be an advan­ tage to introduce the English-speaking world to my moral philosophy through its presentation in this book. As an introduction to my moral philosophy, Professor Frankena provided a concise formulation of the fun­ damental ideas of (...) my ethics by quoting from an article I had just recently published. Several points worth mentioning remain. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish the two editions of the text here translated. The first edition was published in 1951 by Anton Hain in Meisenheim am Glan, under the title Pflicht und Neigung (Duty and In­ clination), with the subtitle Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit, erOrtert und neu bestimmt mit besonderem Bezug auf Kant und Schiller (The Fun­ damentals of Morality, Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller). In 1974, a revised and enlarged second edition was published by the same publisher and was entitled Die Grundlagen der Sitt­ Iichkeit (The Fundamentals of Morality). Of this second edition, the first four chapters have been translated in the present volume, along with four more recent essays. (shrink)

Michael Walzer is one of the world's most important political thinkers. In this book, Toby J. Reiner provides the most wide-ranging and up-to-date introduction to his work available. Examining Walzer's multivarious writings and work, Reiner develops an illuminating new interpretation of his thought that no political theorist can afford to miss.

This paper puts forward a theoretical framework for the analysis of expertise and experts in contemporary societies. It argues that while prevailing approaches have come to see expertise in various forms and functions, they tend to neglect the broader historical and societal context, and importantly the relational aspect of expertise. This will be discussed with regard to influential theoretical frameworks, such as laboratory studies, regulatory science, lay expertise, post-normal science, and honest brokers. An alternative framework of expertise is introduced, showing (...) the limitations of existing frameworks and emphasizing one crucial element of all expertise, which is their role in guiding action. (shrink)

(1996). Amphiboles of identity. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 826-831.

ZusammenfassungIn der gegenwärtigen Diskussion um Patientenverfügungen dominieren die Fragen nach deren Reichweite und Verbindlichkeit. Diese bilden, ebenso wie die Kontroverse um diese beiden Themen, die professionsspezifische Sichtweise von Ärzten und Juristen ab. Aus Patientenperspektive jedoch, so die Ergebnisse einer Studie mit 272 Tumorpatienten, stellt sich die Situation anders dar: Hier fungieren Patientenverfügungen vielmehr als Türöffner für eine intensivere Kommunikation mit Ärzten, aber auch mit Angehörigen und mit sich selbst. Die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit spielt demgegenüber nur eine nachgeordnete Rolle.

Today political competition and thus the politicians’ incentives to cater for the citizens’ preferences are weakened by protectionist regulations aiming at the politicians’ origin, their incomes and the ‘production process of politics’. This paper suggests abolishing these regulations and institutionalizing an open, international market for politics. Foreign as well as profit-seeking ‘policy producers’ should be allowed to run directly for office without nominating specific individuals. This enables a policy supplier to become active in several countries and jurisdictions and thus to (...) build up an international reputation for being credible, i.e. of sticking to his promises and not exploiting the voters after election. The deregulation programme strengthens the influence of the weakly organized social groups and the governments' incentives to pursue what is of general interest. (shrink)

Cooperative discourse procedures produce consensual siting proposals for NIMBY-projects-but only if these proposals do not affect the final siting decision. Then, the members of the discourse commissions stay independent and face few incentives to pursue consequentialist interests. However, the more influential discourse procedures become, the stronger the interest groups’ incentives are to take advantage of them. Thus, cooperative discourses turn into competitive, interest-centred procedures whose outcome is rejected by the less influential groups. The evolution of discourse procedures into functionally specialized (...) parliaments or even into FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions) seems worth pursuing. (shrink)

La «Règle d' Or» , qui est bien connue de la Bible (Tob. 4, 15; Matt. 7, 12; Luc. 6, 31) et qui nous invite à prendre pour critère de notre propre conduite envers autrui les modes d'action que nous (ne) voulons (pas) qu' on envisage envers nous-mêmes, est répandue parmi la plupart des peuples civilisés dès le 5e siècle av. J.-Chr. Elle s'articule principalement de trois façons: 1) comme «règle de sympathie» qui nous engage à (ne pas) imposer à (...) autrui ce que nous (ne) voulons (pas) subir nous-mêmes; 2) comme «règle d'authenticité» qui nous demande de nous en tenir nous-mêmes dans nos actes aux exigences que nous imposons à la conduite d'autrui et que, ce faisant, nous reconnaissons comme universellement valables; 3) comme «règle de réciprocité» qui nous engage à agir nous-mêmes envers autrui comme nous désirons qu'on agisse envers nous. Tout homme revendiquant son corps comme n'appartenant qu' à lui seul, cette règle amène par voie de réciprocité à poser le droit naturel d'un chacun à l'intégrité de son corps, à sa liberté, et à ses biens. (shrink)

