Michael Otsuka sets out to vindicate left-libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. Otsuka reclaims the ideas of John Locke from the libertarian Right, and shows how his Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left-libertarianism which is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. Otsuka's libertarianism (...) is founded on a right of self-ownership. Here he is at one with 'right-wing' libertarians, such as Robert Nozick, in endorsing the highly anti-paternalistic and anti-moralistic implications of this right. But he parts company with these libertarians in so far as he argues that such a right is compatible with a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare. In embracing this principle, his own version of left-libertarianism is more strongly egalitarian than others which are currently well known. Otsuka argues that an account of legitimate political authority based upon the free consent of each is strengthened by the adoption of such an egalitarian principle. He defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society as a confederation of voluntary associations. Part I of Libertarianism without Inequality concerns the natural rights of property in oneself and the world. Part II considers the natural rights of punishment and self-defence that form the basis for the government's authority to legislate and punish. Part III explores the nature and limits of the powers of governments which are created by the consensual transfer of the natural rights of the governed. Libertarianism without Inequality is a book which everyone interested in political theory should read. (shrink)

A review essay of Frances Kamm's 'Morality, Mortality', Vol. 2, 'Rights, Duties, and Status' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Scientific conflicts often stem from differences in the conceptual framework through which scientists view and understand their own field. In this chapter, I analyze the ontological and methodological assumptions of three traditions in evolutionary biology, namely, Ernst Mayr’s population thinking, the gene-centered view of the Modern Syn thesis, and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Each of these frameworks presupposes a different account of "evolutionary causes," and this discrepancy prevents mutual understanding and objective evaluation in the recent contention surrounding the EES. From (...) this perspective, the chapter characterizes the EES research program as an attempt to introduce causal structures beyond genes as additional units of evolution, and compares its research methodology and objectives with those of the traditional MS framework. (shrink)

This chapter provides a defense of a type of occupational pension, known as “collective defined contribution”, which is based on the idea that it is possible to limit the employer’s liability to nothing more than a set contribution while retaining many of the benefits of the collectivization of risks of a traditional defined benefit pension. CDC can be defended against a freedom-based objection from the right via an appeal to the following Hobbesian voluntarist justification: CDC constitutes a “Leviathan of Leviathans” (...) into which it is rational for workers to choose to associate in order to tame longevity and investment risks. CDC pensions that arise from and mirror existing income inequalities can also be defended against an egalitarian objection from the left, by demonstration that they can be grounded in Rawlsian principles of reciprocity and property-owning democracy. (shrink)

In a recent review essay of a two volume anthology on left-libertarianism (edited by two of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid out most of the core issues that confront left-libertarianism. We are each left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to address some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does much of the time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a well-defined and distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism. (...) More specifically, we shall address the following fundamental issues raised by Fried (and others): (1) Does the notion self-ownership have any determinate content? (2) What is the relation between self-ownership and world ownership? (3) How is left-libertarianism different from other forms of liberal egalitarianism (e.g., those of Rawls and Dworkin)? (shrink)

Fifty-seven years ago. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were annihilated by unprecedented state terrorism. But survivors of both cities never said "Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki!" No survivors harbored the feeling "once recovered from devastation of the holy land, Japan will not fail to revenge". Instead, they realized in the atomic inferno that violence begets violence and pledged: "Rest in peace. We will never repeat the mistakes. No more Hiroshima, No more Nagasaki".

Argues against the right to engage in lethal measures to defend oneself or others against innocent aggressors or innocent threats. Criticizes arguments to the contrary by Judith Jarvis Thomson and Frances Kamm. Offers a positive account of why the killing of an innocent threat or aggressor is morally on a par with the impermissible killing of an innocent bystander in self‐defence.

Explains why Lockean voluntarism, even when remedied of the problems discussed in Ch. 5, might be criticized by liberal egalitarians on the following grounds: it allows for the legitimacy of highly illiberal or inegalitarian political societies. Argues that such illiberal or inegalitarian societies would in fact be legitimized by the actual consent of their members when freely given in circumstances of equality. Therefore defends a voluntaristic, left‐libertarian account of political legitimacy that differs in crucial respects from the hypothetical contract approaches (...) of liberal‐egalitarian Kantians such as John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. (shrink)

Considers those circumstances in which self‐ownership and equality cannot be reconciled in the manner proposed in Chapter 1. Argues that, in such circumstances, liberal egalitarians and libertarians can find common ground in support of provision for the disabled by means of the coercive taxation of only those able‐bodied individuals who have committed crimes.

Offers a reconstruction of John Locke's voluntaristic theory of legitimate political authority with the aim of overcoming the following two problems with tacit consent via residence: that it fails to bind either because it is unfreely given or because it is offered in circumstances of inequality. Builds on the author's defence in Ch. 1 of an egalitarian version of the Lockean proviso to remedy these problems and endorses a highly voluntaristic, pluralistic, and decentralized account of legitimate political authority.

Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ‘enough and as good’ proviso calls for acquisition of unowned natural resources that is consistent with equality of opportunity for welfare. Argues, contrary to both Nozick and G. A. Cohen, that a robust right of self‐ownership is compatible with this welfare‐egalitarian proviso across a wide range of circumstances.

