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  1. Robert Almeder (1989). Peircean Scientific Realism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 (4):357 - 364.
  2. Holger Andreas & Frank Zenker (forthcoming). Basic Concepts of Structuralism. Erkenntnis:1-6.
    Primarily addressed to readers unfamiliar with the structuralist approach in philosophy of science, we introduce the basic concepts that the contributions to this special issue presuppose. By means of examples, we briefly review set-theoretic structures and predicates, the potential and actual models of an empirical theory, intended applications, as well as links and specializations that are applied, among others, in reconstructing the empirical claim associated with a theory element.
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  3. M. B. (1973). The Problem of Scientific Realism. Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):144-145.
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  4. Katherine Brading & Elaine Landry (2006). Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Representation. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):571-581.
    This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism. Central to our investigation is the notion of `shared structure'. We begin with a description of mathematical structuralism and use this to point out analogies and disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world connection, this use being crucially important to both the contemporary structural empiricist and realist. We show why minimal scientific structuralism is, at the very (...)
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  5. Harold I. Brown (1990). Cherniak on Scientific Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):415-427.
    In the final chapter of Minimal Rationality Christopher Cherniak offers three arguments to show that an agent with finite cognitive resources is not capable of arriving at a true and complete theory of the universe. I discuss each of these arguments and show that Cherniak has not succeeded in making his antirealist case.
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  6. Harold I. Brown (1988). Scientific Realism. International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):130-131.
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  7. Otávio Bueno (2011). Structural Empiricism, Again. In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. 81--103.
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  8. Michael Byrd & Dennis Henry (1978). Sugihara's Criterion and Some Structural Parallels Between E→ and S3→. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 24 (12):187-191.
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  9. Tian Yu Cao (2006). Structural Realism and Quantum Gravity. In Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford University Press.
  10. Angelo Cei (2010). Structural Realism as a Form of Humility. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. 35--45.
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  11. Jonathan Chaplin (1995). Gooyeweerd's Notion of Societal Structural Principles. Philosophia Reformata 60 (1):16-36.
    The notion of societal structural principles is the foundation stone of Dooyeweerd’s social philosophy, and of the political and legal philosophy grounded in it, yet it has so far received little detailed critical analysis or constructive reformulation among reformational scholars. The aim of this paper is the modest one of illustrating the kind of analysis still to be done if the notion is to be put to more constructive use within social theory. I shall say little about the epistemological or (...)
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  12. Robert C. Culley (1974). Structural Analysis: Is It Done with Mirrors? Interpretation 28 (2):165-181.
    The occurrence of these two kinds of stories in the narrative tradition sets out two modes of response to crises : Yahweh moving from his position of strength to save the situation by supernatural action and human beings moving from their position of weakness to save the situation as best they can with various acts of deception.
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  13. Steven French (2014). The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oup Oxford.
    Steven French articulates and defends the bold claim that there are no objects in the world. He draws on metaphysics and philosophy of science to argue for structural realism--the position that we live in a world of structures--and defends a form of eliminativism about objects that sets laws and symmetry principles at the heart of ontology.
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  14. Steven French (2013). Eschewing Entities: Outlining a Biology Based Form of Structural Realism. In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. 371--381.
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  15. Steven French (2013). Semi-Realism, Sociability and Structure. Erkenntnis 78 (1):1 - 18.
    Semi-realism offers a metaphysics of science based on causal properties. Insofar as these are understood in terms of dispositions for specific relations that comprise the concrete structure of the world it can be regarded as a form of structural realism. And insofar as these properties are 'sociable' and cohere into the groupings that comprise the particulars investigated by science, it captures the underlying intuition behind forms of entity realism. However, I shall raise concerns about both these features. I shall suggest (...)
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  16. Steven French & James Ladyman (2011). In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism. In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. 25--42.
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  17. Yvon Gauthier (1985). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science Ian Hacking Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 287 P. [REVIEW] Dialogue 24 (01):162-.
    This is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. 'Representing' deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putnam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. 'Intervening' presents the first sustained treatment of experimental science for many years and uses it to give a new direction to debates about realism. Hacking (...)
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  18. Anthony Giddens (2000). The Question of Structural Constraints. In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications. 8--179.
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  19. Dimitri Ginev (forthcoming). Alisa Bokulich and Peter Bokulich (Eds): Scientific Structuralism (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 281). Erkenntnis:1-7.
