Plato is a much more experimental philosopher, this book argues, than most commentators acknowledge. Supporting this position, Henry Teloh combines exegesis of particular passages with a synoptic view of Plato's philosophical development through his early, middle, and late dialogues. The result is a study of Plato's ideas with a more ambitious scope than any since W. D. Ross's in 1951,The book chronicles Plato's changing interests through a focus on his ontological commitments—that is, on the types of entities he (...) addresses. It also traces many of the assumptions in Plato's thought back to their sources in pre-Socratic philosophy. By depicting the changes in Plato's thought from one period of dialogue composition to another, and by seeking to explain these changes from textual evidence, this book offers an appealing introduction to Plato for all humanists. (shrink)

Since gregory vlastos resurrected "self-predication" there justifiably has been considerable interest in "self-predication," and the interpretation of this notion is crucial for understanding plato's metaphysics. I am in agreement with vlastos in thinking that plato's degrees-of-reality ontology and his conception of forms as paradigms implies "self-predication." Nevertheless, many of plato's "self-predicational" statements (e.g., "the beautiful is beautiful," "justice is just," etc.) Arise, i believe, from a different source. Plato, at times, accepts an anaxagorean account of causation: a cause must have (...) the quality that it produces in something else. I argue that anaxagorean causation lies behind the apparently "self- predicational" statements at "parmenides" 131 c-e, "euthydemus" 301b, "hippias major" 292e, "protagoras" 330 c,e, and "phaedo" 100c. These statements are, i believe, on a par with an ethical motif of the dialogues– that a man (or the demiurge) must have the quality that he produces in another; e.g., Only a just man can make another man just. (shrink)

Aristotle states in Metaphysics Z13 that nothing said universally τῶν ϰαϑόλου λεγομένων is substance, rather the substance of each thing is particular to it. The natural interpretation of this statement is that being said universally is a sufficient condition for not being substance. But this claim is very perplexing since it is the key premiss in the following apparently inconsistent set:Form is substance.Form is universal.Nothing universal or said universally is substance, rather the substance of something is particular ἴδιος to it.

Aristotle states in Metaphysics Z13 that nothing said universally τῶν ϰαϑόλου λεγομένων is substance, rather the substance of each thing is particular to it. The natural interpretation of this statement is that being said universally is a sufficient condition for not being substance. But this claim is very perplexing since it is the key premiss in the following apparently inconsistent set:Form is substance.Form is universal.Nothing universal or said universally is substance, rather the substance of something is particular ἴδιος to it.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Parmenides’ Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato’s ‘Parmenides’ by Kenneth M. SayreHenry TelohKenneth M. Sayre, author and translator. Parmenides’ Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato’s ‘Parmenides’. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996. Pp. xx + 383. Cloth, $50.00.Kenneth Sayre has written a masterful translation and commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. The translation is literal but readable, and the commentary is informative, challenging, and close to the text. (...) Sayre’s main concern, and what he takes to be the “main problem of interpretation” (xi) is “what to make of Plato’s treatment of the several hypotheses that constitutes the second portion of the dialogue.” Sayre devotes over half of his book to the second half of the Parmenides, and anyone who knows Plato’s text will infer correctly that this is not a book for novices, but rather one which will yield ample reward to serious students of Plato. The book would have benefited from signposts which would locate Sayre’s intricate analyses of passages within his larger scheme of Plato’s development, an account of Plato’s more mature theory of Forms, and a [End Page 524] discussion of how each section of the Parmenides connects or fails to connect with the later. (Granted that we can obtain Sayre’s views from his other works.)Sayre’s book is not only an analysis of Plato’s text; it is also an engagement with important commentaries on that text. He carefully outlines and criticizes Miller, Meinwald, Allen, and Cornford (being most indebted to Cornford’s statements about the Pythagorean elements in Plato’s mature theory). Sayre maintains that the first part of the Parmenides questions the immature theory of Forms which is found in the Phaedo and Republic (68). Sayre believes that this immature theory is in need of more careful articulation and revision, and that the Parmenides begins the process. (Note that Sayre does not worry about whether there are multiple theories of Forms, or developments and changes in a single theory.) The major tenets of the youthful theory are that Forms are: (1) real in that they are “themselves in themselves,” (2) the causes of determinate characteristics in sensible things, (3) paradigms for the naming of their participants, (4) directly known by mind or reason, and (5) absolute in the sense of being independent of their participants (75).Sayre argues that Parmenides’ arguments in the first part of the Parmenides show that (1)—(5) need more elaboration and interpretation. The sections on the sail, day, and participating in a part of a Form force revisions of (1) and (2); Forms must be free of contrary predicates, they cannot be divisible spatially, and hence Plato must rethink participation. The point of the third man argument is that since “.… Largeness has lost its self-determinate status by virtue of being 'demoted' (in thought) to an object of appearance, it is no longer capable of providing determination to the shared features of this augmented group of individuals” (81). Sayre claims that Largeness is no longer one, and that it is “indefinitely multitudinous” (82), and hence that Largeness lacks definite properties. I am unclear about what Sayre’s point is here. Does he mean that Forms come to have contrary predicates—Largeness is both one and many—and each of these predicates is definite enough, but confused when found in the same entity, or that these predicates are themselves indefinite, whatever that might mean? The first interpretation seems to fit Sayre’s overall theory best, and if this is correct, then the third man argument shows that Plato needs to reinterpret (1) and (2) above. The second third man argument shows, Sayre claims, that both participation and resemblance are unexplained in the immature theory, and thus that (3) needs work. The section on our knowledge of the Forms reveals that (4) and (5) must be rethought. Sayre states that Plato rejects radical separation for the position that forms are distinct from their participants. I concur with this last claim, but Sayre needs a sustained discussion of what this claim means. Sayre concludes that the point of the first part of the Parmenides is that... (shrink)

I will describe four major themes in Seeskin's rich essay, which is primarily about Plato's early dialogues. I will then close with some comments on these themes.

