Contrasting the conflicting positions of Fink and Žižek, this article opens and closes with the question: is feminine jouissance ineffable? It solves the mystery of why Lacan associates the Other jouissance with women and presents an account of phallic and the Other jouissance informed by the work of Breuer and Freud. It argues that the satisfactions of Lacan’s feminine subject bear striking affinity to those of the hysteric, while phallic jouissance affords the same sort of enjoyment as that of Freud’s (...) obsessional neurotic. And, while “real” experiences make one lose one-self and may not be represented by one who was absent, this is not to say that we cannot shed light on characteristically feminine pleasure/pains. (shrink)

Humankind is currently witnessing, and shaping, the most significant and rapid paradigm shift in human history - a paradigm shift of major demographic, economic, ecological, and geo-political dimensions. For the first time in human history - we are faced not with just one crisis - but a confluence of several crises; crises that are not related to a single tribe or community - a single nation -or a single region of the world - but are each global in scale. To (...) meet the challenges of these global crises will require an equally historic paradigm shift; a paradigm shift with a strong environmental ethic that restores ecological balance and integrity to our failing ecosystems, and that addresses the critical issue of climate change; a paradigm shift toward an economic system that brings about an end to poverty — and a paradigm that brings an end to war as a means to solving conflict, as it is only through a global family in harmony and peace with itself, that we can solve the unprecedented global issues facing our one common home, planet earth - and our one common future as a global family. The travel and tourism industry has, and will continue to play a vital and leading role toward this paradigm shift, and as the world's largest industry involving virtually every nation in the world — will be the central pillar of a Peace through Commerce movement. The dramatic growth of tourism in the past 60 years is one of the most remarkable economic and social phenomena of our time. The industry has grown from a total of 25 million international arrivals in 1950 to a projected 1 billion international arrivals in 2010, and a further projection to 1.6 billion by 2020. Beginning with the emergence of "Ecotourism" in the late 1980' s, there are an increasing number of tourism market segments which fall within a broad category that can be called "Peace Tourism," and classified within a framework that includes peace within ourselves, peace with others, peace with nature, peace with past generations, peace with future generations, and peace with our Creator. Since its birth in 1986, the International Institute for Peace through Tourism (IIPT) has been promoting these values of tourism together with its vision of Travel and Tourism as the world's first "Global Peace Industry" - an industry that promotes and supports the belief that every traveler is potentially an "Ambassador for Peace." This "higher purpose of tourism" includes the key role of tourism in promoting international understanding and collaboration among nations; environmental protection and preservation of biodiversity; enhancing cultures and valuing heritage; contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction; and healing wounds of conflict. (shrink)

We take coherence based probability logic as the basic reference theory to model human deductive reasoning. The conditional and probabilistic argument forms are explored. We give a brief overview of recent developments of combining logic and probability in psychology. A study on conditional inferences illustrates our approach. First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences conclude the paper.

The present chapter describes a probabilistic framework of human reasoning. It is based on probability logic. While there are several approaches to probability logic, we adopt the coherence based approach.

Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, have investigated this claim empirically. We report four experiments which investigate three rules of SYSTEMP, namely the AND, the LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE, and the OR rule. The actual inferences of the subjects are compared with the coherent normative upper and lower probability bounds derived from a non-infinitesimal probability semantics of SYSTEM P. We found a relatively good agreement of human reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic (...) reasoning. Contrary to the results reported in the ‘heuristics and biases’ tradition, the subjects committed relatively few upper bound violations (conjunction fallacies). (shrink)

Probabilistic models have started to replace classical logic as the standard reference paradigm in human deductive reasoning. Mental probability logic emphasizes general principles where human reasoning deviates from classical logic, but agrees with a probabilistic approach (like nonmonotonicity or the conditional event interpretation of conditionals). -/- This contribution consists of two parts. In the first part we discuss general features of reasoning systems including consequence relations, how uncertainty may enter argument forms, probability intervals, and probabilistic informativeness. These concepts are of (...) central importance for the psychological task analysis. In the second part we report new experimental data on the paradoxes of the material conditional, the probabilistic modus ponens, the complement task, and data on the probabilistic truth table task. The results of the experiments provide evidence for the hypothesis that people represent indicative conditionals by conditional probability assertions. (shrink)

We propose probability logic as an appropriate standard of reference for evaluating human inferences. Probability logical accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning with system p, and conditional syllogisms (modus ponens, etc.) are explored. Furthermore, we present categorical syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers, like the “most . . . ” quantifier. While most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies, we summarize our empirical studies on human nonmonotonic reasoning.

