El presente trabajo se propone explorar el lugar de la economía política en los proyectosfilosóficos de Adam Smith y G. W. F. Hegel, procurando retomar el contenido teórico ínsitoen algunas de sus principales obras. Para ello, se buscará mostrar cómo ambos autores,ante la necesidad de trascender las relaciones sociales directas, desembocan en el estudio delas relaciones mercantiles. Hacia el final del artículo, se dedicarán unas breves reflexionesa las dificultades con las que tropiezan en la consecución de esta empresa y a (...) la relevanciade su legado teórico. (shrink)

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.

I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem”, I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because it (...) denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use. (shrink)

This article considers the current relevance of settler colonial tropes, narratives and idioms by discussing the opening section of On Settling (2012), a recently published book authored by respected political scientist Robert E. Goodin. While Goodin argues that ‘settling’ should be considered a ‘normatively defensible practice’, my critique focuses on his assumed link between ‘settling’ in general and settler colonialism in particular. The first section of this article follows the narrative of settlement that underpins Goodin’s book. The second section discusses (...) this narrative’s inherently exclusionary character, a characteristic that undermines claims to universal normative validity; while the third section appraises the language that supports it. In the fourth, conclusive, section On Settling’s apology of settler colonialism is used as a starting point for an analysis of the settler colonial present in an ‘age of unsettlement’. (shrink)

Considero la propuesta reciente de Vicente, Fraser y Castroviejo según la cual hay (al menos) dos tipos distintos de lenguaje peyorativo en español, uno de los cuales (el que apela a términos neutros usados como insultos) no ha sido, según los autores, suficientemente apreciado y estudiado. Si bien concuerdo con la importancia de la distinción, sugiero una explicación alternativa a la que ellos dan del fenómeno de los términos neutros usados como insultos, que sugiere entenderlos como un caso particular de (...) uso metafórico, y del contenido peyorativo genérico transmitido, que apela a fenómenos generales de la interpretación de metáforas y de la acomodación de presuposiciones. (shrink)

This volume brings together this new knowledge in a single, concise source, covering most if not all of the basic questions regarding human action: What are the ...

In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about the nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously the claim that virtues (and certain flavours of vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed by agents, and secondly, by employing a pluralistic attitude borrowed from Battaly’s pluralism (2008). Through these lenses, we identify three varieties of viciousness: incontinence, indifference, and malevolence. The upshot is that the notion of vice is not as categorically homogeneous as that (...) of virtue: some states of viciousness consist in interference of present virtuous dispositions, or mimicking of absent vicious ones, whereas others can be considered genuine dispositions themselves. Furthermore, this set-up can provide an interesting, albeit highly idealized story as to how, through the interference in one’s environment, one gets acquainted with vice in various degrees. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-à-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-a-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct. (shrink)

Theoretical and manipulative abduction conjectures and manipulations : the extra-theoretical dimension of scientific discovery. -- Non-explanatory and instrumental abduction : plausibility, implausibility, ignorance preservation. -- Semiotic brains and artificial minds : how brains make up material cognitive systems. -- Neuromultimodal abduction : pre-wired brains, embidiment, neurospaces. -- Animal abduction : from mindless organisms to srtifactual mediators. -- Abduction, affordances, and cognitive niches : sharing representations and creating chances through cognitive niche construction. -- Abduction in human and logical agents : hasty (...) generalizers, hybrid abducers, fallacies. -- Morphodynamical abduction : causation of hypotheses by attractors dynamics. (shrink)

According to most interpreters, Aristotle explains death as the result of material processes of the body going against the nature of the living being. Yet, this description is incomplete, for it does not clarify the relationship between the process of decay and the teleological system in which it occurs: this makes it impossible to distinguish between natural and violent death. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by looking at his so-called ‘biological works’ and mainly at the De (...) Juventute. I first introduce the specific concept of life at play in this treatise and prove its complementarity with the framework of the De Anima. Then, I illustrate in detail the process of dying and the reasons why a merely material description is insufficient to account for the distinction between natural and violent death. Finally, I show that for Aristotle natural death is a by-product of teleologically directed life activities: only against the background of this teleological structure is natural death fully explained in terms of essence and causes. To support this claim, I compare death to two analogous cases in Aristotle’s biology, namely dreams and the features of GA V. (shrink)

