Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because (...) they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey’s pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment. (shrink)

This chapter explores a non-intellectualist approach to skilled expertise by comparing modern phenomenological philosopher Hubert Dreyfus’ account of absorbed coping with fifteenth-century Japanese dramatist Zeami Motokiyo’s account of Noh performance. It begins by presenting Dreyfus’ account of skilled performance and skill development, which envisages “conceptual mindedness” as the enemy of expertise. It then moves on to introduce Zeami’s account of skilled expertise in Noh by focusing on three key concepts, namely mushin, shoshin, and hana. By comparing these two similarly non-intellectualist (...) approaches, it argues that Zeami offers a helpful perspective in supplementing Dreyfus’s account by illuminating the role of conceptual knowledge, the open-ended character of skill development, and the cooperative relationship between the actor and the environment. At the same time, it suggests that the phenomenologist’s account of skilled expertise is unjustifiably biased towards young, healthy, able agents, overlooking the inescapable vulnerability of human embodiment. (shrink)

法の分野における類型の解明は、法理学の重要課題の一つである。本書は、著者が十数年間、法思考との関連という角度からこの問題と取り組んできた研究成果を一つにまとめたものである。.

What role does habit formation play in the development of sport skills? We argue that motor habits are both necessary for and constitutive of sensorimotor skill as they support an automatic, yet inherently intelligent and flexible, form of action control. Intellectualists about skills generally assume that what makes action intelligent and flexible is its intentionality, and that intentionality must be necessarily cognitive in nature to allow for both deliberation and explicit goal-representation. Against Intellectualism we argue that the habitual behaviours that (...) compose skilful action are accompanied by their specific, non-cognitive form of intentionality: this is motor intentionality, which is purposive and adaptive while involving no explicit deliberation or goal representation. Our account of habit based on Motor Intentionality explains why the formation of motor habits can sometimes act as the sole basis of skilful acquisition: Motor Intentionality is inherently purposeful because it is an embodied source of sensorimotor anticipation, pre-reflective motivation, and pragmatic know-how. Skill development through exercise always builds on a motor intentional component even when it is guided by Deliberate Practice to the point that, pace Intellectualism, Deliberate Practice is disclosed, not constrained, by habit formation. As suggested by the fact that repetitive exercises can play a major role in the development of flexible and intelligent sport skills, automatism is not a drawback for strategic control and improvisation but rather their pragmatic foundation. (shrink)

法の分野における類型の解明は、法理学の重要課題の一つである。本書は、著者が十数年間、法思考との関連という角度からこの問題と取り組んできた研究成果を一つにまとめたものである。.

Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation between embodiment and narrativity in the process of self-constitution? The question demands a clear definition of embodiment, but existing studies remains unclear on this point (section 2). We offer a correction to this situation by drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the body that highlights its habituality. On this account, the (...) body has an inherent tendency to cultivate an organization of habits through its history of engagement with the world (section 3). Next, we explore its role in narrative self-constitution by distinguishing between two aspects of the narrative self, the narrated I and the narrating I (section 4). We argue on phenomenological grounds that self-narratives are informed by bodily perspectives in both respects. Furthermore, a focus on the habituality of the body allows for a better explanation of self-constitution than those based on implicit self-narratives (section 5). For these phenomenological and theoretical reasons, we conclude that narrative self-constitution is an embodied and embedded practice (section 6). (shrink)

This paper disputes the theoretical assumptions of mainstream approaches in philosophy of pain, representationalism and imperativism, and advances an enactive approach as an alternative. It begins by identifying three shared assumptions in the mainstream approaches: the internalist assumption, the brain-body assumption, and the semantic assumption. It then articulates an alternative, enactive approach that considers pain as an embodied response to the situation. This approach entails the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, which states against the brain-body assumption that the (...) intentional character of pain depends on the agent’s sociocultural background. The paper then proceeds to consider two objections. The first questions the empirical basis of this hypothesis. It is argued based on neuroscientific evidence, however, that there is no empirical reason to suppose that the first-order experience of pain is immune to sociocultural influences. The second objection argues that the mainstream approaches can account for sociocultural influences on pain by drawing on the conceptual distinction between narrow and wide content. In response, the semantic conception of pain underpinning the proposal is challenged. Pain experience can occur in pre-reflective, affectively reflective, or cognitively reflective forms, but the semantic conception at most only applies to the last form. The paper concludes that the enactive approach offers a promising alternative framework in philosophy of pain. (shrink)