O ponto de partida do presente artigo consiste na afirmação de que as religiões originárias do Próximo Oriente - Judaísmo, Cristianismo, e Islamismo - contêm em si mesmas inconsistências práticas e teóricas. Mais ainda, o autor afirma que estas religiões estão em contradição umas com as outras no que diz respeito a aspectos teológicos essenciais, para além de que entre elas existe um passado de guerra e de conflito. Ora estas são precisamente as razões pelas quais o autor considera que (...) a credibilidade epistemológica e moral destas religiões foi dramaticamente afectada. Daí o principal objectivo do artigo: contribuir para o esclarecimento do modo como Filosofia e Teologia podem cooperar entre si em ordem a uma mitigação destas deficiências. Nesse sentido, segundo o autor, uma e outra devem abraçar a possibilidade de demonstrar epistemologicamente que os conteúdos da revelação do ponto de vista da razão não são nem demonstráveis nem refutáveis, pois esses conteúdos não são proposições científicas acerca de eventos e processos interiores ao mundo, mas apenas a expressão de uma atitude religiosa em relação ao mundo no seu todo (e em relação a Deus). Nessa medida, diz o autor, nada justifica que atitudes religiosas de fé e de amor sejam caracterizadas como 'irracionais', antes a elas se devendo aplicar a designação de 'a-racional' ou simplesmente de 'transracional. Mais ainda, a Filosofia e a Teologia estão em posição de mostrar de que modo atitudes religiosas fundamentais estão construídas umas sobre as outras. Com efeito, básica em todas as formas de religião é uma atitude em relação ao mundo considerado como um todo, tal como se pode encontrar, por exemplo, no Taoismo ou no Zen-Budismo, de modo que aqui não se encontra qualquer forma de crença numa divindade transcendente; ora é precisamente esta atitude que o autor do artigo designa por 'Religiosidade A'. Como 'Religiosidade B', por outro lado, designa o autor toda a atitude religiosa de fundo que transcende o mundo presente e nos remete para a existência de um Deus único e da sua Revelação, tal como é o caso com o Judaísmo, o Cristianismo, e o Islamismo. Aqui, a tarefa consiste sobretudo em clarificar de forma lógica e conceptual a possibilidade de uma auto-revelação divina bem como da sua aceitabilidade nos termos de uma crença humanamente constituída. Finalmente, o artigo refere também aquela que o autor considera ser a 'Religiosidade C', expressão esta que simplesmente denota aquela atitude em que, com base nas premissas presentes nas formas A e B de religiosidade, somos especificamente remetidos para á Revelação cristã, ou seja, para a experiência nos termos da qual se professa a encarnação de Deus em Jesus de Nazaré e se afirma a sua condição de ser expressão do amor incondicional de Deus para com todos os seres humanos. Na verdade, a natureza incondicional deste amor apresenta-se como um escândalo moral diante da auto-compreensão ética da humanidade. Consequentemente, a incompreensibiliâade deste amor não pode ser senão objecto da revelação divina e da pura fé, únicos modos possíveis de ele se transformar numa possível justificação 'moral' dos seres humanos. /// Starting-point of this article is the fact that the religions originated from the Near East - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - do contain in themselves theoretical and practical inconsistencies. Moreover, they contradict each other in essential theological regards, and they made war upon each other in the past. For these reasons, their epistemological and moral credibility has been dramatically diminished. In this context, the article aims at showing how philosophy and theology might be able to work together in alleviating these deficits. First, they may demonstrate epistemologically that the contents of revelation are neither rationally demonstrable nor refutable because they are not scientific statements upon events and processes within the world but the expression of a religious attitude towards the world as a whole (and towards God). Therefore, such attitudes as religious faith and love shouldn't be designated 'irrational', but rather as arational' or, 'transrational'. Furthermore, philosophy and theology are able to show in what manner fundamental religious attitudes are built upon another: Basic for all higher forms of religion is an attitude towards the world as a whole – as one can find for instance in Daoism or Zen-Buddhism – where there is not yet any belief in a transcendent deity; that attitude is called 'Religiosity A'. So called 'Religiosity B' is a fundamental attitude which transcends this world and refers to a sole God and his revelation as can be found among Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Here, the possibility of divine self-revelation and of its acceptability by human faith has to be clarified logically and conceptually. Finally, 'Religiosity C denotes that attitude which, on the premises of those Religiosities A and B, refers to the specifically Christian revelation which confesses the incarnation of God in Jesus and presents him as the expression of God's unconditional love to all human beings. The unconditionality of this love seems to be a moral scandal to human moral understanding. Therefore, this unconceivable love has to be object of divine revelation and of pure faith so that it might be the basis of all possible 'moral' justification of humankind. (shrink)

Speaking about the influence Husserl had on his early thinking Heidegger later on always referred to Husserl's 'Logische Untersuchungen', emphasizing the attitude of critical distance he had towards the "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology pointed out there. Nevertheless, as shown in this paper, it is evident that in 'Being an Time' Heidegger took over some essential issues from Husserl's later work. But it is also clear that he was also essentially changing their character.