En este artículo presentamos un análisis de La Comunidad Organizada con un propósito histórico-filosófico, a fin de esclarecer cómo el pensamiento de Hegel supo presentarse en dicha obra. Nuestro esfuerzo se centrará en el estudio del concepto de comunidad que aparece en LCO con el fin de determinar su compatibilidad con el concepto de Estado de nuestro filósofo alemán. A este fin analizaremos el modo en que Hegel es abordado por Perón en la obra, para luego desde la ambigüedad misma (...) de esta presencia encauzar la mirada hacia la relación que, no obstante, creemos que es posible hallar entre ambos dos conceptos. (shrink)

The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...) the sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author of one’s own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-representational, dynamical perspective and show how they cohere with the personal experience of agency. (shrink)

In our research, we examine the efforts made by Latin American business schools in the last decade to deliver a value-based education. We carry out a survey with a sample of faculty members and program directors from the whole region. We find that societal demands influenced the direction of managerial education toward values and social responsibility, changing contents and teaching methodologies in the process. Our research shows that the teaching of value-based contents—social responsibility, business ethics and environmental sustainability—has gained ground (...) in the region in the last decade, and that the emphasis on value-based contents goes hand-in-hand with a more intensive use of active learning methodologies—the case method in particular. From the perspective of respondents, the emphasis on active learning seems to correlate positively with observed changes in students’ civility. (shrink)

Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make explicit (...) the notion of embodiment they defend and its role for cognition. We argue that the sensorimotor and the extended functionalist approaches either fall short of accounting for cognition in LIS from an embodied perspective or do it too broadly by relegating the body only to a historical role. Enactivism conceives of the body as autonomous system and of cognition as sense-making. From this perspective embodiment is not equated with bodily movement but with forms of agency that do not disappear with body paralysis. Enactivism offers a clarifying perspective on embodiment and thus currently appears to be the framework in embodied cognition best suited to address the challenge posed by LIS. (shrink)

There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776) is a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological ‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account of (...) human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning. (shrink)

This is the first dedicated commentary to Sextus Empiricus’ treatise _Against the Arithmeticians_, dealing with crucial issues in the history of the sceptical, Platonic and Pythagorean traditions and in the ancient philosophy of mathematics.

Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) ranks among the greatest scholars and thinkers of the Renaissance. He secured lasting fame for his brilliant critical skills, most famously in his exposure of the “Donation of Constantine,” the forged document upon which the papacy based claims to political power. Lesser known in the English-speaking world is Valla's work in the philosophy of language—the basis of his reputation as the greatest philosopher of the humanist movement. Dialectical Disputations, translated here for the first time into any (...) modern language, is his principal contribution to the philosophy of language and logic. With this savage attack on the scholastic tradition of Aristotelian logic, Valla aimed to supersede it with a new logic based on the actual historical usage of classical Latin and on a commonsense approach to semantics and argument. Valla provides a logic that could be used by lawyers, preachers, statesmen, and others who needed to succeed in public debate—one that was stylistically correct and rhetorically elegant, and thus could dispense with the technical language of the scholastics, a “tribe of Peripatetics, perverters of natural meanings.” Valla's reformed dialectic became a milestone in the development of humanist logic and contains startling anticipations of modern theories of semantics and language. Volume 1 contains Book I, in which Valla refutes Aristotle's logical works on the categories, transcendentals, and predicables, with excursions into natural and moral philosophy and theology. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation constraint, according to which for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ for the reason that p. However, the argument goes, it is not possible to act (or not to act) for a reason (...) for a reason. Therefore, he concludes, there are no second-order reasons. In this paper, I shall argue that Whiting's argument ought to be rejected. Thus, I will argue that we should not accept the motivation constraint on which it is based. It is true that for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ guided in the right way by the consideration that p favours you ϕing. However, I shall argue that it is possible for exclusionary reasons to guide us in the right way, even if it not possible for us to not to ϕ for a reason for a reason. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the history of the idea of 'middle class', an idea that was fundamental to Aristotle's philosophy but disappeared from the repertoire of political thinking for centuries, re-emerging shortly before the French Revolution to be developed by Diderot and other French liberals. The modern notion of 'middle class' is compared with that of Aristotle, and the similarities between the two contexts of emergence -- the crisis of Ancient Greek democracy and that of the French Ancien (...) Régime -- are explored to cast new light on the meaning and political function of that idea, and on the metaphorical operations it performs. (shrink)

