Before Euro-American settlement, many Native American nations intercropped maize (_Zea mays_), beans (_Phaseolus vulgaris_), and squash (_Cucurbita pepo_) in what is colloquially called the “Three Sisters.” Here we review the historic importance and consequences of rejuvenation of Three Sisters intercropping (3SI), outline a framework to engage Native growers in community science with positive feedbacks to university research, and present preliminary findings from ethnography and a randomized, replicated 3SI experiment. We developed mutually beneficial collaborative research agendas with four Midwestern US Native (...) American nations. Ethnographic data highlighted a culturally based respect for 3SI as living beings, the importance it holds for all cultural facets of these Native nations, and the critical impact the practice has on environmental sustainability. One concern expressed by Native growers during ethnographic research was improving soil health—part of the rationale for establishing the 3SI agronomic experiment. To address this, we collaboratively designed a 3SI experiment. After 1 year, 3SI increased short-term soil respiration by 24%, decreased salt-extractable nitrate by 54%, had no effect on soil microbial biomass (but increased its carbon-to-nitrogen ratio by 32%) compared to the average of monoculture crops. The overarching purpose of this collaborative project is to develop a deeper understanding of 3SI, its cultural importance to Native communities, and how reinvigorating the practice—and intercropping in general—can make agroecosystems more sustainable for people and the environment. (shrink)

El discurso biológico de Ayala se centra en estas tres cuestiones: 1) El hecho de la evolución. 2) Historia de la evolución. 3) Mecanismos del desarrollo y cambio evolutivos. El hecho determinante y cierto, según Ayala, es la evidencia de relaciones entre todos los organismos debidas a una común descendencia con modificaciones como lo han demostrado con abundancia la Paleontología, Anatomía comparada, Biogeografía, Embriología, Genética Molecular, Bioinformática y otras disciplinas biológicas que nos llevan a la afirmación de que el hecho (...) de la evolución de los seres vivos tiene el mismo grado de certeza que poseen los hechos históricos y científicos ampliamente confirmados. Para Ayala, explicaciones acerca del origen del mundo, del hombre y de otras criaturas se encuentran en todas las culturas. Tras la publicación del Origen de las Especies de C. Darwin en 1859, se produce gran polémica en los medios científicos, culturales y religiosos, pero pasado un período de maduración, el darwinismo logra ser aceptado especialmente bajo las formas de Neo-darwinismo y Teoría Sintética. Otro asunto muy distinto son las diversas teorías y micro-teorías que se proponen para explicar los mecanismos de la evolución de los organismos vivos que presentan todavía profundas lagunas, deficiencias y controversias que han provocado la aparición de teorías alternativas. No obstante, el darwinismo moderno constituye un peldaño importante en la reconstrucción del sinuoso y complejo proceso evolutivo de la vida a través de millones de años acudiendo a una razonable explicación causal sin que esto atente contra ningún supuesto religioso. (shrink)

In this paper we shall examine a few texts by authors who predate Hilary in order to investigate a possible exegetical tradition or interpretative current that could include several gnostic groups cited by Irenaeus of Lyons (II c.), to Origen (III c.) and saint Hilary of Poitiers (IV c.). However, one of the interpretations that Origen presents in his Commentary on saint John is the same interpretation that Hilary gives, but it is more developed. Certainly, Hilary and Origen comment two (...) different Gospels, but both comment homologous scenes; Hilary comments Mt. 8:5-13 and Origen, Io. 4:46-54. In addition, we believe some testimonies in Hilary’s commentary can reveal the influence of Origen’s commentary on Hilary/s. One of these testimonies could be the explanation of the strange reading transmitted by Hilary who calls tribunus to the centurio of the Gospel. (shrink)