The modus ponens (A -> B, A :. B) is, along with modus tollens and the two logically not valid counterparts denying the antecedent (A -> B, ¬A :. ¬B) and affirming the consequent, the argument form that was most often investigated in the psychology of human reasoning. The present contribution reports the results of three experiments on the probabilistic versions of modus ponens and denying the antecedent. In probability logic these arguments lead to conclusions with imprecise probabilities. In the (...) modus ponens tasks the participants inferred probabilities that agreed much better with the coherent normative values than in the denying the antecedent tasks, a result that mirrors results found with the classical argument versions. For modus ponens a surprisingly high number of lower and upper probabilities agreed perfectly with the conjugacy property (upper probabilities equal one complements of the lower probabilities). When the probabilities of the premises are imprecise the participants do not ignore irrelevant (“silent”) boundary probabilities. The results show that human mental probability logic is close to predictions derived from probability logic for the most elementary argument form, but has considerable difficulties with the more complex forms involving negations. (shrink)

Nonmonotonic logics allow—contrary to classical (monotone) logics— for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new evidence. Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, have investigated this claim empirically. system p is a central, broadly accepted nonmonotonic reasoning system that proposes basic rationality postulates. We previously investigated empirically a probabilistic interpretation of three selected rules of system p. We found a relatively good agreement of human reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic reasoning according (...) to the coherence interpretation of system p. This study reports an experiment on the cautious monotonicity Rule and its “incautious” counterpart that is not contained in system p, namely the monotonicity Rule. In accordance with our previous results, the data suggest that people reason nonmonotonically: the subjects in the cautious monotonicity condition infer significantly tighter intervals close to the coherence interpretation of system p compared with the subjects in the incautious monotonicity condition where rather wide (and hence non-informative) intervals are inferred. (shrink)

Nonmonotonic conditionals (A |∼ B) are formalizations of common sense expressions of the form “if A, normally B”. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted by a “high” coherent conditional probability, P(B|A) > .5. Two important properties are closely related to the nonmonotonic conditional: First, A |∼ B allows for exceptions. Second, the rules of the nonmonotonic system p guiding A |∼ B allow for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new premises. This study reports a series of three experiments on reasoning (...) with inference rules about nonmonotonic conditionals in the framework of coherence. We investigated the cut, and the right weakening rule of system p. As a critical condition, we investigated basic monotonic properties of classical (monotone) logic, namely monotonicity, transitivity, and contraposition. The results suggest that people reason nonmonotonically rather than monotonically. We propose nonmonotonic reasoning as a competence model of human reasoning. (shrink)

We discuss O&C's probabilistic approach from a probability logical point of view. Specifically, we comment on subjective probability, the indispensability of logic, the Ramsey test, the consequence relation, human nonmonotonic reasoning, intervals, generalized quantifiers, and rational analysis.

There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, P(if A then B), is the conditional probability of B given A, P(B|A). We identify a conditional which is such that P(if A then B)=P(B|A) with de Finetti's conditional event, B|A. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of conditional events. In this paper, we illustrate (...) how to overcome this objection with a probabilistic analysis, based on coherence, of these compounds and iterations. We interpret the compounds and iterations as conditional random quantities which, given some logical dependencies, may reduce to conditional events. We show how the inference to B|A from A and B can be extended to compounds and iterations of both conditional events and biconditional events. Moreover, we determine the respective uncertainty propagation rules. Finally, we make some comments on extending our analysis to counterfactuals. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTo build a process model of the understanding of conditionals we extract a common core of three semantics of if-then sentences: the conditional event interpretation in the coherencebased probability logic, the discourse processingtheory of Hans Kamp, and the game-theoretical approach of Jaakko Hintikka. The empirical part reports three experiments in which each participant assessed the probability of 52 if-then sentencesin a truth table task. Each experiment included a second task: An n-back task relating the interpretation of conditionals to working memory, (...) a Bayesian bookbag and poker chip task relating the interpretation of conditionals to probability updating, and a probabilistic modus ponens task relating the interpretation of conditionals to a classical inference task. Data analysis shows that the way in which the conditionals are interpreted correlates with each of the supplementary tasks. The results are discussed within the process model proposed in the introduction. (shrink)