In this paper we consider distributive modal logic, a setting in which we may add modalities, such as classical types of modalities as well as weak forms of negation, to the fragment of classical propositional logic given by conjunction, disjunction, true, and false. For these logics we define both algebraic semantics, in the form of distributive modal algebras, and relational semantics, in the form of ordered Kripke structures. The main contributions of this paper lie in extending the notion of Sahlqvist (...) axioms to our generalized setting and proving both a correspondence and a canonicity result for distributive modal logics axiomatized by Sahlqvist axioms. Our proof of the correspondence result relies on a reduction to the classical case, but our canonicity proof departs from the traditional style and uses the newly extended algebraic theory of canonical extensions. (shrink)

The presence of small polydisperse extrachromosomal circular (spc) DNAs composed entirely of chromosomal sequences seems to reflect the plasticity of eukaryotic genomes. The size distribution and number of spc DNAs is found to vary with development, growth state and mitotic capacity. In particular, spc DNAs are observed to be several fold smaller in established immortal cell lines than in diploid cells with a limited life span. Analysis of cloned spc DNA fragments revealed that: (1) most of the spc DNAs thus (...) far investigated contain repetitive sequences; (2) some of the repetitive sequences are enriched in spc DNA clones relative to their representation in the chromosome; (3) various repetitive sequences of different reiteration frequency were found in spc DNA from immortal cell lines while a particular sequence of retroposon was predominant in primary lymphoid tissue cells and stem cells; (4) most of these spc DNAs appear to represent the extra copies generated by replicon‐misfiring in immortal cell lines or by retrotranscription in stem cells, and intermediates or by‐products produced by abortive rearrangement in diploid cells with a finite replicative capacity. (shrink)

The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, (...) which accepts both extended minds and non-human minds. In the area of philosophy of mind, there are two theories of intentionality based on such commonsense understandings: neo-behaviorism defended, e.g., by Daniel Dennett, and neo-pragmatism advocated, e.g., by Robert Brandom. Neither account is in full agreement with how people ordinarily use their commonsense understanding. Neo-pragmatism, however, can overcome its problem—its inability to explain why people routinely find intentionality in non-humans—by incorporating the phenomenological suggestion that interactional bodily skills determine how we perceive others’ intentionality. I call this integrative position embodied neo-pragmatism . I conclude that the extended view of the mind makes sense, without denying the existence of non-human minds, only by assuming embodied neo-pragmatism and hence the general idea of enactive perception. (shrink)

We explore the integrated structure of consciousness by examining the “phenomenological axioms” of the “integrated information theory of consciousness ” from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty. This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of conscious experience (...) is an integrated complex and holistically as claiming that it is an integrated Gestalt. We argue that the latter reading provides a better characterization of the internal structure of the phenomenal content. Furthermore, the integrated structure of consciousness is not confined to the phenomenal content, but it also extends into the subjective attitude. Subjective attitudes and phenomenal contents are interdependent constituents that jointly make up conscious experiences. This implies a novel theoretical challenge to the scientific component of IIT, which is to explain how to accommodate the subjective dimension of consciousness into its explanatory scope. IIT can respond in a few different ways, but most importantly, it cannot just ignore it once and for all. As one possible way to address the challenge, we propose introducing a novel construct, noetic complex, to develop a fine-grained model of the neural underpinning of consciousness. (shrink)

In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...) on the contrary, that the access problem is a genuine problem that must be addressed by any account of social cognition, perceptual or non-perceptual, because we cannot cast the access problem as a false problem without violating certain fundamental intuitions about other minds. We elaborate the fundamental intuitions as three constraints on any theory of social perception: the Immediacy constraint; the Transcendence constraint; and the Accessibility constraint. We conclude with an outline of an account of perceiving other minds that meets the three constraints. (shrink)

日本政治の実証分析、レヴァイアサン、自由主義的改革、政界再編、ポピュリズム――日本政治研究をリードした「大嶽政治学」の軌跡。.

