Cet article se propose de montrer que le langage en traduction joue un rôle performatif parce que les termes qu’il emploie retraduisent des normes sociales et des positions institutionnelles construites dans une autre culture, avec d’autres conditions historiques. Dans le cas de la naissance des sciences de la communication en Chine, des concepts américains sur la communication sont venus par leur traduction à la rencontre des normes et positions chinoises sur le journalisme et la propagande, engendrant une reconfiguration mutuelle des (...) actants, qu’ils soient sociaux ou langagiers. Nous étudions comment le système socio-culturel de la Chine a recréé un ordre local propre sous la forme d’une discipline spécifique à ce pays, xinwen chuanboxue .This article sets out to show that language in translation plays a performative role, because the terms it uses effectively retranslate social norms and institutional positions that were built up in a different culture and in different historical circumstances. In the case of the emerging communication sciences in China, American concepts on communication, which arrived in translation, came to encounter Chinese norms and positions on journalism and propaganda, and this caused a mutual reconfiguration of the actants, both social and linguistic. We look here at how the Chinese socio-cultural system re-created its own local order in the form of a discipline which is specific to the country, “xinwen chuanboxue”. (shrink)

Diversity is an undeniable fact of nature, and there is now evidence that nature did not stop generating diversity just before “designing” the human brain :15,468–15,473. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509654112, 2015). If neurodiversity is a fact of nature, what about neurodivergence? Although the terms “neurodiversity” and “neurodivergence” are sometimes used interchangeably, this is, we believe, a mistake: “neurodiversity” is a term of inclusion whereas “neurodivergence” is a term of exclusion. To make the difference clear, note that everyone can be said to be neurodiverse, (...) but that it is almost impossible for everyone to be neurodivergent. Neurodivergence is, we claim here, a fact of society. Neurodivergent individuals are those whose cognitive profile diverges from an established cognitive norm, a norm that is not an objective statistical fact of human neurological functioning but a standard established and maintained by socio-political processes. In this paper, we describe the socio-political mechanisms that build neurodivergence out of neurodiversity which, inspired by Mihai :395–416. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-017-0186-z, 2018), we call “epistemic and cognitive marginalization”. First, we extend the traditional concept of neurodiversity, which we believe too closely tied to a neuroreductionist conception of cognition, to that of “extended neurodiversity,” thereby viewing neurodiversity through the lens of 4E cognition. Considering that human cognition depends on epistemic resources, both for their construction and their online dynamic expression, we hypothesize that the differential access to epistemic resources in society, a form of epistemic injustice, is an overlooked mechanism that turns neurodiversity into neurodivergence. In doing so, we shed light on a type of epistemic injustice that might be missing from the epistemic injustice literature: cognitive injustices. (shrink)

Bien que les approches basées sur les déficits soient encore prédominantes en formation à l’enseignement, on reconnaît de plus en plus l’apport potentiel des approches basées sur les forces, afin de développer une identité professionnelle positive. Conséquemment, nous avons expérimenté une activité innovante d’écriture réflexive, basée sur la psychologie positive, auprès de 50 stagiaires en enseignement préscolaire/primaire au Québec. L’analyse de ces empreintes offre de dégager divers aspects constitutifs de l’identité professionnelle des stagiaires, de décrire l’évolution du processus de construction (...) identitaire, ce qui permet d’apprécier la contribution de ce type d’activité pour rendre ce processus plus explicite. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin was one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century - a man who set ideas on fire. His defence of liberty and plurality was passionate and persuasive and inspired a generation. His ideas - especially his reasoned rejection of excessive certainty and political despotism - have become even more prescient and vital today.But who was the man behind such influential views? In Search of Isaiah Berlin tells the compelling story of a decades-long collaboration between Berlin and his (...) editor, Henry Hardy, who made it his vocation to bring Berlin's huge body of work into print. Hardy discovered that Berlin had written far more than people thought, much of it unpublished. As he describes his struggles with Berlin, who was almost on principle unwilling to have his work published, an intimate and revealing picture of the self-deprecating philosopher emerges. This is a unique portrait of a man who gave us a new way of thinking about the human predicament, and whose work had for most of his life remained largely out of view. (shrink)