    In drawing on Poincare’s conventionalism, Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism, Duhem’s methodological conservatism, and Russell’s holist doctrine of scientific knowledge, Worrall (1989) launched in his classical paper a new position in realism debate. The champions of structural realism have managed to combine a sense in which the development of science is cumulative with a picture of theory change that coheres with the argument of the “pessimistic meta-induction”. Twenty two years after the publication of Worrall’s paper, the volume under review presents an exciting recapitulation (...)
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  20. Dimitri Ginev (forthcoming). The Tenets of Hermeneutical Realism. Epistemologia.
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  21. Fabio Gironi & Stathis Psillos (2012). Of Realist Turns: A Conversation with Stathis Psillos. Speculations:367-427.
    Interview with Stathis Psillos regarding realism in the philosophy of science and recent realist trends in Continental Philosophy.
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  22. Piotr Giza (2002). Automated Discovery Systems and Scientific Realism. Minds and Machines 12 (1):105-117.
    In the paper I explore the relations between a relatively new and quickly expanding branch of artificial intelligence –- the automated discovery systems –- and some new views advanced in the old debate over scientific realism. I focus my attention on one such system, GELL-MANN, designed in 1990 at Wichita State University. The program's task was to analyze elementary particle data available in 1964 and formulate an hypothesis (or hypotheses) about a `hidden', more simple structure of matter, or to put (...)
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  23. G. Glas (1989). Emotie Als Struktuur-Probleem. Een Onderzoek Aan de Hand van Dooyeweerds Leer van Het Enkaptisch Strukturgeheel L'émotion Comme Problème de Structure. Une Étude de la Doctrine de l'Ensemble Structural Enkaptique de Dooyeweerd. Philosophia Reformata 54 (1):29-43.
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  24. Irving Goh (2009). Structural Reject. Theory and Event 12 (1).
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  25. Alan H. Goldman (1979). Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):175-192.
    Definitions of stronger and weaker versions of physical realism are offered, The first relating to the existence of physical objects and the second to the independence of their properties. It is argued that recent debates about the commensurability and convergence of scientific theories and the causal theory of reference are irrelevant to the truth of these theses, Although their proponents seem to think them linked. It is then argued that support for realist positions must be inductive. Such support is provided (...)
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  26. Ian Hacking (1989). Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):555-581.
    My Representing and Intervening (1983) concludes with what it calls an experimental argument for scientific realism about entities. The argument is evidently inapplicable to extragalactic astrophysics, but leaves open the possibility that there might be other grounds for scientific realism in that domain. Here I argue for antirealism in astrophysics, although not for any particular kind of antirealism. The argument is conducted by a detailed examination of some current research. It parallels the last chapter of (1983). Both represent the methodological (...)
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  27. Eric D. Hetherington (2000). Cartwright, Nancy. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Review of Metaphysics 54 (2):424-426.
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  28. L. Hjelmslev (1985). Structural Analysis Of. In Jerrold J. Katz (ed.), The Philosophy of Linguistics. Oxford University Press. 2--163.
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  29. Trevor Hussey (2000). Realism and Nursing. Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):98–108.
    It is argued that philosophical realism is well suited to serve as a perspective from which to understand nursing, and that it should be considered as an alternative to positivist, interpretivist, hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches. However, existing forms of realism, including theory and entity realism are shown to be faced with serious problems. In response, an alternative form ‘constraint realism’ is outlined, and shown to be apposite for illuminating the rule or convention governed behaviour characteristic of human beings. A brief (...)
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  30. Alistair M. C. Isaac (2014). Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities. Erkenntnis 79 (3):481-510.
    This paper outlines and defends a novel position in the color realism debate, namely structural realism. This position is novel in that it dissociates the veridicality of color attributions from the claim that physical objects are themselves colored. Thus, it is realist about color in both the semantic and epistemic senses, but not the ontic sense. The generality of this position is demonstrated by applying it to other “secondary qualities,” including heat, musical pitch, and odor. The basic argument proceeds by (...)
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  31. Dale Jacquette (1995). Abstract Entity. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
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  32. R. S. Kaushal (1999). The Role of Structural Analogy In Physical Sciences: A Philosophical Perspective. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 26 (4):543-574.
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  33. Jeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
    Structural realism has been proposed as an epistemological position interpolating between realism and sceptical anti-realism about scientific theories. The structural realist who accepts a scientific theory thinks that is empirically correct, and furthermore is a realist about the ‘structural content’ of . But what exactly is ‘structural content’? One proposal is that the ‘structural content’ of a scientific theory may be associated with its Ramsey sentence (). However, Demopoulos and Friedman have argued, using ideas drawn from Newman's earlier criticism of (...)