Ante el padecimiento de un dolor social producido en un entorno signado por la exclusión, la juventud despliega distintas estrategias entre las que pueden ubicarse las autoagresiones corporales. Este art í culo analiza los hallazgos de un estudio socioeducativo que recupera narrativas del dolor en las experiencias estudiantiles. *Este artículo recoge los resultados de una investigación finalizada con sede en el Programa de Investigación “Transformaciones sociales, subjetividad y procesos educativos”, bajo la dirección de Carina V. Kaplan, del Instituto de Investigaciones (...) en Ciencias de la Educación, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Proyecto UBACyT N° 20020170100464BA – periodo 2018-2021: “Violencias, estigmatización y condición estudiantil. Una sociología de la educación sobre las emociones y los cuerpos”. (shrink)

En la tesina hemos examinado el problema de la tolerancia religiosa, a partir de los escritos de Marsilio de Padua, Thomas Hobbes y John Locke. La elección de los pensadores modernos ha respondido a la relevancia de sus contribuciones para la discusión acerca del problema que supone la tolerancia religiosa en la Modernidad.1 La interpretación que hemos propuesto en relación con los aportes de Hobbes, ha permitido considerarlo como un autor que exhortó a la diversidad como una estrategia para la (...) regulación de la religión. En cuanto a Locke, hemos señalado su defensa de la tolerancia en nombre de la racionalidad, su reivindicación de la utilidad de una actitud tolerante como medio para preservar la coexistencia pacífica. Observamos que las contribuciones de ambos pensadores trascendieron ampliamente los horizontes de su tiempo para arribar a nuestros días con una vigencia sorprendente. De allí que estos autores se convierten en lecturas obligatorias sobre esta materia al intentar buscar posibles soluciones a uno de los problemas políticos más apremiantes. Sin embargo, es importante señalar que, en la historia del pensamiento político, el principio de tolerancia fue desarrollado, no solo por autores modernos, sino asimismo por autores medievales, entre ellos, Marsilio de Padua. Este pensador tuvo una influencia decisiva en el pensamiento filosófico-político de los teóricos modernos anteriormente mencionados a raíz de sus aportes a la discusión de la tolerancia, sus contribuciones en lo que se refiere a la circunscripción del poder pontificio, su crítica a la doctrina de la plenitudo potestatis papal y sus reflexiones en torno a la relación entre el poder temporal y espiritual. Por tal motivo, dedicamos un primer capítulo a presentar y analizar los argumentos filosóficos-políticos centrales de Marsilio de Padua, con el fin de señalar los alcances de este antecedente medieval en el desarrollo de la noción moderna del principio de tolerancia religiosa. En el segundo capítulo, examinamos los argumentos de Hobbes, e intentamos señalar que su preocupación central fue, no tanto la tolerancia religiosa, sino antes bien el problema de la regulación de la religión. En el tercer capítulo, pasamos revista de los aportes de Locke en lo que respecta a esta materia desde una perspectiva liberal. Por último, en el cuarto capítulo realizamos un estudio comparativo entre Marsilio y Hobbes, por un lado, y entre este último y Locke, por otro. (shrink)

