Altered attachment characteristics may disturb the HPA and can even cause changes in the hippocampus. However, it is unknown if that will influence spatial navigation performance, learning and recalling. In this study we pretend to verify if there are differences in spatial navigation learning and was associated with attachment style dimensions of anxiety and close-depend. Sixty-five female participants were recruited and were evaluated using the Adult Attachment Scale-R and tested on a virtual maze navigation task (VMT) at one moment (exploratory (...) trial + 3 trials) and 24h later (3 trials). There was a significant Moment x Trial x Close-Depend interaction for the outcome time, F (2, 126) = 3.807, p = 0.025, with post-hoc analysis indicating that the High Close-Depend group displayed significant improvements between Trial 1 and Trial 3 in the post-test assessment. Conversely, the Low Close-Depend group displayed significant improvements between Trial 1and Trial 3 but on the pre-test assessment. Furthermore, the Low Close-Depend group presented significant better performance in pre-test Trial 3 in comparison to the High Close-Depend group. Thereby, it seems that low comfort with proximity and trust in others is associated with reduced spatial navigation recall, although spatial learning performance was actually superior in these participants. It is possible that reduced exposure to social interaction and meaning relationship may be reduced in the Low Close-Depend group, leading to modifications in hippocampal function and, ultimately, reduced spatial recall. Conversely, participants with high comfort with proximity and trust in others may not display typical spatial learning in the proposed task as they are more willing to freely explore the presented environment. (shrink)

Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...) the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive. (shrink)

This article analyses the evolutionist discourses on the senses that emerged in the late 19th century, when theories on the evolution of species were in full sway. Drawing on newspapers, essays and medical literature, this article aims to set face to face the two currents of thought that I have identified regarding sensory evolution: the one that stressed the value of the progressive specialisation of the senses as evidence for human evolution mainly supported by Max Nordau, and the one which (...) regarded the sensory regrouping, exemplified by the phenomenon of synaesthesia, as the true symptom of evolution, strongly supported by Victor Segalen. A close examination of their arguments will provide clues concerning their relative position vis-à-vis the theory that stressed the exceptional nature of humankind among all living beings. Based on newspapers, essays and medical literature, this paper, which straddles several fields (history of science, philosophy, cultural history and aesthetics) aims to set both positions face to face, examining their arguments in detail and establishing their genealogies. This will lead to a better understanding of the scope and range of evolutionist discourses in the fin de siècle culture and on their impact upon artistic practices. (shrink)

Modern management reporting on its company''s performance is influenced by individuals ethical considerations. Stakeholders philosophies have continued to change over the last 75 years affecting reporting systems for companies reporting information internally and externally. These fundamental changes in philosophy have affected how information is conveyed. We are not claiming that only one philosophical viewpoint dominates companies reporting practices, but there does appear to be a changing trend of philosophies building on one another. We use resource dependence theory in relationship to (...) a decision-making model to explain changing stakeholders positions over time. This paper argues that six dominant philosophical theories have influenced the way individuals and organizations report financial and other information. Further, these philosophies then are depicted in a model that helps us to understand what influences companies to present themselves to the outside world. A vignette is used to depict changing philosophical views for several companies management report over 75 years. (shrink)

The project of naturalizing ethics has multiple contributions, from cognitive and moral psychology to primatology, neuroscience or evolutionary theory. One of the strategies for naturalizing ethics has been to argue that moral norms and values can be explained away if we focus on their causal history, if it is possible to offer both an ultimate and proximate causal explanation for them. In this article, I will focus on the contribution of cognitive and moral psychology as a way of offering a (...) proximate causal explanation for moral judgments. I am mostly interested in understanding to what extent these cognitive and psychological questions have some bearing in the fields of ethics and meta-ethics. Does this research programme put at stake the contention that ethics is a manifestation of human rationality? Is it true that finding the cognitive underpinnings of some of our moral judgments vindicates some meta-ethical position, namely some kind of reductionist naturalism? In the end, I will argue that even if scientific disciplines such as cognitive psychology give us a naturalized picture of the moral agent, there seem to be no reasons to think that from a naturalized perspective of the agent capable of perceiving value it must follow the naturalization of value itself. (shrink)

Rationale, aims and objectives Given the increasing prevalence of cataract and demand for cataract extraction surgery, patients must often wait to undergo this procedure. We validated a previously developed priority scoring system in terms of clinical variables, pre-intervention health status, appropriateness of surgery and gain in visual acuity (VA) and health-related quality of life (HRQoL).Methods Explicit prioritization criteria for cataract extraction created by a variation of the Research and Development (RAND) and University of California Los Angeles appropriateness methodology were retrospectively (...) applied to a prospective cohort of 5257 patients on waiting lists to undergo cataract by phacoemulsification at 17 hospitals in Spain. Demographic data, clinical data and data related to surgical technique were collected by trained ophthalmologists. Patients were evaluated by their ophthalmologist before the intervention and 6 weeks afterward. They also completed, by mail, the Visual Function Index (VF-14) before the intervention and 3 months afterward.Results High-priority patients experienced greater improvement in VA and HRQoL than those classified as intermediate or low-priority (P < 0.0001), even after adjusting by VA and the VF-14 score at baseline. The time to intervention was the same for high-priority patients as it was for intermediate and low-priority patients.Conclusions The priority score we developed identified patients most likely to experience the greatest improvements from cataract extraction. Use of this tool could provide a fairer and more rational way to prioritize patients for cataract extraction. (shrink)

