The paper explores the question of the relationship between science and religion today in light of its modern origin in the Galileo affair. After first presenting Ian Barbour’s four standard models for the possible relationships between science and religion, it then draws on the work of Richard Blackwell and Ernan McMullin to consider the Augustinian principles at work in Galileo’s understanding of science and religion. In light of this the paper proposes a fifth, hybrid model, “dialogical convergence,” as a more (...) adequate model of the relationship in-between science and religion because it is epistemically just in its coherence with the last fifty years of philosophy of science by which it affords more than the mere tolerance of an independence view which leaves no space for the possibility of a theological understanding of nature. (shrink)

The paper explores the question of the relationship between science and religion today in light of its modern origin in the Galileo affair. After first presenting Ian Barbour’s four standard models for the possible relationships between science and religion, it then draws on the work of Richard Blackwell and Ernan McMullin to consider the Augustinian principles at work in Galileo’s understanding of science and religion. In light of this the paper proposes a fifth, hybrid model, “dialogical convergence,” as a more (...) adequate model of the relationship in-between science and religion because it is epistemically just in its coherence with the last fifty years of philosophy of science by which it affords more than the mere tolerance of an independence view which leaves no space for the possibility of a theological understanding of nature. (shrink)

Patrick Madigan's book explores the modern philosophical struggle, from its inception in Descartes to its "apotheosis" in Nietzsche, to come to grips with the essential tension between two of its most fundamental concepts--reason and freedom. Rather than a straightforward historical survey, the work offers the reader, who is somewhat familiar with the moderns, a very useful, thoughtful reflection woven out of a single threading theme: that Descartes' project to defeat the sceptic initiates a relentless pursuit of reason-as-rigor, wherein this reason (...) impregnated with the seeds of suspicion increasingly threatens the very freedom that launched the "modern project to rigor." What is especially praiseworthy is the author's success in displaying, with broad brush strokes, accented by occasional detail, a vital lineage between Descartes and Nietzsche. (shrink)

Much of Western metaphysics has been shaped by the Parmenidian problem of being, as differentiated into the problem of the one and the many and its correlated problem of change; or more precisely, the problem of making sense of any change from not-being to being. The epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem may well be posed as that of how to make sense of any change from not-knowing to knowing. Plato recognized this as an orienting problem for philosophy and posed (...) it as a famous dilemma in the Meno: how can anyone inquire into that which one does not know? A long-standing modern move for handling this problem is to make a basic distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Armed with this distinction, one delimits the proper domain of epistemology to issues of justification and simply skirts the epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem by relegating questions of the discovery or genesis of knowledge to psychology, history, or other social sciences. In this approach, epistemology, like ethics, presupposes an is/ought distinction, and any attempt to include questions of the genesis of knowledge, even partially, in the context of justification commits a genetic fallacy. And though Karl Popper acknowledged the problem of the growth of knowledge as being at the heart of epistemology’s task, he still insisted on the justification/ discovery distinction. Notwithstanding Popper, the work of W. V. O. Quine, N. R. Hanson, and most notably Thomas Kuhn has seriously undermined the distinction, and renewed the challenge of the Meno for epistemology and for philosophy of science in particular. (shrink)

Much of Western metaphysics has been shaped by the Parmenidian problem of being, as differentiated into the problem of the one and the many and its correlated problem of change; or more precisely, the problem of making sense of any change from not-being to being. The epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem may well be posed as that of how to make sense of any change from not-knowing to knowing. Plato recognized this as an orienting problem for philosophy and posed (...) it as a famous dilemma in the Meno: how can anyone inquire into that which one does not know? A long-standing modern move for handling this problem is to make a basic distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Armed with this distinction, one delimits the proper domain of epistemology to issues of justification and simply skirts the epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem by relegating questions of the discovery or genesis of knowledge to psychology, history, or other social sciences. In this approach, epistemology, like ethics, presupposes an is/ought distinction, and any attempt to include questions of the genesis of knowledge, even partially, in the context of justification commits a genetic fallacy. And though Karl Popper acknowledged the problem of the growth of knowledge as being at the heart of epistemology’s task, he still insisted on the justification/ discovery distinction. Notwithstanding Popper, the work of W. V. O. Quine, N. R. Hanson, and most notably Thomas Kuhn has seriously undermined the distinction, and renewed the challenge of the Meno for epistemology and for philosophy of science in particular. (shrink)

