Search results for 'Empty Names' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1. Heidi Savage, Four Problems with Empty Names.
    Empty names vary in their referential features. Some of them, as Kripke argues, are necessarily empty -- those that are used to create works of fiction. Others appear to be contingently empty -- those which fail to refer at this world, but which do uniquely identify particular objects in other possible worlds. I argue against Kripke's metaphysical and semantic reasons for thinking that either some or all empty names are necessarily non-referring, because these reasons (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  43
    Seyed N. Mousavian (2014). Empty Names and Pragmatic Millianism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):49-58.
    Millianism is the view that the semantic content of a proper name is its semantic referent. Empty names, names with no semantic referents, raise various problems for Millianism. To solve these problems, many have appealed to pragmatics, thus ‘Pragmatic Millianism’. Pragmatic Millianism employs the relation of association between names and descriptions as well as some pragmatic processes to substitute empty names with descriptions associated with. The resultant content should account for the intuitions raised by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Andrew Bacon (2013). Quantificational Logic and Empty Names. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (24).
    The result of combining classical quantificational logic with modal logic proves necessitism – the claim that necessarily everything is necessarily identical to something. This problem is reflected in the purely quantificational theory by theorems such as ∃x t=x; it is a theorem, for example, that something is identical to Timothy Williamson. The standard way to avoid these consequences is to weaken the theory of quantification to a certain kind of free logic. However, it has often been noted that in order (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Dolf Rami, Non‐Standard Neutral Free Logic, Empty Names and Negative Existentials.
    In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Andrew Cullison & Ben Caplan (2011). Descriptivism, Scope, and Apparently Empty Names. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):283-288.
  6.  62
    Michael McKinsey (2016). "Truths Containing Empty Names". In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Luis Fernandez Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names. Peter Lang GmbH 175-202.
    Abstract. On the Direct Reference thesis, proper names are what I call ‘genuine terms’, terms whose sole semantic contributions to the propositions expressed by their use are the terms’ semantic referents. But unless qualified, this thesis implies the false consequence that sentences containing names that fail to refer can never express true or false propositions. (Consider ‘The ancient Greeks worshipped Zeus’, for instance.) I suggest that while names are typically and fundamentally used as genuine terms, there is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.
    John Stuart Mill (1843) thought that proper names denote individuals and do not connote attributes. Contemporary Millians agree, in spirit. We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence’s constituents. This proposition is what the sentence semantically expresses. Therefore, we think that sentences containing proper names semantically express singular (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  8. T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.) (2000). Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications.
    Philosophers and theorists have long been puzzled by humans' ability to talk about things that do not exist, or to talk about things that they think exist but, in fact, do not. _Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence_ is a collection of 13 new works concerning the semantic and metaphysical issues arising from empty names, non-existence, and the nature of fiction. The contributors include some of the most important researchers working in these fields. Some of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  9. Nicole Wyatt (2007). The Pragmatics of Empty Names. Dialogue 46 (4):663-681.
    Fred Adams and collaborators advocate a view on which empty-name sentences semantically encode incomplete propositions, but which can be used to conversationally implicate descriptive propositions. This account has come under criticism recently from Marga Reimer and Anthony Everett. Reimer correctly observes that their account does not pass a natural test for conversational implicatures, namely, that an explanation of our intuitions in terms of implicature should be such that we upon hearing it recognize it to be roughly correct. Everett argues (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10. Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott (2010). Recovering What Is Said With Empty Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):239-273.
    As our data will show, negative existential sentences containing socalled empty names evoke the same strong semantic intuitions in ordinary speakers and philosophers alike.Santa Claus does not exist.Superman does not exist.Clark Kent does not exist.Uttering the sentences in (1) seems to say something truth-evaluable, to say something true, and to say something different for each sentence. A semantic theory ought to explain these semantic intuitions.The intuitions elicited by (1) are in apparent conflict with the Millian view of proper (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  73
    Eduardo García-Ramírez (2011). A Cognitive Theory of Empty Names. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):785-807.