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  34. Jim Kitses (1972). Elia Kazan: A Structural Analysis. Cinema 7:25.
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  35. Vincent Lam (2012). Review Of: Tian Yu Cao, From Current Algebra to Quantum Chromodynamics: A Case for Structural Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 32 (6):447-449.
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  36. Vincent Lam (2012). Tian Yu Cao , From Current Algebra to Quantum Chromodynamics: A Case for Structural Realism . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (6):447-449.
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  37. Vincent Lam & Michael Esfeld, Structures as the Objects of Fundamental Physics.
    The paper argues that there are structures rather than objects with an intrinsic identity in the domain of fundamental physics. We line out the standard metaphysics of objects with an intrinsic identity, recall the main objection against that position (section 1) and then retrace the development to epistemic structural realism (section 2) and to ontic structural realism (section 3). We elaborate on the arguments for ontic structural realism from quantum physics (section 4) and from space-time physics (section 5). Finally, we (...)
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  38. Vincent Lam & Christian Wüthrich (2014). No Categorial Support for Radical Ontic Structural Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt053.
    Radical ontic structural realism (ROSR) asserts an ontological commitment to ‘free-standing’ physical structures understood solely in terms of fundamental relations, without any recourse to relata that stand in these relations. Bain ([2013], pp.1621–35) has recently defended ROSR against the common charge of incoherence by arguing that a reformulation of fundamental physical theories in category-theoretic terms (rather than the usual set-theoretic ones) offers a coherent and precise articulation of the commitments accepted by ROSR. In this essay, we argue that category theory (...)
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  39. Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.) (2012). Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality. Springer.
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  40. Andrew J. Lawson (1997). The Structural History of Stonehenge. Proceedings of the British Academy 92:15-37.
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  41. E. Levy (1985). I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Essays in the Philosophy of Natural Science Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 5 (1):14-18.
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  42. D. Lewis (1986). In Defense of Structural Universais. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62:25-46.
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  43. Timothy D. Lyons (2011). The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):317-338.
    According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to (...)
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  44. Timothy D. Lyons (2009). Non-Competitor Conditions in the Scientific Realism Debate. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):65-84.
    A general insight of 20th-century philosophy of science is that the acceptance of a scientific theory is grounded, not merely on a theory's relation to data, but on its status as having no, or being superior to its, competitors. I explore the ways in which scientific realists might be thought to utilise this insight, have in fact utilised it, and can legitimately utilise it. In more detail, I point out that, barring a natural but mistaken characterisation of scientific realism, traditional (...)
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  45. Holger Lyre (2013). Must Structural Realism Cover the Special Sciences? In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. 383--390.
    Structural Realism (SR) is typically rated as a moderate realist doctrine about the ultimate entities of nature described by fundamental physics. Whether it must be extended to the higher-level special sciences is not so clear. In this short paper I argue that there is no need to ‘structuralize’ the special sciences. By mounting concrete examples I show that structural descriptions and structural laws certainly play a role in the special sciences, but that they don’t play any exclusive role nor that (...)
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  46. Edward MacKinnon (1979). Scientific Realism: The New Debates. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):501-532.
    In place of earlier instrumentalist and phenomenalist interpretations of science both Quine and Sellars have developed highly influential realist positions centering around the doctrine that accepting a theory as explanatory and irreducible rationally entails accepting the entities posited by the theory. A growing reaction against this realism is partially based on perceived inadequacies in the doctrines of Quine and Sellars, but even more on reconstructions of scientific explanations which do not involve such ontic commitments. Three types of anti-realistic positions are (...)
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  47. J. Christopher Maloney (1986). Sensation and Scientific Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3):471-482.
  48. Michela Massimi (2011). Structural Realism: A Neo-Kantian Perspective. In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. 1--23.
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  49. Kerry McKenzie (2014). Priority and Particle Physics: Ontic Structural Realism as a Fundamentality Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):353-380.
    In this article, I address concerns that the ontological priority claims definitive of ontic structural realism are as they stand unclear, and I do so by placing these claims on a more rigorous formal footing than they typically have been hitherto. I first of all argue that Kit Fine’s analysis of ontological dependence furnishes us with an ontological priority relation that is particularly apt for structuralism. With that in place, and with reference to two case studies prominent within the structuralist (...)
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  50. Kerry McKenzie (2013). How (and How Not) to Object to Objects: Developments in Structural Realism. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (2):283-287.
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