It is often said that knowledge is power, but more often than not relevant knowledge is not used when political decisions are made. This book examines how political decisions relate to scientific knowledge and what factors determine the success of scientific research in influencing policy. The authors take a comparative and historical perspective and refer to well-known theoretical frameworks, but the focus of the book is on three case studies: the discourse of racism, Keynesianism, and climate change. These cases cover (...) a number of countries and different time periods. In all three the authors see a close link between 'knowledge producers' and political decision makers, but show that the effectiveness of the policies varies dramatically. This book will be of interest to scientists, decision makers and scholars alike. (shrink)

Am Leitfaden des Begriffs Malum oeconomicum fuhrt das Buch seine Leser in einen Dialog mit klassischen und zeitgenossischen Denkern uber die abgrundigen Seiten der Wirtschaft und ihre Spiegelungen in der Seele. In der Wirtschaft erscheinen Menschen tendenziell fureinander als blosse Werkzeuge ihrer Bedurfnisbefriedigung, andererseits wird wirtschaftliche Leistung mit Bedeutungen aufgeladen, die an das Heil in der religiosen Sphare gemahnen. Im Kapitalismus der Moderne entfaltet sich aus der Wechselwirkung zwischen einer entfesselten Produktion und den Antrieben des Innenlebens eine zuvor unbekannte Dynamik. (...) Ist diese in liberalen Theorien ein Anlass, das Malum oeconomicum fur verschwunden zu erklaren, so machen Fundamentalkritiker des globalen Kapitalismus geltend, dass dieser illusionare Bedurfnisse weckt und unversohnliche Gegensatze zwischen Arm und Reich hervorruft, deren Sprengkraft jeden sozialen Zusammenhalt gefahrdet. Aus der Lekture von Platon, Aristoteles, Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, John Maynard Keynes, Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse, John Rawls und Amartya Sen ergeben sich Aussichten auf das Wirtschaftsgeschehen, die uber die Engfuhrungen heutiger Debatten weit hinausweisen. (shrink)

With great sympathy for Roman Ingarden and his work, Edith Stein edited his book project The Literary Work Of Art. In the letters she exchanges with him shereflects on relationship between reality and ideality: she writes that those who do not see the world as a reality must be fools. The political events in the 1930s had an impact on phenomenology. While Edmund Husserl dissociates himself from his protégé Martin Heidegger with regard to the content of his philosophy as well (...) as with regard to his ideology, Edith Stein distances herself more and more from the phenomenological method, seeing it as removed from reality, and she eventually become a Carmelite nun. Roman Ingarden, on the other hand, reconsiders interpreting phenomenology as aesthetic theory. Literature and film are being re-analysed in terms of phenomenological mediality and as factors of human communication. (shrink)

This dissertation will use neopragmatist philosophy to examine three important concepts in entrepreneurship theorizing: entrepreneurial uncertainty, venture ideas, and entrepreneurial opportunities. Neopragmatist philosophers typically understand meaning, objectivity, correct reasoning, and knowledge in terms of social-linguistic interpretive practices. Each of these concepts are perspectival in the sense that different people will interpret others as having a different view than themselves on what is actually objective etc.. According to neopragmatists we should analyse these concepts not by trying to identify any sort of (...) criteria which distinguishes which perspectives are actually correct, but instead identify how these concepts are used when people try to interpret the perspectives of others in relation to their own. This dissolves many difficult ontological problems. I will argue that the concepts ‘entrepreneurial uncertainty’, ‘venture ideas’, and ‘entrepreneurial opportunities’ are similarly perspectival and that a neopragmatist lens allows us to fruitfully understand them in terms of how we scholars use them when interpreting the perspectives of the entrepreneurs we are studying—who are in turn interpreting the perspectives of their stakeholders. In chapter two I will argue that Knightian uncertainty seems largely irrelevant to practicing entrepreneurs, and that we should reconceptualize and study entrepreneurial uncertainty as a lack of social justificatory resources. In chapter three I argue that instead of conceptualizing venture ideas as mental representations we should instead conceptualize them in terms of their role in social justificatory practices whereby entrepreneurs have to navigate how their perspectives diverge from their stakeholders. In Chapter four I argue that when an entrepreneurship scholars says that an entrepreneur pursues an opportunity they are not only claiming that the entrepreneur perceives the course of action as favourable, but are themselves taking a stand on its favourability relative to whatever theoretical lens they are using. The question “what are entrepreneurial opportunities” ceases to be an ontological debate and becomes instead a more fruitful debate about how we scholars can bring relevant theoretical insights to the perspectives of practicing entrepreneurs. (shrink)

Mediante esta reflexión sobre las teorías de justicia global, el autor introduce un fundamento normativo de una teoría realista y crítica. Considera que ciertos planteamientos morales sobre el problema de la pobreza severa y el subdesarrollo fallan en la cuestión normativa que ellos necesitan enfocar. Pues, ellos consideran la realidad institucional, económica y política de las injusticias en el contexto global. El autor introduce el principio racional de justificación, para establecer el fundamento normativo de una teoría realista y crítica.