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  1. Karen Green (2005). The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism. Theoria 71 (2):92-117.
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  2. Xiaoqiang Han (2010). There Is No Such Thing as Reference Failure. Abstracta 6 (1):23.
    I argue that the idea of reference failure which is frequently mentioned and occasionally argued for in the recent philosophy of language literature is a misnomer at best and incoherent when taken seriously. In the first place, there is no such thing as an empty name or name that fails to name anything, where names are understood as not replaceable by descriptions. In the case of demonstrative reference, because the speaker’s perception fixes the referent and the speaker’s referential intention is (...)
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  3. Laureano Luna (2013). Satisfiable and Unsatisfied Paradoxes. How Closely Related? The Reasoner 7 (5):56-7.
  4. T. Parent (forthcoming). Self-Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts. Analytic Philosophy.
    Several authors have argued that, assuming we have apriori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know apriori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know apriori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian's Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such apriori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth experiment, however, since it would (...)
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  5. Heidi Savage, Four Problems with Empty Names.
    Empty names vary in their referential features. Some of them, as Kripke argues, are necessarily empty -- those that are used to create works of fiction. Others appear to be contingently empty -- those which fail to refer at this world, but which do uniquely identify particular objects in other possible worlds. I argue against Kripke's metaphysical and semantic reasons for thinking that either some or all empty names are necessarily non-referring, because these reasons are either not the right reasons (...)
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