Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 3, Page 193-209, July 2022. This study aimed to explore experiences and practices of key research team members in obtaining informed consent for pharmacogenetics research and to identify the approaches used for enhancing understanding during the consenting process. Data collection involved 15 qualitative, in-depth interviews with key researchers who were involved in obtaining informed consent from HIV infected individuals in Uganda for participation in pharmacogenetic clinical trials. The study explored two prominent themes: approaches used to (...) convey information and enhance research participants’ understanding and challenges faced during the consenting process. Several barriers and facilitators for obtaining consent were identified. Innovative and potentially effective consenting strategies were identified in this study that should be studied and independently verified. (shrink)

Informed consent in medical practice is essential and a global standard that should be sought at all the times doctors interact with patients. Its intensity would vary depending on the invasiveness and risks associated with the anticipated treatment. To our knowledge there has not been any systematic review of consent practices to document best practices and identify areas that need improvement in our setting. The objective of the study was to evaluate the informed consent practices of surgeons at University teaching (...) Hospitals in a low resource setting. (shrink)

My topic is the materialist appropriation of empiricism – as conveyed in the ‘minimal credo’ nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (which interestingly is not just a phrase repeated from Hobbes and Locke to Diderot, but is also a medical phrase, used by Harvey, Mandeville and others). That is, canonical empiricists like Locke go out of their way to state that their project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall (...) not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind” (Essay, I.i.2, in Locke 1975; which Kant gets exactly wrong in his reading of Locke, in the Preface to the A edition of the first Critique). Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere, contrary to a prevalent reading of Locke, that the Essay is not the extension to the study of the mind of the methods of natural philosophy; that he is actually not the “underlabourer” of Newton and Boyle he claims politely to be in the Epistle to the Reader (Wolfe and Salter 2009, Wolfe 2010). Rather, Locke says quite directly if we pay heed to such passages, “Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct” (Essay, I.i.6). There would be more to say here about what this implies for our understanding of empiricism (see Norton 1981 and Gaukroger 2005), but instead I shall focus on a different aspect of this episode: how a non-naturalistic claim which falls under what we now call epistemology (a claim about the senses as the source of knowledge) becomes an ontology – materialism. That is, how an empiricist claim could shift from being about the sources of knowledge to being about the nature of reality (and/or the mind, in which case it needs, as David Hartley saw and Denis Diderot proclaimed more overtly, an account of the relation between mental processes and the brain). (David Armstrong, for one, denied that there could be an identification between empiricism and materialism on this point: eighteenth-century history of science seems to prove him wrong: see Armstrong 1968 and 1978.) Put differently, I want to examine the shift from the logic of ideas in the seventeenth century (Locke) to an eighteenth-century focus on what kind of ‘world’ the senses give us (Condillac), to an assertion that there is only one substance in the universe (Diderot, giving a materialist cast to Spinozism), and that we need an account of the material substrate of mental life. This is neither a ‘scientific empiricism’ nor a linear developmental process from philosophical empiricism to natural science, but something else again: the unpredictable emergence of an ontology on empiricist grounds. (shrink)

Sensibility, in any of its myriad realms – moral, physical, aesthetic, medical and so on – seems to be a paramount case of a higher-level, intentional property, not a basic property. Diderot famously made the bold and attributive move of postulating that matter itself senses, or that sensibility (perhaps better translated ‘sensitivity’ here) is a general or universal property of matter, even if he at times took a step back from this claim and called it a “supposition.” Crucially, sensibility is (...) here playing the role of a ‘booster’: it enables materialism to provide a full and rich account of the phenomena of conscious, sentient life, contrary to what its opponents hold: for if matter can sense, and sensibility is not a merely mechanical process, then the loftiest cognitive plateaus are accessible to materialist analysis, or at least belong to one and the same world as the rest of matter. This was noted by the astute anti-materialist critic, the Abbé Lelarge de Lignac, who, in his 1751 Lettres à un Amériquain, criticized Buffon for “granting to the body [la machine, a common term for the body at the time] a quality which is essential to minds, namely sensibility.” This view, here attributed to Buffon and definitely held by Diderot, was comparatively rare. If we look for the sources of this concept, the most notable ones are physiological and medical treatises by prominent figures such as Robert Whytt, Albrecht von Haller and the Montpellier vitalist Théophile de Bordeu. We then have, or so I shall try to sketch out, an intellectual landscape in which new – or newly articulated – properties such as irritability and sensibility are presented either as an experimental property of muscle fibers, that can be understood mechanistically (Hallerian irritability, as studied recently by Hubert Steinke and Dominique Boury) or a property of matter itself (whether specifically living matter as in Bordeu and his fellow montpelliérains Ménuret and Fouquet, or matter in general, as in Diderot). I am by no means convinced that it is one and the same ‘sensibility’ that is at issue in debates between these figures (as when Bordeu attacks Haller’s distinction between irritability and sensibility and claims that ‘his own’ property of sensibility is both more correct and more fundamental in organic beings), but I am interested in mapping out a topography of the problem of sensibility as property of matter or as vital force in mid-eighteenth-century debates – not an exhaustive cartography of all possible positions or theories, but an attempt to understand the ‘triangulation’ of three views: a vitalist view in which sensibility is fundamental, matching up with a conception of the organism as the sum of parts conceived as little lives (Bordeu et al.); a mechanist, or ‘enhanced mechanist’ view in which one can work upwards, step by step from the basic property of irritability to the higher-level property of sensibility (Haller); and, more eclectic, a materialist view which seeks to combine the mechanistic, componential rigour and explanatory power of the Hallerian approach, with the monistic and metaphysically explosive potential of the vitalist approach (Diderot). It is my hope that examining Diderot in the context of this triangulated topography of sensibility as property sheds light on his famous proclamation regarding sensibility as a universal property of matter. (shrink)