    Ordinary use of empty names encompasses a variety of different phenomena, including issues in semantics, mental content, fiction, pretense, and linguistic practice. In this paper I offer a novel account of empty names, the cognitive theory, and show how it offers a satisfactory account of the phenomena. The virtues of this theory are based on its strength and parsimony. It allows for a fully homogeneous semantic treatment of names coped with ontological frugality and empirical and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Ben Caplan (2002). Empty Names. Dissertation, UCLA
    In my dissertation (UCLA 2002), I argue that, by appropriating Fregean resources, Millians can solve the problems that empty names pose. As a result, the debate between Millians and Fregeans should be understood, not as a debate about whether there are senses, but rather as a debate about where there are senses.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13.  38
    R. Mark Sainsbury (2000). Empty Names. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:57-66.
    This paper explores the idea that a name should be associated with a reference condition, rather than with a referent, just as a sentence should be associated with a truth condition, rather than with a truth value. The suggestion, to be coherent, needs to be set in a freelogical framework (following Burge). A prominent advantage of the proposal is that it gives a straight-forward semantics for empty names. A problem discussed in this paper is that of reconciling the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Anthony Everett (2000). Referentialism and Empty Names. In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Csli Publications 37--60.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Anthony Everett & Thomas Hofweber (eds.) (2000). Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    Philosophers and theorists have long been puzzled by humans' ability to talk about things that do not exist, or to talk about things that they think exist but, in fact, do not. _Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence_ is a collection of 13 new works concerning the semantic and metaphysical issues arising from empty names, non-existence, and the nature of fiction. The contributors include some of the most important researchers working in these fields. Some of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  24
    Božidar Kante (2006). Devitt on Empty Names. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):51-62.
    The paper deals with the topic of empty terms as considered in chapter six of Devitt’s book Designation. Devitt’s proposal is that a statement about fiction is (usually) implicitly preceded by a fiction operator roughly paraphrasable by “it is pretended that” or “in fiction”. The causal chain that forms the network for a fictitious name are not d(esignational)-chains, for they are not grounded in an object. Nevertheless, although the fictitious name does not designate, we could say that it stands (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Anthony Everett (2003). Empty Names and `Gappy' Propositions. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):1-36.
    In recent years a number of authors sympathetic to Referentialistaccounts of proper names have argued that utterances containingempty names express `gappy,' or incomplete, propositions. In this paper I want to take issue with this suggestion.In particular, I argue versions of this approach developedby David Braun, Nathan Salmon, Ken Taylor, and by Fred Adams,Gary Fuller, and Robert Stecker.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  18. Mitchell S. Green (2007). Direct Reference Empty Names and Implicature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-37.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  19. David Braun (1993). Empty Names. Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   51 citations  
  20.  29
    Joshua Spencer (2016). The Problem of Empty Names and Russellian Plenitude. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):1-18.
    ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Seahwa Kim (2006). World-Indexed Descriptivism and an Illusory Problem of Empty Names. Philosophy 101:277-298.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Marga Reimer (2001). The Problem of Empty Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):491 – 506.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  23.  79
    Mitchell S. Green (2007). Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-447.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  24.  89
    Stuart Brock (2004). The Ubiquitous Problem of Empty Names. Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):277 - 298.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25.  27
    Seyed N. Mousavian (2015). Do Apparently Empty Names Help Millianism Prevail Against Widescopism? A Note. Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):253-265.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  79
    Fred Adams & Gary Fuller (2007). Empty Names and Pragmatic Implicatures. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):449-461.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  27.  76
    Marga Reimer (2007). Empty Names: Communicative Value Without Semantic Value. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):738-747.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  16
    Michele Marsonet (1997). The Problem of Empty Names. Idealistic Studies 27 (1/2):91-96.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  9
    Kathleen Marie Higgins (2006). Nietzsche, Empty Names, and Individuality. International Studies in Philosophy 38 (3):117-130.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  1
    A. Horecka (2007). Empty Names in the Theory of Tadeusz Kotarbinski. Filozofia Nauki 15 (1 (57)):65-88.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  1
    Michele Marsonet (1998). Dąmbska, Quine, and the So-Called Empty Names. In Katarzyna Kijania-Placek & Jan Woleński (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers 191--198.
  32. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Stacie Friend (2011). The Great Beetle Debate: A Study in Imagining with Names. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.
    Statements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34.  75
    Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  35
    Dolf Rami (2014). The Use-Conditional Indexical Conception of Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):119-150.
    In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36. Heidi Tiedke (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):707 - 726.
    Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  48
    Agustin Arrieta Urtizberea (2005). 'Neptune' Between 'Hesperus' and 'Vulcan': On Descriptive Names and Non-Existence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (3):48-58.
    This work will focus on some aspects of descriptive names. The New Theory of Reference, in line with Kripke, takes descriptive names to be proper names. I will argue in this paper that descriptive names and certain theory in reference to them, even when it disagrees with the New Theory of Reference, can shed light on our understanding of (some) non-existence statements. I define the concept of descriptive name for hypothesised object (DNHO). My thesis being that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  13
    Jessie Munton (forthcoming). Frege, Fiction and Force. Synthese:1-24.