Much of Western metaphysics has been shaped by the Parmenidian problem of being, as differentiated into the problem of the one and the many and its correlated problem of change; or more precisely, the problem of making sense of any change from not-being to being. The epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem may well be posed as that of how to make sense of any change from not-knowing to knowing. Plato recognized this as an orienting problem for philosophy and posed (...) it as a famous dilemma in the Meno: how can anyone inquire into that which one does not know? A long-standing modern move for handling this problem is to make a basic distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Armed with this distinction, one delimits the proper domain of epistemology to issues of justification and simply skirts the epistemological side of the Parmenidian problem by relegating questions of the discovery or genesis of knowledge to psychology, history, or other social sciences. In this approach, epistemology, like ethics, presupposes an is/ought distinction, and any attempt to include questions of the genesis of knowledge, even partially, in the context of justification commits a genetic fallacy. And though Karl Popper acknowledged the problem of the growth of knowledge as being at the heart of epistemology’s task, he still insisted on the justification/ discovery distinction. Notwithstanding Popper, the work of W. V. O. Quine, N. R. Hanson, and most notably Thomas Kuhn has seriously undermined the distinction, and renewed the challenge of the Meno for epistemology and for philosophy of science in particular. (shrink)

This paper surveys the conceptions of law and of legislation to be found in the philosophy of Julian the Emperor. A hierarchy of levels of law is described, going from transcendent divine orders and paradigmatic laws down to the laws of nature, laws innate in human souls and regional laws. Julian’s ideal legislator is discussed, as inspired by transcendent, paradigmatic laws and as subordinate to law and its protector. An example of Julian’s legislation is discussed. Attention is paid to Julian’s (...) use of Plato’s Republic, Statesman, and Laws. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that the Platonist philosophers of Late Antiquity, from Plotinus (third century) to the sixth-century schools in Athens and Alexandria, neglected the political dimension of their Platonic heritage in their concentration on an otherworldly life. Dominic O'Meara presents a revelatory reappraisal of these thinkers, arguing that their otherworldliness involved rather than excluded political ideas, and he reconstructs for the first time a coherent political philosophy of Late Platonism.

In early 2020, a number of countries developed and published intensive care triage guidelines for the pandemic. Several of those guidelines, especially in the UK, encouraged the explicit assessment...

In this paper we articulate how time and temporalities are involved in the making of living things. For these purposes, we draw on an instructive episode concerning Norfolk Horn sheep. We attend to historical debates over the nature of the breed, whether it is extinct or not, and whether presently living exemplars are faithful copies of those that came before. We argue that there are features to these debates that are important to understanding contemporary configurations of life, time, and the (...) organism, especially as these are articulated within the field of synthetic biology. In particular, we highlight how organisms are configured within different material and semiotic assemblages that are always structured temporally. While we identify three distinct structures, namely the historical, phyletic, and molecular registers, we do not regard the list as exhaustive. We also highlight how these structures are related to the care and value invested in the organisms at issue. Finally, because we are interested ultimately in ways of producing time, our subject matter requires us to think about historiographical practice reflexively. This draws us into dialogue with other scholars interested in time, not just historians, but also philosophers and sociologists, and into conversations with them about time as always multiple and never an inert background. (shrink)

Knowledge of the structure of the cosmos, Plato suggests, is important in organizing a human community which aims at happiness. This book investigates this theme in Plato's later works, the Timaeus, Statesman, and Laws. Dominic J. O'Meara proposes fresh readings of these texts, starting from the religious festivals and technical and artistic skills in the context of which Plato elaborates his cosmological and political theories, for example the Greek architect's use of models as applied by Plato in describing the (...) making of the world. O'Meara gives an account of the model of which Plato's world is an image; of the mathematics used in producing the world; and of the relation between the cosmic model and the political science and legislation involved in designing a model state in the Laws. Non-specialist scholars and students will be able to access and profit from the book. (shrink)

Imagine that we are considering whether our healthcare system (or insurer) should fund treatment or procedure X. One factor that may be cited is that of so-called ‘medical necessity’. The claim would be that treatment X should be eligible for funding if it is medically necessary, but ineligible if this does not apply. Similarly, (and relevant to the debates in this special issue), if considering whether a particular treatment should be ethically and/or legally permitted, we may wish to distinguish between (...) cases where the treatment is medically necessary, and those were it is not. But what do we mean by this concept? Here I will propose and briefly defend one plausible and practical definition. (shrink)