The topic of abortion was in the limelight again in Dobbs v Jackson, where the US Supreme Court overturned the decision of Roe v Wade, ‘which guaranteed women and pregnant people a constitutional right to abortion’. While not bound by the judgment, this gives us an opportunity to reflect on the current law in South Africa which regulates the termination of pregnancy. The primary piece of legislation which governs abortion is the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act. Section 2 of (...) the Act lists the grounds under which one may lawfully terminate a pregnancy. One of those grounds relates to the period of the 13th up until the 20th week of the gestation period, and states that if a medical practitioner, after consultation with the pregnant woman, is of the opinion that the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the woman, then the pregnancy may be lawfully terminated. The question is: What exactly is meant by ‘social grounds’? This article considers this aspect from a legal perspective and attempts to provide clarity on the issue, in the hope that this will be of assistance to medical practitioners who are concerned about the outcome of their actions, when assisting persons in this position. (shrink)

This article examines the technique and legality of induced abortion of one or more fetuses in a multiple pregnancy, where the aim is the destruction of some but not all of the fetuses present (selective reduction of pregnancy). It concludes that since the legal status of the procedure in English law is unclear, it may be a criminal offence to perform selective reduction even where there is an ostensible clinical need. Moreover if the procedure is carried out negligently, and any (...) infant damaged as a result is subsequently born alive, he or she may have a civil claim against the practitioner who carried out the procedure. (shrink)

In 2003, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Regina McKnight, an African American woman who was convicted at the age of twenty‐two for committing “homicide by child abuse.” She became the first woman in the United States to be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for experiencing a stillbirth. Rather than an outlier case in the annals of American jurisprudence that stretched law beyond reason while restraining compassion and justice, McKnight's conviction inspired similar prosecutions of other poor black women (...) and then of other women. More than one‐third of states consider pregnant women's illicit drug use a form of child abuse, resulting in unprecedented forms of criminal and civil punishment. Laws previously understood to protect pregnant women from domestic violence during pregnancy, such as fetal protection laws, now serve as the vehicles for prosecuting pregnant women. What these prosecutions and laws expose are the multitudinous ways in which the criminalization of poor pregnant women—and normalization of that criminalization, such that even doctors and nurses are expected to participate in it—serve to humiliate women, interfere with their reproductive health, and ultimately rob women of reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

Termination of pregnancy (TOP) is offered in many countries, for foetuses prenatally diagnosed with congenital malformations that are deemed incompatible with life or that are associated with a high morbidity. In Lebanon, a middle income country where religion plays a focal role, the law prohibits any form of TOP unless it is the only means to save the mother's life. It is the contention of the authors of this article that even if the foetus is a person, if it were (...) medically revealed that there is a substantial risk that the newborn will suffer severe physical abnormalities that will cause it to be seriously handicapped; it is morally acceptable to terminate the pregnancy. Hence, TOP carried out for these indications is justified in the interest of the foetus and the child. Whatever the status of the foetus is, once born, it will become a full-fledged sentient being with all that this entails. When given the option of starting an existence, this person-to-be has the right to a minimum that allows him/her to enjoy a relatively good quality of life. Today, Lebanese obstetricians are confronted with the burden placed on them under the law to refuse TOP, or, when performing them, to forge records or deny having done them. This is why we strongly believe that the Lebanese policy on abortion should be amended. (shrink)

Prenatal and preimplantation testing technologies have offered unprecedented access to information about the genetic and congenital makeup of our prospective progeny. Future developments such as preconception testing, non-intrusive prenatal testing and more extensive preimplantation testing promise to increase that access further still. The result may be greater reproductive choice, but it also increases the burden on women and men to avail themselves of these technologies in order to avoid having a child with a disability. The overwhelming question for legislators has (...) been whether and, if so, how to regulate the use of these technologies in the face of compelling but seemingly contradictory claims about the advancement of reproductive choice and the dangers of eugenic or discriminatory effects. This book examines the evolution of this legislative oversight across a number of jurisdictions and explores the tensions and ambiguities that inform these laws. (shrink)

"End-Of-Law week drinkS @ ACT Magistrates Court: Friday 20 May 2005." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (198), pp. 24.

