The number of writings devoted to the philosophical and sociopolitical views of Paul Lafargue is not small. However, his literary heritage has not been published in full to this day. Nor is there a complete biography shedding light systematically on Lafargue's activity as one of the leaders of the socialist workers' movement in France, as a journalist, philosopher, and scientist. In this connection the book by Kh. N. Momdzhian is indubitably of interest. It is the most comprehensive work on Lafargue (...) in the Soviet literature. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the conceptual analysis of two texts of leading scholars in cognitive neuroscience and its philosophy, Patricia Churchland and Eric Kandel. After a short introduction about the notion of reduction, I give a detailed account of the way both scientists view the relationship between theories about brain functioning on the one hand and consciousness and psychopathology, respectively, on the other hand. The analysis not only reveals underlying philosophical mind/brain conceptions and their inner tensions, but also (...) the conceptual relevance of distinctions that are fundamental in the work of Dooyeweerd, such as the distinction between modes and entities, between law and subject and between subject function and object function. After a brief clarification of the way these distinctions function in Dooyeweerd’s theory of the body as an ‘enkaptic structural whole’, I try to explain how the conceptual framework, developed here, could be applied to brain functioning and leads to greater clarity in neuroscientific theorizing. (shrink)

Réédition du colloque organisé en hommage à Rita Thalmann et publié sous le même titre en 1997 aux Presses universitaires de Paris 7-Diderot, l’ouvrage comprend une préface inédite et une nouvelle introduction. Tout au long de l’ouvrage court la récusation de deux idées reçues : les femmes victimes en toute circonstance, les femmes héroïques en toute circonstance. Il n’y a pas eu de « grâce de la naissance féminine » (Karin Windaus-Waiser) : être femme n’a pas empêché de participer au (...) nazism... (shrink)

Scientists are rapidly mapping the chemical and physical pathways that constitute biological systems, making the complexity of processes such as inheritance, development, evolution, and even the origin of life increasingly tractable. Through genetics and neuroscience, biological understanding is now being extended deeply into the human sciences and has begun to transform our understanding of behavior, mind, culture, and values. The idea of a science-driven unity of knowledge has reemerged in several forms in both reductionist and nonreductionist frameworks. This volume examines (...) some of the extraordinary empirical discoveries that have caused a revival of this idea and presents theories from thinkers in a variety of disciplines, including E. O. Wilson, Eric Kandel, and Elaine Scarry. (shrink)