In recent years, a new dispute has risen to prominence: the dispute between realists and anti-realists about causal powers. Albeit sometimes overlooked, the meta-ontological features of this “question of realism for powers” are quite peculiar. For friends and foes of causal powers have characterized their contrasting views in a variety of different ways; as existence claims, as semantic or truth-making claims, as fundamentality claims, as claims about the nature of certain properties. Not only does this multiplicity of interpretations make it (...) unclear what the genuine bone of contention is, if there is one; some of them appear to be mutually exclusive. Some light can be shed on this apparent yet widespread confusion by distinguishing three degrees of ontological involvement in dispositional truths; viz., three ways, of increasing robustness, to read ontological commitments from dispositional truths. Relatedly, by exploring the literature, and focusing on some selected examples of power realism and anti-realism, we can observe that power realists vastly disagree over the intrinsic nature ad make-up of dispositional properties. Such examples furthermore invite the thought that the question of realism for powers is best understood not as the debate around the existence of properties with a distinctive identity, but rather as a debate about metaphysical hierarchy. Finally, some anti-realists positions are indistinguishable from realist ones, using merely intensional resources: power realism is best appreciated by going hyperintensional. (shrink)

By promising, requesting and commanding we can give ourselves and each other reasons for acting as promised, requested, and commanded. Call this our capacity to give reasons robustly. According to the triggering account, we give reasons robustly simply by manipulating the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons. Here I claim that we ought to reject the triggering account. By focusing on David Enoch’s sophisticated articulation of it, I argue that it is overinclusive; it cannot adequately distinguish between (...) threats and robust reason-giving; and it cannot adequately explain why epistemic reasons cannot be robustly given. I suggest that when we give reasons robustly, we do so directly, without explanatory intermediaries. (shrink)

This paper attempts a reconstruction of reason’s contribution to empirical truth in connection with Kant’s definition of truth as the agreement of cognition with its object. I argue that Kant’s treatment of truth in the Transcendental Analytic gets completed in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic with an often neglected but compelling argument (what I shall call the Variety Argument). This argument postulates such a variety in the appearances as to undermine any attempt at formulating empirical truths. Crucially, I argue (...) that this variety does not depict an extreme-case scenario, but our own epistemic situation without reason. Reason completes Kant’s theory of truth by allowing the understanding (i.) to form empirical concepts and (ii.) approximate to empirical truth. (shrink)

Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way. Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue (...) that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness. (shrink)

Anjan Chakravartty sostiene que – tradicionalmente - el debate realismo-antirrealismo científico ha sido eminentemente epistémico, estando en juego si debemos comprometernos o no con la creencia de que nuestras mejores teorías científicas son verdaderas o aproximadamente verdaderas y sus términos centrales refieren exitosamente a los aspectos del mundo. Sin embargo, las versiones contemporáneas del realismo científico muestran una clara tendencia hacia la profundización de los aspectos metafísicos de la ciencia, a tal punto que una de las características más prominentes de (...) estas son tesis metafísicas sustanciales. Frente a esta situación, Chakravartty afirma que, más allá de ciertos compromisos metafísicos “básicos” - basados en la práctica científica -, el realista científico puede mantener una postura más pragmática - incluso escéptica - frente a los compromisos metafísicos más “profundos”, más propios de la metafísica de la ciencia que del debate que nos compete. El presente trabajo se propone demostrar que los argumentos esgrimidos por Chakravartty no logran justificar dicha postura pragmática y ofrece un ejemplo en el cual dicha postura resulta insostenible para el realista científico. (shrink)

Philosophers have debated at length the epistemological status of scientific thought experiments. I contend that the literature on this topic still lacks a common conceptual framework, a lacuna that produces radical disagreement among the participants in this debate. To remedy this problem, I suggest focusing on the distinction between the internal and the external validity of an experiment, which is also crucial for thought experiments. I then develop an account of both kinds of validity in the context of thought experiments. (...) I show that we can naturally conceptualise internal validity in terms of games of make-believe. Then, I argue that external validity is best defined as accurate representation of a target system. Finally, I turn back to the current debate on thought experiments and show that my diarchic account provides a general framework that can be shared by the competing philosophical views, as well as a fruitful guide for their reconciliation. (shrink)

pt. 1. Apuntes autobiográficos.--pt. 2. Páginas selectas.