One of the most influential of the Victorian philosophers, Henry Sidgwick also made important contributions to fields such as economics, political theory and classics. A proponent of the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, which he analysed in his classic work The Methods of Ethics, he later turned to the practical side of politics in this work, published in 1891. His aim was to have a 'rational discussion of political questions in modern states', and he offers a (...) thorough examination of Victorian politics, beginning with a discussion of political theory before moving on to more concrete matters such as property and law. The later chapters discuss the function of government through themes such as procedural matters, international affairs, war, political parties, and public participation, giving a comprehensive account of both ideas about and the functioning of late-nineteenth-century government. (shrink)

There is growing interest in machine ethics in the question of whether and under what circumstances an artificial intelligence would deserve moral consideration. This paper explores a particular type of moral status that the author terms psychological moral patiency, focusing on the epistemological question of what sort of evidence might lead us to reasonably conclude that a given artificial system qualified as having this status. The paper surveys five possible criteria that might be applied: intuitive judgments, assessments of intelligence, the (...) presence of desires and autonomous behavior, evidence of sentience, and behavioral equivalence. The author suggests that despite its limitations, the latter approach offers the best way forward, and defends a variant of that, termed the cognitive equivalence strategy. In short, this holds that an artificial system should be considered a psychological moral patient to the extent that it possesses cognitive mechanisms shared with other beings such as nonhuman animals whom we also consider to be psychological moral patients. -/- . (shrink)

An eminent philosopher explains why we owe it to future generations to take immediate action on global warming Climate change is the supreme challenge of our time. Yet despite growing international recognition of the unfolding catastrophe, global carbon emissions continue to rise, hitting an all-time high in 2019. Unless humanity rapidly transitions to renewable energy, it may be too late to stop irreversible ecological damage. In The Pivotal Generation, renowned political philosopher Henry Shue makes an impassioned case for taking (...) immediate, radical action to combat global warming. Shue grounds his argument in a rigorous philosophical analysis of climate change’s moral implications. Unlike previous generations, which didn’t fully understand the danger of burning carbon, we have the knowledge to comprehend and control rising carbon dioxide levels. And unlike future generations, we still have time to mitigate the worst effects of global warming. This generation has the power, and thus the responsibility, to save the planet. Shirking that responsibility only leaves the next generation with an even heavier burden—one they may find impossible to bear. Written in direct, accessible language, The Pivotal Generation approaches the latest scientific research with a singular moral clarity. It’s an urgently needed call to action for anyone concerned about the planet’s future. (shrink)

This book explains, in simple but accurate terms, how orthodox quantum mechanics works. The author, a distinguished theoretical physicist, shows how this theory, realistically interpreted, assigns an important role to our conscious free choices. Stapp claims that mainstream biology and neuroscience, despite nearly a century of quantum physics, still stick essentially to failed classical precepts in which mental intentions have no effect upon our bodily actions. He shows how quantum mechanics provides a rational basis for a better understanding of this (...) connection, even allowing an explanation of certain phenomena currently held to be "paranormal". These ideas have major implications for our understanding of ourselves and our mental processes, and thus also for the meaningfulness of our lives. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Intentions of Art Can Private Intentions Go Public? The Intention to Make a Poem Poems Are Made out of Words Blake's “London”.

It is often assumed that singular thought requires that an agent be epistemically acquainted with the object the thought is about. However, it can sometimes truthfully be said of someone that they have a belief about an object, despite not being interestingly epistemically acquainted with that object. In defense of an epistemic acquaintance constraint on singular thought, it is thus often claimed that belief ascriptions are context sensitive and do not always track the contents of an agent’s mental states. This (...) paper uses first-person attitude reports to argue that contextualism about belief ascriptions does not present an adequate defense of an acquaintance constraint on singular thought. (shrink)

The critical attacks of Philosophy upon the Catholic Faith which have developed since the eighteenth century have at last forced the defenders of that religion to consider the metaphysical foundations of their belief. This is all to the good; the disastrous attempt to separate belief from the searching questions of Reason has resulted in confusion and embarrassment both to Faith and Philosophy.

On ne peut comprendre la position de cette œuvre, annoncée dès 1840 comme devant être tout à la fois 'ironique et polémique', sans savoir précisément ce à quoi elle s'oppose. On ne peut saisir le sens de cette opposition si on ne découvre ce qui en constitue le 'point archimédique'. Pour avoir compris cette triple exigence, l'auteur de cet essai fait découvrir dans le monde intellectuel danois du XIXe siècle, qu'il ressuscite, un monde si proche du nôtre qu'on s'en reconnaît (...) presque contemporain, jusqu'à souhaiter apprendre de Kierkegaard le secret d'une exemplaire résistance à la malhonnêteté et à l'irresponsabilité des 'brigands semi-cultivés' qui font de notre époque, comme de la sienne, une 'époque de désagrégation' et de notre société, plus encore que de la sienne, une société du 'nivellement'. Mais il avertit aussi bien que ce n'est pas en cherchant à tout savoir sur Kierkegaard qu'on apprendra quoi que ce soit de Kierkegaard. (shrink)