For philosophical readers, a review of biology Nobel laureate Eric R. Kandel’s Age of Insight historical thesis, that today’s ‘neuroaesthetics’ is a continuation of Vienna’s great contributions to modernism from 1900 on, becomes a ‘critical study’, by closely examining Kandel’s valuable account of E.H. Gombrich’s psychology, then, broadly, his own case for the validity of ‘neuroaesthetics’. The article much credits Kandel for recognising and explaining—unlike most philosophers, with their epistemological and metaphysical perspectives—why Gombrich’s Art and Illusion is (...) subtitled ‘Psychology’, since it is about what its author termed throughout ‘convincing’ depiction. But, while holding that Kandel’s case for ‘neuroaesthetics’ is, at least in tone, superior to Ramachandran’s, the study broadens still further into a critical examination of it, with at first standard—since Aristotle—arguments against reductivism, as a materialism that neglects first formal then final causes or purposes. Original to the critique is an additional argument, that so-called ‘neuroaesthetics’ is not only inconsistent with the ‘reductionist’—not reductivist—principles of Kandel’s own science, as explained in his earlier account of them, In Search of Memory, but also contradicts a basic Darwinian principle underlying all modern biology, that genuine novelty can arise from rearrangement of older materials. The conclusion is that although neuroscience may make important contributions to aesthetics and appreciation, there is as yet no basis for holding that it could produce an aesthetics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 317-322 [Access article in PDF] On Wolfgang Blankenburg, Common Sense, and Schizophrenia Aaron L. Mishara Introduction In its increasing openness to neuroscience (Cowan, Harter, and Kandel 2000) and other of its neighboring disciplines, mainstream biological psychiatry has allowed psychopathology, philosophy, and philosophical approaches to psychopathology to play an increased role in current research interests. Given this new openness, and the acknowledgment of (...) the severity of one of psychiatry's most debilitating, costly, and intractable disorders, 1 the translation of W. Blankenburg's 1969 article concerning the psychopathology of common sense does not merely serve historical interest. It is an exceptional example of a not well-known trend in German- and French-speaking psychiatry to apply philosophical phenomenology and existentialism to psychopathological research. This trend, which reached a peak in the late 1950s and was strong well into the 1970s, has dwindling, but nevertheless, current representatives in Heidelberg and Zurich and is scattered in a few other places in Europe, Japan, the United States, and South America. The view of the Zeitgeist—which may sound astonishing, even antiquated to contemporary readers—was highly ambitious: Conceptual approaches, such as philosophical ("transcendental") phenomenology, were expected to supply knowledge about the structure of consciousness and its disturbance in various mental disorders.Following the lead of Binswanger and Szilasi, who viewed schizophrenia as an "experiment of nature" that enables us to view underlying processes otherwise hidden to "natural, everyday consciousness," Blankenburg believed that it may be possible to map the formal properties of the psychopathology of schizophrenia—precisely in the loss of common sense—as a disturbance to the basic organization of conscious experience. Any attempt to summarize this rather abstract and complex approach in a brief commentary would be ill advised. In passing, rather, I will remark that such efforts could have profound relevance to the current research of schizophrenia and its underlying neurobiology. This research has gradually acknowledged the importance of taking the patient's subjective experience of the disorder into account (Mishara, Parnas, and Naudin 1998). In this commentary, I will first give an account of the biographical and clinical reasons that led Blankenburg to turn to the problem of common sense and its relevance for schizophrenia. I will then explore what implications [End Page 317] his work may have for more recent findings concerning schizophrenia. Blankenburg's Intellectual Development Born in 1928, W. Blankenburg, the son of a Lufthansa pilot who pioneered transatlantic commercial flights, began his studies in Freiburg im Breisgau in 1947. While at Freiburg, Blankenburg heard lectures in philosophy given by E. Fink (the former assistant to Husserl) and Max Mueller, and in psychology, by R. Heiss and others. After three years, Blankenburg turned to the study of medicine, producing a dissertation in 1956 on an application of Daseinsanalysis (Heidegger and Binswanger) to a case of paranoid schizophrenia. Binswanger wrote the forward to the publication. Between 1956 and 1958, Blankenburg studied internal medicine in Heidelberg with the accomplished phenomenologist of bodily experience (Leibphaenomenologer) and student of V. von Weizsaecker Herbert Pluegge. He spent one semester in Goettingen where he attended lectures by the ontological philosopher Nicolai Hartmann, who provided for Blankenburg a more useful approach to the problem of nature and natural science than Heidegger's primary emphasis on the question of Being. During his Freiburg years, Blankenburg attended small seminars led by Heidegger in the Schwarzwald forest. (Heidegger had been forbidden to teach after the end of World War II.) Blankenburg recalls that the participants would sit on logs in an open field as if to invoke Heidegger's concept of the clearing (Lichtung) of Being. While not entirely sympathetic with Heidegger's philosophy, Blankenburg learned to carefully "listen"—as Heidegger would repeatedly emphasize—to language, not merely poetic or philosophical language, but the language of the patients he would meet in clinical practice.During this time, Blankenburg heard lectures by W. Szilasi, the philosopher-scientist who held Husserl's and Heidegger's chair in the department of philosophy. Szilasi collaborated with the phenomenological psychiatrist, L. Binswanger. Their effort to apply concepts from Husserl's... (shrink)

A Kuhnian reformulation of the recent debate in psychiatric nosography suggested that the current psychiatric classification system (the DSM) is in crisis and that a sort of paradigm shift is awaited (Aragona, 2009). Among possible revolutionary alternatives, the proposed fi ve-axes etiopathogenetic taxonomy (Charney et al., 2002) emphasizes the primacy of the genotype over the phenomenological level as the relevant basis for psychiatric nosography. Such a position is along the lines of the micro-reductionist perspective of E. Kandel (1998, 1999), (...) which sees mental disorders reducible to explanations at a fundamental epistemic level of genes and neurotransmitters. This form of micro-reductionism has been criticized as a form of genetic-molecular fundamentalism (e.g. Murphy, 2006) and a multi-level approach, in the form of the burgeoning Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, was proposed. This article focuses on multi-level mechanistic explanations, coming from Cognitive Science, as a possible alternative etiopathogenetic basis for psychiatric classification. The idea of a mechanistic approach to psychiatric taxonomy is here defended on the basis of a better conception of levels and causality. Nevertheless some critical remarks of Mechanism as a psychiatric general view are also offered. (shrink)

It is widely held that a successful theory of the mind will be neuroscientific. In this paper we ask, first, what this claim means, and, secondly, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we argue that the claim is ambiguous between two views--one plausible but unsubstantive, and one substantive but highly controversial. In answer to the second question, we argue that neither the evidence from neuroscience itself nor from other scientific and philosophical considerations supports the controversial view.