Are pregnant women entitled to the same rights of self-determination and bodily integrity as other adults? This is the fundamental question underlying recent highprofile legal interventions in situations when pregnant women and healthcare staff do not agree on management options or appropriate behaviour. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic have sometimes answered that they are not, and the law has at times been manipulated to enforce compliance with medical recommendations. This book offers a comprehensive assessment of healthcare law as (...) applied to the unique situation of pregnancy. (shrink)

IntroductionAfter three decades of the absolute prohibition of abortion, Chile enacted Law 21,030, which decriminalizes voluntary pregnancy termination when the person is at vital risk, when the embryo or fetus suffers from a congenital or genetic lethal pathology, and in pregnancy due to rape. The law incorporates conscientious objection as a broad right at the individual and institutional levels.ObjectivesThe aim of the study was to explore the exercise of conscientious objection in public health institutions, describing and analyzing its consequences and (...) proposals to prevent it from operating as structural violence.Materials and methodsThis study uses a qualitative, post-positivist design. At the national level, according to the chain technique, people who were identified as key actors due to their direct participation in implementing the law were included. Grounded theory was used to analyze the information obtained through a semi-structured interview. The methodological rigor criteria of transferability or applicability, dependability, credibility, auditability, and theoretical-methodological adequacy were met.ResultsData from 17 physicians, 5 midwives, 6 psychologists, 8 social workers, 2 nursing technicians, and 1 lawyer are included. From an inductive process through open coding, conscientious objection as structural violence and strategies to minimize the impact of objection emerge as meta-categories. The first meta-category emerges from the barriers linked to the implementation of the law, the infringement of the rights of the pregnant person, and pseudo conscientious objection, affecting timely and effective access to pregnancy termination. The second meta-category emerges as a response from the participants, proposing strategies to prevent conscientious objection from operating as structural violence.ConclusionConscientious objection acts as structural violence by infringing the exercise of sexual and reproductive rights. The State must fulfill its role as guarantor in implementing public policies, preventing conscientious objection from becoming hegemonic and institutionalized violence. (shrink)

In Sri Lanka, termination of pregnancy, other than in extreme circumstances, is strictly illegal. Among the public and large sections of the medical community there is widespread support for some degree of liberalization of the law, particularly where this relates to serious genetic conditions which can be identified prenatally. Tension emerges out of a publicly maintained conservatism on issues of abortion on the one hand and a growing disconnection from unregulated practices of termination in the private sector on the other. (...) Social science approaches have much to contribute when understanding the ‘therapeutic gap’ that opens up and, in particular, the way that local ideas of fate, destiny and how suffering might be ameliorated become blended with the predictive power of genetic testing. (shrink)

Termination of pregnancy after a certain gestational age and following prenatal diagnosis, in many nations seem to be granted with a special status to the extent that they by law have to be discussed within a predominantly medical context and have physicians as third parties involved in the decision-making process (‘indication-based’ approach). The existing legal frameworks for indication-based approaches, however, do frequently fail to provide clear guidance for the involved physicians. Critics, therefore, asked for professional ethics and professional institutions in (...) order to provide normative guidance for the physicians in termination of pregnancy on medical grounds. After outlining the clinical pathway in an indication-based approach and the involved types of (clinical) judgements, this paper draws upon different understandings of professional ethics in order to explore their potential to provide normative guidance in termination of pregnancy on medical grounds. The analysis reveals that professional ethics will not suffice—neither as a set of established norms nor as internal morality—in order to determine the normative framework of indication-based approaches on termination of pregnancy. In addition, there seem to be considerable inconsistencies regarding the target and outcome between prenatal testing on the one hand and following termination of pregnancy on the other hand. A source of morality external to medicine has to be the basis of evaluation if a consistent and workable normative framework for termination of pregnancy and prenatal testing should be established. (shrink)

The ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of October 22, 2020 introduced a near-complete ban on abortion in Poland, as it removed from the law the embryopathological condition that allowed abortion when the fetus had an incurable, severe disease. The ruling raises a number of questions regarding the recognition of international protection of human rights, the equal protection status of human rights, and the principle of trust in the state. The Tribunal’s ruling resulted in massive public protests in Poland, the (...) adoption of condemnatory resolutions by the European Parliament, and the submission of a new bill by members of the parliament from the opposition groups. The purpose of the paper is to show the questionable ruling issued by the Constitutional Tribunal from the perspective of protection of human rights and the attempts of opposition MPs to change the legal order. The Tribunal’s ruling violates women’s human rights and is therefore a form of discrimination against women. Attempts by opposition MPs to “civilize” the right to abortion have proved unsuccessful. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights may establish a breakthrough, as the Tribunal has received a complaint concerning the prevention of abortion on embryopathological grounds in connection with the ruling of the Constitutional Court of October 22, 2020. (shrink)

This paper considers law’s engagement with pregnancy/workplace conflicts. Drawing on recent research, including original empirical research conducted by the author, I consider how law’s response is ineffective. The nature of this ‘ineffective response’ is explored and in particular I consider the gap between, on the one hand, legal prescriptions and policy ambitions and, on the other hand, the reality of pregnancy/workplace conflicts. In essence, law fails to capture the experiences of pregnant women and new mothers at work and this is (...) reflected in the high number of women experiencing pregnancy discrimination, the low number of women invoking the law in order to gain redress when they do experience pregnancy/workplace conflicts and the low success rate amongst the few women that do bring claims against employers in such circumstances. (shrink)

Although much recent social science and humanities work has been a revolt against simplification, this volume explores the contrast between simplicity and complexity to reveal that this dichotomy, itself, is too simplistic. John Law and Annemarie Mol have gathered a distinguished panel of contributors to offer—particularly within the field of science studies—approaches to a theory of complexity, and at the same time a theoretical introduction to the topic. Indeed, they examine not only ways of relating to complexity but complexity _in (...) practice._ Individual essays study complexity from a variety of perspectives, addressing market behavior, medical interventions, aeronautical design, the governing of supranational states, ecology, roadbuilding, meteorology, the science of complexity itself, and the psychology of childhood trauma. Other topics include complex wholes in the sciences, moral complexity in seemingly amoral endeavors, and issues relating to the protection of African elephants. With a focus on such concepts as multiplicity, partial connections, and ebbs and flows, the collection includes narratives from Kenya, Great Britain, Papua New Guinea, the Netherlands, France, and the meetings of the European Commission, written by anthropologists, economists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and scholars of science, technology, and society. _Contributors._ Andrew Barry, Steven D. Brown, Michel Callon, Chunglin Kwa, John Law, Nick Lee, Annemarie Mol, Marilyn Strathern, Laurent Thévenot, Charis Thompson. (shrink)

Society has historically not taken a benign view of genetic disease. The laws permitting sterilization of the mentally re tarded~ and those proscribing consanguineous marriages are but two examples. Indeed as far back as the 5th-10th centuries, B.C.E., consanguineous unions were outlawed (Leviticus XVIII, 6). Case law has traditionally tended toward the conservative. It is reactive rather than directive, exerting its influence only after an individual or group has sustained injury and brought suit. In contrast, state legislatures have not been (...) inhibited in enacting statutes. Many of their products can be characterized as hasty, unnecessary, ill-conceived, and based on the heart rather than the head. Moreover the lack of expert consultation sought has also been remarkable. One state legislature, for example, has advocated immunization for sickle cell anemia! Many others have enacted laws for the screening of inborn errors of metabolism, e.g., phenylketon uria, but have poorly defined the lines of responsibility to secure compliance. A spate of specific disease-related bills has emerged in the u.S. Congress, each seeking recognition and appropriations. Sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, Cooley's anemia and Tay-Sachs disease have been among the front-runners for support. Finally, in 1975, Congress has begun to examine an omnibus bill concerning all forms of genetic disease. The bill, termed the National Genetic Diseases Act is, however, still far from being enacted. (shrink)

