Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are quickly gaining ground in healthcare and clinical decision-making. However, it is still unclear in what way AI can or should support decision-making that is based on incapacitated patients’ values and goals of care, which often requires input from clinicians and loved ones. Although the use of algorithms to predict patients’ most likely preferred treatment has been discussed in the medical ethics literature, no example has been realised in clinical practice. This is due, arguably, to the (...) lack of a structured approach to the epistemological, ethical and pragmatic challenges arising from the design and use of such algorithms. The present paper offers a new perspective on the problem by suggesting that preference predicting AIs be viewed as sociotechnical systems with distinctive life-cycles. We explore how both known and novel challenges map onto the different stages of development, highlighting interdisciplinary strategies for their resolution. (shrink)

Multidisciplinary studies indicate that auditory hallucinations may arise from speech perception neurocircuitry without disrupted theory of mind capacities. Computer simulations of excessive pruning in speech perception neural networks provide a model for these hallucinations and demonstrate that connectivity reductions just below a “psychotogenic threshold” enhance information processing. These data suggest a process whereby vulnerability to schizophrenia is maintained in the human population despite reproductive disadvantages of this illness.

La délicate mise en rapport de la philosophie nietzschéenne et de l’économie est d’une pratique récente. Dans ce contexte, cet article est motivé par l’introduction du traitement nietzschéen de la « destruction créatrice » en économie et la manière de justifier philosophiquement cette référence. Pour cela, nous mettons en concurrence les interprétations évolutionnistes et nietzschéennes de la destruction créatrice. Ces deux métaphores nous semblent difficilement conciliables et nous avançons des arguments en faveur de la volonté de puissance, contre la lutte (...) pour la vie, pour mieux interpréter le mécanisme de destruction créatrice. (shrink)

Cet article s’inscrit dans la lignée de précédents travaux visant à rapprocher l’entrepreneur schumpétérien et le surhumain nietzschéen. Les deux partagent une créativité pouvant s’interpréter comme l’extériorisation d’un surcroît de force qui, dans l’optique nietzschéenne, s’assimile à la source extra-morale de l’accroissement de la vie. Reste à savoir si le cadre dans lequel ils évoluent est le même. Au-delà d’une approche historique du cycle de la conjoncture, notre hypothèse est que l’approche philosophique d’un cycle du devenir s’avère être féconde pour (...) une interprétation enrichie du cycle de la conjoncture, complétant et prolongeant ainsi notre interprétation du surhumain et de l’entrepreneur. (shrink)

In our recent article ‘The Ethics of the Algorithmic Prediction of Goal of Care Preferences: From Theory to Practice’1, we aimed to ignite a critical discussion on why and how to design artificial intelligence (AI) systems assisting clinicians and next-of-kin by predicting goal of care preferences for incapacitated patients. Here, we would like to thank the commentators for their valuable responses to our work. We identified three core themes in their commentaries: (1) the risks of AI paternalism, (2) worries about (...) attacks to our humanity stemming from the use of AI and (3) the possibility of designing AI systems for more relevant use cases than the one we consider in our work. We shall focus on these themes, leaving aside some other interesting suggestions, given the limited space available for our response. Diaz Milian and Bhattacharyya discuss the risks of AI paternalism highlighting how the use of an AI to predict goal of care preferences may incentivise clinicians and surrogates to shift the burden of decision making to the machine.2 In particular, ‘[i]f the AI-generated response is given priority above the other agents’2 and the AI makes decisions autonomously, then ‘AI paternalism’ would emerge.2 Against this possibility, the authors suggest four safeguards to be implemented in the AI life-cycle.2 These are procedures that may improve the trustworthiness of the AI and human control over it.3 We agree that it is important …. (shrink)

In “The Bioethics of Environmental Injustice: Ethical, Legal, and Clinical Implications of Unhealthy Environments,” Ray and Cooper (2024) initiate needed discourse on environmental justice and the...

