Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical research, the (...) time is ripe for addressing the question of whether the dispositional interpretation of affordance is in accordance with some recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. Following this line, I clarify that there are some cases of affordance-related effects that neither require the actualization of an action, nor the presence of an action-related property bearer in the environment, and that the identification of affordance with physical properties provides only a partial explanation of the wide range of affordance-related effects. Accordingly, I argue in favor of a more general account of affordance perception based on the ability to directly detect perceptual patterns in the environment. (shrink)

Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent’s body and the environment. Contrary to Radical Enactivism, I argue that the intensional properties of cognition cannot be ignored, and that the way in which an agent represents the world has consequences on the explanation of basic (...) sensorimotor abilities. To support this claim, I show that the perception of visual affordances is not segregated from higher forms of cognition; rather, it is modulated by the agent’s ability to recognize the semantic identity of the visual target. Accordingly, since the semantic recognition of an object involves a way of representing it under a certain description, it can be inferred that the perception of visual affordances cannot be accounted for without considering the intensional properties of cognition. This poses an explanatory issue for Radical Enactivism. (shrink)

Antropologia do espaço, de Filomena Silvano, é umlivro comvocaçãomarcadamente didáctica, mas que constitui uma notável síntese (deveríamos dizer ummapa?) de uma disciplina (a antropologia) que tem vindo a ganhar (pelos motivos que Jameson enunciava) uma.

The last years’ achievements in neuroscience are key for a philosophical analysis focused on the mind-body problem, such as the phenomenological approach.The digital evolution, on the one hand, faces us with the interaction between the world of reality and the world of possibility. This means more than a mere coexistence between these two dimensions. Rather, a concrete feedback occurs among them, and this brings out unprecedented and unavoidable issues with regard to perceptual processes. On the other hand, the digital evolution (...) allows for analyzing data and monitoring environmental systems, thus reasoning in a predictive way, anticipating problems, and checking ex ante their evolution and outcomes.Neuroscience, for its part, with the experiments of Libet and their subsequent interpretations, has highlighted a consciousness of the unconscious made of ballistic and automatic processes, which constitutes the starting phase of our decisions and actions. This further confirmed that sequential and linear thinking is unable to address the brain-environment relationship that is key in understanding any cognitive process.This analysis confirms the relevance of different aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology. There is, however, a “but,” which significantly reduces the extent of adherence to his point of view. Husserl assumed that an implicit horizon precedes or accompanies the acts of conscience. This is the material, impressional, passive, receptive, and, in some way, tacit dimension, strictly connected to the issue of genesis, i.e. the process of constitution of the analyzed entities. Thus, he drew a clear dividing line between this dimension and the phases of the self-controlling, vigilant conscience and its activity. In fact, his approach to the phenomenological problem is mainly oriented toward these phases. (shrink)

My work is an epistemological analysis that concern some philosophical questions about scientific realism. Central in these pages is the defence of a distinction between methaphisical and empirical approach to the notion of reality. In this direction I have considered some aspects of contemporary debate, specially the so called “Inference to the Best Explanation”, and a constitutive theory of empirical objectivity.

Riassunto: Il dibattito in filosofia della mente è caratterizzato dal crescente interesse per nuove forme di eliminativismo, note con il nome di teorie enattiviste radicali della mente. Secondo la concezione enattivista radicale, il contenuto intenzionale di uno stato mentale è empiricamente sottodeterminato, pertanto non può essere utilizzato quale elemento di una spiegazione naturalistica del comportamento. Tuttavia, sebbene il riferimento ai contenuti intenzionali non sia conciliabile con il naturalismo ontologico, esso è invece compatibile con una forma di naturalismo metodologico. Seguendo l’analisi (...) semantica proposta da Carnap per i termini teorici, è possibile concepire uno stato mentale come un veicolo simbolico il cui significato è stabilito per mezzo di osservazioni e scelte convenzionali. Attraverso un caso di studio riguardante le funzioni cognitive della corteccia somatosensoriale, l’articolo fornisce le indicazioni programmatiche per un’interpretazione delle spiegazioni intenzionali del comportamento in accordo con la metodologia delle scienze naturali. Parole chiave: Contenuto mentale; Enattivismo radicale; Intenzionalità; Naturalismo; Teleosemantica; Teoria della spiegazione T he Methodological Status of Intentional Contents: The philosophy of mind debate is characterized by increasing consensus regarding a new type of eliminativism, also known as the radical enactivist theory of mind. According to the radical enactivist view, the intentional content of a mental state is empirically undetermined, therefore it cannot figure as part of a naturalistic explanation of behavior. However, although the notion of intentional content is not compatible with any form of ontological naturalism, it is compatible with a form of methodological naturalism. Following Carnap’s semantic analysis of theoretical concepts, it is possible to conceive of intentional mental states as a symbolic vehicles whose meaning can be conventionally established on the basis of empirical observation. In order to support this claim, I refer to a case study on the cognitive functions of somatosensory cortex. This article provides arguments for building an intentional explanation of behavior based on methodological approaches in the natural sciences. Keywords: Mental Content; Radical Enactivism; Intentionality; Naturalism; Teleosemantics; Theory of Explanation. (shrink)

It is well known that common objects in the environment can evoke possibilities of action, but what about their bi-dimensional representation? Do pictures or paintings that represent action-related objects evoke the same possibilities of actions of the objects that they represent? In contemporary cognitive science, there are two contrasting views on this issue. On the one hand, the ecological-dispositional approach to perception supports the idea that viewing depicted objects as endowed with the potential for action is nothing but an illusion. (...) On the other hand, recent findings show that our motor system is activated by the perception of both real and depicted action-related objects, and this activation plays a functional role in planning motor acts. A broad analysis reveals that the activation of the motor system during perceptual tasks plays a crucial rule in processing the practical meaning of the concrete objects and of the abstract representations of them. This evidence has consequences to our understanding of the way we experience pictures and paintings. (shrink)

In the studies about the origin of G'L which can be translated as “to redeem” or “to stain”, “to contaminate”, it is usually deepened in the Deutero-Isaiah as well as in the Trito-Isaiah. This article intends to do an exegetical analysis of the text, through the Historical-Critical-Literary Method, by describing God as the “redeemer of His people” and as a warrior whose powerful hand will bring justice, and notwithstanding the promise of sending a redeemer to save the people and to (...) establish a new covenant, there will be destruction and calamity beforehand. Those divine interventions are due to the lack of a mediation which can ensure righteousness and justice. (shrink)

Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true (...) or false. Second, that the ontological use of the Ideal Language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the Ideal Language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation. (shrink)