Considers the merits of the Locke‐inspired Jeffersonian idea that laws enacted by those who once lived in one's country but are now dead have no authority over the living and hence should lapse unless they are reaffirmed by a democratic majority vote of the living. Considers and rejects consequentialist, communitarian, and Madisonian attempts to justify the authority of the dead over the living. Draws on Ch. 5 to propose and endorse an account based on unanimous Lockean consent of how the (...) laws of the dead can legitimately bind the living. (shrink)

Offers a Lockean account of a natural right to punish, which is grounded in a natural right of self‐protection. Endorses Warren Quinn's derivation of the right to punish from a right of self‐protection, but argues, against Quinn, that his account will succeed only if one is allowed, when justifying punishment, to appeal to the fact that the punishment of the guilty will deter others. Also argues that Quinn's account will succeed only if the right to engage in lethal measures to (...) protect the lives of individuals against innocent aggressors is highly circumscribed. (shrink)

I presented an earlier version of this paper to the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group in Los Angeles, whose members I would like to thank for their comments. In addition, I would also like to thank the following people for reading and providing written or verbal commentary on earlier drafts: Robert Mams, Rogers Albritton, G. A. Cohen, David Copp, Matthew Hanser, Craig Ihara, Brian Lee, Marc Lange, Derk Pereboom, Carol Voeller, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. I owe (...) special thanks to Timothy Hall and Seana Shiffnn for their insightful and helpful comments. (shrink)

Pyridoxal 5′‐phosphate, the vitamin B6 derivative, acts as the coenzyme of many enzymes involved in amino acid metabolism. Exceptionally, this compound was found covalently bound to glycogen phosphorylase, the key enzyme in the regulation of glycogen metabolism. Although it is essential for the function of phosphorylase, its direct role has remained an enigma. We have recently found that the glucose moiety of pyridoxal (5′)diphospho (1)‐α‐D‐glucose, a conjugate of pyridoxal 5′‐phosphate and glucose 1‐phosphate through a pyrophosphate linkage, is transferred to the (...) nonreducing end of glycogen, forming a new α‐1,4‐glucosidic linkage. This finding emphasizes the importance of the direct phosphate‐phosphate interaction between the coenzyme and the substrate in the phosphorylase catalytic reaction. We have proposed a catalytic mechanism for phosphorylase in which the phosphate group of pyridoxal 5′‐phosphate acts as an electrophile to the phosphate group of glucose 1‐phosphate. This appears to represent the first instance of the direct involvement of a phosphate group in catalysis by enzymes. (shrink)

We argue that there is a marked shift in the moral weight of an increment in a person's well-being when one moves from a case involving only intra-personal trade-offs to a case involving only inter-personal trads-offs. This shift, we propose, is required by the separateness of persons. We also argue that the Priority View put forward by Parfit cannot account for such a shift. We also outline two alternative views, an egalitarian view and a claims-based view, that can account for (...) this shift. (shrink)

We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. We argue that while each has particular merits and shortcomings, egalitarian views more fully satisfy a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.

I defend an incompatibilist 'Principle of Avoidable Blame' according to which one is blameworthy for performing an act of a given type only if one could instead have behaved in a manner for which one would have been blameless. First, I demonstrate that this principle is resistant to Harry Frankfurt-type counterexample. Second, I present a positive argument for this principle that appeals to the relation of blame to the 'reactive attitude' of indignation. Finally, I argue against the possibility of blamelessly (...) stumbling into a 'moral blind alley' where one would be blameworthy for whatever one is capable of doing. (shrink)

In "What We Owe to Each Other", T. M. Scanlon argues that one should save the greater number when faced with the choice between saving one life and two or more different lives. It is, Scanlon claims, a virtue of this argument that it does not appeal to the claims of groups of individuals but only to the claims of individuals. I demonstrate that this argument for saving the greater number, indeed, depends, contrary to what Scanlon says, upon an appeal (...) to the claim of a group of individuals to be saved. (shrink)

Over the past decade philosophers of biology have discussed whether evolutionary theory is a causal theory or a phenomenological study of evolution based solely on the statistical features of a population. This article reviews this controversy from three aspects, respectively concerning the assumptions, applications, and explanations of evolutionary theory, with a view to arriving at a definite conclusion in each contention. In so doing I also argue that an implicit methodological assumption shared by both sides of the debate, namely the (...) overconfidence in conceptual analysis as a tool to understand the scientific theory, is the real culprit that has both generated the problem and precluded its solution for such a long time. (shrink)

I argue that prioritarianism cannot be assessed in abstraction from an account of the measure of utility. Rather, the soundness of this view crucially depends on what counts as a greater, lesser, or equal increase in a person’s utility. In particular, prioritarianism cannot accommodate a normatively compelling measure of utility that is captured by the axioms of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. Nor can it accommodate a plausible and elegant generalization of this theory that has been (...) offered in response to challenges to von Neumann and Morgenstern. This is, I think, a theoretically interesting and unexpected source of difficulty for prioritarianism, which I explore in this article. (shrink)

The causal nature of evolution is one of the central topics in the philosophy of biology. The issue concerns whether equations used in evolutionary genetics point to some causal processes or purely phenomenological patterns. To address this question the present article builds well-defined causal models that underlie standard equations in evolutionary genetics. These models are based on minimal and biologically plausible hypotheses about selection and reproduction, and generate statistics to predict evolutionary changes. The causal reconstruction of the evolutionary principles shows (...) adaptive evolution as a genuine causal process, where fitness and selection are both causes of evolution. 1 Introduction2 The Philosophical Puzzle3 Causal Models4 Causal Foundations of Evolutionary Genetics4.1 Univariate quantitative genetics model4.1.1 The causal graph4.1.2 Structural equations4.1.3 Deriving evolutionary transition functions4.2 One-locus population genetics model5 Evolution as a Causal Process5.1 Selection as a causal process5.2 Causes of evolutionary change6 Conclusion. (shrink)

In the Trolley Case (Figure 1), as devised by Philippa Foot and modified by Judith Jarvis Thomson, a runaway trolley (i.e. tram) is headed down a main track and will hit and kill five unless you divert it onto a side track, where it will hit and kill one.

Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (2006): 109-35.