In the past decade, the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) have seen unprecedented developments that raise human-machine interactions (HMI) to the next level.Smart machines, i.e., machines endowed with artificially intelligent systems, have lost their character as mere instruments. This, at least, seems to be the case if one considers how humans experience their interactions with them. Smart machines are construed to serve complex functions involving increasing degrees of freedom, and they generate solutions not fully anticipated by humans. (...) Consequently, their performances show a touch of action and even autonomy. HMI is therefore often described as a sort of “cooperation” rather than as a mere application of a tool. Some authors even go as far as subsuming cooperation with smart machines under the label ofpartnership, akin to cooperation between human agents sharing a common goal. In this paper, we explore how far the notion of shared agency and partnership can take us in our understanding of human interaction with smart machines. Discussing different topoi related to partnerships in general, we suggest that different kinds of “partnership” depending on the form of interaction between agents need to be kept apart. Building upon these discussions, we propose a tentative taxonomy of different kinds of HMI distinguishing coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and social partnership. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die Überwindung des mathematischen Erkenntnisideals" verfügbar.

In clinical practice, decision-making is not performed by individual knowers but by an assemblage of people and instruments in which no one member has full access to every piece of evidence. This is due to decision making teams consisting of members with different kinds of expertise, as well as to organisational and time constraints. This raises important questions for the epistemology of medicine, which is inherently social in this kind of setting, and implies epistemic dependence on others. Trust in these (...) contexts is a highly complex social practice, involving different forms of relationships between trust and reasons for trust: based on reasons, and not based on reasons; based on reasons that are easily accessible to reflection and others that are not. In this paper, we focus on what it means to have reasons to trust colleagues in an established clinical team, collectively supporting or carrying out every day clinical decision-making. We show two important points about these reasons, firstly, they are not sought or given in advance of a situation of epistemic dependence, but are established within these situations; secondly they are implicit in the sense of being contained or nested within other actions that are not directly about trusting another person. The processes of establishing these reasons are directly about accomplishing a task, and indirectly about trusting someone else’s expertise or competence. These processes establish a space of reasons within which what it means to have reasons for trust, or not, gains a meaning and traction in these team-work settings. Based on a qualitative study of decision-making in image assisted diagnosis and treatment of a complex disease called pulmonary hypertension, we show how an intersubjective framework, or ‘space of reasons’ is established through team members forging together a common way of identifying and dealing with evidence. In dealing with images as a central diagnostic tool, this also involves a common way of looking at the images, a common mode or style of perception. These frameworks are developed through many iterations of adjusting and calibrating interpretations in relation to those of others, establishing what counts as evidence, and ranking different kinds of evidence. Implicit trust is at work throughout this process. Trusting the expertise of others in clinical decision-making teams occurs while the members of the team are busy on other tasks, most importantly, building up a framework of common modes of seeing, and common ways of identifying and assessing evidence emerge. It is only in this way that trusting or mistrusting becomes meaningful in these contexts, and that a framework for epistemic dependence is established. (shrink)

This paper is about rewilding and the tensions it involves. Rewilding is a relatively novel approach to nature conservation, which seeks to be proactive and ambitious in the face of continuing environmental decline. Whilst definitions of rewilding place a strong emphasis on non-human agency, it is an inescapably human aspiration resulting in a range of social conflicts. The paper focuses on the case study of the Cambrian Wildwood project in Mid Wales (UK), evaluating the ways in which debate and strategic (...) action to advance rewilding is proceeding, assessing the extent to which compromise and learning has occurred amongst advocates. As such, we provide an important addition to the field, by detailing how conflicts play out over time and how actors' positioning and approach shifts, and why. In this case, tempers have flared around the threat that rewilding is seen to pose to resident farming communities. Tensions discussed include the differing social constructions of landscape and nature involved; the distribution of impacts on different stakeholders; and the relative power of different actors to make decisions and gain representation. Responding to these, the paper outlines how rewilding advocates have sought to advance a more peopled and culturally responsive vision, which seeks to champion sustainable livelihood strategies. The changes in approach detailed demonstrate a reflexive stance from rewilders, which suggests that learning and adaptation can occur. Nonetheless, caution is expressed regarding the extent to which rewilding can truly advance inclusive opportunities for rural change, given a continued return amongst stakeholders to exclusionary narratives of belonging and authenticity, suggesting substantive difficulty in moving beyond longstanding concerns over identity and the re-imagination of place. Rewilding, it would seem, is about who we think we are and how we co-constitute our sense of self. We, therefore, close by arguing that tactics and politicking can only have so much bearing, tensions over rewilding are unavoidably emotional. (shrink)