Logical argument forms are investigated by second order probability density functions. When the premises are expressed by beta distributions, the conclusions usually are mixtures of beta distributions. If the shape parameters of the distributions are assumed to be additive (natural sampling), then the lower and upper bounds of the mixing distributions (P´olya-Eggenberger distributions) are parallel to the corresponding lower and upper probabilities in conditional probability logic.

Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, investigated this claim empirically. In the present paper four psychological experiments are reported, that investigate three rules of system p, namely the and, the left logical equivalence, and the or rule. The actual inferences of the subjects are compared with the coherent normative upper and lower probability bounds derived from a non-infinitesimal probability semantics of system p. We found a relatively good agreement of human (...) reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic reasoning according to the coherence interpretation of system p. Contrary to the results reported in the “heuristics and biases” tradition, the subjects committed relatively few upper bound violations (conjunction fallacies). More lower than upper bound violations were observed. When the premises were presented in terms of intervals higher mean lower bounds were observed as when the premises were presented in terms of point percentages. (shrink)

Nonmonotonic conditionals (A |∼ B) are formalizations of common sense expressions of the form “if A, normally B”. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted by a “high” coherent conditional probability, P(B|A) > .5. Two important properties are closely related to the nonmonotonic conditional: First, A |∼ B allows for exceptions. Second, the rules of the nonmonotonic system p guiding A |∼ B allow for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new premises. This study reports a series of three experiments on reasoning (...) with inference rules about nonmonotonic conditionals in the framework of coherence. We investigated the cut, and the right weakening rule of system p. As a critical condition, we investigated basic monotonic properties of classical (monotone) logic, namely monotonicity, transitivity, and contraposition. The results suggest that people reason nonmonotonically rather than monotonically. We propose nonmonotonic reasoning as a competence model of human reasoning. (shrink)

A system of intermediate quantifiers (“Most S are P”, “m/n S are P”) is proposed for evaluating the rationality of human syllogistic reasoning. Some relations between intermediate quantifiers and probabilistic interpretations are discussed. The paper concludes by the generalization of the atmosphere, matching and conversion hypothesis to syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers. Since our experiments are currently still running, most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies.

We report two studies on the effect of implicitly versus explicitly conveying affirmation and denial problems about conditionals. Recently Evans and Handley (1999) and Schroyens et al. (1999b, 2000b) showed that implicit referencing elicits matching bias: Fewer determinate inferences are made, when the categorical premise (e.g., B) mismatches the conditional's referred clause (e.g., A). Also, the effect of implicit affirmation (B affirms not-A) is larger than the effect of implicit denial (B denies A). Schroyens et al. hypothesised that this interaction (...) is due to uncertainty in the case-wise affirmation of the contrast class of negated elements involved in implicit affirmations. In Experiment 1 we tested this hypothesis by manipulating the set size of the conditional clauses. The results confirm that binary sets, where the contrast class is a singleton, eliminate the differential effect of implicit affirmation and denial. With non-binary sets the interaction is not modulated by the scope of the contrast class (3, 5, 9 elements). Experiment 2 further investigated the role of contrast classes by using class inclusion to construct implicit affirmations (Mammal vs Mammal or Monkey) and implicit denial (No-Mammal vs Mammal or Monkey), in addition to the standard implicit problems mediated by contrast-class inclusion [(No-)Mammal/No-Mammal; Reptile; Snake). Findings indicate that class inclusion (Mammal/Monkey; Reptile/ Snake) only marginally affects performance, and is independent of the type of problem. This would suggest that the implicitness problem-type interaction is dependent on constructing contrast classes. However, the experiment failed to replicate the interaction, even on the subset of problems repeating the abstract letter/number format of Experiment 1. Moreover, with the natural binary set-sizes (vowels/consonants) the implicitness effect was eliminated entirely. (shrink)