There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past”. A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent”. This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to (...) be preferred to FP. (shrink)

An interesting question, in both the moral and the legal context, is whether babies born of an infertility treatment-induced supernumerary pregnancy are properly considered to have been harmed. One might wonder how such a question could even arise in the face of data that clearly demonstrate that ITISP leaves an unduly large number of babies blind, deaf, and palsied, and facing lifelong disabilities. In fact, however, a number of arguments, based on the problem of collective form and two forms of (...) the so-called “nonidentity problem,” challenge the claim of harm in the ITISP context. The purpose of the present paper is to establish, as against these arguments, that harm has been imposed on the ITISP-damaged offspring. (shrink)

We all know that we have and are our bodies. But might it be possible to leave this common place? In the present article we try to do this by attending to the way we do our bodies. The site where we look for such action is that of handling the hypoglycaemias that sometimes happen to people with diabetes. In this site it appears that the body, active in measuring, feeling and countering hypoglycaemias is not a bounded whole: its boundaries (...) leak. Bits and pieces of the outside get incorporated within the active body; while the centre of some bodily activities is beyond the skin. The body thus enacted is not self-evidently coherent either. There are tensions between the body’s organs; between the control under which we put our bodies and the erratic character of their behaviour; and between the various needs and desires single bodies somehow try to combine. Thus to say that a body is a whole, or so we conclude, skips over a lot of work. One does not hang together as a matter of course: keeping oneself together is something the embodied person needs to do. The person who fails to do so dies. (shrink)

Let (leeway) incompatibilism be the thesis that causal determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Several prominent authors have claimed that incompatibilism alone can capture, or at least best captures, the intuitive appeal behind Jorge Luis Borges's famous “Garden of Forking Paths” metaphor. The thought, briefly, is this: the “single path” leading up to one's present decision represents the past; the forking paths that one must decide between represent those possible futures consistent with the past and the laws (...) of nature. But if determinism is true, there is only one possible future consistent with the past and the laws and, hence, only one path to choose from. That is, if determinism is true, then we are not free to do otherwise. In this paper, I argue that this understanding of the Garden of Forking Paths faces a number of problems and ought to be rejected even by incompatibilists. I then present an alternative understanding that not only avoids these problems but still supports incompatibilism. Finally, I consider how various versions of (leeway) compatibilism fit with the Garden of Forking Paths as well as the broader question of whether metaphors, however intuitive, have any dialectical force in the debates over freedom. (shrink)

This paper develops a challenge to theism. The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god. Theists typically dismiss the evil-god hypothesis out of hand because of the problem of good–there is surely too much good in the world for it to be the creation of such a being. But then why doesn't the problem (...) of evil provide equally good grounds for dismissing belief in a good god? I develop this evil-god challenge in detail, anticipate several replies, and correct errors made in earlier discussions of the problem of good. (shrink)

There is an old and powerful argument for the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A recent response to this argument, sometimes called the “dependence response,” centers around the claim that God’s relevant past beliefs depend on the relevant agent’s current or future behavior in a certain way. This paper offers a new argument for the dependence response, one that revolves around different cases of time travel. Somewhat serendipitously, the argument also paves the way (...) for a new reply to a compelling objection to the dependence response, the challenge from prepunishment. But perhaps not so serendipitously, the argument also renders the dependence response incompatible with certain views of providence. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

A dialogue investigating whether the usual religious defences of belief in God are really up to the job.