We investigate the rural resistance of one of the world’s largest social movements, La Via Campesina, as a powerful enactment of radical democracy in practice. More than this, the paper describes how the movement challenges the framework of radical democracy by pointing towards the ethical importance of recognizing the relationship of human dignity with nature and considering ethico-political values inherent in the peasants’ way of living. Their resistance is a rejection of depoliticizing silencing, and their everyday life is a commitment (...) to a “more than human” radical democracy in its most radical sense, as they are always already “in parliament with land”. We conclude by outlining a perspective which is both more than radical and more democratic, considering those who have not yet been heard but also that which, in the light of radical democracy, has never been counted as part of the political body at all: nature. (shrink)

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, dispositionalism is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...) This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to elucidate the very foundations of science. In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the state of the debate and explain the twofold aim of the present collection of essays which is (i) to explore the ontological commitments of dispositionalism and (ii) to discuss these against the background of latest scientific research, by bringing together perspectives from both metaphysics and the philosophy of science. I finally provide a summary of this intellectual journey. (shrink)

We used attractiveness judgements as a proxy to visualize the ideal female and male body for male and female participants and investigated how individual differences in the internalization of cultural ideals influence these representations. In the first of two studies, male and female participants judged the attractiveness of 242 male and female computer-generated bodies which varied independently in muscle and adipose. This allowed us to map changes in attractiveness across the complete body composition space, revealing single peaks for the attractiveness (...) of both men and women. In the second study, we asked our participants to choose the most attractive male and female bodies in a method of adjustment task in which they could independently vary muscle and adipose to create the most attractive body. We asked whether individual differences in internalization of cultural ideals, drive for muscularity, eating disorder symptomatology and depressive symptoms could systematically shift the location of peak attractiveness in body composition space. We found a clear preference by both genders for a male body with high muscle and low adipose, and a toned, low adipose female body. The degree of internalization of cultural ideals predicted large individual differences in the composition of the most attractive bodies. (shrink)

Was ist das Spezifische der Marx'schen Kritik? Die zahlreichen Versuche, die eine Kritik bei Marx zu identifizieren, ließen bislang oft das verbindende Moment der unterschiedlichen Sprachen der Kritik in seinem Werk außer Acht: ihren politischen Einsatz. Man muss diesen Einsatz als konstitutiv für den Modus seiner Gesellschaftskritik begreifen, den Marx mit dem Bild einer »Kritik im Handgemenge« einfing. Die Beiträge des Bandes binden auf neue Weise Marx' Kritik wieder stärker an deren konkrete politische Situierung und erörtern die Bedeutung des 'Handgemenges' (...) für die Entwicklung seines Denkens - nicht zuletzt um hier auch ein Grundmerkmal moderner Gesellschaftskritik überhaupt auszuweisen. (shrink)

L’avènement de la biomédecine moderne est souvent considéré comme une avancée majeure. Cependant, l’ humanisme médical remet en question l’idée que la biomédecine actuelle et son système de santé soient (encore) suffisamment tournés vers des valeurs humanistes telles que la dignité, l’autonomie, l’individualité, l’empathie ou l’humilité. À côté de la biomédecine, il existe cependant de nombreuses approches relevant de la médecine non conventionnelle qui affirment fréquemment être davantage holistiques ou empathiques que la biomédecine. Cette contribution souhaite donc examiner si la (...) médecine dite complémentaire, alternative et intégrative (MCAI) pourrait mieux correspondre aux valeurs attribuées à l’humanisme médical que la biomédecine. (shrink)

Lors d’une table ronde organisée à KADIST le 10 décembre 2021 intitulée After Àsìkò. Artistic and Curatorial Practices in Africa, les commissaires Iheanyi Onwuegbucha et Aude Christel Mgba ont pu mettre en parallèle différentes initiatives pédagogiques du continent africain, comme Àsìkò ou encore Artbakery créé par l’artiste camerounais Goddy Leye. Dominique Malaquais a fréquenté ses différents lieux, en son hommage voici l’histoire d’ Àsìkò, une initiative curatoriale et pédagogique fondée au CCA, Lagos par Bisi Silva en 2010.