The aim of the present research was to assess elite student-athletes’ perception of the dual career during the lockdown caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, compared with a group of elite student-athletes who could develop their dual career under normal conditions. A total of 150 elite athletes who were also undergraduate or postgraduate students self-completed the “Perceptions of dual career student-athletes ” questionnaire. From them, 78 did it during the mandatory lockdown period due to the state of emergency caused (...) by COVID-19 and 72 completed it in the previous year to Rio 2016 Olympic Games. The COVID-19 group was found to spend a significantly higher number of hours per week studying, while no significant differences were observed between groups in any training time variable. Student-athletes of the COVID-19 group showed better perception of whether their sport career could help them cope with their academic career and better general perception of remote learning and the use of tasks and videoconferencing as learning support tools. A lower percentage of athletes of the COVID-19 group than of the control group wished to continue with their sport career once they finished their studies. To conclude, student-athletes of the COVID-19 group show adaptations with regard to the organization of their studies and the importance they give to them and to the services provided by dual-career programs, compared with student-athletes from an ordinary pre-Olympic year. In general, student-athletes’ perception of the dual career is very positive. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca puntuar algunas características y usos políticos de la noción de sentido común desde el pensamiento de Michel Foucault. A partir de una breve comparación con la perspectiva gramsciana del sentido común, se intenta especialmente atender a dos cuestiones: por un lado, qué estatuto epistémico se le da al conocimiento general presente en la vida cotidiana y, por otro, qué vínculo respecto a él se sostiene, o bien bajo la figura del “intelectual orgánico”, o bien el estilo (...) foucaulteano del “intelectual específico”. Desde allí, se intenta situar alcances y limitaciones de la noción desde una perspectiva foucaulteana. (shrink)

A fines de la Segunda Guerra Mundial sedebilita el espíritu vanguardista que caracterizó la modernidad. En esta coyuntura nace la posmodernidad como una respuesta a la canonización del movimiento moderno, como una nueva sensibilidad y una reacción que transformó los modelos estéticos y los esquemas vitales. Su influencia fue muy amplia, afectó diversos aspectos de la vida social y modificó la percepción que se tenía de la historia y del tiempo, como el valor que tenía la noción de progreso y (...) la idea de perfectibilidad como un dinamizador de la actividad del hombre hacia el futuro. Fue un movimiento que cuestionó los ideales de la modernidad, la universalización de los gustos, el racionalismo y el pragmatismo que inspiraba la función social del arte, como la funcionalidad que imponía en algunas de las artes un estilo no ornamental. Además, fue un movimiento que desde el eclecticismo borró las diferencias entre las artes, y el abismo que separaba el arte culto y el arte popular. El artículo tiene tres partes: en la primera parte se ocupa de manera general del tema de la posmodernidad, de la ruptura que esta nueva “episteme” generó y de los cambios que se dieron tanto en el pensamiento filosófico como en la forma de entender y asumir la existencia cotidiana, en la experiencia estética como en otros ámbitos de la sociedad. En la segunda parte, de algunas características de la literatura posmoderna. Y, en la tercera, del análisis de dos obras de Elena Poniatowska, “Hasta no verte Jesús mío” y “La noche de Tlatelolco”,que pueden servir de ejemplos o de ilustraciónde algunas de las características ya enunciadas. (shrink)

El presente trabajo trata de hacer una defensa de una particular versión de positivismo jurídico excluyente como teoría que mejor describe el derecho y sus referencias a la moral. Aunque se reivindica la tesis de las fuentes como la tesis iuspositivista por excelencia, el quid de la defensa se asienta sobre un análisis de los diferentes tipos y conceptos de moral que se consideran relevantes a la hora de la identificación del derecho. La posibilidad del error en el descubrimiento de (...) la moral objetiva deja campo abierto para entender que el derecho no puede quedar determinado por otra cosa que no sean hechos sociales. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

[This book] develops an account of rationality and justice that is tradition specific.-http://undpress.nd.edu.

Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the (...) proposition that Glenn loves Tracy has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that Glenn loves Tracy is distinct from the proposition that Tracy loves Glenn yet both have the same constituents, what is about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? In The Nature and Structure of Content, Jeffrey C. King formulates a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, King deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: he shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on his approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The Nature and Structure of Content also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis. Scholars and students working in the philosophy of mind and language will find this book rewarding reading. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

Niko Čavčavaże -- Tʻamaz Buačʻiże -- Zurab Kakabaże -- Eduard Kodua.

