Erratum zu:N. Campagna et al.,Tocqueville-Handbuch,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05754-9Ecrits sur le système pénitentiaire en France et à l’étra.

Erratum to Using the context of controversies surrounding evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) and the possibility of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, I provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization). These two characteristics are salient because the goals that organize and regulate scientific practice, including the activity of using a theory, are heterogeneous. This means that the same theory can be structured differently, (...) in part because theory presentations (as idealizations) intentionally depart from different features known to be present in a theory. Since there are diverse and potentially incompatible theory structures derived from heterogeneous goals found in scientific practices, a question arises about the absence of a unifying theory structure in the background. The notion of a “theory façade” offers a fruitful perspective on this potentially unsettling result. (shrink)

In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter's analogy to Quine's 'naturalization of epistemology' does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter's replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if — contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced — Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is (...) ever justified, it would not help Leiter's parallel. Given Leiter's way of drawing the parallel, the analogous position in the legal case would be not the Legal Realists' indeterminacy thesis, but the very different position that we have no vantage point from which to address whether legal decisions can ever be justified. I then go on to address the more important question of whether the indeterminacy thesis, if true, would support any replacement of important legal philosophical questions with empirical ones. Although Ronald Dworkin has argued against the indeterminacy thesis, if he were wrong on this issue, it would not in any way suggest that the questions with which Dworkin is centrally concerned cannot fruitfully be addressed. The indeterminacy thesis is a bone of contention in an ordinary philosophical debate between its proponents and Dworkin. Of course, if the determinacy thesis were true, no one should try to show that it is false, but this triviality lends no support to the kind of replacement proposal that Leiter proposes. I conclude with some general reflections on naturalism and philosophical methodology. (shrink)

Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).should be replaced (...) withHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford (plus the justified background belief that Jones is in his office), and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).The added part is highlighted in boldface.And within the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceFrom this belief alone. (shrink)

Both in the bibliography and in the citation in the text, Michelle Gibbons’ article below has been mistakenly attributed to “Gibson.” The proper reference to the article should be: Gibbons, M.. Reassessing discovery: Rosalind Franklin, scientific visualization, and the structure of DNA. _Philosophy of Science, 79_, 63–80.

Erratum to: Int J Semiot Law DOI 10.1007/s11196-014-9376-7Dans la publication originale de cet article, l’auteur n’a pas cité le titre correct de la thèse de philosophie de Stefan Goltzberg.A la dernière phrase du premier paragraphe, il ne faut pas lire «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulé Théorie et histoire de la philosophie du droit, philosophie du droit de Chaïm Perelman, de Theodor Viehweg, de Roscoe Pound» mais bien «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulée Théorie bidimensionnelle (...) de l’argumentation. Définition, Présomption, Argument A fortiori». (shrink)

Erratum to: Found Sci DOI 10.1007/s10699-014-9364-0The author, Kun Wu’s name, affiliation and biography have been incorrectly published in the original article. The correct affiliation and biography are provided below.

Full text of erratum: "In the article by D.J. Buller, on p. 278, the y-axis label to Fig. IIb was incorrect. Instead of 'Percentage choosing "Eats cassava root" and "Tattoo," it should have read: 'Percentage choosing "Eats cassava root" and "No tattoo."' We apologise to readers for this error.".

Erratum to: Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-014-9252-9The affiliation of the second author was incorrectly published in the original article. The author’s correct affiliation appears in this erratum.

Erratum to: Bioethical InquiryDOI 10.1007/s11673-012-9391-xLobna Rouhani, University of Melbourne, is a co-author of the article “Genetic Research and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians” (2012, 419–432) that was published in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry’s 9(4) symposium “Cases and Culture.” Her name was omitted from the publication and she should be credited as the third author of this article.

Erratum to: Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0678-4The last two block quotes of this article should be cited as “Sellars 1947c”, not “Sellars 1947”. “Sellars 1947c” references the bibliography entry for a piece of correspondence housed in the special collections archive at the University of Iowa. It is not, as the bibliography lists, a published work.