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...) a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals. (shrink)

When and why do we need the indexical ‘I’? Perry (1979) thinks that ‘I’ is an essential ingredient to the explanation and prediction of action. We need ‘I’ to classify the kind of belief that causes an agent to produce a new action. In his view, classifying the agent’s belief in terms of ‘I’ makes sense because, when asked to explain her behavior, the agent will be disposed to say ‘I’. Here, we argue that this dispositional assumption is problematic. The (...) disposition to act according to an essential indexical and the disposition to make a speech act that contains ‘I’ are two very different things that are not always related. The most common circumstances in which we need to say ‘I’ to explain ourselves involve other agents: when we coordinate in joint actions or when we engage in self-talk to save face before the eyes of potential witnesses. Finally, we revisit Perry’s famous messy shopper anecdote to offer a better story about why its main character is disposed to say ‘I’. (shrink)

These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.

It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can (...) have a concept of death. In order to answer this question, I begin by sketching an account of concept possession that favours intensional classification rather than mere extensional discrimination. Further, I argue that the concept of death should be construed as neither binary nor universal. I then present a proposal for a set of minimal conditions that must be met to have a concept of death. I argue that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and then grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility. Lastly, I lay out the sort of observational and experimental evidence that we should look for to determine whether animals have the capacity for a minimal comprehension of death. (shrink)

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...) argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es hacer una reseña de los conceptos fundamentales que elabora Slavoj Žižek en su libro “El sublime objeto de la ideología”. Tomaré algunas ideas centrales acerca del síntoma, la ideología y la fantasía, así como también haré algunos comentarios. Žižek nos advierte de no caer en las trampas actuales ilusorias de que vivimos en una época posideológica.

A presente pesquisa sobre uma abordagem de gênero propõe­se a analisar as trajetórias de Trabalhadores docentes, focalizando os fatores que impulsionam as mulheres a seguir a carreira na educação superior na Universidade Federal de Sergipe. O estudo de caso organizacional desenvolveu­se na Universidade Federal de Sergipe/Campus de Itabaiana­-SE, que integra 84 docentes (58 homens e 26 mulheres). Fontes utilizadas: revisão bibliográfica abordando conceitos orientadores da literatura; documentos da instituição e dados estatísticos sobre o perfil. As estatísticas de imediato descobrem a (...) permanência da segmentação e divisão sexual do trabalho. Verificamos que existem avanços pontuais, mas, no entanto, sem a ruptura de mecanismos que historicamente inviabilizaram a democratização dos espaços acadêmicos, em que as mulheres têm o papel de buscar uma maior efetivação em tais espaços. (shrink)

Este trabajo muestra cómo una modificación en el sentido del término caracter adquirido llevó a rechazar la hipótesis de la herencia de esos caracteres. Se considerará el ejemplo del experimento llevado a cabo por Weismann que fue tomado como un caso paradigmático en los libros de textos y en la bibliografía especializada para refutar esa hipótesis. Ese diseño experimental fue aceptado por la comunidad como una refutación, a pesar de que los caracteres a los que hacía referencia no cumplían con (...) ninguna de las condiciones necesarias para poder ser considerado un carácter adquirido. Así, quedó establecida la premisa de que sólo las células germinales podían heredarse fundándose lo que se conoció como la barrera de Weismann. Este caso pretende poner en consideración cómo la enseñanza y reproducción de los términos científicos y de sus indicadores puede llevar a limitar el desarrollo de las teorías. Se concluye acerca de la necesidad de reflexionar sobre la manera en que se citan y enseñan las teorías científicas a fin de evitar barreras en el desarrollo de los campos disciplinares. (shrink)

DERECHO DE RESPUESTA COMO FORMADOR DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA: La jurisprudencia norteamericana y su relación con la argentina.

Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least (...) one type of moral motivation does not require mindreading. This means that, a priori, non-mindreading animals can be moral. (shrink)

El pensamiento de P. F. Strawson ofrece un difícil equilibrio entre una tendencia naturalista no reduccionista y una trascendental post-kantiana. Este escrito reconsidera un argumento de la estrategia strawsoniana que fue utilizado por Barry Stroud en su famosa crítica a los argumentos trascendentales de los años 60. La reflexión sobre el fin y el alcance de este tipo de argumentos no sólo intenta mostrar la compatibilidad de ambos aspectos en el pensamiento de Strawson, sino iluminar el carácter de necesidad de (...) las proposiciones metafísicas. (shrink)

O artigo discute a questão da redução da existência humana à vida natural no pensamento de Hannah Arendt, analisando as práticas totalitárias de exclusão dos apátridas das esferas jurídica e política e a dominação totalitária nos campos de concentração, quando o governo totalitário operou a transformação da vida humana até atingir a aniquilação da liberdade humana e produzir um resíduo antropológico em que os seres humanos foram reduzidos à elementaridade da vida.