Conditionals are central to inference. Before people can draw inferences about a natural language conditional, they must interpret its meaning. We investigated interpretation of uncertain conditionals using a probabilistic truth table task, focussing on (i) conditional event, (ii) material conditional, and (iii) conjunction interpretations. The order of object (shape) and feature (color) in each conditional's antecedent and consequent was varied between participants. The conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and took longer to process than conjunction (mean di (...) erence 500 ms). Material conditional responses were rare. The proportion of conditional event responses increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with 55% of participants showing a qualitative shift of interpretation. Shifts to the conditional event occurred later in the feature-object order than in the object-feature order. We discuss the results in terms of insight and suggest implications for theories of interpretation. (shrink)

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a six-sided die, and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upwards when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the (...) sides of each die. In two experiments (N1 = 66, N2 = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional’s antecedent and consequent: participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (shrink)

We investigate a subsystem of minimal logic related to D. Vakarelov’s logic \, using the framework of subminimal logics by A. Colacito, D. de Jongh and A. L. Vargas. In the course of it, the relationship between the two semantics in the respective frameworks is clarified. In addition, we introduce a sequent calculus for the investigated subsystem, and some proof-theoretic properties are established. Lastly, we formulate a new infinite class of subsystems of minimal logics.

Intuitionistic logic formalises the foundational ideas of L.E.J. Brouwer’s mathematical programme of intuitionism. It is one of the earliest non-classical logics, and the difference between classical and intuitionistic logic may be interpreted to lie in the law of the excluded middle, which asserts that either a proposition is true or its negation is true. This principle is deemed unacceptable from the constructive point of view, in whose understanding the law means that there is an effective procedure to determine the truth (...) of all propositions. This understanding of the distinction between the two logics supports the view that negation plays a vital role in the formulation of intuitionistic logic.Nonetheless, the formalisation of negation in intuitionistic logic has not been universally accepted, and many alternative accounts of negation have been proposed. Some seek to weaken or strengthen the negation, and others actively supporting negative inferences that are impossible with it.This thesis follows this tradition and investigates various aspects of negation in intuitionistic logic. Firstly, we look at a problem proposed by H. Ishihara, which asks how effectively one can conserve the deducibility of classical theorems into intuitionistic logic, by assuming atomic classes of non-constructive principles. The classes given in this section improve a previous class given by K. Ishii in two respects: (a) instead of a single class for the law of the excluded middle, two classes are given in terms of weaker principles, allowing a finer analysis and (b) the conservation now extends to a subsystem of intuitionistic logic called Glivenko’s logic. This section also discusses the extension of Ishihara’s problem to minimal logic.Secondly, we study the relationship between two frameworks for weak constructive negation, the approach of D. Vakarelov on one hand and the framework of subminimal negation by A. Colacito, D. de Jongh, and A. L. Vargas on the other hand. We capture a version of Vakarelov’s logic with the semantics of the latter framework, and clarify the relationship between the two semantics. This also provides proof-theoretic insights, which results in the formulation of a cut-free sequent calculus for the aforementioned system.Thirdly, we investigate the ways to unify the formalisations of some logics with contra-intuitionistic inferences. The enquiry concerns paraconsistent logics by R. Sylvan and A. B. Gordienko, as well as the logic of co-negation by G. Priest and of empirical negation by M. De and H. Omori. We take Sylvan’s system as basic, and formulate the frame conditions of the defining axioms of the other systems. The conditions are then used to obtain cut-free labelled sequent calculi for the systems.Finally, we consider L. Humberstone’s actuality operator for intuitionistic logic, which can be seen as the dualisation of a contra-intuitionistic negation. A compete axiomatisation of intuitionistic logic with actuality operator is given, and comparisons are made for some related operators.Abstract prepared by Satoru Niki.E-mail:Satoru.Niki@rub.de. (shrink)