Este artículo pretende mostrar cómo hablar de ciencia útil en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, expresó un vínculo orgánico entre determinadas ciencias y las prioridades del gobierno. La geografía, la botánica, la química, la medicina y, especialmente, la historia natural, proveían información sobre los recursos disponibles para la reorganización económica del imperio español. Aquellos científicos criollos que se dedicaron a las ciencias útiles terminaron siendo promotores de reformas que presentaron ante el tribunal de (...) la opinión pública, en una forma de debate colectivo, como sucedió con el Semanario del Nuevo Reyno de Granada. (shrink)

En el devenir de las artes visuales en Colombia, la preocupación por los efectos de los fenómenos de la violencia ha sido recurrente. Lamirada de los artistas se ha valido de diferentes lenguajes expresivos y formas de traducción, con el interés de construir una estrecha relación entre la naturaleza de las obras y el acontecer de los propios fenómenos sociales.

This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or "phronesis"--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which ...

Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are digital technologies that will have significant impact on the development of humanity in the near future. They have raised fundamental questions about what we should do with these systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve, and how we can control these. - After the Introduction to the field (§1), the main themes (§2) of this article are: Ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e., tools made and used (...) by humans. This includes issues of privacy (§2.1) and manipulation (§2.2), opacity (§2.3) and bias (§2.4), human-robot interaction (§2.5), employment (§2.6), and the effects of autonomy (§2.7). Then AI systems as subjects, i.e., ethics for the AI systems themselves in machine ethics (§2.8) and artificial moral agency (§2.9). Finally, the problem of a possible future AI superintelligence leading to a “singularity” (§2.10). We close with a remark on the vision of AI (§3). - For each section within these themes, we provide a general explanation of the ethical issues, outline existing positions and arguments, then analyse how these play out with current technologies and finally, what policy consequences may be drawn. (shrink)

Diversos trabajos han abordado la influencia del protestantismo en la configuración del mundo moderno. Más allá de la influencia del protestantismo en la sociedad moderna desde distintos ámbitos particulares (la economía, el derecho, la política, etc.), podría considerarse la existencia de algún vector aglutinante de penetración de dicha influencia. Es aquí donde la filosofía se intuye definitiva. La comprensión del ser humano pasa para el creyente por su comprensión de la fe. Este trabajo revisa las coincidencias, similitudes, relaciones o simples (...) compatibilidades entre el pensamiento existencialista y el luteranismo. Se concluye que ambos se muestran significativamente afines no sólo en la problemática acometida y sus conclusiones, sino también en lo relativo al talante y la retórica utilizados. (shrink)

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

The ninth edition of Media Ethics: Issues and Cases has been updated to reflect the most pressing ethical issues in media. Featuring 25 new cases on hot topic issues from fake news to drones and a new chapter on social justice, this authoritative case book gives students the tools to make ethical decisions in an increasingly complex environment.

This book offers solutions to two persistent and I believe closely related problems in epistemology. The first problem is that of drawing a principled distinction between perception and inference: what is the difference between seeing that something is the case and merely believing it on the basis of what we do see? The second problem is that of specifying which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., directly, or noninferentially, justified) and which are not. I argue that what makes a belief a (...) perceptual belief, or a basic belief, is not any introspectible feature of the belief but rather the nature of the cognitive system, or "module", that is causally responsible for the belief. Thus, even zombies, who in the philosophical literature lack conscious experiences altogether, can have basic, justified, perceptual beliefs. -/- The theories of perceptual and basic beliefs developed in the monograph are embedded in a larger reliabilist epistemology. I use this theory of basic beliefs to develop a detailed reliabilist theory: Inferentialist Reliabilism, which offers a reliabilist theory of inferential justification and which solves some longstanding problems for other reliabilist views by demanding inferential support for some—but not all—beliefs. The book is an instance of a thoroughgoingly naturalistic approach to epistemology. Many of my arguments have an empirical basis, and the view that I endorse reserves a central role for the cognitive sciences—in particular, cognitive neuroscience—in filling in the details of an applied epistemological theory. (shrink)

Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent needs distinctive communicative transactions, by which (...) other obligations, prohibitions, and rights can be waived or set aside in controlled and specific ways. Their book offers a coherent, wide-ranging and practical account of the role of consent in biomedicine which will be valuable to readers working in a range of areas in bioethics, medicine and law. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)