Thought experiments play a role in science and in some central parts of contemporary philosophy. They used to play a larger role in philosophy of science, but have been largely abandoned as part of the field’s “practice turn”. This chapter discusses possible roles for thought experimentation within a practice-oriented philosophy of science. Some of these roles are uncontroversial, such as exemplification and aiding discovery. A more controversial role is the reliance on thought experiments to justify philosophical claims. It is proposed (...) that if we adopt an underlying empiricist view of concepts, then thought experiments can be seen as affording us contact with scientific practice, despite their seemingly a priori character. The advantages and drawbacks of thought experiments are discussed via comparison with case studies, on the one, and simulations on the other hand. The chapter closes with some remarks on how to combine thought experiments with other methods. (shrink)

La catégorie de l'hospitalité ne constitue pas une nouvelle perspective de l'éthique contemporaine; c'est plutôt l'une des plus vieilles notions éthiques que l'histoire de l'humanité nous ait données.Conscient de cette particularité, le philosophe espagnol Daniel Innerarity propose un repositionnement anthropologique de l'hospitalité qui ébranle sérieusement les assises théoriques des perspectives classiques de l'identité, de la subjectivité, de la conscience de l'espace et, particulièrement, du temps. Daniel Innerarity repose la question de l'hospitalité dans une époque déboussolée qui est la nôtre. Il (...) introduit l'idée d'une hospitalité à partir de ce que nous pourrions nommer " une ouverture à l'impromptu ". Une ouverture à la contingence, une éthique de la réception de la fortune, l'hospitalité comme une occasion d'accueillir ce qui arrive sans notre consentement, comme une occasion qui nous est offerte. Pour Daniel Innerarity, notre monde " sans centre " et " sans environs ", tiraillé entre " les impératifs de la modernisation et de la croissance et les exigences d'une éthique de la conservation, de la prudence et de la protection ", nous invite, avant tout, à acquérir de nouvelles attitudes et aptitudes interprétatives. Ce livre n'a pas pour objet l'étude exégétique de l'essai Ethique de l'hospitalité de Daniel Innerarity, mais cherche plutôt à l'inscrire dans un jeu de dialogues avec des chercheurs de différents horizons qui ont comme sens commun de faire résonner le concept d'hospitalité dans leurs perspectives distinctes. Ce jeu de dialogues se termine sur un texte inéditde Daniel Innerarity sur l'hospitalité. (shrink)

In the struggle for breathable air amid pollution and climate change, both resistance and inspiration can be found in ‘atmospheric care practices’ (Vine 2019). In this article, I embed these practices in a more than human political approach (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017). More than human atmospheric care practices work to undo toxic harm both on a material and social level while intimately involving human beings with more than human worlds. In so doing, they are demonstrative of different kinds of (...) agency and political activity that open up alternative ways of relating and responding to climate change. (shrink)

This article argues that the impact of digital images on visual culture can only be understood if the specific materiality of these artefacts is taken into account. An analysis of the famous distinguishes five material layers, including making, coding, forensic and epistemic materiality, as well as the notion of trans-materiality. Each layer is developed in relation to theoretical concepts of materiality in media studies, art history, computer science, and anthropology.