In Search of Memory, Eric Kandel’s excellent account of the rise of neuroscience, in which his own research has a prominent place, is reviewed with special attention given to its relation to Michael Polanyi’s philosophy. It is found that Polanyi’s epistemological theory, although established on quite different grounds, accords well with Kandel’ s description of how the brain operates. In particular, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing seems to be both enriched and validated by Kandel’s account of how (...) memory functions. (shrink)

Les recherches récentes sur la plasticité neuronale ouvrent à une nouvelle compréhension des liens entre structures nerveuses et comportement humain. Selon les perspectives développées par Kandel et Edelman, le concept de libre arbitre a toute sa pertinence. Une confrontation avec les expériences de Libet et l’interprétation qu’en propose Wegner conduisent tout d’abord à l’analyse du problème du déterminisme en lien avec les traditions scientifiques et philosophiques. Les relations au langage sont ensuite étudiées en référence aux travaux de Habermas et (...) Davidson. Dans la mesure où l’activité langagière s’intègre à la dynamique de la plasticité neuronale, un modèle explicatif est proposé où, à distance de Wegner, le langage peut avoir un impact effectif sur le comportement humain. Un libre arbitre effectif de l’humain parait pensable. (shrink)

(1) It is not clear from Gold and Stoljar’s definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel’s theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. (2) Objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrine. There might also be the implicit belief that for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must (...) invoke neurophysiological concepts and cannot be purely psychological. (shrink)

Could anything provide a philosophically convincing mark of the mental in simple organisms (Lloyd 1984)? Individual organisms’ capacities to modify behavior adaptively as a result of past encounters with the environment might mark the first step in the phylogeny of minds. The simplest examples of mental representation are likely to be found in the simplest forms of animal learning.The most scientifically rigorous test case of “bottom- up” strategies in cognitive neuroscience is provided by current studies of the cellular and molecular (...) biology of associative learning in higher invertebrates, but particularly gastropod molluscs, snails or slugs (Quinn 1984). For the relevant neurobiological research community (Farley and Alkon 1985; Hawkins, Clark, and Kandel 1986), “Bottom-up” does not just mean letting one’s study of the properties of the nervous system control one’s analyses of animal behavior or cognition. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Cajal and Consciousness: Introduction. By PEDRO C. MARIJUAN1 -- Part I. Consciousness, One Hundred Years after Textura -- Progress in the Neural Sciences in the Century after Cajal (and the Mysteries -- That Remain). By THOMAS D. ALBRIGHT, THOMAS M. JESSELL, -- ERIC R. KANDEL, AND MICHAEL I. POSNER11 -- Part II. Biological Complexity and the Emergence of Consciousness -- Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks. -- By MURRAY GELL-MANN41 -- The Epistemic Paradox of Mind (...) and Matter. By HAROLD J. MOROWITZ50 -- The Conscious Cell. BY LYNN MARGULIS55 -- Complexity and Tinkering. By FRANCOIS JACOB71 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry. By STUART HAMEROFF. 74 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry: An Addendum-Some -- New Developments on the Orch OR Model for Consciousness. -- By ROGER PENROSE105 -- Part III. From Primary to Higher-level Consciousness -- Consciousness: The Remembered Present. By GERALD EDELMAN111 -- Consciousness and the Binding Problem. By WOLF SINGER123 -- Cajal on Neurons, Molecules, and Consciousness. By JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX 147 -- A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks. By -- STANISLAS DEHAENE, MICHEL KERSZBERG, AND JEAN-PIERRE -- CHANGEUX152 -- Consciousness and the Brain: The Thalamocortical Dialogue in Health and -- Disease. By RODOLFO LLINAS AND URS RIBARY166 -- The Neuroanatomy of Phenomenal Vision: A Psychological Perspective. -- ByPETRA STOERIG176 -- Co-evolution of Human Consciousness and Language. By MICHAEL A. ARBIB 195 -- From Computing with Numbers to Computing with Words-From -- Manipulation of Measurements to Manipulations of Perceptions. -- By LOTFI A. ZADEH221 -- Part IV. Closing Remarks -- Who Was Cajal? By ALBERTO PORTERA-SANCHEZ253 -- Index of Contributors259 -- Subject Index261. (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to draw attention to eight forgotten heroes: William C. Bagley, Charles DeGarmo, David Felmley, William Torrey Harris, Isaac L. Kandel, Charles McMurry, William C. Ruediger, and Edward Austin Sheldon. They have been marginalized from our profession, and drawing upon their legacy is the best hope for restoring the profession of teaching today. This work also includes a chapter at the end of the book entitled "John Dewey's Forgotten Essays." The audience for this book (...) includes: 1) classroom teachers, 2) school administrators, 3) teacher educators, 4) deans and other university administrators, 5) college and university presidents, 6) legislators, 7) historians of education, 8) curriculum specialists, 9) specialists in teacher training, and 10) the general public. (shrink)

Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor role in mental (...) activity. However, contemporary neuroscience provides experimental evidence suggesting that mental representations necessarily involve consciousness. Consciousness does not only enable individuals to become aware of their own thoughts, it also constantly changes the causal properties of these thoughts. In light of these empirical studies, mental representations appear to be intrinsically dependent on consciousness. This discovery represents an obstacle to any attempt to construct an artificial mind. (shrink)