This paper seeks to explore the processes involved in becoming a teacher in this particular historical moment of global pandemic in Brazil. What are the challenges, limitations, possibilities and opportunities that the pandemic presents to the process of teaching work and teacher formation? A review of the literature that included contributions from Caponi, Kohan, Larrosa, Neuscharank, Vaz, Arroyo and Abramowicz suggests a dialogue between pedagogic theory, philosophy of education and the contemporary experience of political and social events in the pandemic (...) period The discussions reviewed explore the profound extent to which Covid-19 has affected our way of living, working and relating to others, and the psychological effects of social isolation. The situation demands from the Brazilian teacher an attitude of openness to change, specifically in the use of new technologies, and the extent to which they are or are not able to replace face-to-face interactions. The situation also challenges us to reconstruct, beyond the logic of neoliberalism, our notions of the type of school we have and type of school we want, the type of teachers we are and the type of teacher we want to be. We conclude that this process of thinking school again depends, if it is to escape neoliberal logic, on the capacity of understanding the vocation of the teacher to be one of “becoming-child” in the sense of experiencing an openness to and a desire for the new. As such, the “becoming-teacher” is one who allows herself to be addressed by another logic, another more sensitive and more aesthetic temporality, and who finds, in encounter with others, with art, with childhood, with becoming itself, the capacity to think, to resist, to fight for the realization of that logic. (shrink)

This work has its origin in a master's research about Brazilian Education. The approach that we present in this text reveals the perspectives of caring perceived in a five-year-olds classroom in the daily life in a municipal center for Early Childhood Education in Fortaleza. The theoretical discussions on the theme involved a dialogue between Pedagogy and Philosophy of Education based on the contributions of Kramer, Pagni, Foucault, Rancière, Kohan and Boff. It was a qualitative research of phenomenological inspiration, which method (...) of data creation was participant observation. The analysis revealed that: in the interactions occurred in pedagogical practices, teachers and children take care of each other; the meaning of caring for children can be perceived in the minutia of their daily actions, as well as in affective involvement, in playing together, in speaking and listening to others, in sharing life on a daily basis; as for the meaning of caring for the adults, it is influenced by the way they were cared for, by their subjectivation and their choices in their way of being; caring humanizes teaching practices, inspiring emancipation; the policy on results that has aimed at "improving educational indices" may represent a danger to Early Childhood Education by minimizing the sharing of specific childhood experiences to training in order to achieve expected results. The study emphasized the need to reflect on the meaning of education and therefore proposes that caring be valued as an ethical decision and as an option for reflection on the way of living and interacting. (shrink)

Em Ser e Tempo, Heidegger argumenta que o conhecimento primordial do Dasein se dá no manuseio de entes mundanos. Merleau-Ponty, por sua vez, descreve na Fenomenologia da Percepção que o conhecimento é, antes de tudo, uma intencionalidade corporal intraduzível em termos proposicionais. Mais tarde, em What Computers Can’t Do, Hubert Dreyfus usa a obra de ambos para apontar os equívocos do paradigma cognitivista, isto é, a abordagem dominante do então nascente campo da inteligência artificial. Finalmente, em The Embodied Mind: Cognitive (...) Science and Human Experience, a noção de enativismo - elaborada por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosch - surge como uma tentativa de tomar do cognitivismo e do conexionismo a hegemonia nas ciências cognitivas. Dito isso, o objetivo do artigo consiste em descrever o enativismo e apontar sua herança fenomenológica. (shrink)

No final da década de 1950, Merleau-Ponty desloca seu foco de investigação da fenomenologia à ontologia. Tal transição envolve a articulação de seus estudos prévios acerca da percepção e da corporeidade com os desdobramentos filosóficos dos postulados da física e da biologia da primeira metade do século. A partir de uma reformulação do conceito de natureza, fomentada não só pelas ciências supracitadas como pela metafísica de Whitehead, Merleau-Ponty propõe a admissão da natureza como um fluxo de expressividade temporal autoprodutora de (...) sentido, incorporando ao âmago do ser a temporalidade e a negatividade antes exclusivas ao para-si. A carne de Merleau-Ponty, como veremos, está em harmonia com a noção de processo de Whitehead, apontando assim um certo hilozoísmo pré-socrático na ontologia de ambos. Dito isso, o objetivo do artigo consiste em examinar a ontologia indireta de Merleau-Ponty, indicando sua convergência com a filosofia de Whitehead para, finalmente, introduzirmos uma crítica incipiente a partir da obra de Francisco Varela. Defende-se aqui que o conceito de autopoiesis pode indicar uma alternativa à noção merleau-pontiana de natureza. (shrink)