In one sense of the term, empathy refers to the act of sharing in another person’s experience of and perspective on the world. According to simulation accounts of empathy, we achieve this by replicating the other’s mind in our imagination. We explore a form of empathy, empathic perspective-taking, that is not adequately captured by existing simulationist approaches. We begin by pointing out that we often achieve empathy (or share in another’s perspective) by listening to the other person. This form of (...) empathy, which we call “empathy through listening”, involves four distinctive features: (i) the actual sharing of a perspective; (ii) dynamical unfolding; (iii) collaboration; and (iv) mutual transformation. Next, we consider the individual basis of empathy through listening. We argue that it requires an attitude of “receptivity” and elaborate on this elusive concept in terms of “epistemic respect”. Finally, we consider whether this form of empathy can be adequately explained within the simulationist framework. We argue that simulationist approaches must be complemented by a receptivity-based conception of empathy—that is, a conception that envisions empathy not so much as an individual imaginative enterprise, but rather as a collaborative practice of engaging with the other while paying her due epistemic respect. (shrink)

In his doctoral dissertation, Harold Garfinkel critically examined Talcott Parsons' classical formulation of the problem of order referred to as the Hobbesian problem. Garfinkel's criticism can be summarized under the following three headings: (1) common sense rationality replaces scientific rationality; (2) the level of the premises of conduct replaces the level of de facto action; (3) congruence theory replaces the correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to make some observations on the structure of the problem of order which (...) Garfinkel discovered through this criticism. I propose to call it the Rashomon problem after Akira Kurosawa's film Rashomon. Ethnomethodology can be regarded as an attempt to solve the Rashomon problem. (shrink)

明治の草創期に、学校教育に欧米式の方法が導入されて以来、子どもたちの直観や自発性を重視したペスタロッチーとフレーベルの教育思想は、戦後にいたるまで日本の教育に強い影響力を与え続けてきた。二人の教育思想 はどのように受容され、実践されてきたのだろうか。その理想に共鳴した教育者・教育学者の足跡からたどる。.

The mean-field theory with the use of the slave-boson functional method has been generalized to take account of the spin- and/or orbital-ordered state in the doubly degenerate Hubbard model. Numerical calculations are presented of the antiferromagnetic orbital-ordered state in the half-filled simple-cubic model. The orbital order in the present theory is much reduced compared with that in the Hartree–Fock approximation because of the large orbital fluctuations. From a comparison of the ground-state energy, the antiferromagnetic orbital state is shown to be (...) unstable against the antiferromagnetic spin state, although the situation becomes reversed when the exchange interaction is negative. (shrink)

生体仿自己生成過程，、﹒步步又﹒步、一步三位已提唱芒才、才一才可工又、多概念主、力二的『判斷力批判旁的起源是也令。力、、「二重作動可鍵概念仿導入主才一才工又仿環境二仿諸閔係旬強調主、才一卡才工又叮本性 是一明確』寸弋芒早已。 La notion d'autopoïèse, proposée par Humbert R. Maturana et Francisco J. Varela, comme processus par lequel le vivant se produit lui-même a ses racines dans la Critique de la faculté de juger de Kant. Mais il convient d'en préciser la nature en introduisant la notion clé de « double opération » et en insistant sur les rapports de l'autopoïèse avec l'environnement. The concept of « autopoiesis » as suggested by Humbert R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela as a process (...) by which life occurs, has its roots in Kant's Criticism of Judgment. But it is advisable to specify its nature by introducing the key notion of a « double opération » and by insisting on the connections between autopoiesis and environment. (shrink)

1. Menschliches Wesen und die transzendentale Frage 1.1 Notwendigkeit der transzendentalen Frage, 1.2 Gegen die Ent-Transzendentalization, 1.3 Apperzeption als Auslegung 1.4 Transzendentales Apriori, 1.5 Apperzeption als Selbstbewußtsein, 1.6 Freies Subjekt und seine "Tranzendenz"-Struktur, 1.7 Die transzendentale Struktur des Daseins 2. Phänomenologie und Sprachanalytische Philosophie 2.1 Die Struktur des prädikativen Satzes und die Intentionalität, 2.1.1 Was ist die Intentionalität?, 2.1.1 Intentionalität- Kritik aus der Sprachanalyse, 2.1.3 Ein Versuch der Gegenkritik 2.2 Noema und Sinn, 2.2.1 Neue Entwicklung der Husserl-Interpretationen, 2.2.2 Frege's Sinn (...) und Noema, 2.2.3 Noema und Gestalt, 2.2.4 Individuation und die Entschiedenheit der Intention, 2.2.5 Die Identität des Einzelnen und die ideale Identität 3. Die phänomenologische Theorie der Leiblichkeit---"mon corps". (shrink)