Biobanking activities for genetic research purposes have recently undergone nothing short of a small revolution. Many biobanks have left their traditional home of a small refrigerator in a laboratory to reach the unprecedented proportion of large, sophisticated storage centers containing DNA samples from whole populations. As we turn our attention to research on complex diseases and show great interest in human genetic variation and genetic epidemiology, we need to base our research not only on the DNA of small family cohorts, (...) but on larger sample collections, coupled with geographic location, genealogical information, and environmental and medical data. Population genetic research projects are underway around the world. Setting up such large-scale population biobanks is a challenge for any researcher. Population genetic research projects raise legal, ethical, and social issues that need to be addressed properly in order to maintain the trust of the population, an absolute requirement for the success of such research endeavour. (shrink)

I aim here to confront texts of Levinas and Sartre in an attempt to rethink the relation of the poIitical to the ethical in the early eighties in France. The method is essentially to try to think a passage from one domain into the other without privileging poIitics over ethics or vice versa while uncovering their organic and dialectical interaction, a subject that an only be touched upon via the bridging metaphor of a Visage that can liberate oneself from the (...) totalization of egoity. My purpose, thus, is not to confront Levinas and Sartre but to allow them to embark on a dialogue constructed around the paradigm of the question of the Other. (shrink)

How do René Girard’s theories apply to a context of double colonization? Through a new interpretation of Alexis Wright’s novel Plains of Promise, this paper aims to show the crosscultural relevance of mimetic theory. The study will highlight the way in which the scapegoat mechanism is represented in the Australian colonial context. It also offers a Girardian analysis of the predicament of female characters of Aboriginal descent who are victims of sexual violence.

Biobanking activities for genetic research purposes have recently undergone nothing short of a small revolution. Many biobanks have left their traditional home of a small refrigerator in a laboratory to reach the unprecedented proportion of large, sophisticated storage centers containing DNA samples from whole populations. As we turn our attention to research on complex diseases and show great interest in human genetic variation and genetic epidemiology, we need to base our research not only on the DNA of small family cohorts, (...) but on larger sample collections, coupled with geographic location, genealogical information, and environmental and medical data. Population genetic research projects are underway around the world. Setting up such large-scale population biobanks is a challenge for any researcher. Population genetic research projects raise legal, ethical, and social issues that need to be addressed properly in order to maintain the trust of the population, an absolute requirement for the success of such research endeavour. (shrink)

This article reads with Michi Saagiig Nishnaabe writer and independent scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, and Nêhiyaw legal scholar and novelist Tracey Lindberg. The practice of reading with involves heeding textual instructions and prioritising narrative terms of engagement. Indigenous bodies layered with resurgent potential in Lindberg’s and Simpson’s fictions refuse to re-centre the legacy of white settler coloniality. Attending to the process of reading with, as a relational undertaking, involves re-apprising cross-generational legacies and re-membering collective responsibilities.

Predatory grooming is a form of abuse most familiar from high-profile cases of sexual misconduct, for example, the Nassar case at Michigan State. Predatory groomers target individuals in a systematic effort to lead them into relationships in which they are vulnerable to exploitation. This is an example of a broader form of epistemic misconduct that Leydon-Hardy describes as epistemic infringement, where this involves the contravention of social and epistemic norms in a way that undermines our epistemic agency. In this (...) chapter, Leydon-Hardy looks at the distinctive epistemic harm caused by epistemic infringement. She argues that this harm cannot be understood simply as the victim’s having a false belief, or even as her being alienated from her belief-forming mechanisms. A deeper understanding of the harm caused by infringement shows that it stems from damage to one’s epistemic agency, and indeed, to one’s personhood. (shrink)

