The main purpose of this essay is to examine Brentano's rejection of Kant's theory of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori judgments. The essay begins by recalling the views of Descartes and Locke about the acquisition of knowledge, since Brentano regards them as on the whole correct or, at least, as pointing in the right direction and since he regards Kant's epistemology as obscurantist and reactionary (Section 1). There follows a brief characterization of Brentano's conception of knowledge as based (...) on self-evident inner perception and analytic propositions, i.e. propositions which are true ex terminis (Section 2). Next some aspects of Kant's epistemology are compared with corresponding features of Brentano's doctrine (Section 3). In the light of this comparison the validity of Brentano's criticisms is examined (Section 4). In conclusion an independent view of the function of concepts and of their relation to perception is briefly outlined and contrasted with the views of Kant and Brentano (Section 5). (shrink)

Originally published in 1966. This volume analyzes the general structure of scientific theories, their relation to experience and to non-scientific thought. Part One is concerned with the logic underlying empirical discourse before its subjection to the various constraints, imposed by the logico-mathematical framework of scientific theories upon their content. Part Two is devoted to an examination of this framework and, in particular, to showing that the deductive organization of a field of experience is by that very act a modification of (...) empirical discourse and an idealization of its subject matter. Part Three analyzes the concordance between theories and experience and the relevance of science to moral and religious beliefs. (shrink)

Nach einem kurzen, kritischen Bericht über die Gründe, die Brentano zur Ablehnung der mathematischen Logik bewogen, wird gezeigt, daß seine Analyse der logischen Urteilsformen sich in einem finiten Untersystem der exakten Prädikatenlogik interpretieren läßt. Es wird sodann ausgeführt, daß dieses logische System auch zur Formulierung seiner Relationstheorie geeignet ist - sofern man von der Kontinualrelation absieht. Dieser wird aber durch eine Erweiterung der Prädikatenlogik durch inexakte Prädikate genügegetan. Schließlich wird erklärt, wie Brentanos Auffassung der logischen Modalitäten als Urteilsmodi in diesem (...) logischen System ausgedrückt werden kann. Eine kurze Nachbemerkung gilt dem Verständnis zwischen Brentanos Ontologie und der von ihr angeregten logischen Theorie. (shrink)

Nach einem kurzen, kritischen Bericht über die Gründe, die Brentano zur Ablehnung der mathematischen Logik bewogen, wird gezeigt, daß seine (spätere) Analyse der logischen Urteilsformen sich in einem finiten Untersystem der exakten Prädikatenlogik interpretieren läßt. Es wird sodann ausgeführt, daß dieses logische System auch zur Formulierung seiner Relationstheorie geeignet ist - sofern man von der Kontinualrelation absieht. Dieser wird aber durch eine Erweiterung der Prädikatenlogik durch inexakte Prädikate genügegetan. Schließlich wird erklärt, wie Brentanos Auffassung der logischen Modalitäten als Urteilsmodi in (...) diesem logischen System ausgedrückt werden kann. Eine kurze Nachbemerkung gilt dem Verständnis zwischen Brentanos Ontologie und der von ihr angeregten logischen Theorie. (shrink)

Hauptthema des Aufsatzes sind philosophische Methoden und Argumente, welche der Begründung allgemeingültiger, philosophischer Prinzipien dienen sollen. Es wird gezeigt, daß die Cartesianische Methode des Zweifels, die transzendentale Methode Kants und die phänomenologische Methode Husserls diese Aufgabe nicht erfüllen, daß sie aber, wenn man von ihren Ausschließlichkeitsansprüchen absieht, wichtige Einsichten enthalten. Selbst die sogenannte "wissenschaftliche" und die sogenannte "linguistische" Methode erweisen sich trotz ihrer Zirkularität als nicht völlig wertlos. Der Aufsatz schließt mit einigen Bemerkungen über Argumentationsweisen, welche bescheidenere Ziele verfolgen und (...) erreichen können. (shrink)

In this paper the author argues that empiricist ethical theories are not open to a number of objections which have often been supposed to be fatal to them. He argues, Firstly, That empiricist ethical theories do not necessarily commit the "naturalistic fallacy". He argues, Secondly, That moral judgments would have, If empiricism is true, A "pseudo a priority" which might satisfy the demands of those who think that they are genuinely a priori. He argues, Thirdly, That, Though moral judgments cannot (...) be necessary, If empiricism is true, It can nevertheless be "necessary that we have the moral attitudes we do". (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to exhibit certain crucial shortcomings of some representative empiricist and anti-empiricist ethical theories and to sketch an empiricist ethics which is not exposed to these objections and adequate to our cognitive and practical position in the world. The discussion falls into two parts. Part I, which is mainly critical, begins with a general distinction between empiricist and anti-empiricist ethical theories and surveys the assumptions which are permissible to the former in the sphere of factual (...) beliefs, practical attitudes and logical inference. It then examines the central theses of three kinds of empiricist ethical theory, namely utilitarian, contractual and emotivist theories and of three corresponding kinds of anti-empiricist theory which can be viewed as attempts at correcting the faults of their empiricist counterparts. Part II, which is mainly constructive, contains a sketch of a new empiricist ethics and in its light a brief discussion of various types of moral system of the limits of moral pluralism and the nature of moral argument. (shrink)

Among A. J. Ayer's many influential contributions to philosophy are the accounts of the nature of metaphysics which he propounded at various stages of his philosophical development. Whereas his early position is a clear version of the antimetaphysical attitude of the Viennese circle and, more generally, of logical positivism, his later position is, as he generously emphasized, in some crucial respects indebted to Peirce's pragmatism and to Ramsey's analysis of the structure of theories. His later views on the nature of (...) metaphysics are contained in his book Central Questions of Philosophy and in his reply to my criticisms in a Festschrift , published on the occasion of his retirement from the Wykeham Chair of Philosophy at Oxford University . Although in this reply he describes his later account of metaphysics as ‘much too perfunctory’, it does constitute an important attempt at answering one of the central questions of philosophy. (shrink)

This book covers a wide spectrum of connected topics in the field of practical and moral thinking. It contains papers and discussions on the logic of practical reasoning and moral obligation; on the decision-theoretical approach to morality; on the relation between practical and theoretical reason; and on the political aspects of morality. The contributors are, for the most part, well-known philosophers who have not been content with merely restating their positions, but have sued this as a forum for proposing new (...) ideas. The value of the collection lies not only in the originality of the contributions on the various topics mentioned but equally in its demonstration of the interrelations among these topics. (shrink)