A chapter on the specifically 'medical' Epicureanism of La Mettrie, connecting his materialist approach to mind-body issues and his hedonistic ethics.

Well prior to the invention of the term ‘biology’ in the early 1800s by Lamarck and Treviranus (and lesser-known figures in the decades prior), and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‘organism’ under the pen of Leibniz and Stahl in the early 1700s, the question of ‘Life’, that is, the status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the (...) discourse on the ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, models of living being were constructed in opposition to ‘merely anatomical’, structural, mechanical models. It is therefore striking that the classic narratives of the Scientific Revolution conspicuously avoid any consideration of what status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe (I discuss this in Wolfe 2011, 2019 chapt. 1). Neither Harvey, nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms unique, or conversely, what does not. In this chapter I seek to establish how something we might call ‘the knowledge of Life’, to use an expression of Georges Canguilhem’s, emerged as part of early modernity without being part of the mainstream history of life science. This leads to the question, can one can correlate early modern “knowledge of life” with the emergence of a science called ‘biology’? (see Zammito 2018, Wolfe 2019, Bognon-Küss and Wolfe eds. 2019). It was once fashionable to speak of, e.g. ‘precursors of Darwin’, and then Canguilhem and Foucault famously did away with the category of precursor. But how then do we account for the phase that precedes the constitution of a science? With the case of biology, how do we account for the increasing fascination with the ontology of Life during the decades prior to the ‘naming of biology’, as McLaughlin has called it, at the end of the eighteenth century? This increased focus on Life and the ontology of Life sits awkwardly, both with mainstream narratives of the Scientific Revolution and of the history of biology. In seeking to address this increased focus (in which vitalism plays a role but was by no means the only conceptual actor: Wolfe 2020), I critically examine Foucault’s notorious claim (Foucault 1966) that there was no such thing as ‘Life’ in the eighteenth century and thus no such thing as biology. (shrink)

Les dernières oeuvres de Diderot révèlent une écriture et une pensée morales plurielles, mettant en scène des points de vue complémentaires. Diderot réfléchit en outre, dans l'Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron, à une véritable éthique de l'interprétation.

A growing phenomenon in contemporary society is adult children caring for their elderly parents. Although some interest has been directed to the question of filial piety in general, surprisingly, scant attention has been focused on the ethical dimensions of caring for elderly parents. This article explores the contribution that Aquinas’s theory of the virtues of filial piety and prudence can make to the ethical dilemmas of elder care. In examining Aquinas’s theory, I explicate the relationship between moral agency and prudence, (...) with a special emphasis on the relationship between the integral parts of prudence and the exercise of moral virtue. In doing so, I suggest how Aquinas’s theory can shape and guide contemporary filial piety in order to advance quality elder care. (shrink)

Dans un court article rarement discuté intitulé « Note sur la situation faite en France à la philosophie biologique » (publié en 1947 dans la Revue de métaphysique et de morale ), Canguilhem dénonce la « situation » de ce qu’il appelle la philosophie biologique en France, par rapport à une tradition germanique plus développée. Il explique que la réflexion française sur les questions biologiques est à l’arrêt, à la fois en raison de son héritage cartésien et d’une sorte de (...) crainte inavouée à l’égard de la tradition romantique « lebensphilosophisch » allemande et de ses traductions politiques. Cette position est inhabituelle dans un texte paru peu après la guerre, et dont l’auteur fut un résistant actif. Mais plutôt que d’examiner la conjoncture socio-historique et les influences qui ont pu conduire à cette « Note », l’article en examine les assertions. Que serait une telle philosophie biologique? Une philosophie de la vie germanique traduite en français? En un sens, l’accueil très enthousiaste que Canguilhem a réservé à l’œuvre de Kurt Goldstein (qu’il a faite traduire en français avec Merleau-Ponty) relève d’une telle translatio. Mais en un autre sens, tous ses travaux ne relèvent pas de ce programme : d’une certaine façon, Le normal et le pathologique (1943, revu et augmenté en 1966) y correspond, mais non les essais réunis dans La Connaissance de la vie (1952, augmentée en 1965), notamment en raison de leur orientation plus historiciste. Ce dernier cas est particulièrement clair : une épistémologie historique des sciences de la vie est un projet tout à fait différent d’une « philosophie biologique » (ou philosophie de la vie) d’inspiration romantique. L’article conclut sur les perspectives d’une philosophie biologique aujourd’hui. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1925 edition.