Introduction: our environment is out of control -- The foundation: your environment shapes you -- Every hero is the product of a situation : understanding the proximity effect -- How your environment shapes you : the myth of willpower -- Use positive-stress environments to promote change -- Create enriched environments : the key of "forcing functions" to promote change -- More than good intentions : how to adapt to new and difficult environments -- Grow into your goals : outsource your (...) motivation to high pressure environments -- Optimal environments for rapid learning : shortcuts to success -- Rotate your environments : change it up based on the work you're doing -- Find unique collaborations : design your world through transformational relationships -- Never forget where you came from : remember the environment where you began -- Pse rejuvinating environments to promote recovery and growth -- Establish your value system : the clearer you get, the more successful you'll be -- Remove everything that conflicts with your values : how to make tough choices -- Change your defaults : outsource your behavior to your environment -- Create triggers to prevent self-sabotage : putting failure-planning to work -- Shock your routine : the power of regular sabbaticals -- Reset your body and brain every week: the power of a fast -- Designate a sacred space : create an environment to stay on course -- Conclusion: no matter where you are, you can change -- Acknowledgments -- Index -- About the author. (shrink)

En el escrito Vorläufige Thesen zur Refomation der Philosophie, Ludwig Feuerbach atribuye a Spinoza la autoría de la filosofía especulativa. A la zaga queda Schelling, considerado por Feuerbach únicamente como el restaurador de la misma. En la secuencia establecida por éste, Hegel sería, por su parte, solo un elemento más en la constitución de la filosofía especulativa, aunque tiene el mérito de completar tal sistema de pensamiento. En el presente artículo pretendo determinar en qué medida el autor de esta filosofía (...) se halla presente en el que la consuma. Esbozaré la forma y grado de esa presencia poniendo el foco en un aspecto nuclear, que, al mismo tiempo, servirá de guía del trabajo aquí propuesto: la negación. (shrink)

Aristotle maintains that every man has, or should have, a single end, a target at which he aims. The doctrine is stated in E.N. I 2. ‘If, then, there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall (...) we not, like archers who have a mark to aim t, be more likely to hit upon what is right?’. Aristotle does not here prove, nor need we understand him as claiming to prove, that there is only one end which is desired for itself. He points out correctly that, if there are objects which are desired but not desired for themselves, there must be some object which is desired for itself. The passage further suggests that, if there were one such object and one only, this fact would be important and helpful for the conduct of life. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...) domain. The central element in Socrates’ account of an expert is what I call the truth-and-caring criterion: an expert has to make seeking the truth and avoiding (avoidable) error her supreme epistemic goal and she has to make caring for common goods the supreme goal of practising her expertise. (shrink)

Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous nature of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have traditionally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not be but (...) linguistic. When any problem divides a community of otherwise intelligent rational thinkers, one suspects some deep conceptual confusion is at play. Indeed, we believe that the conceptual categories used to frame these and related questions are so hopelessly muddled that one could honestly answer “both simultaneously”, or “neither”, depending one what is meant by the alternatives. But let’s get our priorities straight. This paper first and foremost aims at defending what we believe to be a step in that direction of the proper view of thinking, a view we call the spatial-motor view. In order to do so, however, we have found it essential to start by address the conceptual confusion just alluded to. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in two steps. First a conceptual step, in which we reconsider some of the traditional categories brought into play when thinking about thinking. Then an empirical step, in which we offer empirical evidence for one of the views conceptually isolated during the first part of the work. Future version of this collaborative work will include a speculative step in which we spin out an evolutionary and developmental scenario whose function it is justify the spatial-motor view by showing how it fits into current evolutionary and developmental theories. (shrink)

Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not (...) be but linguistic. When any problem divides a community of otherwise intelligent rational thinkers, one suspects some deep conceptual confusion is at play. Indeed, we believe that the conceptual cate- gories used to frame these and related questions are so hopelessly muddled that one could honestly answer “both simultaneously”, or “neither”, depending one what is meant by the alternatives. But let’s get our priorities straight. This paper first and foremost aims at defending what we believe to be a step in that direc- tion of the proper view of thinking, a view we call the spatial-motor view. In order to do so, however, we have found it essential to start by addressing the conceptual confusion just alluded to. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in two steps. First a conceptual step, in which we reconsider some of the traditional categories brought into play when thinking about thinking. Then an empirical step, in which we offer empirical evidence for one of the views conceptually isolated during the first part of the work. Future version of this collaborative work will include a speculative step in which we spin out an evolutionary and developmental scenario whose function it is justify the spatial-motor view by showing how it fits into current evolutionary and developmental theories. (shrink)