Fan culture has grown immensely over the past few years. People are constantly looking up to celebrities and personalities as role models for their fashion, identity, and success. During the stage of adolescence, it is normal for teenagers to admire well- known people and form fan attachments as part of their identity formation. However, this admiration of a specific media figure can be associated with one's personality, cognitive processes, and psychological well-being. Thus, the current study aims to investigate the correlation (...) between celebrity admiration and the self-esteem of 238 Filipino male teenagers. The research instruments, namely Celebrity Attitude Scale (CAS) and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) were both utilized through google forms. Results have shown high scores on celebrity admiration and the normal range of self-esteem of the participants. Using Pearson’s r correlation coefficient, it was found that celebrity admiration and self-esteem of Filipino male teenagers have a significant relationship that exists in a negative direction. (shrink)

Amor Masovic, responsable de la commission de recherche des disparus en Bosnie-Herzégovine et ancien responsable de la commission pour l’échange des prisonniers pendant la guerre de 1992-1995, nous présente ensuite un tableau accablant des disparitions dans les guerres récentes en ex-Yougoslavie, et des pratiques pour faire en sorte que ceux-ci ne soient ni retrouvés ni, encore moins, identifiés (d’où des fosses communes de deux types : « primaires » – où les corps furent enterrés initialement – et « secondaires » (...) – où ces mêmes corps furent ré-enterrés, souvent démembrés, après avoir été déterrés pour être dispersés et moins aisés à repérer). 28 000 des 40 000 disparus ex-Yougoslaves relèvent du conflit en Bosnie et sont à 95 % des civils protégés par les conventions de Genève. Sur les 280 charniers identifiés la plupart se trouvaient à l’arrière et non sur le front et les disparitions sont datables à des périodes de non-combat. Le but de la commission est donc d’abord de retrouver et identifier les morts pour « faire savoir » et permettre le deuil (puisque la barbarisation qui a été exercée est double : contre les victimes et contre leurs familles qui ne peuvent « vivre » tant qu’elles n’ont pas de certitude). En outre, faute de disposition légale et d’une absence de droit spécifique des disparus personne ne peut être incriminé pour une disparition devant le TPIY où les « disparus » ne sont donc pas représentés. Amor Masovic tire quatre conclusions de son exposé : 1) la barbarie exprimée aujourd’hui est pour partie un résultat des manques de la justice à l’égard des crimes de guerre de la seconde guerre mondiale ; 2) la guerre contre les civils augmente en même temps qu’augmentent les dispositions internationales contre ces exactions qui restent donc purement formelles ; 3) en Bosnie, la barbarisation s’est exercée sur les corps des victimes de façon redoublée puisque l’anéantissement des preuves du crime fait que la mort n’est pas une vraie fin. D’où une forme particulière de barbarisation d’après-guerre ; 4) seul élément plus « positif » : en Bosnie des échanges de prisonniers eurent lieu pendant la guerre sans attendre la fin du conflit ce qui est rarissime et va au-delà des exigences posées par les conventions de Genève en matière de libération des prisonniers. (shrink)

"Le religieux est-il un objet de recherche comme les autres? Exige-t-il une certaine sensibilité de la part du chercheur ou de la chercheuse? Issus de disciplines diverses, les auteurs et auteures se prononcent sur les distinctions et les convergences entraînées par la mise en tension de la neutralité et de l'engagement dans l'étude du religieux. Comprise superficiellement, cette opposition peut paraître factice : l'engagement n'est pas nécessairement religieux, car la vérité comprend aussi un engagement, et la neutralité n'est pas nécessairement (...) objective, car il y a des neutralités engagées. Qui prend au sérieux cette question n'a pas d'autres choix que d'éviter les dichotomies simplistes et d'aborder de front ce qui unit et différencie plus fondamentalement les relations entre savoir et croire. En posant la relation « neutralité ou engagement » sous forme interrogative, cet ouvrage souhaite traiter des enjeux liés au positionnement épistémologique des chercheurs et des chercheuses ainsi que de la responsabilité scientifique envers le religieux."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Building on Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love this book takes up the "question of the Other" and argues that through the interpretive activities of the amorous imagination lovers come to experience one another as the Beloved.