Contra las imágenes que pretendían representar a las sociedades del siglo XXI como sociedades del conocimiento reflexivo (Beck, Giddens y Lash, 1997), en las que se habría vuelto finalmente posible un uso autorreflexivo y un control democrático de los efectos de la ciencia y la tecnología, vemos cómo reaparecen en la actualidad los viejos dilemas que Habermas había diagnosticado a finales de la década de 1960 sobre la función ideológica de la ciencia y la técnica. Tanto el dilema político, que (...) abarca el dislocamiento trágico entre la libertad y el sometimiento del sujeto que produce el discurso científico, como el dilema teórico, en el que la ciencia oscila entre la apertura y la clausura del mundo cultural, generan una serie de problemas que continúan exigiendo investigaciones teóricas y prácticas. En esta ocasión, quisiera pensar la actualidad de estos dilemas políticos y teóricos de la relación de la ciencia con la sociedad a través de una reflexión en dos pasos: primero, voy a intentar reactualizar el diagnóstico crítico que estudiaba las transformaciones de la ciencia y la técnica como nuevas formas de ideología, que seguía de cerca a las transformaciones de la esfera pública y el desarrollo de nuevas formas de poder que se justifican exclusivamente con criterios de perfeccionamiento técnico; luego, intentaré demarcar, mediante un análisis de algunos límites que este planteo podría tener en nuestra actualidad, cuáles son a mi entender los principales desafíos que la ciencia y la técnica vuelven a plantearle a nuestro mundo social contemporáneo. (shrink)

La crítica del sujeto moral realizada por Adorno resulta clave para comprender su proyecto filosófico. Por un lado, permite reconstruir los momentos esenciales de su crítica a la filosofía del sujeto. Pero la crítica moral también ofrece la posibilidad de realizar una indagación más formal de su obra, dado que la misma figura como uno de los objetos privilegiados de la Dialéctica Negativa. De este modo, al revisar su crítica moral uno tiene la oportunidad de plantear la difícil pregunta por (...) la forma de esa filosofía que se presenta a sí misma como una dialéctica que exacerba la negatividad del pensamiento. (shrink)

Se suele plantear que a comienzos del siglo XX las investigaciones acerca del control social abandonan la prisión como tema central para pensar el problema del orden a partir de la ciudad. Sin embargo, poco se ha dicho de la conexión, a veces subterránea, que ello guarda con la obra de Franz Kafka. Consideramos posible rastrear en la literatura del autor checo el proceso por el cual la ciudad va convirtiéndose en un eje en el cual se desarrollan un sinnúmero (...) de sucesos, justamente cuando en la Escuela de Chicago comenzaban a elaborarse las bases para una teoría ecológica de la organización social. (shrink)

We present an elementary system of axioms for the geometry of Minkowski spacetime. It strikes a balance between a simple and streamlined set of axioms and the attempt to give a direct formalization in first-order logic of the standard account of Minkowski spacetime in [Maudlin 2012] and [Malament, unpublished]. It is intended for future use in the formalization of physical theories in Minkowski spacetime. The choice of primitives is in the spirit of [Tarski 1959]: a predicate of betwenness and a (...) four place predicate to compare the square of the relativistic intervals. Minkowski spacetime is described as a four dimensional ‘vector space’ that can be decomposed everywhere into a spacelike hyperplane - which obeys the Euclidean axioms in [Tarski and Givant, 1999] - and an orthogonal timelike line. The length of other ‘vectors’ are calculated according to Pythagora’s theorem. We conclude with a Representation Theorem relating models of our system that satisfy second order continuity to the mathematical structure called ‘Minkowski spacetime’ in physics textbooks. (shrink)