Le contenu et la portée de l'ouvrage se déploient sur trois plans. Alliant outils d'histoire intellectuelle et approche philosophique, cet ouvrage jette tout d'abord un éclairage nouveau sur le problème de l'historicisme du point de vue de sa dimension pratique et de son rapport avec la philosophie politique au cours des années 1930 de même que durant la période de l'après-guerre. L'approche novatrice du livre conjugue épistémologie de l'histoire et théorie politique et permet de mettre en contexte la mobilisation politique (...) et idéologique du concept d'historicisme et ses corollaires, le relativisme et le nihilisme. La seconde partie du manuscrit traite plus directement d'une question centrale en philosophie politique, celle des fondements de la rationalité politique. À partir d'une réflexion sur la réception de la philosophie des valeurs de Max Weber, l'ouvrage aborde la question des possibilités et limites du jugement politique en temps de crise. Ensuite, cet ouvrage examine une dimension peu étudiée des oeuvres respectives de Leo Strauss et Raymond Aron. D'un point de vue historiographique, le livre montre que la reconstruction du dialogue amorcé entre les deux penseurs (à partir de sources d'archives incluant correspondances, transcriptions de séminaires et textes inédits) permet de jeter une lumière nouvelle sur la façon dont on peut conceptualiser l'utilité de l'histoire pour la philosophie politique. Finalement, dans le champ disciplinaire de la philosophie politique contemporaine, la figure de Raymond Aron est souvent peu considérée. L'une des visées de ce manuscrit est de montrer la pertinence de la philosophie aronienne du jugement et de la responsabilité politique. (shrink)

La médiation, en tant que mode de prévention ou de résolution des litiges, a le vent en poupe. Toutefois, les imprécisions successives du législateur n’ont pas permis d’en cerner clairement les contours. De fait, cette notion se décline aujourd’hui selon des modes pluriels. À cet égard, deux pratiques médiatives nées de l’activité de la DGFiP illustrent bien la diversité des expressions de ce phénomène. Il s’agit du Médiateur du MINEF et de la cellule de médiation sociale mise en place par (...) la Direction générale des finances publiques. Dans ce contexte de flou terminologique, il convient d’interroger la qualité de ces pratiques se revendiquant de la médiation. (shrink)

Can mental causation be naturalised without being eliminated? Thomas Buchheim argues that it can, proposing a neo-Aristotelian account dubbed "Horizontal Dualism". In this paper I assess this proposal. This article is part of a series of articles commenting on Thomas Buchheim's target article "Neuronenfeuer und seelische Tat. Ein neoaristotelischer Vorschlag zum Verständnis mentaler Kausalität", published in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119,2 (2012), 332-346. The article was reprinted in: Mentale Verursachung [Mental Causation], ed. by Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, (Jahrbuch-Kontroversen 1), Freiburg: Alber, 2014.

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...) This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science. The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage collectif porte sur la place qu’occupent les femmes dans différentes parties de l’Empire romain d’Orient hellénophone. Il résulte de trois rencontres scientifiques organisées dans le cadre du programme GRECS d’ANIHMA entre 2012 et 2014. Comme l’explique Sophie Lalanne dans son introduction, le volume ne reflète que partiellement le contenu de ces rencontres ; l’éditrice formule d’ailleurs des réflexions intéressantes sur la place de l’histoire des femmes et du genre dans le domain...

Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” Call this idea the “Non-Akrasia Constraint”. Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act, an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by her evidence. The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic. In a number of recent papers, the (...) Non-Akrasia Constraint has been called into question. The goal of this paper is to defend it... for the most part. (shrink)

While scientific pluralism enjoys widespread popularity within the philosophy of science, a related position, epistemic relativism, does not have much traction. Defenders of scientific pluralism, however, dread the question of whether scientific pluralism entails epistemic relativism. It is often argued that if a scientific pluralist accepts epistemic relativism, she will be unable to pass judgment because she believes that “anything goes”. In this article, I will show this concern to be unnecessary. I will also argue that common strategies to differentiate (...) relativism and pluralism fail. Building upon this analysis, I will propose a new way of looking at both positions’ relations. This article aims to understand what explains the friction between scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism. I will demonstrate that conceptualizing both epistemic relativism and scientific pluralism as “stances” sheds better light on their relation and demonstrates that it is, in principle, possible to support both positions at the same time. Preferred policies and levels of analysis, however, cause friction in practice. (shrink)

Believing rationally is epistemically valuable, or so we tend to think. It’s something we strive for in our own beliefs, and we criticize others for falling short of it. We theorize about rationality, in part, because we want to be rational. But why? I argue that how we answer this question depends on how permissive our theory of rationality is. Impermissive and extremely permissive views can give good answers; moderately permissive views cannot.