Ovid begins his overtly programmatic Amores 2.1 with the claim that Cupid, who had previously interfered with the poet's attempt to write an epic , has once again ordered him to reject epic subjects and to compose a book of decadent love-elegies instead. Faced with this new task, the poet dutifully proceeds to warn that his elegiac verses are not suitable for the prudish but hopes that they will be read by lovers. Among the prospective readers are young men who, (...) like Ovid himself, have been shot by Cupid's arrow. (shrink)

Within the increasingly complex picture which has emerged in recent years of the manuscript tradition of Ovid's Amores the relationship of the two earliest MSS appears to remain firm: cod. P or Puteaneus of the 9th or early 10th century, which begins at Am. 1.2.51, was copied, probably directly, from the second half of the 9th-century cod. R or Regius , whose first half now ends at Am. 1.2.50. This view, which originates in S. Tafel's dissertation of 1910 and lies (...) behind the stemma constructed by E. J. Kenney for his OCT edition of 1961 , has come to be taken by Ovidian scholars to be the truth. My purpose in this first section is to show that this idea is unlikely to be the truth and, in the form in which it has most strongly been put forward, cannot be the truth. In the second section consequences for the manuscript tradition as a whole are explored. First we shall need some details. P, the slightly later manuscript, consists in all of 99 folia, of which 1–54 contain most, but not all, of the Heroides — not all, because they are in a lacunose state, a point to which we shall return in greater detail later. Foll. 55–6 are blank sheets of paper, not parchment, clearly inserted at a much later date during rebinding. (shrink)

Within the increasingly complex picture which has emerged in recent years of the manuscript tradition of Ovid's Amores the relationship of the two earliest MSS appears to remain firm: cod. P or Puteaneus of the 9th or early 10th century, which begins at Am. 1.2.51, was copied, probably directly, from the second half of the 9th-century cod. R or Regius, whose first half now ends at Am. 1.2.50. This view, which originates in S. Tafel's dissertation of 1910 and lies behind (...) the stemma constructed by E. J. Kenney for his OCT edition of 1961, has come to be taken by Ovidian scholars to be the truth. My purpose in this first section is to show that this idea is unlikely to be the truth and, in the form in which it has most strongly been put forward, cannot be the truth. In the second section consequences for the manuscript tradition as a whole are explored. First we shall need some details. P, the slightly later manuscript, consists in all of 99 folia, of which 1–54 contain most, but not all, of the Heroides — not all, because they are in a lacunose state, a point to which we shall return in greater detail later. Foll. 55–6 are blank sheets of paper, not parchment, clearly inserted at a much later date during rebinding. (shrink)

Sin orden moral no puede darse desarrollo de la civilización o verdadero progreso. Ahora bien, el orden moral supone la existencia de un valor moral absoluto que no puede ser otro que el amor que Dios se tiene a sí mismo. La ética balmesiana es una ética del amor: la corrección moral de los actos humanos viene definida por su fidelidad al amor y el cumplimiento del deber. Se trata de una ética profundamente humanista que trata de evitar cualquier sombra (...) de egoísmo y utilitarismo. (shrink)

Recently Mr. E. Courtney has reopened discussion on the authenticity of the last six Heroides, a subject which had almost universally been accepted as settled by scholars.2 He also briefly discussed the ninth epistle and examined certain grounds for doubting whether it is rightly included in the Ovidian canon. In this he is following Karl Lachmann, who was disposed to doubt the authenticity not only of the last six but also of those of the remainder which are not mentioned in (...) Ovid's catalogue of the epistles given at Amores 2. 18 f.3 This despoliation of the canon has not generally found favour since Lachmann, and in the case of Heroides 9 the editors and other scholars working on the poems 4 have without exception regarded the poem as a genuine specimen of Ovid's work. (shrink)

Recently Mr. E. Courtney has reopened discussion on the authenticity of the last six Heroides, a subject which had almost universally been accepted as settled by scholars.2 He also briefly discussed the ninth epistle and examined certain grounds for doubting whether it is rightly included in the Ovidian canon. In this he is following Karl Lachmann, who was disposed to doubt the authenticity not only of the last six but also of those of the remainder which are not mentioned in (...) Ovid's catalogue of the epistles given at Amores 2. 18 f.3 This despoliation of the canon has not generally found favour since Lachmann, and in the case of Heroides 9 the editors and other scholars working on the poems 4 have without exception regarded the poem as a genuine specimen of Ovid's work. (shrink)