Erratum to: Philosophia 42:1063–1084DOI10.1007/s11406-014-9553-7The original version of this article unfortunately includes some imperfections. The correct details are given below.In the second paragraph of the text, references to Leslie 2002 are actually to Leslie 1996.At note 23, the sentence “even if in so doing I would not make A’s condition overall worse” should be replaced by “even if in so doing I would not make B’s condition overall worse”; in the following period, an “if” should be inserted between “even” and (...) “it”.In the last page of the third paragraph, the sentence “would result in a strong violation of some kind of duty toward already existing people than” is intended substituted by the following one: “would result in a violation of some kind of duty toward already existing people, then,”. (shrink)

Erratum to: Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0705-5In line 3 of footnote 8 on page 4, ‘allow’ should be ‘disallow’.In line 8 of page 5, \ should be \ and \ should be \. Similarly for lines 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13 and 14 of page 6.The entry in row 20 column 6 of the table on page 5 should be 1 rather than 0.The entry \ in row 30 column 5 of the table on page 5 should be \.In line (...) 27 of page 13, ‘it’ should be ‘them’.Four lines from the end of section 12.3 on page 20, ‘premisses’ should be ‘premiss sets’, and .. (shrink)

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal traits and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance (...) that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues. (shrink)

Erratum to: Synthese 192:317–335 DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0570-7The second sentence on page 317 reads “The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how a negative truth, e.g., \ of something could be made true by the existence of some entity”.This sentence should read “The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how a negative truth, e.g., \ that is concerned with the non-existence of something could be made true by the existence of some entity”.

J Med Philos, 2020; 45: 28–41; doi:_ 10.1093/jmp/jhz031 _.

Erratum to: Philosophia 42:741–748DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9543-9The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. There were two slight text errors. The correct text information are given below.In the second line of the last paragraph in section "Reply to Yi" right before the "Conclusion", the text should read as:“atypical or, as Yi suggests, are more typical than we appear to suppose”.andIn the middle of the same paragraph, the text should read as:“…Note that a proponent of the Brueckner/Fischer approach can accept (...) that it would be rational to regret late birth somewhat, if it really were true that Learning Japanese represents the typical case.”. (shrink)

Erratum to: Metascience DOI 10.1007/s11016-014-9881-zIn the version of this essay review initially published, in the final paragraph and in the reference list, the last name of the author H. Floris Cohen was incorrectly written as Cohen Floris.

Erratum to: Philos Stud 165:401–419 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9957-9 Throughout the paper, all occurrences of ‘not- and … and In)’, ‘not- and I and … and In)’, ‘not-’, and ‘not- and I1 and … and In)’ should be replaced by, respectively, ‘not- or … or In)’, ‘not- or I or … or In)’, ‘not-’, and ‘not- or I1 or … or In)’.In particular, the definitions of and on pp. 407–408 should read, respectively:x interferes with o’s being intrinsically disposed to M when (...) S iff:I1 and … and Ik and … and In and … and In’),it is nomically possible that not- or … or In),it is not the case that, if it were the case that S, then o would M,for each Ij , even if it were the case that not- or I or … or I .. (shrink)

Erratum to: Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0408-3Appendix 1: NotationLet \(X\) represent a sequence of data, and let \(X_B^t\) represent an i.i.d. subsequence of length \(t\) of data generated from distribution \(B\).We conjecture that the i.i.d. assumption could be eliminated by defining probability distributions over sequences of arbitrary length, though this complication would not add conceptual clarity. Let \(\mathbf{F}\) be a framework (in this case, a set of probability distributions or densities).Let any \(P(\,)\) functions be either a probability distribution function or probability (...) density function, as appropriate. Let \(M_\mathbf{F}\) be a method that takes a data sequence \(X\) as input and outputs a distribution. (shrink)

Erratum to: Sci Eng Ethics DOI 10.1007/s11948-013-9481-0Unfortunately, the originally published article contains an incorrect title and author names.

Erratum to: Axiomathes DOI 10.1007/s10516-014-9234-yIn the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. Please find below the corrected version of these references.

Erratum to: Synthese 191:1925–1930 DOI:10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3 The authors were unaware that points in their article appeared in “Caveats for Causal Reasoning with Equilibrium Models,” by Denver Dash and Marek Druzdzel, published in S. Benferhat and P. Besnard : European Conferences on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty 2001, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2143, pp. 192–203. The authors were unaware of this essay and would like to apologize to the authors for failing to cite their excellent work.

This erratum is published as name was misspelt in references in original publication. “In James Malazita’s ‘Astrobiology’s Cosmopolitics and the Search for an Origin Myth for the Anthropocene’, Daniel Coren’s last name is misspelled as ‘Cohen’ in the references. The correct entry should be ‘Coren D Anthropocentric biocentrism in a hybrid. Ethics Environ 20:48–60’.”.

_Erratum zu:_ _Ethik Med 2017_ https://doi.org/10.1007/s00481-017-0464-6 Im Tagungsbericht „Die klinische Translation humaner induzierter pluripotenter Stammzellen. Eine Stakeholder-Konferenz zur Evaluation innovativer Risikoforschung“ wurden einige Aussagen aus Herrn Wolfram-Hubertus Zimmermanns Vortrag.