Written by four members of the Calvin College philosophy department, The Little Logic Book is a valuable resource for teachers and undergraduate students of philosophy. In addition to providing clear introductions to the modes of reasoning students encounter in their philosophy course readings, it includes a nuanced description of common informal fallacies, a narrative overview of various philosophical accounts of scientific inference, and a concluding chapter on the ethics of argumentation. The book features engaging dialogues on social, philosophical and religious (...) issues based on the styles of argument taken up in the chapters. In additions to core concepts, distinctions, explanations, rules of inference, methods of assessment, and examples, The Little Logic Book provides philosophical commentary that will stimulate discussion of the assumptions and implications of various kinds of human reasoning. (shrink)

This paper has been written in the light of recent discussions on the relevance of the New Physics to Philosophy, and with particular reference to a symposium held at the Royal Institution on May 19, 1943. It seemed to me that, at the symposium, there was some misunderstanding both on the part of the scientists and on the part of the philosophers, mainly due to the fact that neither quite realized what the opposite side considered to be the function of (...) science and philosophy. One of the few things that emerged clearly was that the scientists thought the new physics had very definite relevance for philosophy, while the philosophers thought that it had no relevance at all. It would seem that such disagreement could be due only to disagreement about what the new physics attempts to do, or to disagreement about what philosophy attempts to do. I shall consider each of these in turn. (shrink)

Science is remarkably reliable. It puts people on the moon, performs laser eye surgery, tells us about ancient civilisations and species, and predicts the future of our climate. What underwrites this reliability? This book argues that the standard answers—the scientific method, rigour, and objectivity—are insufficient for the job. Here we propose a new model of science that places its products front and centre. This is the ‘Tangle of Science’. In this book we show how any reliable piece of science is (...) underpinned by a vast, diverse, and thick network of other scientific products. In doing so we bring back into focus areas of science that have been long neglected, emphasising how every product, from the screws that hold the space shuttle together to ways of measuring the consumer price index to Einstein’s theory of general relativity, work together to support results we can trust. (shrink)

Conjectures are made on the text of three passages in Tibullus, Books 1–2: 1.4.26 hastam … suam for crines … suos, 2.1.56 membra for bache, 2.4.60 aliis rebus for alias herbas.

Introduction -- Ethical preliminaries -- Economics -- Justice -- Business ethics -- Conclusion.

Le De mundi caelestis terrestrisque constitutione liber, attribué à tort à Bède, est un texte curieux, qui, élaboré en milieu monastique au XIe ou XIIe siècle, présente peu de références scripturaires, mais renseigne sur la réception médiévale des textes scientifiques et philosophiques latins d'époque tardive.

In the context of a dialogue between Kant and Hegel, this paper aims at presenting some aspects of the reception that Hegel made in the Logic of Being on the so-called notion of Inbegriff aller Realität. It is a notion that Hegel retrieves and examines dialectically and speculatively, not just in a way of an exposition. The paper seeks to identify and explain the main connections of the moments in which Hegel, in the field of the development of a pure (...) logic, first turns the reality into negation and then into contradiction. (shrink)

Revision of the author's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1970. Bibliography: p. 155-158.

Moral education is an important topic—both for moral philosophy and for the philosophy of education. Of the many questions that ought to be asked about moral education, certainly the following would be included in any reasonable list: What constitutes a moral education? How does one properly give someone a moral education? and Why provide persons with moral education? I have little to say about question. My main interest in this paper is in the third question, but I shall approach it (...) by first concentrating on question. What does a person have if he possesses a moral education? What is lacking and what is defective in an individual who does not have one? (shrink)