    Discussion of Frege’s theory of fiction has tended to focus on the problem of empty names, and has consequently missed the truly problematic aspect of the theory, Frege’s commitment to the view that even fictional sentences that contain no empty names fail to refer. That claim prima facie conflicts with his commitment to the cognitive transparency of sense, and the determination of reference by sense. Resolving this tension compels us to recognize that fiction for Frege is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Heidi Savage, Kypris, Aphrodite, and Venus: Another Puzzle About Belief.
    My aim in this paper is to show that the existence of empty names raise problems for the Millian that go beyond the traditional problems of accounting for their meanings. Specifically, they have implications for Millian strategies for dealing with puzzles about belief. The standard move of positing a referent for a fictional name to avoid the problem of meaning, because of its distinctly Millian motivation, implies that solving puzzles about belief, when they involve empty names, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  97
    Anna Bjurman Pautz (2008). Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.
    There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41.  53
    Samuel C. Rickless (2012). Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition. Theoria 78 (1):6-25.
    There are two major semantic theories of proper names: Semantic Descriptivism and Direct Reference. According to Semantic Descriptivism, the semantic content of a proper name N for a speaker S is identical to the semantic content of a definite description “the F” that the speaker associates with the name. According to Direct Reference, the semantic content of a proper name is identical to its referent. Semantic Descriptivism suffers from a number of drawbacks first pointed out by Donnellan (1970) and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Saul A. Kripke (2013). Reference and Existence. The John Locke Lectures. Oxford University Press.
    Reference and Existence, Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work -- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth. In treating these questions, he makes a number of methodological observations that go beyond the framework of his earlier book (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  43. Saul A. Kripke (ed.) (2011). Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.
    This important new book is the first of a series of volumes collecting essential work by an influential philosopher. It presents a mixture of published and unpublished works from various stages of Kripke's storied career. Included here are seminal and much discussed pieces such as “Identity and Necessity,” “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” and “A Puzzle About Belief.” More recent published work include “Russell's Notion of Scope” and “Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference” among others. Several of the works (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  44. Piotr Kulicki (2013). On Minimal Models for Pure Calculi of Names. Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):429–443.
    By pure calculus of names we mean a quantifier-free theory, based on the classical propositional calculus, which defines predicates known from Aristotle’s syllogistic and Leśniewski’s Ontology. For a large fragment of the theory decision procedures, defined by a combination of simple syntactic operations and models in two-membered domains, can be used. We compare the system which employs `ε’ as the only specific term with the system enriched with functors of Syllogistic. In the former, we do not need an (...) name in the model, so we are able to construct a 3-valued matrix, while for the latter, for which an empty name is necessary, the respective matrices are 4-valued. (shrink)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Imogen Dickie (2015). Fixing Reference. Oxford University Press.
    Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth, and the second of which connects truth and justification. These principles (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Stephen Barker (2015). Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-Existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 80 (S2):215-234.
    Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  28
    Emar Maier, Fictional Names in Psychologistic Semantics.
    Fictional names pose a difficult puzzle for semantics. We can truthfully maintain that Frodo is a hobbit, while at the same time admitting that Frodo does not exist. To reconcile this paradox I propose a way to formalize the interpretation of fiction as ‘prescriptions to imagine’ (Walton 1990) within an asymmetric semantic framework in the style of Kamp (1990). In my proposal, fictional statements are analyzed as dynamic updates on an imagination component of the interpreter’s mental state, while plain (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  49
    Karen Green (2015). Frege on Existence and Non‐Existence. Theoria 81 (4):293-310.
    Despite its importance for early analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege's account of existence statements, according to which they classify concepts, has been thought to succumb to a number of well-worn criticisms. This article does two things. First, it argues that, by remaining faithful to the letter of Frege's claim that concepts are functions, the Fregean account can be saved from many of the standard criticisms. Second, it examines the problem that Frege's account fails to generalize to cases which involve definite descriptions (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Bryan Frances, The Four Puzzles of Reference.
  50.  7
    Siu-Fan Lee (2014). Who Wants To Be a Russellian About Names? In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. De Gruyter 161-180.
    Russell had two theories of names and one theory of description. Logically proper names are Millian names, which have only denotation but no connotation. Ordinary names are not genuine names but disguised definite descriptions subject to quantificational analyses. Only by asserting that ordinary names are definite descriptions could Russell motivate his theory of description to solve three problems for Millian names, namely, Frege’s puzzle, empty reference and negative existentials. Critics usually discuss Russell’s (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000