Introduction : archaic tombstone -- I. The awakening of thought -- II. Lucretius -- III. Cicero -- IV. The rise of Christianity -- V. The approach of death -- VI. Development of Christianity -- VII. Plotinus.

Souvenirs.--In troublous hours.--The gates of death.--With the young.--Gird up thy loins!--Forerunners.--By Faith.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

A powerful and original statement on the nature of film and the intimate relation of "film imagination" to our lives as human beings in the world.

This book is an examination of the inattention of business schools to moral education, addressing lessons learned from the most recent business corruption scandals and financial crises, and also questioning what we're teaching now and what should be considering in educating future business leaders to cope with the challenges of leading with integrity in the global environment"--Provided by publisher.

Charles Sanders Peirce has been characterized as the greatest American philosophic genius. He is the creator of pragmatism and one of the founders of modern logic. James, Royce, Schroder, and Dewey have acknowledged their great indebtedness to him. A laboratory scientist, he made notable contributions to geodesy, astronomy, psychology, induction, probability, and scientific method. He introduced into modern philosophy the doctrine of scholastic realism, developed the concepts of chance, continuity, and objective law, and showed the philosophical significance of the (...) theory of signs and mathematical logic. The present series is the first published edition of his systematic works. (shrink)

In this article, network science is discussed from a methodological perspective, and two central theses are defended. The first is that network science exploits the very properties that make a system complex. Rather than using idealization techniques to strip those properties away, as is standard practice in other areas of science, network science brings them to the fore, and uses them to furnish new forms of explanation. The second thesis is that network representations are particularly helpful in explaining the properties (...) of non-decomposable systems. Where part-whole decomposition is not possible, network science provides a much-needed alternative method of compressing information about the behavior of complex systems, and does so without succumbing to problems associated with combinatorial explosion. The article concludes with a comparison between the uses of network representation analyzed in the main discussion, and an entirely distinct use of network representation that has recently been discussed in connection with mechanistic modeling. (shrink)

Pourquoi la démocratie qui, en son principe, est un régime de liberté peut-elle dériver vers la servitude? Cette question n'est pas nouvelle, elle figurait déjà en bonne place dans la pensée politique de Platon et d'Aristote, pour lesquels cette dérive était inscrite dans la nature du régime, lequel n'était donc pas viable. Elle se retrouve également chez les premiers penseurs de la démocratie réelle moderne, en particulier Alexis de Tocqueville, pour lequel la démocratie est perpétuellement confrontée à une redoutable alternative (...) : promouvoir le goût de la liberté ou, à l'inverse, se dégrader en servitude de mœurs et d'opinion. Or, que cette servitude démocratique, qui est une tendance interne par laquelle la démocratie se détruit elle-même, ne résulte pas d'un pouvoir de contrainte externe mais trouve ses ressorts dans la volonté des individus, nous savons le penser depuis longtemps avec le concept de servitude volontaire d'Etienne de La Boétie. Pourquoi donc parler de nouvelles servitudes? Parce qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'écrire aujourd'hui un " Contr'un ". La figure du maître a changé, ce n'est plus un maître personnel, un tyran, qui tiendrait sous son pouvoir une multitude effrayée, mais un maître anonyme, sans visage et sans nom propre qui, par de nouvelles voies, instaure une domination d'un nouveau genre et de nouvelles servitudes. Celles-ci sont analysées ici sur les plans de l'anthropologie, de l'éthique, de l'économie, ainsi que de l'analyse sociale et de la philosophie politique en vue de repenser une liberté civile à la mesure des problèmes de notre temps. Ce livre est une défense de la liberté issue de la convergence des vues, non d'un collectif, mais d'un certain nombre d'individus singuliers, auteurs libres et indépendants, disons intempestifs, qui entendent s'élever contre les formes larvées de servitudes qui se mettent en place dans les sociétés démocratiques. Il s'agit donc de retrouver l'esprit de liberté sans lequel la démocratie se dégrade et se meurt. (shrink)

Les sociétés démocratiques sont confrontées à l'émergence d'enjeux environnementaux décisifs qui concernent tant les modes de production, d'échange et de consommation que l'habitat, les transports, l'agriculture, l'industrie et même nos modes de vie. La prise en charge de ces enjeux ne saurait s'opérer simplement par des mesures ponctuelles ou locales. Elle doit aujourd'hui être repensée la temporalité de l'action politique, confrontée à une urgence qui ne cessera de s'accroître dans les prochaines années.