''There is no doubt that postgraduate students and researchers in cognitive neuroscience will find this book to be a useful tool and I would not hesitate to recommend it... The relatively short length of the essays and their overview of current research, make them ideal reading material for more advanced researchers... The book therefore serves as an ideal starting place for cognitive psychologists who want to know more about cognitive neuroscience.'' -Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16Cognitive neuroscience has been the most productive, (...) and arguably the most exciting area of growth in psychology and neuroscience over recent years, with remarkable insights into the brain mechanisms of cognitive abilities being gained from studies of both animals and humans. Johan Bolhuis has brought together a stellar list of contributors, including, amongst others, Patrick Bateson, Lawrence Weiskrantz, Robert Hinde, Eric Kandel, Mark Johnson, and James McGaugh to provide a truly authoritative and comprehensive overview of our current knowledge of the essential neural mechanisms of perception, learning, and memory. Written to be accessible to advanced undergraduates, and postgraduates, the book describes the latest advances in the most important fields of cognitive neuroscience. Brain, Perception, Memory will be an invaluable reference work and textbook for advanced students and researchers in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and animal behaviour. (shrink)

This essay selectively reviews, from an historical and philosophical perspective, the dopamine (DA) hypothesis of schizophrenia (DHS; Table 1 lists the abbreviations used in this essay). Our goal is not to adjudicate the validity of the theory—although we arrive at a generally skeptical conclusion—but to focus on the process whereby the DHS has evolved over time and been evaluated. Since its inception, the DHS has been the most prominent etiologic theory in psychiatry and is still referred to widely in current (...) textbooks (e.g., Buchanan and Carpenter, Jr. 2005, 1336; Cohen 2003, 225; Gazzaniga 2004, 1257;Kandel et al. 2000, 1200). Understanding its origins and evolution should help to clarify the nature of modern .. (shrink)

In their influential book, The Child Centered School, Harold Rugg and Ann Schumaker wrote that, in traditional schools, students found “that behind each classroom door lurked a deceptive Pandora’s box of fears, restraints, and long, weary hours of suppression” (Rugg and Shumaker 1928, p. 4). The American child-centered, romantic progressives were known to quip that educators of the old, traditional education did not care what students were taught, as long as students didn’t like it. Isaac Kandel, the longtime critic (...) of child-centered progressivism, retorted that, for progressives, “it does not matter what a student studies, so long as he does like it” (Kandel 1943, p. 49). And so a debate took root about several fundamental educational questions: just how important is it that students enjoy themselves, that they are self-motivated, and that they are interested in what they were doing? What role is left for the curriculum, discipline, and students’ intellectual inheritance? So the debat. (shrink)

In this long and detailed book Bennett and Hacker set themselves two ambitious tasks. The first is to offer a philosophical critique of, what they argue are, philosophical confusions within contemporary cognitive neuroscience. The second is to present a ‘conceptual reference work for cognitive neuroscientists who wish to check the contour lines of the psychological concept relevant to their investigation’ (p.7). In the process they cover an astonishing amount of material. The first two chapters present a critical history of neuroscience (...) from Aristotle to Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield. Chapter three (to which I shall return), offers the philosophical basis for much of the book. Chapters four to twelve present detailed philosophical criticisms of a wide variety of neuroscientists (and some philosophers) on a large number of topics. These include: Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Marr and Frisby on perception (particularly the primary/secondary quality distinction and the binding problem); Milner, Squire and Kandel on memory; Blakemore and others on mental imagery; LaDoux and Damasio on the emotions; Libet on voluntary movement; and Baars, Crick, Edelman, Damasio, Penrose, Searle, Chalmers, and Nagel on consciousness (with a great deal on qualia and self-consciousness). Chapters thirteen and fourteen, along with the two appendices, contain an elaboration and defence of the book’s methodology and present explicit contrasts with the Churchlands, Dennett and Searle. Bennett and Hacker maintain that whilst neuroscientists have made significant discoveries concerning the workings of the brain, these discoveries have been obscured by their presentation within an incoherent conceptual framework. Their complaints, therefore, are often not with neuroscience itself but with what might be called its philosophical self image. (shrink)

As a generation of fuzzy set, the notion of complex fuzzy set which is an innovative concept is introduced by Ramot, Milo, Friedman and Kandel. The purpose of this article is to apply complex fuzzy set to BCK/BCI-algebras. The notions of a complex subalgebra and a complex left reduced ideal in a BCK/BCI- algebra are introduced, and related properties are investigated. Characterizations of a complex subalgebra are provided, and the homomorphic image of a complex subalgebra and a complex left (...) reduced ideal. (shrink)