L'ouvrage s'articule autour de deux perspectives. La première consiste à analyser des processus factuels touchant la réalité, mais aussi les représentations, la hiérarchie des valeurs, le statut de la violence au sein des démocraties contemporaines. Il ne s'agit pas de donner une vision globale, mais de mettre en évidence des transformations singulières, obscures et inaperçues qui affectent pourtant profondément la politique et sont susceptibles de rendre compte des dérives de la démocratie aujourd'hui. Ainsi, le monstre ordinaire, le maître anonyme, la (...) nouvelle trinité sont des concepts qui permettent de comprendre les métamorphoses du rapport entre la norme et sa transgression, la mise en place de nouveaux dispositifs de domination ou encore l'hégémonie de valeurs purement instrumentales. La seconde est normative, elle entend dépasser les faits pour s'interroger sur notre capacité à repenser et à changer le cours des choses au plan politique. Il en va ainsi de la reconsidération de la notion de légitimité démocratique, de la distinction des différents modes de consultation des populations, de l'élucidation des modes d'identification collectifs, des réflexions sur les conditions d'une laïcité vivante. (shrink)

La question cosmopolitique est restée en marge de l'intérêt qui a été porté à la pensée juridico-politique de Kant. Mais l'intérêt philosophique de la question cosmopolitique dépasse très largement ce cadre. Elle atteste d'abord que la théorie politique de Kant ne se limite pas une théorie de l'Etat. Il doit y avoir un en deçà et un au-delà de l'Etat, où la politique dépasse l'idée de peuple pour atteindre celle d'humanité. En ce sens, Kant est l'antidote de Carl Schmitt, qui (...) portait en lui la haine de l'idée cosmopolitique. Cet antagonisme théorique entre Schmitt et Kant, entre le poison et le remède, est largement attesté dans ce volume. Ce qui montre à quel point nous avons besoin aujourd'hui du cosmopolitisme de Kant, pour penser le passage de la guerre à la paix, la place de l'hôte étranger dans nos sociétés complexes et la nouvelle configuration d'un monde globalisé. (shrink)

This new edition of Charles Fried's 'Medical Experimentation' includes a general introduction by Franklin Miller and the late Alan Wertheimer, a reprint of the 1974 text, an in-depth analysis by Harvard Law School scholars I. Glenn Cohen and D. James Greiner, and a new essay by Fried reflecting on the original text and how it applies to the contemporary landscape of medicine and medical experimentation.

This paper describes one style of functional analysis commonly used in the neurosciences called task-bound functional analysis. The concept of function invoked by this style of analysis is distinctive in virtue of the dependence relations it bears to transient environmental properties. It is argued that task-bound functional analysis cannot explain the presence of structural properties in nervous systems. An alternative concept of neural function is introduced that draws on the theoretical neuroscience literature, and an argument is given to show that (...) this alternative concept of may help to overcome the explanatory limitations of task-bound functional analysis. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un point névralgique en philosophie? C'est une question ou une position particulière, locale, mais autour de laquelle une pensée se joue dans sa totalité. Autrement dit, c'est un lieu de décision philosophique qui n'engage pas seulement sa cohérence, mais aussi et surtout sa spécificité et sa teneur. Un point névralgique est donc un lieu de décision philosophique dont aucune philosophie marquante ne fait l'économie. Dans cet ouvrage sont analysés les principaux points névralgiques de nombres des plus grands philosophes contemporains. (...) Il en va ainsi, par exemple, de la question du sujet chez Foucault, ou de celle du pardon chez Derrida, ou encore de celle de la légitimation postmoderne chez Lyotard, etc. Ces points névralgiques ne sont pas les seuls chez ces penseurs, mais ils ont au moins une importance toute particulière et tous ont joué un rôle majeur dans la construction de la pensée occidentale. (shrink)

A fascinating research program in neurophysiology attempts to quantify the amount of information transmitted by single neurons. The claims that emerge from this research raise new philosophical questions about the nature of information. What kind of information is being quantified? Do the resulting quantities describe empirical magnitudes like those found elsewhere in the natural sciences? In this article, it is argued that neural information quantities have a relativisitic character that makes them distinct from the kinds of information typically discussed in (...) the philosophical literature. It is also argued that despite this relativistic character, there are cases in which neural information quantities can be viewed as robustly objective empirical properties. (shrink)